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Abstract:
The  thesis  argues  that  there  is  a  pressure  on  the  authorship  concept  since  the
emergence of collections of facts, anthologies, and adaptations of pre-existing works.
These works were the reason that Judges offered various interpretations to authorship
and  originality,  as  some  Judges  lessened  the  requirement  of  originality  to  obtain
copyrightability for these works and some raised it.  This led to make the protection
granted  by  copyright  law  to  intellectual  works  vague  and  uncertain.  This  became
apparent  in  conflicts  in  courts  decisions  on  copyright  subsistence  in  works.  This
subsequently  led  to  confusion  around  the  criteria  of  interpretation  that  should  be
adopted and the theory or justification that copyright law is founded upon. 
The thesis argues that this vagueness and uncertainty is related not to the authorship
concept  but  to  the  failure  of  law to  adapt  to  two  separate  natures  of  works,  one
including  authorial,  mental  and  personal  contribution  and  the  other  only  including
manually skilful contribution. Those two kinds cannot be subject to same principles or
justifications of protection. The inexistence of such differentiation in doctrine, judiciary
and  legislation  led  to  the  distortion  of  authorship  and  originality  concepts  in  the
attempts to reduce their interpretation to suit those works that actually miss authorial
contribution.  Alternatively,  whole  attention  was  paid  to  granting  ownership  to  right
holders of these works, which led to the prevalence of the ownership concept as being
a necessity for the marketability of cultural works over the authorship concept.
 The thesis  finds  that  this  difference in  nature  can  be  uncovered  by  settling  on  a
differentiation between two kinds of skills that are used in creating works: the mental
skills,  which are authorial  skills,  on the one side,  and manual  skills,  which are the
collecting,  combining,  performing or  executing  skills,  on  the other.  Accordingly, this
thesis proposes a categorisation of works, that of ‘high, low and non-authorship’ works,
which relies on the nature of the works and elements of authorship in the work. The
thesis finds that every category of works needs a separate criterion that can suit its
nature and constituent authorship elements; also, the protection needs to be graded
depending on the level of authorship in the work. This thesis suggests that such a legal
proposition be implemented digitally in what it calls the ‘Digital Cultural National Gate’,
which  decides  the  category  the  work  should  belong  to  and  the  correspondent
protection, and that through some questionnaires on the work the authorship elements
can be recognised.
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1 Chapter One:  
The Research Argument and Methodology 
1.1 The Thesis Argument: 
This thesis argues that intangible works are not necessarily intellectual works. The 
skills and capabilities used to create works vary between mental ones and manual 
ones. Some works require only mental effort, others only manual effort; others require 
both, as will be detailed in the next paragraphs. The thesis argues that authorship is, in 
general, a mental process that requires absorbing information and processing it in the 
mind and producing a product that conveys thoughts or sensations to the audience. 
This depends on Locke’s ‘mind processing’ theory, since he requires that the author 
should do “thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing” 1 in order for his 
work to be a work of intellect, otherwise, the use of only the senses will produce a work 
of a lesser grade, 2 like, the collections of facts even if it was claimed that the selection 
and arrangement is original. 
This discussion of which works are reflective of mind, and which are a product of 
manual effort, is needed at a time when copyright law has been able to protect the 
tables of trains and the receipts of restaurants and give them the same protection that 
the ‘Mona Lisa’3 and ‘Ulysses’,4 ‘Odyssey’5 or the ‘Thinker’ statue6 can have. The 
distinction between personal and mental authorial contribution, on one side, and 
manual or mechanical efforts on the other, is thought by this thesis to need more focus 
in modern times. The inexistence of such distinction has led to the distortion of 
copyright law and its orthodox concepts of authorship and originality. As confirmed by 
the Court in National Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph,7 “[l]ittle by little 
copyright has been extended to the literature of commerce, so that it now includes 
books that the old guild of authors would have disdained; catalogues, mathematical 
tables, statistics, designs, guide-books, directories, and other works of similar 
character. Nothing, it would seem, evincing, in its makeup, that there has been 
                                                          
1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700). p. 88 
2 Ibid. p. 89 
3 ‘Mona Lisa’ is a half-length portrait of a woman by the Italian artist Leonardo da Vinci. 
4 ‘Ulysses’ is a novel written by James Joyce and is considered one of the most important works of 
modernist literature, James Joyce, 'Ulysses. 1922', Ed. Hans Walter Gabler. New York: Vintage,  (1986). 
5 An epic poem written by Homer. 
6 It is a bronze sculpture created by Auguste Rodin to represent philosophy. 
7 National Telegraph News Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1902, 119 F. 294, Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
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underneath it, in some substantial way, the mind of a creator or originator, is now 
excluded.”8 [Underlining added] 
The thesis argues that collecting and combining facts or precedent works, or changing 
the physical form of the work are non-authorship processes, as these works require 
manual work not mental work, they are created through following several steps that 
anybody without any capabilities can do, even machines or computers can do such 
types of work. This is why Laddie et al. have described directories thus: “no imagination 
is required to produce these and no skill beyond knowing how to read and write.”9 The 
process of creating factual works is confined to collecting information in order to 
present them as a dispersed group of information to the audience, though this type of 
works is important to society, but the creators of factual works cannot be authors; they 
may be investors or workers in collection, or performers of executive steps, but not 
authors of creative works, as “[r]ecognizing them directly as ‘authors’ will strengthen 
their rights.”10 And this causes distortion to authorship and copyright law in general as 
will be explained. Examples of those works are: maps, databases, train timetables, or 
matches, collections of pictures, etc.  
Creating an intellectual work requires an effort of mind or intellect, wherein the work is 
considered a way of communication that is used by the author to convey his thoughts 
or sensations to the audience. Hegel calls the work of art -for instance- “the portrayal of 
thought in an external medium”.11 Examples of authorship works are novels, musical 
works, artistic works, and dramatic works that convey to the audience thoughts or 
sensations that belong to the author. However, if the work reworks the thoughts and 
detailed ideas of an antecedent work, like adaptations of works, they should not be in 
the same ‘selection and arrangement’. The thesis argues that the ‘selection and 
arrangement’ of the raw material of authorship – the words, lines and common pieces 
of information - is the process that proves whether there is authorship in the work or 
not. The difference in ‘selection and arrangement’ between the created work and 
antecedent works is an evidence that the author is expressing his own thoughts and 
sensations.  
Accordingly, it is contended that the factual works are ‘non-authorship’ or ‘utilitarian 
works’, and other works that have included mental processes are ‘authorship works’. 
                                                          
8 Ibid. at 297, as the Court held that ticker tapes listing telegraph transmissions of market quotations, 
sports scores, and race results are not copyrightable. 
9 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2 vols. 
(Fourth edn., 1: LexisNexis, 2011). at 3.69. 
10 Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, 'Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship', Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment. Law Journal, 25 (2008). p. 1061. 
11 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. TM Knox (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1952). p. 54 
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These should be separated into two groups and each group should have its own 
criteria for protection, justification for protection and specific level of protection. 
Furthermore, authorship works should be divided into high and low authorship works 
depending on the level of authorial contribution done and using the ‘selection and 
arrangement’ criterion. As Tarolli argued, “[t]he copyright system, which only protects 
works demonstrating a subjective authorial presence, or high amounts of creative 
authorship, neither consistently serves copyright's original purposes nor adequately 
protects many utilitarian works that facilitate the dissemination of valuable information. 
Rather than continuing to require utilitarian works to evidence authorial personality, 
copyright law would better fulfil its purposes with the adoption of a binary system of 
protection.” 12 However, no-one has proposed such a distinction in copyright law in a 
comprehensive way. 
The above argument is the ultimate aim of the discussion throughout this thesis. 
However, the initiator of this discussion is the desire to face the conflict in copyright 
decisions in the UK and the US judiciary regarding copyright subsistence in works, the 
interpretation of originality, and the justification of copyright law protection, especially 
regarding the collections of facts, “there is a split of authority among the United States 
courts of appeals as to the proper rationale for extending copyright protection to 
compilations”.13 Such conflict is caused by the desire to apply the copyright law’s 
orthodox values of authorship and originality that are based on personality to works 
that are devoid of personal and mental authorship. Such conflict has continued for over 
three hundred years and has been aided by advocators of authorship, on one side, and 
advocators of ‘the death of the author’,14 on the other. The thesis argues that it is the 
first group that will win at the end, depending on theoretical justification, and judicial 
and legal indicators. 
                                                          
12 Stephen P. Tarolli, 'Comment, the Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 1639 (1997).p. 1664 
13 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', 
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 23 (1989). p. 348, Haungs explains further that “[o]ne line of 
cases, the ‘originality standard’ cases, bases copyright protection upon the compilation’s orig inality in its 
selection and arrangement of material. A contrary line of authority, the ‘industrious collection’ standard 
cases, followed by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, grounds protection for compilations in the compiler’s 
‘industrious collection’ - the labor or effort expended in creating the compilation.” See, ibid. p. 348 
14 A doctrine initiated by Roland Barthes, in his work Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', Image, 
Music, Text (Fontana Press, 1977)., and by Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', in Donald F. Bouchard 
(ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Cornell University Press, 
1980). and which has been inserted into law discussions, especially by Martha Woodmansee in her 
articles Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of The'author'', Eighteenth Century Studies,  (1984). And M. Woodmansee, 'On the Author 
Effect: Recovering Collectivity', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 (1991)., and by P. Jaszi in 
his article, Peter Jaszi, 'On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity', ibid. ( For 
more detailed discussion see Chapter 4. And the book, Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The 
Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Duke University Press Books, 
1994). 
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It is argued that UK and US copyright laws are not consistent with the different natures 
of the works they protect. The originality criterion used to decide on the copyrightability 
of works is not suitable for application to all works that have different constituent 
elements; this expresses a deeper differentiation in the theories and concepts behind 
this criterion that cannot be applied to different natures.  
Besides, Judges over-concentrate on originality to the detriment of authorship in order 
to reach a decision on ownership and the protection of copyright law. This thesis 
argues that the authorship concept has been disregarded in modern copyright law in 
the UK and the US in favour of focusing on the interpretation of the ‘originality’ 
condition as a threshold for copyright protection, not as a concept with a theoretical 
foundation and historical development that is linked to authorship. It is insisted upon in 
this thesis that originality concept should reflect the status of the authorial contribution. 
This manner reflects the desire to protect works by courts even to the detriment of the 
legal theory of copyright law. This has resulted in the elevation of the ownership 
doctrine and the marginalization of authorship, hence the thesis’s title: ‘Ownership and 
Authorship in Copyright Law’.15  
It has been explored that at a specific historical stage, the courts have mixed two 
issues, first, between work that is an intellectual work and others that are just intangible 
but devoid of any intellect’s effort; and, secondly between whether the aim of copyright 
law is to protect the products of mind or the products of effort and investment. The lack 
of rapid interaction by the law with the appearance of intangible but not intellectual 
works and separating them from other intellectual works has forced Judges to use the 
contemporary principles of copyright law, which is entangled with authorship doctrine,16 
to protect emerging non-intellectual works, and the equality between them through 
using a unified originality criterion. It is argued that this step was the reason for the 
distortion of the authorship doctrine and then the confusion within copyright law 
appeared in judicial decisions. This all helped to constitute the chaotic status of courts’ 
decisions.17 This thesis’s study of authorship and originality is therefore crucial at this 
stage to help copyright law achieve some stability and certainty.  
Such uncertainty is caused by non-discrimination between diverse intellectual works 
when interpreting the originality criterion that is required by copyright law. It is believed 
that the ‘one size fits all’ criteria is an out-dated one, as created works are varied in 
                                                          
15 The normal order of the two concepts in copyright law studies is authorship and then ownership, 
according to the rule that the ownership is approved to the person who gains the author title.  
16 Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law 
and Literature, supra note 14, p. 2-3 
17 Explained in Chapter Two 
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nature and may not fit with orthodox literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works’ 
categorisation, principally due to the lack of authorial contribution.  
In order to guarantee the smooth application of the proposed theoretical distinction of 
works in practice the thesis proposes that this distinction be applied through an online 
platform titled ‘Digital Cultural National Gate’ (DCNG). According to the DCNG the 
author has to provide information through a questionnaire that enquires about the 
nature of his work and elements of authorship included if any. Using the proposed 
categorisation of works the author will be given a certificate that indicates the category 
his work belongs to and the level of protection it is qualified to. Furthermore, an 
appeals committee should be also existent in the copyright or intellectual property 
office in the country.  
The DCNG keeps pace with the recent proposition by The Advisory Group appointed 
by The Civil Justice Council (CJC),18 as it proposed an online courts system called 
‘Online Dispute Resolution’ (ODR) for small litigations.19 Through this system the case 
will pass through three tiers; the ‘Online Evaluation’, which will help users to “to 
evaluate their problems, that is, to categorize their difficulties.”20 There is then a second 
tier ‘Online Facilitation’ and a third called ‘Online Judges’, and in these last two tiers 
natural persons will intervene to help in settling cases. The  proposed DCNG and the 
theoretical categorisation which it will apply can be considered an earlier step to the 
emergence of conflicts and resorting to the proposed ODR, but following its own digital 
nature. Yet, the DCNG is thought to be the development that not copyright law 
theoretically and practically only needs but also that comply with the digitalization in 
recent times of laws and judiciary. 
This proposed categorisation and its digital implementation have several benefits.  
Firstly, Judges will have a classification system that relies on the elements that every 
work includes.  The Judge’s mission will be confined, although he will still have some 
discretion in the final judgment, in allocating the work to a suitable category according 
to its nature and authorship elements, and granting the corresponding protection of this 
category.  Accordingly, the existence of such a system will help to reduce the conflict in 
copyright subsistence decisions to a large extent.  Secondly, this proposition will 
preserve the authorship and originality values without collapsing with the 
commodification or marketability of cultural works, as the thesis proposes that non-
                                                          
18 Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group، Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims، 
February 2015، Civil Justice Council،  
19 Graham Ross, 'Odr Advisory Group in the Uk Recommends Online Court', last accessed 19 February 
2015. 
20 Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group، Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims، 
February 201518, p. 19  
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authorship works will obtain protection under a separate sui generis system that is 
devoid of authorship and originality concepts.   
Position of Authorship in Copyright Law:  
The reason for such pressure on authorship is that it is the gateway that right-holders 
must pass through to reach ownership, according to the general rule in copyright law 
‘the author of a work shall be the first owner’21. Such a system has made authorship 
likely to be modelled, reformed, manipulated and eventually distorted by Judges, 
scholars and lawyers in order to reach the desired ownership, driven by the interests of 
the copyright-holders, and the desire to provide protection for their investments. Such 
distortion happens through repurposing authorship in works that lack any authorship 
process, or by using a pretext to prove, wrongly, the existence of this authorship in 
works that are already devoid of any authorial contribution. 
It is suggested that copyright and authorship have mutual influences on each other; the 
justifications for copyright affect authorship. Likewise, authorship and originality 
interpretations by courts and scholars affect the scope of copyright, both in theory and 
in practice. Authorship is the “The most central, and certainly the most resonant, of the 
foundational concepts associated with Anglo-American copyright doctrine,”22 and this 
centrality is “an uncritically accepted notion”23. Authorship can be defined as that 
structure that “generates products of special social value, entitling the practitioners (the 
authors) to unique rewards”. 24 
1.2 Development of originality interpretation: 
This section will put an initial investigation of the justification of copyright protection that 
courts have taken in consideration in the UK and the US, starting from the early 
decisions and the development happened. As will be shown, copyright law principles 
have been followed in a straight way in earlier cases and what protected was the 
mental contribution by the author, however, this attitude has changed, and the pressure 
by factual works’ right holders is the reason, as will be clarified below. This fact will be 
detailed and discussed in many places throughout this thesis.25 
                                                          
21 This was initially stated in the British Copyright Act 1911, “subject to the provisions of this act, the author 
of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein.” See, 'An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law 
Relating to Copyright', Copyright Act, 1911 (Great Britain, 1911)., s. 5. (1) 
22 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', Duke Law Journal,  
(1991a). p. 455 
23 Ibid. p. 466 
24 Ibid. p. 466 
25 For detailed discussion on the differentiation between authorship and non-authorship works see chapter 
6 and 7. 
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Before the statute of Anne: 
Before any copyright law courts protected works that depended on mental work. This 
was the case, for instance, under the Statute of 1662 concerning printing.26 The Court 
of The Company of Stationers v. Seymour27 mentioned some references that may be 
considered the origin of originality requirement in copyright law thereafter. The Court 
questioned what sort of books might be granted a licence for printing, “the question 
here is not, whether the King may, by law, grant the sole printing of all books; but of 
any, and of what sort of books?”28 The idea that the subsequent works should not have 
the same contents as antecedent works, was stable at that time. 29 The Court also 
talked about the additions to a book which could not guarantee the granting of a license 
to print if they were ‘inconsiderable', “[t]hose additions of prognostications and other 
things that are common in almanacks, do not alter the case; no more than if a man 
should claim a property in another man's copy, by reason of some inconsiderable 
additions of his own.” 30 
This case confirms that works protected before the Statute of Anne31 had to be ‘works 
of mind’, and this is apparent through a glance at a statement by the Court in the same 
case: “men had some other way to publish their thoughts.”32[Underlining added]. So the 
stake was the ‘thought’ not ‘labour’ in creating and protecting works, as happened 
afterwards. This vision continued after the statue of Anne.  
After the Statute of Anne: 
When the Statute of Anne was enacted and authorship recognised, the author’s 
position was reinforced, as the Courts continued to protect works that depended on the 
author’s mental contribution. 
In the Carnan v. Bowles case33, for instance, it was apparent that the Court was 
adopting ‘mental effort’ as a condition for considering the work original, and originality 
was used as an explicit condition for copyrightability. This was evident from the court 
reliance on the argument of Locke, in his book ‘The essay on human understanding’ to 
justify that works that lack mental processes are less work, as their creators depend on 
outer senses not inner senses,34 -“it is not an operation of the mind, like the Essay on 
                                                          
26 'Licensing Act (Statute Concerning Printing)', 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33 (a) (England, 1662). 
27 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 1677, 29 CAR. 2,  
28 Ibid. at 257 
29 Ibid. at 257 
30 Ibid. at 258 
31 'Statute of Anne', 8 Anne, c. 19 (England, 1710). 
32 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 29 CAR. 2, supra note  27, at 258 
33 Carnan V. Bowles, 1786, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 283, Court of Chancery 
34 For a detailed discussion of Locke’s argument, see Chapter 6 
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Human Understanding; it lies in medio.”35- [Underlining added]. Lord Thurlow confirmed 
that the question of copyright of the book of roads depends “much upon the nature of 
them”, 36  and he finds that these works “every man with eyes can trace it; and the 
whole merit depends upon the accuracy of the observation: every description will 
therefore be in a great measure original. If this be so, every edition will be a new 
work.”37 This statement contains a great deal of advancement in the analysis of the 
nature of works in terms of kind of contribution involved whether it is authorial 
contribution or not. Lord Thurlow’s argument in the eighteenth century presents a view 
that this thesis finds suitable to end the conflict in copyright subsistence decisions in 
the twenty-first century. 
We should also note that the Court of Chancery‘s concern was about the work itself (a 
map), not the preparatory steps, or the labour expended in creating the work. 38 Also it 
refused to consider the next work protectable as it included the same works as the first 
one and there was no authorial addition. “If the improvements are mere additions of 
what was imperfect, they are only part of the original work; if they are surveys of 
different roads, they constitute a new work.” 39 Not just that, but the Court approved the 
Master’s opinion that originality lies not in the map itself, but in the addition of the 
creator if he has provided an index or ‘ready method’ of finding a place in the map. “It is 
an extremely difficult thing to establish identity in a map, or a mere list of distances: but 
there may be originality in casting an index, or pointing out a ready method of finding a 
place in a map.”40 [Underlining added]  
It is worth noting that after a long period of confusion about originality in factual works, 
like maps, and resorting to skill and labour in the UK, the EC database directive41 used 
the criterion applied in this case “a ready method of finding a place in a map”42. As the 
database directive required originality in a methodical means of arrangement: 
“’database’ shall mean … arranged in a systematic or methodical way”43 regardless of 
                                                          
35 Carnan V. Bowles, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 283, supra note 33, at 83 
36 Ibid. at 83 
37 Ibid. at 83 
38 Ibid. at 83 
39 Ibid. at 83 
40 Ibid. at 84 it is worth noting here how originality was used in the cases after the Statute of Anne, and is 
not a result of the romanticism doctrine, as argued, and this will be discussed later, see, Chapter Five 
41 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', 96/9/EC 
(EU, 1996). 
42 Carnan V. Bowles, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 283, supra note 33 at 84 
43 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', supra 
note 41 Recital 21. See in interpreting the meaning of ‘systematic or methodical way’ Hugh Laddie, Peter 
Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 9, p. 1273 at 32.22 as 
Laddie et.al. argued that “what is required is that the collection should be contained in a fixed base and 
include technical means such as electronic, electromagnetic … as an index … to allow the retrieval of any 
independent material ... However,, physical storage in an organized way is not necessary.” See Ibid at 
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the arrangement of data in the database itself, as confirmed in the directive “it is not 
necessary for those materials to have been physically stored in an organized 
manner.”44 
This thesis finds a reflectance of its argument in Lord Chancellor Thurlow’s statement 
that “the question will be, whether the author has exhibited any new and distinct idea in 
the exposition of them”. 45 The same argument was confirmed in the Cary v. Faden 
case,46 wherein the subject matter was maps of ‘Great Britain’ and the Court of 
Chancery decided that the work can be original from the view of the plan and design 
used, without looking to the manual work the plaintiff has done, “the general plan or 
design of the Plaintiff's work is not new or original.”47  
However, in the Sayre v. Moore case48, we find that Lord Mansfield expected that a 
confusion might happen between the two justifications of copyright protection: the 
protection of ingenuity, on one hand, and the protection of investments and labour, on 
the other, as Lord Mansfield confirmed “[w]e must take care to guard against two 
extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time 
for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the 
reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of 
improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.”49 However, according to his 
reference to the Carnan v. Bowles case Lord Mansfield refused to consider charts as 
works of authorship as “charts […] not to be within the Statute [of Anne]”. 50 This 
behaviour although prevail authorship and mentality values over manual or superficial 
alterations, compilations of facts are important products for the public and should get 
some kind of protection, and that which this thesis’s proposition will do alongside 
prevailing authorship concept also. 
The change to expense and labour as a criterion for protection: 
By the beginning of the 1800s many courts began to rely on the expenditure of labour 
and time by the creator to prove the copyrightability of the work, and they applied that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
32.22, Laddie et. al. cited Fixtures Marketing Ltd. V. Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou 
(Opap), 2005, C–444/02 - E.C.D.R. 3, Court of Justice of the European Communitiesat. at 30 
44 Recital 21 of the 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Databases', supra note 41 
45 Carnan V. Bowles, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 283, supra note 33, at 85 
46 Cary V. Faden, 1799, 5 Ves. Jr. 24, Court of Chancery 
47 Ibid. at 25 
48 Sayre V. Moore, 1785, 102 E.R. 139; 1 East's 361, Court of King's Bench  
49 Referred to in Bill Morrow, 'Originality: Primary, Initial, First', Alternative Law Journal, 20 (1995). p. 164 
as a registration of this case was not found. 
50 Carnan V. Bowles, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 283, supra note 33, at 84 
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to all works. For instance, in Matthewson v. Stockdale 51 it was stated -regarding a 
calendar and directory- that “if a man, … has by considerable expence and labour 
procured with correctness all the names and appointments …, he has a copyright in 
that individual work.”52 [Underlining added] 
Since this time, the terminology of labour, time and expense in creating works were 
used to justify the conferral of copyright protection to factual works, and the mental 
work or personal addition terminology was ignored. For instance, in Longman v. 
Winchester 53 it was stated that the defendant’s work included “great many additions 
and corrections,… various alterations of lines, and differences of names, … [that] were 
made by the Defendants at great labour and expense”54 and instead of relying on the 
originality of ‘mental effort’ the court used the expression “it is the fair fruit of original 
labour.”55[Underlining added] 
Also, in Morris v. Ashbee 56 although the court briefly referred to that the work was “not 
an original design of Plaintiff,” 57 it stated that the labour and expense are the important 
elements,58 and the term ‘original’ was not used again in the case. The Court confirmed 
that ‘independent labour and expense’ is sufficient to grant copyright protection: “no 
one has a right to take the results of the labour and expense incurred by another for the 
purposes of a rival publication, and thereby save himself the expense and labour of 
working out and arriving at these results by some independent road.”59 [Underlining 
added] 
This direction has continued until recently, e.g., in Ladbroke v. William Hill, 60 Lord 
Hodson cited, with approval, the statement of Sir Charles Hall, V.C., in the case of 
Hogg v. Scott,61 when he confirmed “[t]he true principle in all these cases is, that the 
Defendant is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which the Plaintiff has 
been at for the purpose of producing his work—that is, in fact, merely to take away the 
result of another man's labour, or, in other words, his property.”62 This focus on the 
person’s labour without investigating the mental contribution whether it was 
                                                          
51 Matthewson V. Stockdale, 1806, 12 Vesey Junior 270; 33 E.R. 103, Court of Chancery 
52 Ibid. at 105 
53 Longman V. Winchester, 1809, 16 Vesey Junior 269; 33 E.R. 987, Ct of Chancery 
54 Ibid. at 269. 
55 Ibid. at 272. 
56 Morris V. Ashbee, 1868, L.R. 7 Eq. 34, Giffard, V. C. 
57 Ibid. at 36. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. at 40. 
60 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1964, 1 W.L.R. 273, House of Lords 
61 Hogg V. Scott, 1874, H. 207., L.R. 18 Eq. 444,  
62 Ibid.at 458 cited in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 273, supra note 60, 
at 287 
 
 
19 
appropriated or not is what this thesis criticise and argues that it is the main reason for 
the conflict in cases, as will be clarified below.63 
In Ravenscroft v. Herbert 64 Brightman J. cited with approval the Harman Pictures v. 
Osborne65 case, which in turn cited Jarrold v. Houlston66 for this statement: “another 
person may originate another work in the same general form, provided he does so from 
his own resources and makes the work he so originates a work of his own by his own 
labour and industry bestowed upon it.”67 This again confirms the reliance of courts in 
1800s and 1900s on the labour and industry in protecting intellectual works. 
At the same time, in the US, earlier cases were influenced by the Statute of Anne and 
the theories of personality and mental authorship. Mental addition was something that 
was essential in order to grant copyright protection, though the condition differed 
afterwards as happened also in UK. For instance, in Baker v. Selden 68 the court 
stated: “[a]lthough great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and 
enterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being 
rewarded in this way … The title of the Act of Congress is, ‘for the encouragement of 
learning,’ and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected 
with learning and the sciences...”69 [Underlining added] This shows that early copyright 
decisions in the UK and even in the US were adopting mental contribution and refusing 
labour and industry justifications in protecting works, but the situation changed after 
that due to the pressure of works of that industry nature. 
This practice was confirmed also in the early US case of Trade-Mark Cases. v. 
Steffens70 which stated that ‘originality’ is required and it is construed to mean mental 
and authorial contribution: “originality is required. And while the word writings may be 
liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, 
&c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. 
The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in 
the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.”71 [Underlining added] However, 
cases in the 1900s in US reflects a tendency to adopt the ‘labour’ whether it is manual 
or mental in protecting works, as will be clarified in next paragraphs. 
                                                          
63 See below sections in this chapter, and see especially chapter 7 for the detailed differentiation between 
natures of works. 
64 Ravenscroft V. Herbert, 1980, R.P.C. 193, The High Court of Justice - Chancery Division 
65 Harman Pictures V. Osborne, 1967, 1 W.L.R. 723, Chancery Division 
66 Jarrold V. Houlston, 1857, 69 E.R. 1294,  
67 Ibid. at 708. 
68 Baker V. Selden, 1879, 101 U.S. 99, WL 16689, Supreme Court of the United States 
69 Ibid. at 105 
70 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 1879, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, 
Supreme Court of the United States 
71 Ibid. at 94 
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Mutual influence between the UK and the US case law and scholarship: 
Since the emergence of the first US Copyright Act the mutual influence between the 
UK and the US has been evident. Judge Miller in the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony case72 confirmed that the framers of the US Constitution were affected by the 
Statute of Anne at the time of the enactment of the US Constitution, and that they 
“understand the nature of copyright and the objects to which it was commonly applied, 
for copyright, as the exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or 
intellect, [that] existed in England at that time.”73 [Underlining added]. 
It appears from the UK case of Ravenscroft v. Herbert74 also the mutual influence 
between UK and the US courts, as Brightman J. cited the US Oxford Book Co. v. 
College Entrance Book Co. case75, in distinguishing between the copyrighted parts and 
the non-copyrighted parts in the debated work. 76 Even recently, the Eleventh Circuit of 
the US Court of Appeal in the case of Suntrust bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.77 has 
relied on the fact that Statute of Anne came to “encourage creativity and ensure that 
the public would have free access to information” 78 in order to support its argument. 
And it confirmed that “[c]ongress directly transferred the principles from the Statute of 
Anne into the copyright law of the United States in 1783 … then in 1790, with the 
passage of the first American federal copyright statute”.79 
Accordingly, this thesis tends to explain the situation of legislation and judiciary in the 
UK and the US in a parallel manner, and it will appear that both are taking the same 
approach in developing, and the thesis’s proposition is believed to be applied in both 
jurisdictions. 
Confusion between personal justification and financial justification: 
It is argued that in the UK and the US the nature of factual works (Databases, maps, 
charts, etc.) which is different from other literary and artistic works led to conflicting 
interpretations of the originality requirement in case law, as will be elaborated in 
                                                          
72 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States 
73 Ibid. at 281 
74 Ravenscroft V. Herbert, R.P.C. 193, supra note 64. 
75 Oxford Book Co. V. College Entrance Book Co. , 1938, 98 Fed. Rep. 688 Second circuit, United States 
Court of Appeal 
76 Ibid. at 691 
77 Suntrust Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001, 268 F.3d 1257, United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit. 
78 Ibid. at 1260 
79 Ibid. at 1261 
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second Chapter. The common factor that causes this conflict is the confusion of courts 
between the personal and mental justifications that copyright law assumes on one side 
and the investment and labour justifications that factual works’ nature assume on the 
other side. 80  
Judges always express their confusion about the nature of compilations of facts. As it is 
noticed that they argue that compilation works are neither literature nor art, and cannot 
be original, however, they grant them copyright protection under the pressure of the 
inexistence of other legislation that protects them; otherwise they will not be protected. 
For instance, Lord Evershed in Ladbroke v. William Hill 81 case confirmed: “[t]rue it is 
that no question of literary taste or quality is involved that would give to the coupon the 
award of literature as normally understood. But, having regard to the introduction of a 
compilation into the definition, that clearly cannot be a decisive factor, since otherwise 
such things as lists or catalogues could never have been held to have been properly 
subject to copyright.”82 Accordingly, he used the ‘skill, labour and Judgement’ criteria to 
allow the protection of compilation works under copyright law. Ginsburg confirmed this 
thesis’s argument: “even when courts do in fact protect a compilation's commercial 
value, they express disconcertion at the incongruence between the result and standard 
copyright rationales.”83 
Accordingly, the thesis criticises the inclusion of compilation works (in US law), or 
databases (in UK law), under the protection of Copyright Law, using the same criteria 
used for other literary and artistic works, due to the confusion around the nature of 
factual works. As this confusion, which will be detailed later,84 has caused distortion of 
the authorship doctrine and originality in general, instead they should be separated 
under a sui generis system. 
The situation in international provisions:  
The Berne Convention, 85 TRIPS agreement, 86 WIPO Copyright Treaty,87 the Computer 
Software EC Directive, 88EC Directive on Databases,89 and the EU Directive on the 
                                                          
80 Due to determining the orientation of the law towards these kinds of works was wholly left to judges, so 
they relied on their own interpretation or understanding, or even on personal preference in choosing 
between both routes, whether preserving the authorship values and personalisation requirements and then 
raising the threshold of copyright protection, or in lessening or ignoring any orthodox values in copyright 
theory, or even through twisting them to adapt to the new works to allow for their protection. 
81 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 273, supra note 60 
82 Ibid., at 281 
83 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', 
Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990). p. 1869 
84 See chapter 7 at 7.3 
85 Art. 2 (5) of the 'Berne Convention', (Switzerland 1886 (Paris act 1971)).stated “Collections of literary or 
artistic works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and arrangement 
of their contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such.” 
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Term of Protection90, have all assured the criterion of copyright protection as 
‘intellectual creation’, and has specified or limited this criterion regarding collections or 
compilations of works or data to be applied to the ‘selection and arrangement’ of these 
works or data. 
The EC Directive 96/9 on the Protection of Databases91 provided for a dual system for 
protecting databases, the first through copyright law, and the second through a sui 
generis system. Under Chapter II, entitled ‘Copyright’, Art. 3 provided that “[i]n 
accordance with this directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be 
protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their 
eligibility for that protection.”92 [Underlining added] 
 
The parallel system of protection for databases is stated under Chapter III, which is 
entitled ‘Sui Generis Right’ as Art. 7 of the EC Directive states: “[m]ember States shall 
provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, 
verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of 
the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the 
contents of that database.”93 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
86 Art. 10 (2) of 'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Trips)', O.J. 
1994 L. (1994). stated “Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form, 
which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, shall be 
protected as such. Such protection, which shall not extend to the data or material itself,” 
87 'Wipo Copyright Treaty 1996', (Geneva, 1996). Art. 5 of the WIPO copyright treaty provides for 
“Compilations of data or other material, in any form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of 
their contents constitute intellectual creations, are protected as such. This protection does not extend to 
the data or the material itself and is without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or material 
contained in the compilation.” 
88 Art. 1 (3) provided that “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the 
author's own intellectual creation.” See, 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs', 2009/24/EC (European Union, 2009). 
89 Art. 3 (1) of 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Databases', supra note 41, stated “In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation shall be 
protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that 
protection.”  
90 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Term of Protection of Copyright and 
Certain Related Rights', 2006/116/EC (European Union, 2006). See Recital 16 and Article. 6 
91 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', supra 
note 41. 
92 Article 3, s(1), of ibid. 
93 Ibid. Art. 7. In addition, to confirm that this system is independent of copyright protection, Chapter III Art. 
7 (4) of EU Directive 96/9 provided that, “The right provided for in paragraph 1 shall apply irrespective of 
the eligibility of that database for protection by copyright or by other rights. Moreover, it shall apply 
irrespective of eligibility of the contents of that database for protection by copyright or by other rights.” 
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The UK CDPA did not include any mention of databases before the EC Directive on the 
Protection of Databases 96/9,94 as they were included under the expression 
‘compilations’ as one type of literary works that is protected by copyright law if they 
were original. The ‘skill, labour and judgment’ criterion was applied to all works, 
including compilation works. The thesis argues that this criterion was used to 
incorporate any kind of work under copyright law if there is skill of any kind, and labour 
-mental or manual- included, and judgment, which may be ignored. “[T]he skill and 
labour [that] have been key to the protection of these compilations as it is the standard 
by which originality has been Judged”.95 
 
Waelde confirmed how Judges could adapt this criterion to allow for the protection of 
any kind of works, regardless of their nature, “[a]t times, where it has been clear that 
one part of the process (such as an alphabetical arrangement) lacks in the requisite 
originality level for protection, greater emphasis will be placed on the labour and 
expense in gathering the information together. At other times, where the labour in 
creating or gathering information has been meagre, emphasis has been placed on the 
expression. The two are sometimes distinguished by terminology such as quantity or 
preexpressive labour (the creation and gathering) and the quality or expressive labour 
(the arrangement and presentation).”96 
However, Chapter III of the EC Database Directive was implemented through Part III of 
the amendment to the UK CDPA in 1997, entitled ‘The Copyright and Rights in 
Databases Regulations 1997’,97 which gave databases a sui generis right to protection, 
independent of the protection that may also be granted to databases under the 
regulations for copyright protection under CDPA. According to the new right, “[a] 
property right ("database right") subsists … in a database if there has been a 
substantial investment in obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the 
database.”98 It confirmed that this protection is not correlated or dependant on whether 
the work is protected under copyright law, “[f]or the purposes of paragraph (1) it is 
immaterial whether or not the database or any of its contents is a copyright work, within 
the meaning of Part I of the 1988 Act.” 99 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 
95 Charlotte Waelde, 'Database Copyright: The Story of Bhb', Copyright Law: A Handbook of 
Contemporary Research (2009), 109. p. 113 
96 Ibid. p. 114 
97 Part III (Regulations 12-25) of the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032, 
as free-standing legislation not incorporated into the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
98 Art. 13 (1) of 'The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations', (UK, 1997). 
99 Art. 13 (1) of ibid. 
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It is believed that this implementation included a paradox. As although the amendment 
was implemented in s. 3 (A) and included the same definition of databases as the EC 
directive and the same criteria used for protecting them under copyright law, which is 
that a “database is original if, and only if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of 
the contents of the database the database constitutes the author’s own intellectual 
creation.”100 The amendment also added databases to literary works and the general 
requirement for originality according to Art. 3.1 (d), which gave a definition of ‘literary, 
dramatic and musical works’, and included ‘databases’ as an example of literary works. 
Consequently, the condition of originality that exists in Art. 1. 1 (a) applies to 
databases.101 This method of integration led Laddie et al. to argue that UK CDPA 
differentiated between compilations and databases.102 
 
Although databases were defined in the EC Databases Directive as “a collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way 
and individually accessible by electronic or other means.”103 The term ‘independent 
works’ is interpreted to refer to works that are “intended to be appreciated or useful in 
isolation”104, accordingly, this database’s definition is broad enough to include all 
compilation works of facts, and previous works or information, whether encyclopaedias, 
directories, anthologies or catalogues. 105  
However, cases after this 1997 amendment in the UK has kept the application of ‘skill, 
labour and judgment’ criterion on all works, including databases. For instance, in the 
Cantor Fitzgerald International v. Tradition Ltd. case106, Mr Justice Pumfrey confirmed 
that “[i]n my judgment, so far as English law is concerned the correct approach to 
substantiality is straightforward. It is the function of copyright to protect the relevant skill 
and labour expended by the author on the work.”107 Not just that, but the mechanical 
labour was also approved by the Court as a possible requirement for the conferment of 
                                                          
100 S. 3 A (2) defined the meaning of database as: “a literary work consisting of a database is original if, 
and only if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the database the database 
constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.”  
101 Which provided that: (1) Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the 
following descriptions of work— (a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. 'Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act (Cdpa)', (UK, 1988). 
102 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
9, p. 1276 
103 Art 1(2) of 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Databases', supra note 41. 
104 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
9, at 32.19 
105 Ibid.9, at 32.19 
106 Cantor Fitzgerald International V. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd, 1999, R.P.C. 95  The High Court of Justice-
Chancery Division 
107 Ibid. at 131  
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copyright protection to the work.108 Also, in the Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. 
Meltwater Holding case109 the Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Industries Inc. case110 was cited 
with approval, as the Court adopted the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ criteria, confirming 
that “[o]riginality involves the application of skill or labour in the creation of the work.”111 
 
In attempting to adapt the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ criterion to the requirements of 
the EU Directive the Court justified that “the test of quality has been re-stated but for 
present purposes not significantly altered by the Infopaq case … I say that in the 
knowledge that the decision may sit awkwardly with some provisions of English law, 
that many questions remain unanswered by the CJEU and that the full implications of 
the decision have not yet been worked out.”112 
 
On the other hand, Waelde argued that the EU database directive adopted a civil law 
perspective, “[t]his standard for database copyright is one that is familiar from civilian 
legal systems, and is generally thought by most commentators to be higher than the 
traditional British tests of skill, labour and effort.”113 And that which this thesis 
understands and seeks to maintain. 
It can be understood that the International provisions (BERNE, TRIPS, WIPO and EU 
directives) would like to avoid the conflict that occurred between national Judges in the 
interpretation of originality, and that is why they used a different terminology to settle 
the issue. As they adopted the ‘intellectual creation’ criterion as a high interpretation of 
the originality criteria that incorporate mental with personal authorship. The EU has 
supported this argument, for instance, it confirmed regarding photographic works that 
“[a] photographic work within the meaning of the Berne Convention is to be considered 
original if it is the author's own intellectual creation reflecting his personality.”114 
[Underlining added] 
                                                          
108 As stated “So, it is possible that entirely mechanical labour may be saved by copying something 
produced by entirely mechanical labour, involving no skill. The only question is whether the entirely 
mechanical labour which went into the earlier work is relevant labour for the purpose of conferring 
originality in the copyright sense” see, ibid. at 133 
109 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others V. Meltwater Holding Bv and Others, 2012, EWHC 3099 
(Ch), Bus. L.R. 53, Court of Appeal, UK 
110 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., 1989, A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 Privy Council 
111 Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and Others V. Meltwater Holding Bv and Others, EWHC 3099 (Ch), 
Bus. L.R. 53, supra note 109, at 62 
112 Ibid. at 72 
113 Charlotte Waelde, 'Database Copyright: The Story of Bhb', supra note 95, p. 125 
114 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Term of Protection of Copyright and 
Certain Related Rights', supra note 90, recital (16) 
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Laddie et al. touched this point, as after they discussed the ‘travaux preparatires’115 of 
the EU Directives of Databases, Computer Program and Term Protection, they 
concluded “[i]n summary, such indicators as there are in the travaux preparatoires 
relating to the three directives point towards the intellectual creation criterion for 
originality being higher and more fundamentally a different test to that which UK law 
traditionally applies.”116 [Underlining added] 
It is worth noting that, in the EC Directive of Databases, the ‘selection and 
arrangement’ criterion was preserved as a condition of copyright protection, at the 
same time that Recital 21 of the Directive states that “it is not necessary for those 
materials to have been physically stored in an organized manner.”117 CJEU in the 
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou (OPAP) 
case,118 interpreted this provision stating that “[the] condition implies that the collection 
should be contained in a fixed base, of some sort, and includes technical means such 
as electronic, … an index, a table of contents, … to allow the retrieval of any 
independent material contained within it.”119 Accordingly, Laddie et al. confirmed that 
arranging works in “alphabetical or chronological order would be included”120 within this 
definition, although Laddie et. al. mentioned above that this criterion is higher than UK 
traditional criteria.121 
This interpretation supports the thesis’s argument that the arrangement of databases 
has become easy manual work that cannot prove any creativity in the work, 
accordingly, it cannot impart any originality or creativity to the work as a whole. The 
thesis contends that preserving the ‘selection and arrangement’ as a criterion of 
copyright in the EC directive and allowing the arrangement to be electronic, separate 
and not physical is a confession of the real purpose of the protection of databases. It is 
not the originality of the ‘selection and arrangement’ or creativity, but the protection of 
investments, even by employing copyright principles for this purpose. 
The thesis also argues that the ‘selection and arrangement’ criterion adopted to ensure 
that there is an intellectual creation (or authorship) in compilations and databases is not 
                                                          
115 Preparatory proceedings of the directives which include the proposals by the member states, the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the European Parliament’s opinion 
116 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
9, at 32.28 
117 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', supra 
note 41, Recital (21) 
118 Fixtures Marketing Ltd. V. Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou (Opap), C–444/02 - E.C.D.R. 
3, supra note 43. 
119 Ibid. at 38 
120 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
9, at 32.22 
121 Ibid. at 32.82. 
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suitable for application to these works, for many reasons. For instance, these works do 
not aim to provide creative content to the society, but they are useful in preserving 
information and presenting it, and whether they are presented in totality or in a 
selective way is something that differs according to the nature of the information and 
the requirements of the audience for this specific collection. This will be detailed 
later.122 The thesis finds that it is not fair to give protection to a collection of selected 
specific works, and to deprive a collection that is considered to be comprehensive of 
protection. In both cases usefulness is achieved. And selection and arrangement is not 
suitable to the nature of compilations of facts.123  
The criterion for selection and arrangement also has no scope for application when 
applied to works that lack authorship. As in this case stipulating the selection and 
arrangement is a stipulation of novelty not originality. The work reflects the personality 
of its author through the thoughts and sensations it bears, and regarding compilations 
of facts the thesis questions what sort of thought or sensations a ‘specific selection or 
arrangement’ of facts per se can bear. There is a confirmation of this argument in the 
German case Pharma Intranet v. IMS Health GmbH 124 cited in the Football Datco Ltd 
v. Britten Pools Ltd 125 case as the Court stated “[a] selection or organisation that 
anyone would undertake in a particular manner does not constitute individual creation. 
If the selection or organisation is determined by the nature of the thing or is 
predetermined by purposefulness or logic, then there is no room for individual creative 
work...”126 
1.3 The Thesis’s Proposition: 
This thesis argues that the confusion around interpreting originality among Judges 
returns to the disregard of the authorship concept which originality had to be applied to, 
in other words, it is the authorship in the intangible work that originality had to measure 
to decide whether it can be qualified to be a ‘work’ or ‘intellectual work’ or not. Applying 
originality to intangible works without a guide led to varied interpretations of originality 
even within the same legal system, such as ‘origination from the author’, expenditure of 
‘skill, judgment and labour’ in the work. Authorship is believed to be the major and 
prominent component of originality which is confirmed by the expression ‘original work 
                                                          
122 See Chapter 7 at 7.4 
123 For detailed discussion on the nature of works see chapter 7 at 7.3 
124 Pharma Intranet Information Ag V. Ims Health Gmbh & Co. Ohg, 2005, ECC 12, Oberlandesgericht 
(Court of Appeal) 
125 Football Dataco Ltd V. Britten Pools Ltd, 2010, R.P.C. 17, High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 
126 Pharma Intranet Information Ag V. Ims Health Gmbh & Co. Ohg, ECC 12, supra note 124. 
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of authorship’127 in US law and ‘intellectual creation’128 in UK law and international 
provisions. 
The thesis mainly asserts that judges have dealt with originality as a rule that is devoid 
of a principle, and has been interpreted as an abstract terminology, although “no rule 
can exist without principle, and that legal decisions cannot be reached by simple and 
exclusive deduction.”129 This attitude is in fact what judges have practiced regarding 
interpretation of originality as they ignored its historical background and theoretical 
basis though the notion of originality entails in fact “a profound philosophical impact”130. 
So, the thesis’s research in the history and theory behind originality is a kind of 
researching the foundations of the principles which is represented in authorship, that 
from it emanates the notions of the author, the work, the originality and creativity. That 
constitutes the third and second layers of the ontology of copyright law. 131    
Thus, it is authorship rather than originality is the core of copyright protection; copyright 
law is only related to personal and mental contribution, so the manual efforts used to 
create works are devoid of authorship and should be separated in a different system. 
Although this system is similar to that provided for in the Database Directive and 
approved by courts afterwards “[t]he purpose of copyright is to provide encouragement 
for creative endeavour, and differs in that respect from the sui generis right which is 
designed to encourage investment in particular types of data gathering.”132 There is no 
sufficient justification of this trend especially in the UK and the US where works were 
protected for the labour and investment, also the system provided in the Database 
Directive is not a comprehensive enough to include works of the same nature of 
database, which will still not prevent contradictions in copyright law. That is why this 
thesis is presenting a theoretical justification of the distinction between works, in a 
comprehensive way and through implementing technological means also that reduce 
the conflict of decisions to the minimum. 
The thesis proposes a categorisation of works to two categories. The first are 
‘authorship works’, which get full protection using the criteria that measure mental and 
personal contributions. The second are ‘non-authorship’ or ‘utilitarian works’ that gain 
less protection and use a criterion that depends only on measuring investment, labour 
                                                          
127 Which is required in §. 102 of the copyright act of 1976 as a description of works that can be 
copyrighted 
128 As required in s. 3A of the CDPA as a requirement for protecting databases. 
129 Guido Westkamp, 'Changing Mechanisms in Copyright’s Ontology - Structure, Reasoning and the Fate 
of the Public Domain', in GUIDO WESTKAMP (ed.), Emerging Issues in Intellectual Property-Trade, 
Technology and Market Freedom: Essays in Honour of Herchel Smith (Edward Elgar, 2007), 54-72. p. 56 
130 Ibid. p. 57 
131 According to the multi-layer approach of copyright law ontology explained by Westkamp, see, ibid. p. 56 
132 Football Dataco Ltd V. Britten Pools Ltd, R.P.C. 17, supra note 125 at 542 
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and time expended. Also, authorship works is proposed to be separated into ‘high’ and 
‘low’ authorship works depending on the selection and arrangement criterion. The 
adoption of a sui generis system for databases in the EU and UK CDPA is only a step 
towards reaching the thesis’s argument of categorising works as authorship and non-
authorship (utilitarian) works, with a clear application of different criteria and level of 
protection for each. 
In reaching this proposition, authorship must be reinforced against some challenges 
that call for its abolition. That is why the thesis will discuss the calls for the ‘death of the 
author’,133 and claims that the romantic author is against the incorporation of collective 
works under copyright law.134 In these discussions or claims there are much confusion 
between the literary and legal concepts of authorship. The thesis argues that although 
copyright law borrows some terminology from literature, this does not mean that it has 
adopted the whole concept and it should develop with it step by step.135 
The thesis emphasise that the author’s individuality is the basis of copyright law, and 
authorship in general, and that does not mean adopting the ideas of genius and the 
romantic author that exist in literature. The individuality invoked by copyright law‘s 
authorship is shown in works through the existence of a mental and personal 
contribution by an author.136 Regarding the death of the author doctrine, it is argued 
that this is a literary discussion that should be confined to this scope and cannot be 
applied in law.137 
Having said that authorship in UK is going to, or has to, adopt the personality approach 
of the civil law system, it is worth referring here to the German case which Judge Floyd 
referred to in Football Dataco Ltd v. Britten Pools Ltd138, as he cited the Germen 
Court’s confirmation that: “the individuality differentiates the work protected in copyright 
law from the unprotected mass of everyday things, from purely physical labour, routine 
performance,”139 which supports this thesis’s approach. 
It seems that the US also had decided to take the personality approach, as in the last 
compendium of U.S. copyright office practices140 it seems that the latter office decided 
to return to the 19th century interpretation of originality and cited the Trade-Mark Cases. 
                                                          
133 See Chapter 4 at 4.2 
134 See Chapter 5 at 5.4 
135 This will be the subject of two Chapters 4 & 5 
136 This is the subject of Chapter 5 
137 This is the subject of Chapter 4 
138 Football Dataco Ltd V. Britten Pools Ltd, R.P.C. 17, supra note 125. 
139 Ibid. at 544 
140 Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices، 2014، Third 
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v. Steffens, 141 stating that “[t]he copyright law only protects ‘the fruits of intellectual 
labor’ that ‘are founded in the creative powers of the mind.’” [Underlining added] The 
office also cited the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony case.142 Accordingly, the 
office decided that “[b]ecause copyright law is limited to the ‘original intellectual 
conceptions of the author,’ the Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that 
a human being did not create the work.” [Underlining added] However, US courts did 
not settle the issue in this clearance.  
The thesis will examine the personality approach and the attempts to apply it in order to 
prohibit a return to confusion within copyright law. As, although that authorship and 
originality interpretations need to be maintained, doing this without establishing an 
outlet for the works with which their nature can cope will result in continuing the 
distortion of authorship and originality. 
Additionally, applying the proposed categorisation will not be effective unless through 
using the technological facilities in classifying works using the proposed ‘Digital Cultural 
National Gate’ (DCNG). In addition, it is believed that if this categorisation is applied 
digitally authorship and originality concepts will be reinforced; the uncertainty regarding 
copyrightability of works will be reduced, and the conflict of cases will be less. 
Furthermore, the registration of literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works online will 
increase the ability of the proposed system to pick up infringement more easily over 
time. Also, as noted earlier143 the proposed DCNG can assist the recently proposed  
‘Online Dispute Resolution’ (ODR) through identifying the characteristics of the 
disputed work, elements of authorial contribution, the parts appropriated from 
antecedent works, and identifying the originality interpretation suitable to the nature of 
the work. 
The thesis’s argument, then, investigates the following questions: 
- Is there a conflict in judicial decisions? What are the reasons, and to what 
degree has that conflict been reached?  
- Can authorship survive amid challenges against it? This includes two 
discussions. 
o The death of the author. 
o The romantic author.  
- How does the nature of factual works differ from other intellectual works?  
                                                          
141 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, supra 
note 70. 
142 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 72. 
143 See above p. 12 
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- Are personal and mental elements the only components or elements of 
authorship?  
- How will the proposed categorisation of works work and how can this reduce 
conflict in decisions?  
- Finally, how will the proposed ‘Digital Cultural National Gate’ participate in 
implementing theories of copyright on the practical daily transactions of authors 
and users? How will this affect the interpretation of originality or possible 
distortion of copyright principles? 
1.3.1 How will Categorisation Look? 
As stated above the thesis argues that works should be divided into ‘non-authorship’ 
works category, and ‘high authorship’ works and ‘low authorship’ works.   
With regard to ‘high authorship’ works, those are the works which include thoughts and 
sensations peculiar to the author that he wanted to convey to the audience, regardless 
of whether these thoughts are found in other work, or not. What matters here is 
whether the author has exercised mental work and established a peculiar structure in 
the work that can bear these thoughts to the audience. This structure is defined by the 
thesis as the ‘selection and arrangement’ of the ‘raw materials of authorship’ –words, 
lines, or any public domain elements- used in creating the work. 
Low authorship works are those that depend heavily on previous works, wherein the 
author just changes the expressive and physical form of the work. Such as adaptations 
from novels to films, and the works where their elements are re-arranged from a prior 
work to convey thoughts or sensations, whether different or similar, like parody or 
musical arrangements. Here, the ‘raw materials of authorship’ the first author selected 
are still the same in the adapted work, but the author of the second work has reworked 
them or changed their appearance, although his intervention is not substantial, he has 
used mental efforts to do so. Accordingly, the adapted work is an authorship work, but 
still less than the level of the original work it relied upon, hence, it should be considered 
a low authorship work and the creator should gain authorisation from the original 
author, if it is still copyrighted, to make these changes. 
Non-authorship or utilitarian works are the third category. These are works created 
using manual effort and skills only, and with the expenditure of time, investment, or with 
technical, mechanical and technological means. This category includes works that rely 
completely on facts or antecedent works to the degree these facts or works were not 
changed, whether by collecting them together or changing the physical form on which 
they are borne; an example of the first is the collection of facts, or a collection of 
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previous works, poems, musical notes, songs,144 and an example of the second kind is 
a transfer from painting to sculpture,145 painting to photography or the opposite. 
It is worth mentioning some clarification examples here. For instance, a change from 
novel to film is to be considered an authorship work (though a low authorship work), 
however, the change from painting to sculpture is a non-authorship work. In the change 
from novel to film, the director and scriptwriter, although they follow the same steps as 
the novelist, they use their judgment to choose between several choices to offer the 
same expression or moves or circumstances with which to build a dramatic plot. 
However, the sculptor follows the same steps, lines and angles, and he attempts to 
abolish his personality or any tendency to change something, he tries to be faithful in 
copying. On the other hand, the director and scriptwriter cannot already find a direct 
line to follow, unless through the general plot, that is why their discretion bears more 
mental and personal characteristics than the creator of sculpture out of painting.  
 
That is why the transfer from painting to sculpture can be, and has already been, 
replaced by machines, such as the 3D printers, due to the mechanical nature of this 
work. However, the transfer from novel to film cannot be done by a machine, due to the 
quantum of judgment, mental and personal work it involves, which is why it is 
considered an authorship work. The same justification is followed by the thesis to 
criticise the Walter v. Lane 146 case,147 as the skill used is not mental skill, as anyone 
who can read and write can do it, and no personal trace can be found in the work 
produced, as the creator has no intent to do so. However, Laddie et al. argued that 
copyright protection can be granted to directories, although “no imagination is required 
to produce these and no skill beyond knowing how to read and write.”148 [Underlining 
added] The same applies to verbatim reports, according to the belief of the thesis, as 
the author follows the original author’s steps and eliminates his will and abolishes any 
ideas that come to his mind so as to comply with the original author’s structure. 
According to Hegel and Locke, as will be detailed later,149 this is against what 
‘authorship’ presumes. 
 
                                                          
144 Though this was specifically excluded pursuant to Recital. 19 of the 'Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', supra note 41. The thesis finds that 
there is no difference between the collection of music, songs, photographs, poems, film clips etc. 
145 The thesis would like to draw attention to that if the sculptor drew a sample of his sculpture before 
making it then his sculpture can be considered a high authorship work, and his drawing is a separate work 
similar to the notes and drafts that precede the writing of a novel. 
146 Walter V. Lane, 1900, A.C. 539, House of Lords 
147 See Chapter 3 at 3.5 
148 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note  
9. at 3.57. 
149 See Chapter 6 at 6.3 & 6.4 
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The thesis accordingly calls for the revival of the US ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine 
regarding collections and compilation works and other non-authorship works. That 
approach was advocated by Judge Roney, in the Miller v. Universal Studios case,150 
who argued that “it may be better to recognize the directory cases as being in a 
category by themselves rather than to attempt to bring their result and rationale to bear 
on non-directory cases.”151  
As Ginsburg contended, copyright law should protect low authorship works and should 
do so in low authorship terms.152 She proposed a dual system for both high and low 
authorship works instead of “disguising” low authorship works as high ones. 153 This 
thesis advocates this system but, a fortiori, it proposes differentiation between works, 
depending on their inherent elements, into authorship and non-authorship works, and 
afterwards, separating authorship works into high and low authorship. Such a system 
will consider the special qualities and characteristics of every type of works, as factual 
works or compilation works are devoid of authorship and not just low in authorship. 
Accordingly, the works of high originality should gain full copyright protection154, and 
this will give authors the utmost incentive to produce creative works,155 as the reward 
for their creative efforts will be due more to being able to distinguish it from other less 
‘authorship’ works. Also, the public will encourage such differentiation that will break 
down the current mix of creative and non-creative works.156 The low authorship works 
will have lower protection in terms of copyright protection and exclusive rights. The 
third, ‘non-authorship works’, will gain the minimum amount of protection, prohibiting 
the full copying of works and preserving financial incentives for producers.157 Besides, 
the criterion used to decide copyrightability of every category should be differentiated to 
suit the elements of the work it is going to measure. 
  
                                                          
150 Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 1981, 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., United 
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 
151 Ibid. at 1370 
152 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', 
supra note 83, p. 1916 
153 Ibid. p. 1916 
154 This is applied now, as the thesis argues that if current copyright protection is applied appropriately and 
respects the proposed dichotomous system, without excluding any of the copyright principles, then it will 
be enough to protect authors and incentivise them. 
155 Creativity is a term related to inventive creation and laborious mind efforts, and is adopted as a more 
specific term to mean more than originality. 
156 Further elaboration of the benefits of this distinguishing can be found in Chapter 5 at 5.3 
157 This classifying of concepts of authorship and grades of originality and creativity, and the tailored 
concepts of copyright for every category of works is explained in Chapter 5 at 5.3 
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Accordingly, the proposed categorisations of works will be as follows: 
 High-authorship 
works 
Low-authorship works Non-authorship works 
Subject of work Thoughts and 
ideas belong to 
the author 
-Main Thoughts and 
ideas do not belong to 
the author, only include 
change of the 
expressive form 
-Or thoughts are 
different but the 
elements of authorship 
are the same  
-Collection of Facts 
and information, 
presented 
comprehensively or 
selectively 
-Or collection of 
previous works 
-Or change of the 
physical form  
Characteristics -Different selection  
-Different 
arrangement from 
antecedent works 
Examples: 
Novels, music, 
paintings, 
sculpture not 
derived from 
antecedent work. 
-Same selection 
-Same arrangement of 
the original work  
-Different expressive 
form. 
Examples: 
-Adaptations: novel to 
film 
-Translation 
-Abbreviation 
Collection of facts, 
information or 
antecedent works. 
Examples: 
-Databases 
(telephone directories, 
match tables)  
-Compilation of 
previous works 
(legislations, poems) 
or anthologies  
-Maps 
-Same selection  
-Different 
arrangement  
Examples: 
Books of different 
sciences, 
especially text 
books. 
-Same selection 
-Different arrangement 
-Same expressive form 
Examples: 
Musical 
rearrangement, audio-
visual (films and 
drama) rearrangement, 
-Same selection  
-Same arrangement  
-Same expressive 
form as the original 
work. 
With change of 
physical form 
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Parody, Appropriation. Examples: 
Change from painting 
to sculpture,  
Criteria -Different 
selection, 
arrangement of 
elements of 
authorship 
-If similar selection 
and arrangement, 
prove independent 
creation 
-Mental effort and 
Judgement in creating 
the work (not-following 
mathematical means). 
-License from the 
author of original work 
if work is copyrighted 
-Proving the 
expenditure of labour, 
funds 
-Independent creation.  
Suggested 
protection 
The current 
copyright 
protection in 
exclusivity and 
term of protection. 
Lower term of 
protection, i.e., 30 
years after death. 
-Less exclusive rights 
Lower term of 
protection i.e., (15 
years) 
-Less exclusive rights 
 
In terms of the factual application of such a proposition, this thesis proposes an 
amendment to be made of copyright laws in the UK and US to codify the proposed 
system.158 It also proposes the adoption of the mentioned and further investigated 
philosophies and doctrines in this thesis by Judges in their interpretations of copyright 
law or in the application of an originality threshold to decide on the copyrightability of 
works. Also, the DCNG will contribute in the reduction of the conflict of decisions 
through a user-friendly platform that makes the copyright protection graded and 
straightforward. 
1.4 Methodology: 
In dealing with the theoretical issues of copyright law and due to “copyright [being] ... 
conceptual in nature”159 it is important to understand the concepts of authorship, 
originality, creativity, and ownership. This thesis finds that theoretical study is the basis 
                                                          
158 For further detail on the amendment and its application, see Chapter 8 at 8.5 and 8.6 
159 Jean-Robert Tyran and Lars Feld, Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the 
Provision of Public Goods, ideas.repec.org, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic 
Research, 2002 p. 181 
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on which we can establish a relatively certain, stable and less vague system of 
protection, that all people seek –even those who support uncertainty.160 
The thesis will pursue a theoretical and historical study to investigate the emergence of 
originality, the challenges it faces, and its conflicted interpretations. A critical and 
historical study of authorship will be followed when the death of the author doctrine is 
challenged. This issue is an important subject that should be challenged in every study 
that addresses authorship. It is also important to challenge the romantic author 
doctrine’s pressure on authorship in copyright law, in order to purify authorship of any 
possible doubts about its validity in copyright law. 
A theoretical study will then be pursued to support the reasons for which authorship 
should prevail in copyright law. Lastly, the thesis’s proposition will be the subject of the 
last Chapter, when all the strands are brought together to support and justify the 
proposed categorisation of works and its digital implementation the DCNG.  
1.4.1 Theoretical and Historical Perspective: 
This theoretical study will concern the concepts of originality and authorship, as the 
thesis will investigate the history of originality, when originality emerged, and the 
development of the interpretation of originality. 
There is a collision between the desire to satisfy the economic needs of right holders, 
and the need to preserve the concept of authorship.161 If it is believed by a Judge that 
copyright justification is to enhance the production of works and encourage and protect 
investment, then the Court162 will embrace low, or broader, criteria of copyrightability.163 
For the sake of rewarding efforts and funds expended on the production of works and 
to foster the economic incentivisation that pushes this intellectual production. By 
contrast, if the copyright justification is believed to be maintaining and rewarding 
creativity and ingenuity, the Judge164 adopts high or strict criteria165 in deciding the 
                                                          
160 Like Jerome Frank, See Chapter 2 at 2.6 
161 See copyright law justifications in Chapter 5 at 5.4 
162 E.g. Hutchinson Telephone Co. V. Fronteer Directory Co. Of Minnesota, Inc., 1985, 770 F.2d 128, 
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.; Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company V. 
Associated Telephone Directory Publishers; C.A., 1985, 756 F.2d 801, United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit.; Leon V. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 1937, 91 F.2d 484, Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
163 For an illustrative definition and examples of low criteria, or the wide interpretation of authorship and 
protection criteria, see Chapter 6 at 6.4 
164 E.g.,, Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991, 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 
Supreme Court of the United States; International News Service V. Associated Press, 1918, 248 U.S. 215, 
39 S.Ct. 68, Supreme Court of the United States; and there are those who have differentiated between 
fictional and non-fictional works in stipulating originality, like, W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 1984, 736 
F.2d 859, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
165 For an illustration of the high criteria of copyright protection, or the narrow interpretation of authorship 
principles and protection criteria, see Chapter 6 at 6.4 
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copyright subsistence of works, in order to reward creativity and originality and to 
maintain authorship principles and philosophies166. 
The theoretical study of this thesis will also be made on the discussion of the ‘death of 
the author’ doctrine, the arguments of Barthes and Foucault will be challenged in both 
literary and legal contexts, and it will be shown how this argument cannot be applied in 
law, since this was not meant by their initiators. A study of ‘romantic authorship’, or 
romanticism, will be theoretically discussed and challenged in legal terms. To prove the 
validity of the thesis’s claims, a historical investigation of authorship and literary 
property and of the originality stipulation in England and the US will be presented. 
The next discussion will concern the question of why uncertainty is an undesirable 
feature in copyright law, and this will mainly entail challenging Frank and Holmes, as 
achieving a reasonable degree of stability and certainty will help authors and users to 
know the situation of their works and other works that have emerged. This will 
encourage them from the start to think about which elements their works should have 
to fulfil the originality requirement and to be considered under copyright law, and which 
parts or elements of works can be appropriated or reused, as will be elaborated in later 
chapters. On the other hand, stability will encourage investors to produce more works, 
as they will know from the start which kinds of works and which features will be 
protected, and which features will make the work un-copyrightable.  
1.4.2 Practical Perspective: Technological Implementation: 
This thesis argues that technology should be a tool in hands of law not the opposite, so 
technology can be used to enforce or enhance the application of copyright law not to 
be used in making a parallel system through the technological restrictions and digital 
rights management.167 
Following from the above theoretical discussions, the implementation of the proposed 
categorisation system in the technological environment through a ‘Digital Cultural 
National Gate’ (DCNG) will help to efficiently categorize works depending on the 
proposed division of works and criteria to decide the level of protection that is 
deserved. This further step will help authors to have a clear idea on whether their 
works deserve protection and at which level they can be classified, even before 
completing their works. Users will benefit also through deciding the rights or exceptions 
they can gain for every work; even publishers and producers, as the proposed system 
provides protection for all works, but at different levels. Such a technological 
                                                          
166 Authorship philosophies or principles refer to the major principles constituting the main structure of the 
authorship concept, like originality and creativity. 
167 See Chapter 8 at 8.6 
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proposition, it is presumed, will combat the adverse effects of technology on copyright 
law and reinforce the position of the orthodox concepts of authorship and originality in 
practice.168 
Accordingly, the technological proposition (DCNG) is a tool that employs the theoretical 
system in the digital world, by investigating works through the applicants themselves 
and under their responsibility. Such theoretical research and practical implementation 
can reinforce the position of copyright law before laws of contract, competition, and 
trade that have recently overshadowed copyright law, as Bently confirmed: “the failings 
of copyright have resulted in a strengthening of the actions which have been developed 
to fill the gap - which, in turn, make copyright law increasingly insignificant.”169 
1.5 Terminology: 
Copyrightability: this term is used to refer to copyright law’s main purpose which is 
protecting works through conferring protection to them. Namely, it means the copyright 
subsistence decisions. This is mostly used as a differentiation between the literary 
discourse of authorship, and the legal discourse that looks to copyright law as a means 
to regulate relations and to confer protection or exclusive rights. 
Factual works: this term refers to all works based on facts, ideas, or pre-existing 
works, without addition from the creator. Those works are normally created through 
collecting, combining and arranging information or previous works, whether randomly 
or in a specific form. They are usually compared with authorship works that are based 
on the author’s mental work. 
Collective works and a collection of works: the collective work is a work that is 
produced by several authors and it is not possible to specify the part that every author 
has created. The collection of works occurs when several contributions of several 
authors are gathered within one collection of separate works, and it is specified for 
every work that it was created by a specific author.170 
1.6 Overview 
This thesis comprises of eight chapters; the first is mainly focused –as we saw- on 
formulating its main argument through presenting the research problem171, and a brief 
presentation of the different natures of works, and the development of originality 
                                                          
168 See Chapter 8 at 8.6.4 
169 Lionel Bently, 'Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law', The Modern Law Review, 
57/6 (1994). p. 976 
170 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
9, at 32.20 
171 See this Chapter at 1.1 
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interpretation that causes confusion in copyright law,172 together with an introduction to 
the proposed solution173 and how –in a brief reference- this solution will look or will 
work174.  
The second Chapter will firstly be concerned with originality, as the main reason for 
the confusion around the copyrightability of works, so it will seek for the emergence of 
originality,175 its definition,176 and the development of originality in case law,177 and how 
it has participated in conflicts in judicial decisions.178 
Secondly, it will focus on answering the initial question - why is the thesis concerned 
with searching the conflict in copyrightability decisions, and if it is desirable to leave 
them in conflict, or whether this conflict is natural to the law. Here, this thesis 
challenges the arguments that advocate uncertainty in laws and answer the question: 
what are the reasons for which it advocates stability and certainty in laws.179 
The third Chapter shows the varied interpretations of the originality requirement by 
courts in the UK and the US even those cases heard before the same court or 
regarding similar works. These interpretations varied between the ‘sweat of the brow’ 
doctrine and the ‘origination from the author’ in the US,180 and the adoption of the 
minimal creativity interpretation -in the UK and the US-,181 and ‘skill, labour and 
judgment’ in the UK.182 These interpretations will be separated according to which 
elements of the work they are measuring, the author’s personality or labour and 
investment, so they can match the categorisation proposed between authorial works 
and utility works with the suitable interpretation.183 
The fourth Chapter addresses the doctrine of the ‘death of the author’, which mainly 
emerged from Barthes and Foucault,184 who claimed that the author should disappear 
in favour of language. The thesis replies to their claims by discussing the literary and 
legal side of their argument,185 and concludes that a distinction between literary and 
                                                          
172 See this Chapter at 1.2 
173 See this Chapter at 1.3 
174 See this Chapter at 1.3.1 
175 See Chapter 2 at 2.2 
176 See Chapter 2 at 2.3 
177 See Chapter 2 at 2.4 
178 See Chapter 2 at 2.5 
179 See Chapter 2 at 2.6 
180 See Chapter 3 at 3.2 
181 See Chapter 3 at 3.10 
182 See Chapter 3 at 3.6 
183 See Chapter 3 at 3.7 
184 See Chapter 4 at 4.2 
185 See Chapter 4 at 4.4 
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legal authorship is required.186 This discussion removes the doubts around the validity 
of the ‘authorship’ concept so as to still and revive it in copyright law before the 
increasing claims against it, as authorship is the main focus of the thesis. It must thus 
be defended before being used and built on in remainder of the thesis. 
The fifth Chapter addresses claims that authorship depends on the romantic author 
concept. This is supported by Woodmansee and Jaszi, who confirmed that authorship 
in copyright law is not convenient for collaborative authorship and adaptations.187 In the 
reply to these arguments, historical perspective will be followed to prove the old history 
of the author concept and of literary property, and even of originality in the UK before 
any laws of copyright,188 as personal authorship was considered the main theme when 
discussing literary or artistic works. However, this does not include the meaning of 
romantic nor of the genius author that is revealed in literary discourse, as copyright law 
is concerned with authorship leading to copyrightability not literary discourse of 
romantic authorship, and in this way it understands authorship. Accordingly, this 
Chapter insists on the necessity of separating literary authorship from legal authorship, 
as they share the vocabulary but not the substance.189 
The sixth Chapter addresses the authorship elements,190 or what the elements that 
show that a given work is a product of an authorship process, and herein it will depend 
on the opinions of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Kant.191 It finds that there are mental and 
personal features that works should show so as to be a work of intellect or authorship, 
and this will be relied upon in determining the natures of works and, accordingly, to 
categorise works into ‘authorship’ and ‘devoid of authorship’ works. 
The seventh Chapter includes an application of the elements and factors of 
authorship, set in the previous Chapter, on factual works,192 or imitations,193 in order to 
reveal whether they include authorship or not. Also, ‘selection and arrangement’ as 
criterion for collections of facts will be challenged in this Chapter, especially regarding 
whether it can prove the existence of personal or mental authorship, or not.  
In the eighth Chapter, the proposed system is described, according to a 
categorisation of works in terms of ‘high, low and non-authorship’.194 There is a 
                                                          
186 See Chapter 4 at 4.5 
187 See Chapter 5 at 5.4 
188 See Chapter 5 at 5.3 
189 See Chapter 5 at 5.6 
190 See Chapter 6 at 6.7 
191 See Chapter 6 at 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 & 6.5. 
192 See Chapter 7 at 7.3 
193 See Chapter 7 at 7.5 
194 See Chapter 8 at 8.4 
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corresponding division of originality interpretations in the three categories.195 Every 
interpretation will have specific elements that fit with it and which can measure the 
elements in the corresponding category of works. Finally, the thesis proposes a 
technological implementation of the proposed system that can merge theoretical 
discussion in the online environment and contribute in lessening future distortions of 
originality and authorship. This will be through the proposed ‘Digital Cultural National 
Gate’.196 
  
                                                          
195 See Chapter 8 at 8.4.1 
196 See Chapter 8 at 8.6 
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2 Chapter Two:  
Originality and the Conflict of Copyright Subsistence Decisions 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
This thesis is interested in investigating the developments in the authorship and 
ownership concepts that are shaping the modern copyright law, and it argues that the 
copyright criteria is the most important part of this investigation as, according to it, the 
definitions and borders of authorship, in the meaning of copyrightability, and of 
ownership are decided. 
In order for copyright to fulfil its functions, namely to provide right holders with the 
protection they need for their works as the subjects of dealings, its protection should be 
selective. Providing protection to all works means protecting the work and its 
infringement, and this equates with the non-protection of any work. Such selectivity 
needs a criterion in order to action it. On the other hand, the existence of protection 
presumes an infringement of this protection by attempts to circumvent it. Accordingly, 
we need a criterion through which to decide whether the creator of the disputed work 
has infringed the copyright of antecedent works or not,1 this criterion is ‘originality’. 
Accordingly, this Chapter will discuss how the concept of originality emerged, what its 
interpretations are, and whether these interpretations are subject to any classification.  
2.2 The Emergence of Originality: 
As discussed in the introduction in first chapter, the requirement of criteria for works, 
that they be a ‘personal creation’ and ‘mental work’, was required even before the 
Statute of Anne, for instance, in the The Company of Stationers v. Seymour case.2 
Herein, there will be more investigation on the emergence and definition of originality 
and the conflict in interpreting it in several cases in the UK and the US. 
Historically, Woodmansee has confirmed that the principle of originality first appeared 
in Young’s writing in 1759.3 Young argued that the originality of the work, - he took 
                                                          
1 In the law’s view, as an organizational tool for relations and transactions in society, the existence of the 
protection of a work requires distinguishing between protected and unprotected works, as conferring 
protection to all works will entail the protection of even infringing works, as they are intellectual works also. 
So the focus in the legal context should be on how to separate infringing work from other works in general. 
The separation between works needs a criterion or threshold to provide a means by which the Statute can 
first assess whether the work is in the beginning a literary or artistic work, or neither. Second: has it 
infringed other pre-existing works? 
2 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 1677, 29 CAR. 2,  
3 Edward Young and Samuel Richardson, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author of 
Sir Charles Grandison (Printed for A. Millar, 1759). On the other hand, if this argument brings to mind the 
Woodmansee reference to the Franciscan, St. Bonaventura, (1221-1274); this will be discussed in Chapter 
5 at 5.3.1. 
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poems as an example- or its essential quality, emanates from the poet’s own genius, 
and it is that which should be evaluated, rather than the “rules extrapolated from 
classical literature”.4 Woodmansee confirms that these ideas, after translation into 
German, were used by Goethe, Kant and Fichte to engage originality in the theory of 
arts.5 
It seems that originality was not invented by legislation, but was one of the features of 
the 19th century to which artists resorted to distinguish themselves from the imitations 
and repetitions of that age, and it thus spread in society before being required by law. 
This is obvious in Eitner’s explanation: “Claude was to Turner, Raphael to Ingres, 
Rubens to Delacroix far more than a brief stimulus or passing influence. Such 
dependence on tradition was not unprecedented in the history of art, but what 
distinguished the particular situation of 19th century art from that of earlier periods of 
eclecticism was the modern artist's claim to originality and individual freedom.”6 It 
seems that the emergence of originality participated in the progression of art and 
literature in the 19th century,7 However, this does not mean that originality was born in 
this period, but there is other evidence that it had existed since the 15th century as a 
legal and literary concept, as will be shown in the next section. 
Originality was required in the UK at an early stage in the Sculpture Copyright Act, 
1814, which had established the requirement of being “new and original” 8 in any works 
to gain copyright protection. The same was followed in the Copyright of Designs Act, 
1842.9 However, the Fine Art Copyright Act of 186210 sufficed with the condition of 
being ‘original’. Accordingly, it was considered that “the 1862 Act provided the first 
occasion on which the legislature introduced the requirement that works be "original" 
                                                          
4 Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence 
of The'author'', Eighteenth Century Studies,  (1984). p. 430 
5 Ibid. p. 430 
6 Lorenz Eitner, Neoclassicism and Romanticism, 1750-1850: Enlightenment (1: Prentice Hall, 1970). p. 93 
7 Walter Darby Bannard, 'On Originality', Arts Magazine, September 1985 (1985). p. 132 as he confirmed 
“[t]his search for originality (that which had not been done or produced before) goes some way to explain 
the progression of artistic movements which started in the latter part of the 19th century and has continued 
to the present time. In the eyes of some it represents a 'ritual of novelty' where originality is not just 
desirable but obligatory.” 
8 See s. 1 of 'Sculpture Copyright Act', (Britain, 1814). referred to in R. Bently & M. Kretschmer Deazley, 
'Commentary On: Fine Art Copyright Act (1862)', Primary sources on copyright (1450-1900) (Arts and 
Humanities Research Council; UK: copy.law.cam.ac.uk, 2008). 
9 'An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Laws Relating to the Copyright of Designs for Ornamenting 
Articles of Manufacture', (Britain, 1842)., 5 & 6 Vict., c.100. referred to in R. Bently & M. Kretschmer 
Deazley, 'Commentary On: Fine Art Copyright Act (1862)', supra note 8. 
10 'Fine Arts Copyright Act', 25 & 26 Vict., c.68 (Britain, 1862).. Although Bentley confirms that the first 
copyright act that required originality is the 1911 Copyright Act, see L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual 
Property Law (third edn.: Oxford University Press Oxford:, 2009). p. 93, this thesis argues that it is the 
1862 Act and supports this argument with the Graves Case, wherein the Queen's Bench Division 
confirmed “By 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, §. 1, “the author of every original painting, drawing, and photograph, and 
his assigns,”, see, Graves' Case, 1869, L.R. 4 Q.B. 715, Queen's Bench Division at 715 
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as a threshold for copyright protection.”11 Also, Lord Herschell argued in a 
Parliamentary Bill12 proposition that “[c]opyright in respect of a newspaper shall apply 
only to such parts of the newspaper as are compositions of an original literary 
character, to original illustrations therein.”13 [Underlining added]  
 
In the US, Saunders claimed that originality was initiated depending on the term 
‘authors’ mentioned in the US constitution, “[s]ince an author means beginner, first 
mover, creator, or originator, the Constitution necessarily requires originality, and if it is 
lacking, the work is not one of an author.”14 As inferred by the Supreme Court in 
Burrow Giles, v. Sarony, where Judge Miller interpreted originality as ‘origination from 
the author’ and include ‘intellectual conception’ or mental work, as he argued that “[a]n 
author in that sense is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who 
completes a work of science or literature.’ … so far as they are representatives of 
original intellectual conceptions of the author.”15 [Underlining added] 
 
It is thus evident that from the beginning of the 19th century ‘originality’ was a 
recognised criterion for copyright protection. Since then, originality has had a central 
position in copyright law, “[o]ne of the concepts central to copyright protection is that of 
originality” 16 or, as Suk stated, “originality is the touchstone of copyright law” 17 and 
proved to have a close relationship with the authorship doctrine for “[i]n general usage 
authorship has connotations of originality.” 18 
2.3 Definition of Originality 
There is an ambiguity around ‘originality’, not just regarding its position in copyright law, 
or its application, but in its definition also, in the UK and the US statutes ‘originality’, as 
a copyright criterion, is not defined, as this mission was left to the courts to develop. 
However this mission proved to be impossible, Nietzsche argued, “[w]hat is originality? 
To see something that is yet without a name, that is yet impossible to designate, even 
                                                          
11 R. Bently & M. Kretschmer Deazley, 'Commentary On: Fine Art Copyright Act (1862)', supra note 8. 
12 Lord Herschell, 'Copyright in Books', in Sessional Papers House of Lords (ed.), (Vol. 3, Bill No. 21. 
Birrell, 1898). This bill has not been enacted into legislation. 
13 This was confirmed in a bill proposition that has not been enacted, see, ibid. section 11, p. 210. 
14 Elizabeth M Saunders, 'Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the Originality Standard 
Allow Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection', Notre Dame L. Review, 62 (1986). p. 766  
15 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States at 58 
16 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2 vols. 
(Fourth edn., 1: LexisNexis, 2011). at 3.57. 
17 Jeannie Suk, 'Originality', Harvard Law Review, 115 HVLR (2002). p. 1988 
18 J.G.H. Griffin, 'The Need for a New Paradigm in Ip Law: A Focus on Authorship', Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 14/3 (2005). p. 269 
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though it stares you in the face.”19 In terms of deciding its level or borders, it is argued 
that the evaluation of artistic value or the artistic merit of the work should be excluded. 
For that Macqueen confirms: “even the most mundane of works, rehearsing old ideas 
and information has copyright if expressed in the author’s own way.”20 Laddie et. al. 
also argue that whatever the kind of work, literary, dramatic or artistic, it may enjoy 
protection, even though it is devoid of any aesthetic merit21. 
It is worth referring, as well, to the lingual meaning of originality, as it refers to ‘The 
ability to think independently and creatively; or the quality of being novel or unusual’.22 
However, the ambiguity of the term ‘original’ is the main cause of the ambiguity around 
copyrightability that is embodied in the conflict of Courts’ decisions and, accordingly, in 
copyright law, “it is very difficult if not impossible to state with any precision what 
copyright law means when it demands that works be original”23 
Bently suggests that originality’s main function is limiting the copyright protection term 
through preventing already protected works from gaining further protection or extending 
the term of that protection. 24 He finds that this function can be fulfilled by requiring that 
the work, in order to get copyright protection must not already exist. This is what is 
required from the entrepreneurial works to be protected, although originality is not 
required there, consequently ‘originality’ should have another meaning or should do 
something more, but “what this is, however, is unclear”.25 
The originality stipulation or significance has floundered between two extremes. On the 
one hand, there are those who have considered originality the main threshold of 
copyright law, “the concept of originality which is the premise of copyright law”26, and 
that the extent of the copyrightability of works is dependent on the interpretation of this 
                                                          
19 Friedrich Nietzsche was a German philologist, philosopher, cultural critic, poet and composer, (1844-
1900) 
20 H.L. MacQueen et al., Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, UK, 
2011).Para 2.35 
21 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
16, at 3.28 
22 See, Oxford Dictionary, it is a synonym for, inventiveness, ingenuity, creativeness, creativity. See, 
'Oxford Dictionaries', <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/originality>, last accessed 
12/2013.. In the Cambridge Dictionary it means ‘the quality of being special and interesting and not the 
same as anything or anyone else’, see, 'Cambridge Dictionaries Online', 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/originality>, last accessed 12/2013. 
23 L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, supra note 10, p. 93 
24 Ibid.p. 94 
25 Ibid.p. 94 
26 Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 1981, 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., United 
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. at 1368 also, Olson confirmed “originality has long and consistently 
been judicially required for protection.” See Dale P Olson, 'Copyright Originality', Missouri Law Review, 48 
(1983). p. 31. In Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc it was stated that “the one indispensable element of 
authorship is originality.” See Puddu V. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 1971, 450 F.2d 401, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuitat 402 
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term. Abrams, for instance, confirms its role in the authorship practice as 
copyrightability, “the question of originality, the threshold standard of qualification for 
copyright protection, is at the core of copyrightability.”27 Besides, the US Congress 
confirms that originality was enacted to prohibit courts from protecting works that the 
constitution meant to unprotect, or unprotecting works that were meant to be 
protected.28  
On the other hand, there are others who have denied the requirement or importance of 
originality at all, like Sherwin29, who argues that the creation of art in general is a 
process of building over preceding generations’ creations, and the work can be original 
only if the creator was hidden from all visual experiences.30 He concludes that 
originality in art “does not exist” 31, justifying this with a claim that how would painters 
learn to hold the paintbrush, and how would photographers know that cameras are 
used for taking photographs, unless they had experience from living and preceding 
artists, thus “nothing is original”.32 So, he confirms that what the best artists can do is to 
“offer a unique adaptation of ideas that have been already explored”.33 This thesis 
argues that Sherwin has interpreted originality in an extreme way that is equal to 
novelty, and that such a meaning is not actually applied in copyright law. Judge 
Learned Hand in Sheldon v. Metro,34 confirmed this view: “copyrighted work, unlike 
patent, need not be new as well as original.”35 
2.4 The Development of Originality in Case Law: 
Though it is believed that originality appeared in case law in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, especially in the cases of Lewis v. Fullarton36 and Jarrod v. 
Houlston,37 this thesis argues that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, in Gyles v. Wilcox,38 
initiated the requirement for a ‘criterion’ in order to obtain copyright protection under the 
                                                          
27 Howard B Abrams, 'Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law', Law & Comtemporary Problems Journal, 
55 (1992). p. 4 
28 House of Representatives, 'Rep No 1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 51', (1976). , and, Senate Report, 'Rep. 
No 473, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 50', (1975). 
29 Sherwin is an art critic, blogger, curator, artist and writer based near Chicago, Illinois. He has been 
published in Hi Fructose Magazine, Illinois Times, The Huffington Post, The Boston Globe, and Juxtapoz 
Magazine. 
30 Brian Sherwin, 'The Origins of Original Art: The Stepping Stone of Originality in Art', Fine Art Views 
<http://faso.com/fineartviews/33317/the-origins-of-original-art-the-stepping-stone-of-originality-in-art>, last 
accessed 07/12/2013. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Sheldon V. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 1936, 81 F.2d 49, Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
35 Ibid. at 49 
36 Lewis V. Fullarton 1839, 48 E.R. 1080,  
37 Jarrold V. Houlston, 1857, 69 E.R. 1294,  
38 Gyles V. Wilcox, 1740, 27 E.R. 682, 368, Barnardiston Chancery 
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Statute of Anne.39 That was when he said: “[w]hen Complaints have been made of a 
Book's being printed contrary to the Statute, the only Question has been, whether it is 
the same Book with the former?” 40 [Underlining added] Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
considered this condition or requirement to be an interpretation of the “intention of the 
legislature”. 41 However, he did not use the term ‘original’, but his expression holds the 
substance of being original. 
Although we showed in the introduction how mental creation was the basis of 
conferring protection to works, whether before or after the Statute of Anne, the case of 
Gyles v. Wilcox 42 in 1740 represented the confusion that ‘low authorship’ and ‘non-
authorship’ works43 may cause to the copyright criteria interpretation, even before 
giving it the name ‘originality’. As regards ‘abridgments’, a work that relies heavily on 
previous works, the Court used personal and usefulness justifications to confer 
protection to them. That was evident when Lord Chancellor Hardwicke stated, 
“abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because … the invention, 
learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them, and in many cases are 
extremely useful.”44 [Underlining added] Although the expressions ‘invention’, ‘learning’, 
and ‘judgment’ refer to the requirement of a high level of creation and authorship or to 
mental efforts, Lord Hardwicke approached copyright and patent through the word 
‘invention’, as a description of both. On the other hand, the use of the expression 
‘extremely useful’ raises the question about which philosophy the Court adopted in 
considering the work copyrightable: is it the high and original authorship, or the utility of 
the work? 
Mr Justice Willes in Millar v. Taylor45 stated at the beginning of this case that “[i]t is 
found ‘that the work is an original composition’ …” 46 This might be the first mention of 
‘originality’ terminology in the decisions of courts in the UK. He even confirmed 
afterwards that: “[c]ertain bonâ fide imitations, translations, and abridgments are 
different; and, in respect of the property, may be considered as new works; but 
colourable and fraudulent variations will not do.”47 Herein, Mr Justice Willes required 
that works should not be a colourful variation of the antecedent work to obtain copyright 
                                                          
39 'Statute of Anne', 8 Anne, c. 19 (England, 1710). 
40 Gyles V. Wilcox, 27 E.R. 682, 368, supra note 38, at 143 
41 Ibid. at 143 
42 Ibid. at 143. Accordingly, this thesis argues that such expressions refer to the requirement for creativity 
or a high level of originality, not a low level of originality, as detailed in Chapter 4 at 4.4 
43 See, for clarification, Chapter 1 at 1.1 
44 Gyles V. Wilcox, 27 E.R. 682, 368, supra note 38, at 143 
45 Millar V. Taylor, 1769, 4 Burrow 2303, Court of King's Bench 
46 Ibid. at 206 
47 Ibid. at 206  
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protection; this reflects a kind of high originality interpretation and special treatment for 
translation and abridgment. 
Likewise, in Millar v. Taylor,48 Mr Justice Yates equated patent and copyright in 
requiring originality for both and calling them inventions, “[b]oth original inventions 
stand upon the same footing, in point of property; whether the case be mechanical, or 
literary; whether it be an epic poem, or an orrery. The inventor of the one, as well as 
the author of the other, has a right to determine ‘whether the world shall see it or 
not.’”49 The main focus of the statement is the exclusive rights of authors and inventors, 
however the expression ‘original inventions’ was meant to be applied to both inventions 
and literary works. 
It is worth noting, and of special significance for this thesis’s argument, the reference 
by Mr Justice Yates to the mind faculties of the author that are manifest in the work. 
This was stated when he talked first about “Mr. Harrison's time-piece; which is said to 
have cost him twenty years application”50 and afterwards, he equated this invention 
with the writing of the ‘Seasons’, as both used ‘all faculties of the mind’, as he 
commented, “Mr. Harrison (whom I mentioned before) employed at least as much time 
and labour and study upon his time-keeper as Mr Thomson could do in writing his 
Seasons for, in planning that machine, all the faculties of the mind must be fully 
exerted. As far as value is a mark of property, Mr Harrison's time-piece is, surely, as 
valuable in itself, as Mr Thomson's Seasons.”51 [Underlining added] Mr Justice Aston in 
the same case  added that “[t]he present claim is founded upon the original right to this 
work, as being the mental labour of the author; and that the effect and produce of the 
labour is his. It is a personal, incorporeal property.”52 [Underlining added] 
Mr Justice Aston added another dimension when he considered that the thoughts and 
sensations in books are the main determinant of its copyrightability. This was in his 
comparison between invention and copyright and gave more protection and 
monopolisation to copyright, and he justified this by arguing that, “the difference 
consists in this, that the property of the maker of a mechanical engine is confined to 
that individual thing which he has made; that the machine made in imitation or 
resemblance of it, is a different work in substance, materials, labour and expense, in 
which the maker of the original machine cannot claim any property; for it is not his, but 
only a resemblance of his, whereas the reprinted book is the very same substance; 
because its doctrine and sentiments are its essential and substantial part; and the 
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. at 247 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. at 247 
52 Ibid. at 221 
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printing of it is a mere mechanical act, and the method only of publishing and 
promulgating the contents of the book. The composition therefore is the substance: the 
paper, ink, type, only the incidents or vehicle.”53 [Underlining added] In brief he 
confirmed “[t]he imitated machine, therefore, is a new and a different work: the literary 
composition, printed on another man's paper, is still the same.” 54 
This proves not just that the copyright of the author in his work is more inherent than is 
that of the invention in this age, but also – which is of special importance to this thesis’s 
argument - the literary work’s manifestation of ‘doctrine and sentiments’ are the 
characteristics of literary works in that age. Although Mr Justice Aston was talking 
about the reproduction of the book, this statement says that in imitation, the existence 
of sentiments and its doctrine is an inhibitor to considering the work as original work, 
accordingly, some alteration in the sensations expressed or the doctrine followed in 
expressing them should be present in order to consider the work original. 
These arguments prove the high level of originality required in cases that followed the 
Statute of Anne to approve the conferral of copyright , as the origination of the work by 
the author or not copying from previous work were insufficient, but it is the mental effort 
and the intellectual originality that can make the work copyrightable. Also, in Millar v. 
Taylor the distinction was apparent between whether the work bears the thoughts of its 
author or the thoughts of another person and the author just performs ‘improvements’ 
for “the improvement is the title to the merit of the invention: but the original thought 
and first attempt belongs to another person, and probably would never have occurred 
to the improver.”55 However, when the matter is related to factual works, confusion 
starts to emerge, for instance, in the Morris v. Ashbee Case56, although the Court 
explicitly confirmed that ‘originality’ cannot be found in just the arrangement of facts, 
“[t]here can be no copyright in the mere arrangement and plan of the Plaintiff's work, 
which is not original in this respect.”57 [Underlining added] The Court allowed for 
protection of directories.58 
                                                          
53 Ibid. at 227 
54 Ibid. at 227 
55 Ibid. at 263 
56 Morris V. Ashbee, 1868, L.R. 7 Eq. 34, Giffard, V. C. 
57 Ibid. at 37 
58 Ibid. 
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Cases after the Statute of 1911: 
The Copyright Act of 191159 explicitly stated the condition of ‘originality’ in s.1 (1) which 
provided that “subject to the provisions of this act, copyright shall subsist … in every 
original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work.”60  
This thesis contends that after this express requirement of ‘originality’, courts began to 
question whether a work is original or not and ignored asking whether the work is prima 
facie a literary work or not, whether there is an authorship and authorial contribution? 
The debate around the interpretation of originality began by Judge Peterson in 
University of London v. University Tutorial61, when he stated “the Act does not require 
that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be 
copied from another work—that it should originate from the author.” 62 Judge Peterson 
here changed the meaning of originality in its historical context, as stated in the above 
cases (i.e. Millar v. Taylor63 and Gyles v. Wilcox64). Instead of requiring a degree of 
difference in the work, or something that reflects the author’s personality and which 
appears in his ideas and sensations, he interpreted it to mean ‘non-copying’ from 
another work. This thesis asserts that this is the main step taken on the way to 
distorting the originality requirement and authorship concept in modern copyright law in 
the UK. 
The scepticism on the copyrightability of works with no clear authorial contribution and 
the desire to protect works with any justification was obvious also in Judge Peterson’s65 
statement “[i]f an author, for purposes of copyright, must not draw on the stock of 
knowledge which is common to himself and others who are students of the same 
branch of learning, only those historians who discovered fresh historical facts could 
acquire copyright for their works.”66 [Underling added] It is argued that Judge Peterson 
was confused regarding the copyrightability of facts, which is apparent from the 
contradiction between the latter statement and his belief that the author should be a 
genius -which is understood from the latter underlining statement. This is the reason for 
the low level of originality that he adopted. In older cases discussed above, whether the 
subject matter was abridgments (in Gyles v. Wilcox and Millar v. Taylor) translations 
(Millar v. Taylor), directories (Morris v. Ashbee), or maps (Carnan v. Bowles), it was 
                                                          
59 'An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Copyright', Copyright Act, 1911 (Great Britain, 
1911). 
60 Ibid. §.1 (1) 
61 University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 1916, 2 Ch. 601, Chancery Division 
62 Ibid. at 609 
63 Millar V. Taylor, 4 Burrow 2303, supra note 45. 
64 Gyles V. Wilcox, 27 E.R. 682, 368, supra note 38. 
65 University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 2 Ch. 601, supra note 61. 
66 Ibid. at 609 
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never discussed whether the author should rely on facts in common knowledge, or not, 
because this is out of the discussion, as facts can never get protection or justify 
protection 
This approach by Judge Peterson paved the way for every work to gain copyright 
protection, regardless of any conditions, especially under his renowned statement 
“what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.” 67  
In the US: 
Courts in the US showed conflicting interpretations regarding the level of criteria that 
should be adopted in deciding the protection of intellectual works. For instance, in the 
1879 case of Trade-Mark Cases. v. Steffens 68 the Court assessed whether trademarks 
could be protected under copyright law or not. It found that the objections to this step 
are strong since copyright law protects only literary works that are works of mind and 
shows creativity, “while the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to 
include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and 
are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected 
are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, 
and the like.”69 [Underlining added] This shows how the understanding of copyright 
protection to literary works has presumed the intervention of mental effort and personal 
authorship in the creation of these works.  
This was confirmed also in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony70 when, although 
the debated work was a photograph, and despite the scepticism about the mechanical 
process of producing them, Judge Miller argued that in any work the author should 
prove the existence of the “originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and 
conception on the part of the author.”71 Notice here how the originality criterion has 
been entrenched in the US doctrine since the Copyright Act, and how from the outset it 
was attached to values of personality and mental effort.  
                                                          
67 Ibid. at 609, this thesis questions the situation of Judge Peterson’s refusal to consider the work of 
defendants as original work, although they added their own answers and criticism to the question of the 
plaintiffs, and the mention of the questions was not the essential work. The question is raised by this thesis 
because Judge Peterson earlier argued that it suffices that the expression belongs to the author, and is not 
copied and that “what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting” and the defendants’ work was 
undoubtedly worth copying. This thesis argues that Judge Peterson sufficed by expressing his personal 
objection to conferring protection to the defendants’ work, although he confirmed that “[b]oth publications 
are intended for educational purposes and for the use of students,” ibid. at 609. 
68 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 1879, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, 
Supreme Court of the United States 
69 Ibid. at 94 
70 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 15. 
71 Ibid. at 282 
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However, when the subject of the case is a low or a non-authorship work72 (database, 
compilations, abridgments, etc.) the confusion began to appear. For instance, just three 
years after the last case, in the case of List Pub. Co. v. Keller,73 although Judge 
Wallace argued, that the work was original due to the selection and judgment - “[t]hey 
are original to the extent that the selection is original. Their commercial value depends 
upon the judgment and knowledge of the author …”74 However, he finds that the nature 
of these works requires a protection for more than just the selection, because “the 
compiler of such a directory uses a previous directory of the same character, to save 
himself the trouble of making an independent selection” 75 which make the copyright 
protection to these works useless. 
Then the interest of the judge in this case was transferred to a deeper stage and looks 
beyond the work itself and its characteristics to the process of creating the work, and 
the subject matter is transferred from the original work to the original labour used to 
create the work. “The question in the case is whether the defendant, in compiling his 
directory, has done so by his own original labor, or whether, in order to spare himself 
time and expense …” 76 as the next compiler “has no right to take … the results of the 
labor and expense” 77 of the original author. Also, in Batlin v. Snyder78 the Court ruled 
that ‘non-copying’ from other works sufficed to confer copyright protection. 79 
These cases show how factual works, or in fact the decisions of the Judges dealing 
with factual works, were the reason for the confusion that has continued until today 
regarding the interpretation of originality. In the US, the development that followed the 
List Pub. Co. v. Keller80 case was the adoption of the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, and 
continued until cases like Feist v. Rural81 that attempted to return to the first cases and 
retrieve the origins and theoretically orthodox principles of copyright law that were 
                                                          
72 For the definition of low and non- authorship works see Chapter 1 at 1.3 
73 List Pub. Co. V. Keller, 1887, 30 F. 772, Circuit Court, S.D. New York. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 L. Batlin & Son, Inc., V. Jeffrey Snyder and Etna Products Co., 1976, 536 F.2d 486, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
79 Ibid. at 491. As it stated “[o]riginality, as copyright prerequisite, means that work owes its creation to its 
author, and this in turn means that work must not consist of actual copying”. 
80 List Pub. Co. V. Keller, 30 F. 772, supra note 73 
81 See, Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991, 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 
Supreme Court of the United States 
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apparent in Trade-Mark Cases. v. Steffens 82, and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony .83  
2.5 Conflict in Decisions on Copyright Subsistence: 
In this section the thesis will present some examples of the conflict of decisions that 
result from the different interpretations that Judges give to originality, although the 
interpretations of originality will be detailed in the next Chapter.  
An important case is the US case of Bridgeman v. Corel84, that had an impact on UK 
law also, as Judge Kaplan confirmed that the photographic transparencies of other 
works of arts in the public domain, created by ‘Bridgeman’ and sold on CDs, are not 
eligible for copyright protection, due to a lack of sufficient originality85. The Judge here 
interpreted originality as requiring the ‘independent creation’ of the author, besides he 
required a ‘distinguishable variation’ of the work from pre-existing works86. Judge 
Kaplan confirmed that this lack of originality is recognised both in the UK and US laws, 
as he stated, “Bridgeman's images lack sufficient originality to be copyrightable under 
the UK… the court would reach the same result under United States law”87. 
[Underlining added] Even after reargument and reconsideration of the case by the 
plaintiff, Judge Kaplan confirmed this result88.  
On the other hand, we find another court has made a completely different decision in a 
case with facts close to those in the above case. In the case of Alfred Bell v. Catalda89 
Judge Smith explained that the plaintiff ‘Bell’ had aimed to produce mezzotint 
engravings that ‘faithfully’ reproduced paintings in the public domain, so that “the basic 
idea, arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the original artist.”90 
He outlined that there was a ‘long’ and ‘tedious’ process in making these 
reproductions.91 In addition, Judge Smith confirms that “[t]he engraver is not trying to 
                                                          
82 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, supra note 
68. 
83 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 15. 
84 For Trial Court see, Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 1999, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, United States 
District Court, S.D. New York.; and for the reconsideration of the case see, The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. 
V. Corel Corporation, Et Ano., 1999, 36 F.Supp.2d 191 United States District Court, S.D. New York.  
85 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, supra note 84, at 427 
86 Ibid. at 427 
87 Ibid. at 427 
88 The Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corporation, Et Ano., 36 F.Supp.2d 191 supra note 84. 
89 For Trial Court see, the Interlocutory Judgment Alfred Bell & Co. V. Catalda Fine Arts, 1947, 74 F.Supp. 
973, District Court, S.D. New York.; and Alfred Bell & Co. V. Catalda Fine Arts, 1949, 86 F.Supp. 399, 
United States District Court, S.D. New York.; for Appellate Court see, Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda 
Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 1951, 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
90 Alfred Bell & Co. V. Catalda Fine Arts, 74 F.Supp. 973, supra note  89, at 975 
91 Ibid. at 975. As it stated “It is a tedious process requiring skill and patience and is, therefore, rather 
expensive compared with modern color photographic processes. The artists employed to produce these 
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alter or improve on the old master. He is trying to express in another medium what the 
original artist expressed in oils on canvas.”92 However, he decided that the treatment of 
the same work in another medium is original. 93 The thesis argues that this decision is 
defective.  
It may be argued that Judge Smith’s decision was affected by the long and tedious 
process of making these reproductions, which cannot be applied in photography, so it 
may be thought that the Alfred Bell v. Catalda94 and Bridgeman v. Corel95 cases are not 
in conflict. Surprisingly, in the Alfred Bell Case, Judge Smith exposed to the analysis of 
the photography made of these engravings, and he contended that they were original 
works and deserved copyright protection, even if they were reproducing works in the 
public domain.96 This result was also confirmed by Judge Frank in the Court of Appeal 
Second Circuit, where he compared the ‘novelty’ required in patent law and the 
condition that the work should ‘owe its origin to the author’, which he argued to be the 
only threshold for conferring copyright protection.97 Consequently, he conferred 
copyright protection for the engravings because they belonged to their creators. 
The collision is thus evident between Judge Kaplan in Bridgeman v. Corel ,98 who 
refused to confer copyright protection for the photography of old paintings, and Judges 
Smith and Frank, in the case of Alfred Bell v. Catalda,99 who conferred copyright 
protection for similar works (engravings reproducing paintings) and even the same 
work (photography of engravings). The analysis of these two decisions will assume one 
of two approaches. The first approach is that we have to research the artistic value of 
the debated photographic works to decide which case is protected and which 
prohibited or not encouraged within copyright law doctrine, and this is largely 
unfavourable according to copyright law principles. As Mr Justice Holmes confirms “it 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in law to constitute 
themselves final Judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations.”100 The second approach 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mezzotint engravings in suit attempted faithfully to reproduce paintings in the mezzotint medium so that 
the basic idea, arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the original artist.” 
92 Ibid.at 976 
93 Ibid. 89 at 976 he added also, “it is a distinguishable effect which can itself be copied by photography. 
The engraver's contribution to the world's art is indeed modest, but it is his own and should be protected.” 
see, ibid. 89 at 976 
94 Ibid. 89 
95 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, supra note 84. 
96 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 89, at 
977, but in this case, of course, photographs were made of protected copyrighted works, as both courts 
decided. 
97 Ibid. at 102 
98 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, supra note 84. 
99 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 89. 
100 Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 1903, 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, Supreme Court of the 
United States at 251. 
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is to confess the existence of conflict in decisions in conferring copyright law protection, 
and the need to find a solution that can achieve some stability and certainty, and that 
what this thesis aims for.101 
Another example of the conflict between judicial decisions is related to originality and 
the fact/expression dichotomy.102 In the case of Miller v. Universal Studios,103 the 
plaintiff Gene Miller wrote a book called ‘83 Hours Till Dawn’ about an actual 
kidnapping incident, and he engaged in research and interviews and used the style and 
techniques of exciting writing about historical events in the context normally used for 
crime novels.104 Universal Studios (the defendant) relied on his book in producing film 
called ‘The Longest Night’. Judge Roettger, of the District Court, found that there was 
proven access by the defendant to the work of the plaintiff, with evidence that even 
mistakes made by Miller were copied into the film,105 and proved substantial similarity 
through the expert witness and a jury verdict,106 although, there was an evidence that 
the scriptwriter was told that the use of Miller book is ‘verboten’.107 
Depending on the US (and partly in the UK) rule that if there is no direct evidence of 
copying it is proper to rely on two factors. Proving access to the copyrighted work, and 
the substantial similarity between the two works,108 Judge Roettger decided that there 
was an infringement by the defendant of the plaintiff’s work. Judge Roettger deemed 
this approach more suitable to the spirit of copyright law: “[i]n the age of television 
‘docudrama’ to hold other than research is copyrightable is to violate the spirit of the 
copyright law and to provide to those persons and corporations lacking in requisite 
diligence and ingenuity a license to steal.”109 
However, Judge Roney of the Appellate Court argued that there was a statement that 
deemed the District Court decision reversible, which is the instruction to the jury that 
‘research is copyrightable’. And that was the substantial question Judge Roney tried to 
answer: is research copyrightable? Depending on his own investigation he decided to 
                                                          
101 See next paragraphs for more details about this conflict.  
102It means, in brief, that facts are not copyrightable, but the expression of the facts or the mould that facts 
are put in is copyrightable, see Chapter 6 at 6.9 
103 For the Trial Court, Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 1978, 460 F.Supp. 984, United States District 
Court, S. D. Florida; and the Appellate Court, Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 650 F.2d 
1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., supra note 26. 
104 Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 984, supra note 103, at 984 
105 Ibid.at 985 
106 Ibid. at 986-88 
107 Ibid. at 986 
108 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas (M. Bender, 1990). at s 13.01(B) 
109 Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 984, supra note 103, at 988 
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reverse and remand the case. Judge Roney cited Rosemont v. Random House110 and 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios111 as supportive cases to his argument.112 While 
Circuit Judge Moore of the Rosemont case rejected the protection of research and any 
efforts to prepare the work, and even the independent research doctrine, as a threshold 
for copyrightability.113 The Court in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios gave the 
argument briefly in one statement: “the protection afforded the copyright holder has 
never extended to history, be it documented fact or explanatory hypothesis.”114 Judge 
Roney considered this approach beneficial for copyright law policy as he confirmed “[i]t 
provides a means of balancing the public's interest in stimulating creative activity, as 
embodied in the Copyright Clause, against the public's need for unrestrained access to 
information.”115 This thesis attempts to support this approach for the same reason: 
‘stimulating creativity’. 
On the other hand, the cases Toksvig v. Bruce116 and Rosemont v. Random House117 
have debated the copyrightability of ‘research’ performed in the process to reach facts 
used for creating works. In the former case, independent work was considered an 
important element in conferring copyright protection to works; consequently, the 
defendant could get the same information (passages from biographical work that was 
extracted from Danish resources) by going through to the original resources.118 Here, 
the touchstone is “whether she [the defendant] in fact had done her own independent 
research”.119 On the other hand, the latter case rejected the dependence on 
‘independent research’ and tended towards banning the protection of facts and ideas at 
all, as it considered that the fair use doctrine was intended to save time and effort for 
subsequent authors120. It confirmed: “[i]t is just such wasted effort that the proscription 
                                                          
110 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 1966a, 366 F.2d 303, United States Court of 
Appeals Second Circuit 
111 Hoehling V. Universal City Studios, 1980, 618 F.2d 972, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
112 As he stated “We find the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Hoehling and Rosemont to be more 
consistent with the purpose and intended scope of protection under the copyright law than that implied by 
Toksvig.” See, Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., 
supra note 26, at 1371. 
113 See, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, supra note 110, at 310 
114 Hoehling V. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, supra note 111, at 974 
115 Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., supra note 
26, at 1371 
116 Toksvig V. Bruce Pub. Co., 1950, 181 F.2d 664, United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit 
117 For Trial Court see, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 1966j, 256 F.Supp. 55, United 
States District Court S.D. New York. For Appellate Court see, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random 
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, supra note 110. 
118 Toksvig V. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, supra note 116, at 666 
119 Ibid. at 667. 
120 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 256 F.Supp. 55, supra note  117, at 258 
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against the copyright of ideas and facts, and to a lesser extent the privilege of fair use, 
are designed to prevent.”121  
In addition, the Toksvig Court confirmed that using a precedent biography’s translation 
in a foreign language to make a new biography is not fair use, as it saved two thirds of 
the time that was required to create the pre-existent biography, consequently, this was 
deemed as infringement. 122 On the contrary, in Rosemont case the Court argued that 
the author is not precluded from saving “time and effort by referring to and relying upon 
prior published material”.123 Subsequently, the Court of the latter case confirmed that 
the narration of historical events, although its form of expression is copyrighted, it 
cannot be monopolised, 124 even it argued that there is no infringement of copyright law 
in the biographies that rely heavily on precedent articles or magazine reports.125 
Additionally, the Rosemont Court confirmed that the people who enter the public arena 
should ease their privacy right for the sake of the public right to get information about 
public figures.126 Note here the contrast in the interpretation of copyright principles 
adopted in every case, the Toksvig Court believed that copyright law prohibited the 
saving of time and effort by the next creators, however, the Rosemont Court believed 
the opposite, as it argued that copyright law does not forbid the saving of time and 
effort, and the fair use doctrine is designed to achieve this purpose. 
Regarding the fair use claim by the defendant in both cases, the Rosemont Court 
called for the need in giving priority to the public interest in the development of art over 
the copyright holder’s interest in financial return.127 It confirmed that quoting directly 
from precedent biographies is permitted as it encourages the “development and 
distribution of historical and biographical works.” 128 The Toksvig Court, on the other 
hand, claims that it is not a matter of whether the defendant has obtained the 
information from the same resources, but it is rather whether he has done his own 
independent research which confers originality to the work, or whether he has just 
made unfair use of others’ works.129 This reflects a huge gap of understanding in 
interpreting the originality criteria in copyright law and what the justification of protection 
granted is, and whether it is realised in their respective cases, or not.  
                                                          
121 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, supra note 110, at 303. 
122 Toksvig V. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, supra note 116, at 664. 
123 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, supra note 110, at 303. 
124 Ibid. at 303, 306. 
125 Ibid. at 303, 306. 
126 Ibid. at 303. 
127 Ibid. at 307. 
128 Ibid. at 303. 
129 Toksvig V. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, supra note 116, at 665. 
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Another important factor on which both courts disagreed over is the role of financial 
return in deciding infringement; the Toksvig Court argued that although the 
appropriation did not prejudice the sale of the plaintiff’s work, it held that there was an 
infringement of copyright law even if there was no financial loss. 130 On the other hand, 
the Rosemont Court decided that due to there being no actual damage suffered by the 
claimant, and that because there was no competition between the two works, so the 
preliminary injunction was not justified and the infringement claim could not be 
backed.131 
Finally, it is worth referring to two cases under the same law, the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which adopted contradicting views regarding the interpretation of originality. In the 
Schroeder v. William Morrow 132 case in 1977 the judge adopted the ‘sweat of the brow’ 
doctrine when he stated “only ‘industrious collection’,… is required.” 133 However, in the 
Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Service 134 case in 1985 the seventh court 
confirmed on the abandonment of the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine when stated that 
“[t]he copyright laws protect the work, not the amount of effort expended.” 135 Also it 
explained “[i]n each case the copyright depended on the fact that the compiler made a 
contribution-a new arrangement or presentation of facts-and not on the amount of time 
the work consumed.” 136 This represents the conflict of courts’ interpretations of 
copyright law principles and justifications. 
It is worth referring here to a more evident example of misinterpretation of legislation 
texts for the sake of benefitting specific parties in cases. This is regarding the 
interpretation of the DMCA.137 As plaintiffs depend on this Act to intimidate their 
competitors from circumventing the technological protection measures (TPMs) they 
used to protect their works, even if they benefited from fair use permission according to 
the DMCA itself.138 For instance, although the DMCA has stressed the respect for the 
fair use doctrine, as it provided that: “[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, 
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,”139 we 
                                                          
130 Ibid. at 665. 
131 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. V. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, supra note 110, at 303. 
132 Schroeder V. William Morrow & Co., 1977, 566 F.2d 3, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
133 Ibid. at 5 
134 Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. V. Directory Service Co. Of Colorado, Inc., 1985, 768 F.2d 145, United 
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
135 Ibid. at 148 
136 Ibid. at 149 
137 'The Digital Millennium Copyright Act', (U.S., 1998). 
138 See, Jacques Dewerra, 'The Legal System of Technological Protection Measures under the Wipo 
Treaties, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the European Union Directives and Other National Laws 
(Japan, Australia)', Alai Congress: Adjuncts and Alternatives To Copyright (2001). Para. IV (a); and 
Pamela Samuelson, 'Intelletual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to Be Revised', Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 14 (1999). p. 519  
139 S 1201 (c), of 'The Digital Millennium Copyright Act', supra note 137. 
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find Judge Newman in the Universal City Studios v. Corley140case confirming that 
Congress intentionally declined to incorporate the fair use defence into anti-
circumvention violations,141 and his reply to the appellants’ argument, that the law 
allowed the circumvention when the conditions of fair use are available, was that “[t]he 
Appellants' much more expansive interpretation of subsection 1201(c)(1) is not only 
outside the range of plausible readings of the provision, but is also clearly refuted by 
the statute's legislative history.”142  
This case led to the belief that the practical implementation of laws is accompanied by 
misinterpretation in order to favour the right holders’ financial interests over the users’ 
or competitors’ fair rights. The same attitude is reflected in the case of Universal City 
Studios v. Reimerdes143, when Judge Kaplan argued that “nothing in DMCA suggested 
that the fair use defense was available”144 he added that “[i]f Congress had meant the 
fair use defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so.” 145 As a result, he 
conditioned authorised access in order to allow fair use,146 which, in fact, empties the 
fair use doctrine of its substance. 
2.6 Conclusion: The Need for a Stable Copyright Subsistence System 
Landes and Posner believe that the condition of originality in copyright law, and even 
novelty in patent law, are not mechanical or stable criteria that will settle the matter of 
protection in a strict manner, for authors and publishers cannot be sure in advance of 
litigation whether their work is protected or not.147 Ginsburg stressed also, “Within a 
single jurisdiction, the requisite level of originality may vary with the nature of the 
work”.148 Although this argument reflects an actual experience of what can be seen in 
copyright decisions, this thesis argues that this dilemma should be resolved, and the 
solution lies in the last expression of Ginsburg “the nature of the work”. 149 This thesis 
finds that this ‘nature’ is the reason for the uncertainty, and it is the solution also, as the 
nature of works can categorise them and accordingly establish copyright criteria that 
can suit every category.150 
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 The hesitant and uncertain status of copyright protection has influenced ‘predictability’, 
which is the main factor in modern legal rules. The 1996 Green Paper of the EU 
Commission on copyright151 mentioned that “[e]ffective exploitation of works and other 
related matter across the EU therefore requires clear predictability for right holders and 
users on what exactly is protected, … [as] [t]he present situation is characterised by 
legal uncertainty.”152 [Underlining added] It is evident from this statement that, firstly, 
there is a confession of the existence of uncertainty in copyright subsistence decisions. 
Secondly, that this uncertainty is an undesired status for users and right holders on 
which works are protected, and that there is also a need for a legal certainty. 
The need for a stable and predictable life that Maslow's hierarchy153 included 
undoubtedly comprises stability in the judicial system, so that authors, users and 
producers can have a predictable industry and practice.154 This is something that the 
nature of humanity calls for after fulfilling survival needs (food, clothing, and shelter), as 
stability is a major element in the safety that humans need because “apparently growth 
forward customarily takes place in little steps, and each step forward is made possible 
by the feeling of being safe … assured safety permits higher needs and impulses to 
emerge and to grow towards mastery.”155 
This thesis will not delve into theoretical discussions about whether the law should exist 
and reflect legal concepts of positivism,156 natural law,157 or realism,158 as such 
                                                          
151 Commission Of The European Communities, 'Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society ', Communication From The Commission (Brussels, 1996 ). 
152 Ibid. The full context is “The exclusive right of reproduction is one of the core rights of intellectual 
property ("copyright"). Effective exploitation of works and other related matter across the EU therefore 
requires clear predictability for right holders and users on what exactly is protected as well as an 
equivalent level of protection across the EU with respect to this important right. The present situation is 
characterised by legal uncertainty” 
153 See, Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (3rd edn.; New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1998). at 2.4 
154 Ibid. at 2.4. 
155 Ibid.  
155 ibid.  
156 Positivism is a theoretical philosophy that accordingly enacted laws not morals are the source of 
regulation. Its major advocators are Bentham, Hart, Austin and Kelsen. See, Jeremy Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781).; Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political 
Economy (GP Putnam, 1839).; Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart and Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, The 
Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). and John Austin, ... Lectures on Jurisprudence: Or, the 
Philosophy of Positive Law (J. Murray, 1875). 
157 Natural law, moral law or metaphysics are expressing one philosophical doctrine that refers to that 
regulation of society should be governed by reason and ethics rather than enacted rules enacted by 
authorities. Its main advocators are John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Lon Fuller, and John Finnis. 
See, John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011).and Lon L Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (152: Yale University Press, 1969). 
158 Realism is a philosophy that accordingly the actual application or operation of law on grounds is what 
should be considered not the laws previously enacted. Its major advocators are Jerome Frank and 
Holmes. See, Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (6th edn.; London: stevens & Sons Limited, 1930). 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law (2009 edn.: The Floating Press, 1897). 
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discussion emerges a kind of endless confusion, reflected in the understandings of 
scholars of these theories. Some find that although “realism represents an assault on 
positivism”159 they treat the law ‘as it is’, which turns them into ‘positivists’, “realists are 
-paradoxically- considered positivists”160 even Alan Hunt describes realists as ‘a rather 
simplistic positivism’161, and Wacks confirms “the realists … their implicit conceptual 
loyalties were distinctly positivist.”162 Altman described that realists in defending their 
argument of the operation of the judiciary they presuppose a theory of law which is a 
kind of positivism.163 Furthermore, realists seek various scientific approaches in proving 
their perspective including sociology and psychology,164 which inspired Llewellyn to 
argue that realism “is not a philosophy-it is a technology”.165 
The question that needs to be answered here is: is the thesis’s argument, to find a 
solution to the conflict of juridical decisions, meaningful and needed? The answer to 
this question lies in supporting the concepts of certainty and stability of laws which are 
strongly opposed by realism theorists, Frank and Holmes’ thoughts may thus be those 
most related to this answer. Although certainty can be sought, Schulz argues that we 
first have to decide which meaning we refer to, as in one sense it can mean “the 
certainty that right will prevail in its struggle with wrong”166, in another sense, “certainty 
as to what is the law, its recognizable character and the predictability of the legal 
consequences [is] entailed by a particular set of facts”. 167 However, Frank had a 
renowned argument in this regard, as he finds that searching for certainty in law is like 
a child searching for emotional satiability by “hankering for the strict rules of the 
father”,168 eventually, Frank confirmed that the possibility that law can be “stationary 
and certain” is an “illusion or myth.”169 
                                                          
159 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory (Oxford University 
Press, 2012). p. 146. 
160 Ibid. p. 146.  
161 Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (Pluto 
Press, 1994). cited in Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory, 
supra note 159, p. 146. 
162 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory, supra note 159, p. 
147. 
163 Andrew Altman, 'Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin', Philosophy & public affairs,  
(1986).. 
164 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory, supra note 159, p. 
146. 
165 Karl N Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice (1: Transaction publishers, 2011). 
However, Leiter argues that realism and positivism are compatible at the philosophical or conceptual level, 
and realism needs positivism, but at the empirical level they disagree, and he even argues that no one 
legal philosopher “has actually provided a real argument against the Realist view.” See, Brian Leiter, 'Legal 
Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered', Ethics, 111/2 (2001). p. 280. 
166 Fritz Schulz and Marguerite Wolff, Principles of Roman Law (Clarendon Press, 1936). p. 258. 
167 Ibid. p. 258. 
168 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, supra note 158, p. 263. 
169 Ibid. p. 16. 
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Frank believed that the search for certainty in legal rules and application of law is a 
childish attitude “[t]he genealogy of legal myth-making may be traced as follows: 
childish dread of uncertainty and unwillingness to face legal realities produce a basic 
legal myth that law is completely settled and defined.”170 He describes the insistence on 
this childish attitude as, “fatuous insistence on illusory certainty, continuity and 
uniformity; wishful intellection which ignores, or tries to obliterate from cognizance, 
unpleasant circumstances- these are the marks of childish thought and often affect 
legal thinking.”171 
Although certainty is impossible to achieve in a perfect way, it is desirable and can be 
proportionally achieved, even Frank, although he confirms the uncertainty that the law 
has, considers this neither an inherent nor a desirable character, “it is simply not true 
that most of the ‘realists’ (and the writer in particular), to any greater extent than many 
of the ‘non-realists’ above cited, have expressed or implied a belief that imprecision in 
the legal rules is desirable.”172 What he meant is that the definition of the law as just 
being rules is considered a tightening of the scope of the real status of applicable law. 
He argues that “[t]he sceptics insist that legal rules exist and must be studied. But they 
say that knowledge of the rules is but a small part of what lawyers and Judges use in 
their work and that a definition of law as rules does an injury to clear thinking about 
law.”173 As he believes that the law, in fact, consists of decisions not rules and the 
judge is the person who makes the law. 174 
All Frank’s thoughts in this regard can be summarized not in the uncertainty or 
probability of the law, but in the definition of the law and the role of rules in its making, 
“[t]hat process of judging (which is law) is not to be confined within the compass of 
mere rules. The rules play only a subordinate role.”175 This was clear also in his focus 
on the law as being central to the work of the lawyer, and his refusal to define this focal 
point as consisting of legal rules, otherwise he finds that abolishing the word ‘law’ may 
be a solution. 
It is worth maintaining here that, firstly, Frank’s doctrine cannot be applied to all law 
rules, as uncertainty is harmful to many areas which these rules regulate. For instance, 
                                                          
170 Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Government in a Democracy (Harper & Brothers, 
1942). p. 304. 
171 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, supra note 158, p. 82. 
172 Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Government in a Democracy, supra note 170, p. 
304. 
173 Jerome Frank, 'Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That 
Judges Behave Like Human Beings', University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register,  
(1931). p. 45. 
174 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, supra note 158, p. 127. 
175 Ibid. p. 274. 
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Fligstein confirms that “unstable market relations threaten the survival of all firms. 
Governments intervene to produce rules to promote stability.”176 Secondly, the 
philosophy of Frank, from the point of view that laws cannot be eternally certain and 
accepted, is correct for any human act, even facts and discoveries still have some 
percentage of uncertainty. That is what Brierly confirmed when he stated that even if 
legal rules were enacted in a determined and stable way, the facts to which these rules 
are applied can never be expressly determined and are always rare, obscure or 
disputed. “Certainty is an ideal that law must never cease to aim at, but it is also one 
that it can never realize at all completely; for the main cause of uncertainty in any kind 
of law is the uncertainty of the facts to which it has to be applied. ... It is this 
intractability of facts that prevents the practice of law from ever becoming a science; it 
is and always will be an art.”177  
It is believed that Frank’s appeal to abolish the need for stability is impractical, as the 
existence of law itself is a kind of father-power that enforces all individuals to respect 
his (its) rules, and the government is the executive body of that law or party that can be 
resorted to when some individuals in society have a conflict, this situation will remain 
so, as long as there are interrelations and consequent conflicts between individuals. 
“When stable markets become destabilized, it is natural for firms to appeal to 
government for help.”178 This intervention is always recognised through the laws that 
maintain this stability: “if producing stability in multiple markets requires rules, then 
governments are deeply implicated in defining the various social structures that 
stabilize markets.”179 This thesis considers that such an appeal for certainty –even 
relatively- is inherent to the nature of humans and their social relations. As market 
stability relies on mores and legislative rules in order to maintain a degree of stability, 
even if it is minor, “[t]o get such stability, people need either long experiences with one 
another, such that they settle into habitual patterns, or more formal rules to govern 
novel interactions”.180 
In the Infopaq v. Danske Case,181 the CJEU depended on ‘legal certainty’ in several 
places to justify its decision, this is apparent in its contention that “[l]egal certainty for 
right holders further requires …”182 and in elsewhere, “… thereof must also be 
                                                          
176 Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist 
Societies (Princeton University Press, 2001). p. 19. 
177 James Leslie Brierly, The Outlook for International Law (Clarendon Press, 1944). p. 16. 
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interpreted in the light of the need for legal certainty for authors with regard to the 
protection of their works.” 183 
It is worth noting that the situation of uncertainty and confusion in copyright law has 
urged the EU legislators to affirm the need for stability in national laws, as this is 
important for the economic flourishing of the EU. This is supposed to be the reason that 
the EU adopted a unified criterion for copyright, namely, ‘intellectual creation’, in all its 
directives.184 Directive 2001/29 states, in Recital 4 of the preamble, that, “[a] 
harmonised legal framework on copyright and related rights, through increased legal 
certainty and while providing for a high level of protection of intellectual property, will 
foster substantial investment in creativity and innovation, including network 
infrastructure …”185 [Underlining added] This confirms how the EU has considered legal 
certainty to be beneficial to increasing investments in creativity and innovation which is 
against the beliefs of Frank. Directive 2001/29 further described how technologies can 
help to increase ‘uncertainties in protection’ and how this can affect the economy of 
cultural works.186 The need to banish the confusion around copyright subsistence in the 
individual countries is thus preamble before the pursuit to achieve the harmonisation 
between the EU members. That is why the EU stated: “[t]his Directive should define the 
scope of the acts covered by the reproduction rights. … A broad definition of these acts 
is needed to ensure legal certainty within the internal market.”187 [Underlining added] 
 
 
  
                                                          
183 Ibid. 
184 See text under title ‘The Situation in International Provisions’ under section 1.2 Development of 
Originality Interpretation. 
185 See recital (4) of 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society', 2001/29/EC (EU, 2001). 
186 Since in Recital 6 of the preamble 2001/29 stated: “(6) Without harmonisation at Community level, 
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order to respond to the technological challenges might result in significant differences in protection and 
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187 Recital 21 of the preamble of the EU directive 2001/29. 
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3 Chapter Three:  
Originality Interpretations in the UK and the US: 
Interpretations Measure Different Features in Works Whether High or 
Low authorship 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter this thesis will expose the different interpretations of originality 
suggested by courts in the UK and the US in order to confer copyright protection for 
cultural works. In this Chapter we will show how this criterion was not agreed upon, 
sometimes the Judges resorted to low requirements, like ‘sweat of the brow’, 
‘originating from the author’, or ‘non-copying’, and at other times they raise the 
requirement to ‘personal input’ or ‘creativity’, regardless of what the legislation states 
about and even whether it requires originality or not. 1 
Due to “[o]riginality remain[ing] the sine qua non of copyright”2 and authorship, it is 
necessary to investigate it especially for this research’s argument, namely focusing on 
authorship and categorisation of works. This cannot be done except by discussing the 
interpretations of originality given by Judges in the UK and the US. These 
interpretations need to be categorised so as to suit the proposed categorisation of 
works. Subsequently, each of these interpretations will be applied to a corresponding 
category of works, so works within each category can be subjected to a specific 
interpretation that is suitable to their nature, and abolishing the ‘one size fits all’ criteria 
that caused conflicting decisions. 
3.2 The US ‘Sweat of the Brow’ Doctrine  
This section will expose the emergence and development of the ‘sweat of the brow’ 
doctrine in the US until it was challenged, and how this criterion caused confusion to 
the originality criteria. Following this discussion, the thesis will conclude that ‘sweat of 
the brow’ was resorted to in order to protect facts from being copied against the 
copyright orthodox rule of not protecting facts. Yet, the ‘sweat of the brow’ cannot be 
generalised to all copyright works, as a result of the conceptual and logical conflict it 
causes when applied to them. However, it may be only suitable to certain works such 
as non-authorship works.3 
                                                          
1 S. Von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2008). p. 45. 
2 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991, 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, Supreme 
Court of the United States at 348. 
3 See chapter 8 at 8.4.2 for an explanation of the adoption of this criterion regarding non-authorship  
works. 
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In general, it seems that the originality criterion, since it emerged in the US, has been 
subject to several fluctuations, sometimes going higher into personal requirements -
even before the 1976 Act- and in other times going lower, so that the ‘sweat of the 
brow’, or even ‘originating from the author’ suffices – even after the 1976 Copyright Act.  
Under the ‘sweat of the brow’ criterion, it is sufficient that any manual effort done to 
create the work to obtain copyright protection. 4 The courts’ tendency to use the ‘sweat 
of the brow’ was largely driven by the need to reward or compensate investors in 
compilation works, and at the same time to guarantee their production as they are 
works that are useful for society.5 
In the US, before the 1909 Copyright Act, factual works had strong protection, as cases 
adopted the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine to protect all works. Most courts prohibited the 
copying of facts contained in any precedent factual works due to the efforts and funds 
expended in their creation –or collection- and that any work should be independently 
created in order to get copyright protection. For instance, in List Pub co. v. Keller,6 
Judge Wallace argued that directories are an explicit example of copyrighted works 
and it is against the law to copy any portion of the texts or facts included. 7 If the 
subsequent compilers want to include any of the precompiled facts, they have to collect 
them themselves.8 Judge Wallace confirmed that the compiler should show a degree of 
‘independent creation’ or his ‘original labor’ so as to invalidate any infringement 
concerns, as Judge Wallace asked: “[t]he question in the case is whether the 
defendant, in compiling his directory, has done so by his own original labor, or whether, 
in order to spare himself time and expense he has copied the names and 
addresses…”. 9 [Underlining added] 
The only facility the Court allowed for the subsequent creator is for him to check his 
work, “he may use the first compiler's book for the purpose of verifying the orthography 
of the names, or the correctness of the addresses, of the persons selected.”10 It is 
noted here that the word ‘original’ has the meaning: ‘originating from the author’, which 
used by the court to refer to the said ‘original labour’, and that is equal to the 
‘independent creation’ also, all have the same substance of ‘sweat of the brow’ and the 
                                                          
4 Howard B Abrams, 'Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law', Law & Comtemporary Problems Journal, 
55 (1992). p. 8. 
5 Sherrie Callis, 'Copyright Protection in Factual Compilations: Feist Publications V. Rural Telephone 
Service Company Altruism Expressed in Copyright Law', Golden Gate University Law Review, 22 (1992). 
p.532 
6 List Pub. Co. V. Keller, 1887, 30 F. 772, Circuit Court, S.D. New York. 
7 Ibid. at 773. 
8 Ibid. at 773. 
9 See, ibid. at 772. 
10 Ibid. 
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same intention in protecting the labour or effort’s product not mental works, as will be 
clarified in next examples.  
The ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine was confirmed also in the case of Morris v. Ashbee,11 
when it was argued, “no one has a right to take the results of the labour and expense 
incurred by another for the purposes of a rival publication, and thereby save himself the 
expense and labour of working out and arriving at these results by some independent 
road.”12 [Underlining added] In these cases, it is evident that saving time, effort, or 
expense was unlawful, and the ‘independent creation’ of the work that proves the 
‘originating of the work from the author’ is the criterion required to prove the existence 
of copyright protection.  
After the US Copyright Act 1909, Judge Learned Hand, in Jeweler v. Keystone,13 
continued the same approach through confirming, “[a]ll are free to repeat those facts, 
just because they are facts.”14 However, at the same time, the compiler of facts should 
show his own ‘independent work’ through collecting facts by himself, and the only thing 
he can do with the precedent factual work is to ‘check back’ his compilation with such 
precedent works.15 So, here, facts are not protected per se,16 but the effort expended to 
find or discover them is, so independent work by subsequent authors was required in 
order to include these facts. 
In Southwestern Bell v. Nationwide Independent Directory,17 the District Court of 
Arkansas confirmed that the man who goes through the street and collects the names 
and numbers of inhabitants acquires copyright on his material, and he can be named 
as ‘the author’ of these materials, accordingly, any copying by anybody of any portion 
of the material collected in order to prepare a separate directory, is an infringement of 
his copyright18. Moreover, it confirmed that such a decision is regardless of whether 
such material shows literary skill, originality or just industrious collection.19 Before and 
after the US Copyright Act of 1909 the manual efforts and labour of the author was thus 
what confers originality to the work, and any role of thoughts, sensations or additions to 
culture were ignored. 
                                                          
11 Morris V. Ashbee, 1868, L.R. 7 Eq. 34, Giffard, V. C.. 
12 Ibid. at 40 
13 Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. V. Keystone Pub. Co., 1921, 274 F. 932, District Court, S.D. New York. 
14 Ibid. at 935. 
15 Ibid.at 934. 
16 This means that there is no monopoly on the facts, as it is possible that anybody else can repeat these 
facts, but only if he did his own independent research or discovery. So the patent law rules are not applied 
here. 
17 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. V. Nationwide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 1974, 371 F.Supp. 
900, United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Hot Springs Division. 
18 Ibid. at 903-904. 
19 Ibid. at 905. 
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In other example, the Court in International News Service v. Associated Press20 
decided that intellectual works could not be protected unless they were independently 
created and not just dependent on appropriations. This was its interpretation of 
originality. In addition, the Court stressed that the protection of works is guaranteed 
when there are funds and efforts expended in their creation. 21 Accordingly, 
‘independent creation’ was the emblem of copyrightability in US before the 1976 
Copyright Act, and it was used interchangeably with ‘sweat of the brow’ and ‘origination 
from the author’. 
Under the Copyright Act 1976, although §. 102(1) stated: “Copyright protection 
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression,”22 [Underlining added]. However, the threshold of the 
protection of ‘sweat of the brow’ continued to be adopted.  
An example is in Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co.,23 where the 
Court argued that Hutchinson’s Directory, which included its customer listing, is “an 
original work of authorship and therefore is copyrightable under the provisions of 17 
USC. § 102.”24 Because it “alone solicited, gathered, filed, sorted, and maintained the 
information on which the directory is based”25 [Underlining added] and it is irrelevant 
whether Hutchinson Co. got its information through requiring subscribers to supply him 
with the required information, or even if this was a State’s requirement.26 It is worth 
noting here that there is a conflict between this case and Feist v. Rural27 six years later, 
which confirmed that the State authorities’ requirement of the collection of specific data 
make the work unoriginal.  
So, the whole focus of the Court was on the ‘labour and efforts’ expended by the 
author. As it confirmed, “[t]he proper focus is … whether the directory itself is derived 
from information compiled and generated by Hutchinson's efforts.” 28 [Underlining 
added] No creative or personal input was thus required by the Court to fulfil the 
originality requirement. The effort and labour, or the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, 
sufficed for the Court.  
                                                          
20 International News Service V. Associated Press, 1918, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, Supreme Court of the 
United States 
21 Ibid. , pp. 243-245. 
22 'Copyright Act of the United States', Ch8-10; 12-17 of Title 17 of the US code (US, 1976).. 
23 Hutchinson Telephone Co. V. Fronteer Directory Co. Of Minnesota, Inc., 1985, 770 F.2d 128, United 
States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. at 132. 
24 Ibid. at 132. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
28 Hutchinson Telephone Co. V. Fronteer Directory Co. Of Minnesota, Inc., 770 F.2d 128, supra note 23, at 
132. 
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The ND Illinois District Court in Illinois Bell v. Haines29 twelve years after the 1976 Act, 
confirmed the old approach that facts cannot be copied, and ‘industrious collection’30 
should be practised by the subsequent compilers. Even the Court of Appeal confirmed 
the District Court’s argument in this regard and required that the compiler should not 
get the facts by copying from the existing copyrighted factual work, as the facts per se, 
and the effort and research expended in their discovery, are protected.31  
The Seventh Circuit Court, in Illinois Bell v. Haines,32 refused to base the infringement 
on the substantial copying, and argued that ‘any copying’ of the facts from the factual 
copyrighted work constitutes an infringement of copyright, as it stressed that the 
defendant’s argument that substantial similarity “constitutes an infringing use. This is 
not the law.”33[Underlining added] 
The same approach was adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court in Schroeder v. William 
Morrow34 also after the US Copyright Act 1976, wherein the Court of Appeal confirmed: 
“only ‘industrious collection,’ not originality in the sense of novelty, is required.”35 This 
argument by the Court in Schroeder shows how the misunderstanding of originality 
contributed to the adoption of the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine. Likewise, the same 
approach was adopted by the Court in Rockford Map v. Directory Service,36 which 
confirmed the independent creation requirement for conferring protection to factual 
works. 37  
The above mentioned cases ignored also § 102(b) of the US 1976 Copyright Act, which 
provides that: “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work”.38 Facts, whether discoveries, concepts or 
principles were explicitly excluded from protection. The House of Representatives’ 
report confirmed this meaning and in 1976 it expressly interpreted it as meaning that no 
                                                          
29 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. V. Haines and Co., Inc., 1988, 683 F.Supp. 1204, United States District 
Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division. 
30 Ibid. at 1208. 
31 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. V. Haines and Co., Inc., 1990, 905 F.2d 1081, United States Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. at 1209. 
32 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. V. Haines and Co., Inc., 683 F.Supp. 1204, supra note 29. 
33 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. V. Haines and Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 1081, supra note 31, at 1086. 
34 Schroeder V. William Morrow & Co., 1977, 566 F.2d 3, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
35 Ibid. at 5, the Court, in this argument, cited two cases decided by the Court of Appeal in 1937, 1992; 
Leon V. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 1937, 91 F.2d 484, Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit And Jeweler's Circular 
Pub. Co. V. Keystone Pub. Co., 1922, 281 F. 83, Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
36 Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. V. Directory Service Co. Of Colorado, Inc., 1985, 768 F.2d 145, United 
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
37 Ibid. at 149. 
38 'Copyright Act of the United States', supra note 22, of 1976. 
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protection can be conferred to facts or ideas, when it stated, “[c]opyright does not 
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's 
work.”39[Underlining added] However, as, there are still judicial decisions that protect 
this information and preclude its copying.  
These cases were referred to here to show the reader how the courts interpreted the 
originality requirement as, at the time, these courts required a low level of effort to 
make the work eligible for copyright protection, others raised this requirement, as will 
be shown in the next sections, not just after the Statute of 1976, but even before it.40 
Every interpretation is preferred to put into a separate group to show the different 
interpretations given to originality. This categorisation of the interpretations given to 
originality will be relied upon in the thesis’s proposition, as these interpretations will be 
divided to suit a correspondent categorisation of works, proposed in later Chapters.  
It is thus evident that before Feist case there was a long tradition that most US Courts 
would grant copyright coverage to informational works by taking into account ‘the sweat 
of the brow’ doctrine, or, in other words, by considering ‘efforts’, ‘independent research’ 
or ‘collection of facts’ as original work that deserves copyright protection. In doing so, 
they credited and approved the originality of the works’ industriousness and the 
investment of resources in a variety of works “from directories and mailing lists to 
computerized databases.”41  
3.3 Refusing the ‘Sweat of The Brow’ Doctrine 
In 1902, the US Seventh Circuit Court, in National Telegraph v. Western Union 
Telegraph,42 anticipated the need to raise the originality requirement, a step that 
happened 90 years later in the Feist v. Rural decision,43 as it refused to confer 
copyright protection for informational or factual works (e.g., compilations, directories 
and maps). The Court refused to rely on the expenditure of effort and money - the 
‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine - as a criterion used when deciding the copyrightability of 
the works in dispute and they anticipated the adverse implications of the 
implementation of this doctrine in an excellent statement. The Seventh Circuit stated, 
“[l]ittle by little copyright has been extended to the literature of commerce, so that it now 
includes books that the old guild of authors would have disdained; catalogues, 
mathematical tables, statistics, designs, guide-books, directories, and other works of 
                                                          
39 House of Representatives, 'House Report No. 94-1476', ( 2d Sess 94th Cong, 1976). p. 56. 
40 See this Chapter at 3.3 
41 Jane C Ginsburg, 'No Sweat Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist V. Rural 
Telephone', Columbia Law Review, 92 (1992).p.339. 
42 National Telegraph News Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1902, 119 F. 294, Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. 
43 See, Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 
2. 
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similar character. Nothing, it would seem, evincing, in its makeup, that there has been 
underneath it, in some substantial way, the mind of a creator or originator, is now 
excluded.”44 [Underlining added]  
This extraordinary statement by the Seventh Circuit needs a little thought. The Seventh 
Circuit in 190245 had referred to this thesis’s differentiation between works and had 
anticipated the current fears facing copyright law, which is discussed in this research,46 
as follows. Firstly, it talked about the category of works that have been interpolated or 
inserted into copyright and their creators who had wrongly been given the description 
‘author’, and it called these works the ‘literature of commerce’. Which are called here 
‘non-authorship works’ or ‘utilitarian works’. This is supported as well through the term 
‘commerce’ that indicates the nature of these works, which differs from other works that 
lack this characteristic but that are concerned with personal contribution and mental 
work.  
Secondly, it anticipated how most works have gradually been enclosed under copyright 
protection, and the ‘making up’ process which will make the adverse effects 
unnoticeable at the beginning, through describing the non-intellectual efforts as 
authorship and the produced works as original, although there is no authorship at all, 
and that will contribute in marginalising intellectual efforts. This describes exactly what 
the thesis inferred, when courts describe the selection and arrangement of facts as an 
original contribution, it is argued that this will eventually lead to that everything being 
considered original, and will lead to the emptying of the meaning from this criterion, or 
any need for it. That is why we need the authorship and author doctrine. This result 
was described by the Court as “the mind of a creator or originator, is now excluded”,47 
and this is what happened under the ‘death of the author’ doctrine. 
Although it is commonly known that Feist v. Rural48 is the case that refuted the long 
history of the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, and its influence is not denied, there was a 
case in 1986 that established good case law in refuting this doctrine, and which 
criticized the philosophy of protecting efforts and funds and highlighted the drawbacks 
to which this can lead. This is the US case Financial Information(FII) v. Moody49. In this 
case, the employees and researchers of FII have carried out a time and effort 
                                                          
44 National Telegraph News Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 F. 294, supra note 42, at 297, as 
the Court held that ticker tapes listing telegraph transmissions of market quotations, sports scores, and 
race results are not copyrightable. 
45 In ibid. 
46 See Chapter 1 at 1.1 
47 National Telegraph News Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 F. 294, supra note 42, at 297. 
48 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
49 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1986, 808 F.2d 204, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. at 207. 
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consuming job and spent huge sums on the collection of information relating to 
municipal redemption bonds. They extracted the information and advertisements 
relating to the redemption of bonds on a specifically municipal level from various 
publications, and put them in a special format, since such information was very 
important to interested individuals. The District Court found the compilation was 
copyrightable because of the considerable effort and funds expended to extract 
information from a wide variety of scattered sources.50 However, on remand, the 
Second Circuit Court reversed the District Court’s decision,51 afterwards, the District 
Court found that the compilation was not copyrightable and Judge Carter concluded, 
“FII's researchers perform a simple clerical task…. [and] there is no room for selection 
or choices or judgment”52, and this was confirmed by the Second Circuit Court . 53  
This thesis insists on an important argument, which constitutes the basis of its 
proposition, that the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine that is used as a criterion to protect 
works is refused initially because it measures the efforts exerted in the process of 
creating the work. It does not measure anything in the work itself, which gets the 
copyright protection. What should be measured is the subject matter of the protection, 
not the efforts expended in the process of collecting and gathering. So, we can 
conclude that the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine ignores the qualities and traits of the 
work itself.54 
This argument found its echo in the Second Circuit decision in FII v. Moody,55 which 
confirmed that “[t]he statute thus requires that copyrightability not be determined by the 
amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the nature of the final result.”56 
[Underlining added] Besides, it confirms that relying on the ‘sweat of the brow doctrine’ 
will put vast amounts of facts and research material outside the public domain. “To 
grant copyright protection based merely on the ‘sweat of the author's brow’ would risk 
putting large areas of factual research material off limits and threaten the public's 
unrestrained access to information,”57 as, “copyright law should protects only the 
expression of facts, not the facts themselves”.58 [Underlining added] 
                                                          
50 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1983, 599 F.Supp. 994 United States 
District Court, S.D. New York.. 
51 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, 1984, 751 F.2d 501, United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit. 
52 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204, supra note 49. 
53 Ibid. at 207. 
54 For further discussion see Chapter 6 at 6.6. 
55 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204, supra note 49. 
56 Ibid. at 207. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
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3.4 Selection and Arrangement Criterion: 
 
The thesis argues that ‘selection and arrangement’ is the criterion to which courts have 
resorted to escape from the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine. According to this criterion 
courts required that compilations of facts show original or creative selection or 
arrangement, in an attempt to attach personality to the bare facts and to justify the 
application of authorship and originality concepts to these devoid of authorship 
compilations. Although the Feist v. Rural case is the most known case in establishing 
the selection and arrangement criterion in compilations of facts in the US case law, this 
interpretation was existent a century before. As in 1896 the court of Simms v. Stanton 
59 case quoted with advocacy Drone’s argument that subsequent compiler can take 
common material in previous works and arrange them differently, as copyright protects 
only the arrangement not the underline common material.60 
Also in the 20th century before the Feist case the selection and arrangement criterion 
was applied several times,61 for instance, in the Eckes v. Card Prices62 case the 
Second Circuit stated that the sweat of the brow of the compiler cannot confer 
copyright protection unless there is ‘wholesale appropriation’.63 The court thought that 
the subjective selection and arrangement of facts is the criterion that should be used, 
and it cited Nimmer: “‘originality involved in the selection and/or arrangement of such 
facts’ protected literary work”.64 [Italic in original, Underlining added] 
Although Judge Feinberg of Eckes v. Card Prices65 raised the level of copyright criteria, 
even the Court in FII v. Moody66 recognised his decision as a “reluctance to grant 
copyright protection to works of non-fiction”.67 Judge Feinberg conferred copyright 
                                                          
59 Simms V. Santon, 1896, 75 F.6, C.C.N.D. Cal. 
60 As Drone stated that “There is no recognized principle which will prevent a subsequent compiler from 
copying common materials from an existing compilation, and arranging and combining them in a new form, 
or using them for a different purpose. It is true that in this case he avails himself to some extent of the 
labor and research of his predecessor, instead of obtaining the material from the original sources. But the 
first compiler has no exclusive property in that of which he is not the author, and which may be used by 
any one. His copyright protects only his own arrangement of the materials which he has selected.” See, 
Eaton Sylvester Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and 
the United States: Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, and Playright in Dramatic and 
Musical Compositions (Little, Brown, 1879). p. 424 quoted in Simms V. Santon, 75 F.6, supra note 59, at 
13 
61 ‘Selection and arrangement’ was mentioned first in art 2(3) of the Berne convention (Brussels Act 1948) 
which became art 2(5) according to the Stockholm and Paris Acts. 
62 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 1984, 736 F.2d 859, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
63 Ibid. at 862 
64 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas (M. Bender, 1990). Cited in W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 
F.2d 859, supra note 62. 
65 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, supra note 62. 
66 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204, supra note 49. 
67 Ibid. at 207. 
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protection to Eckes’ guide depending on the selection, creativity, and Judgement he 
found in the choosing of 5,000 premium baseball cards among the total number of 
18,000 cards.68 As he stated “[we] have no doubt that appellants exercised selection, 
creativity and judgment in choosing among the 18,000 or so different baseball cards in 
order to determine which were the 5,000 premium cards.”69 In an exaggerated manner, 
Judge Feinberg 70 described the selection and arrangement done by the claimant as 
creative acts that deserve copyright protection, as it confirmed that “[a]lthough 
copyright law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows, subjective selection and 
arrangement of information can merit protection, and in view of the selection, creativity 
and judgment exercised by copyright holders … [their acts] merited protection under 
the copyright laws.”71 [Underlining added] 
Although ‘selection and arrangement’ was used after the Copyright Act 1976 as an 
interpretation of originality –stated in the act-, the inner intention of judges stayed the 
protection of industry and labour. For instance in West Publishing Company v. Mead 
Data 72 the Eight Circuit found that the arrangement done by West of the ‘Appeal 
Courts decisions’ within each volume is original due to there is considerable labor, 
talent, and judgment expended in the arrangement. Although the expressions ‘talent’, 
‘judgment’, ‘arrangement’ used, the arrangement was in a numerical order, which does 
not reflect any intellectual effort. Haungs commented on this case that: “if an obvious 
arrangement in numerical order is a sufficient criterion of originality for copyright 
protection, then virtually any arrangement of factual material will satisfy the requirement 
of originality. The result is the same as if labor alone were the decisive factor.”73 [Italic 
in original, Underlining added] What confirms this conclusion is that the Eighth Circuit 
justified its decisions by arguing that the access of Lexis users to the West’s data will 
give them “a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry in 
compiling, and would pro tanto reduce any one’s need to buy west’s books” 74 
3.4.1 The Feist v. Rural Decision: 
As long as this thesis is concerned with authorship and its correlated principle of 
originality then the Feist v. Rural75 decision needs a specific focus as “[t]he most 
significant development in the US copyright case law concerning the originality 
                                                          
68 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, supra note 62, at 863. 
69 Ibid. at 863. 
70 Ibid. 
71 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, supra note 62, at 859. 
72 West Publishing Company V. Mead Data Central, Inc., 1986, 799 F.2d 1219, United States Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
73 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', 
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 23 (1989). p. 353 
74 West Publishing Company V. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, supra note 72. 
75 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
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standard is unquestionably the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co.”76 
 
The discussion of this decision aims to analyse the most renowned attempt in modern 
copyright law to resurrect authorship theories of individualism and personality. In this 
case, it is evident that Mrs Justice O’Connor believed in personality theory as the real 
justification for copyright law protection and property, as she wanted to reflect them on 
authorship through the interpretation conferred to the originality criteria. However, the 
application of her thoughts on compilation works has led to a vacillating decision whose 
conception is different from its implementation. 
 
Why the Feist case is important case law in the requirement of originality? 
The importance the Feist case lies in the timing of the decision, as the Court’s 
insistence on applying the originality requirement in its strict meaning77 and refuting the 
long established doctrine of the ‘sweat of the brow’, was an unpredicted decision if 
compared to the contemporary judiciary and jurisprudence. The significance of this 
case does not lie in its requirement for ‘originality’, as that was stated in the Copyright 
Act of 1976, but the surprising claim this Court made is its contention that originality 
was required by the US Constitution also, and that the Constitution meant that 
originality referred to creativity, although the Constitution included no reference to this 
condition. This argument relied upon the analysis of the specific terms used by the 
Constitution and that opened the door for theoretical discussion on the significance of 
the principles and theories behind terms used in legislation, which this thesis also 
supports.  
Although the US Copyright Act of 197678 had already stipulated originality in §.102 in all 
‘works of authorship’, and again confirmed the requisite of originality regarding 
compilations in §.103, the Courts continued 79 to grant copyright protection to 
compilations and factual works depending on the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine. This 
attitude was driven by the belief that originality is conferred to a work when there are 
extensive efforts expended in its creation. What supported this belief under the 1976 
Copyright Act is the legislative history of §.102 (a) of the Copyright Act, which stated: 
“[t]he phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is 
                                                          
76 P. Samuelson, 'The Originality Standard for Literary Works under Us Copyright Law', American Journal 
of Comparative law Supp., 42 (1994). p. 394 
77 As we argued before and will later elaborate, originality has many meanings, ranging from low 
interpretations (like, sweat of the brow, or originating from the author) to high or strict interpretations (like, 
creativity) and that latter interpretation which was adopted by the Feist Court, although it emptied it of 
content, as will be shown later. 
78 'Copyright Act of the United States', supra note 22, of 1976. 
79 As explained under title 2.3.1. 
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intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the 
courts under the present copyright statute”.80 Reytblat stated that “such a uniform 
standard [originality] did not exist. Instead, originality jurisprudence was splintered, with 
"originality" often representing two distinct concepts.”81 
The District Court of Rural v. Feist82 confirmed this fact: “[t]he issue of whether 
telephone directories are copyrightable is well-settled. Courts have consistently held 
that telephone directories are copyrightable.”83 The District Court mentioned several 
decisions confirming this meaning, both before and after the Copyright Act 1976, such 
as, Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co.(1985, Eighth Circuit)84, 
Southern Bell Telephone v. Associated Telephone Directory (1985, Eleventh Circuit)85, 
and Leon v. Pacific Telephone (1937)86. Although the Tenth Circuit of Appeal has 
confirmed this decision,87the Supreme Court has made an unpredicted step and 
reversed the District and Appeal Courts’ decisions.88 
The Supreme Court did not even look at, or investigate, how much effort or funds were 
expended in the creation process, like other previous courts, as the real belief of the 
Supreme Court was that it was the author’s ‘original creation’,89 not his manual labour, 
which ought to be protected. It confirmed, “the primary objective of copyright is not to 
reward the labor of authors, but to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”.90 
That is why the Court ruled that a modicum of creative expression must be shown, 
even if there were a great deal of labour exerted in the making of the work. 91 Although 
the principle of ‘sweat of the brow’ was widely accepted, the Feist’s Supreme Court 
abolished it and used ‘creativity’ as an alternative criterion that should be adopted. The 
Supreme Court confirmed that effort is no longer a good criterion for deciding copyright 
protection,92 and adopted ‘the selection and arrangement of the factual material’ if it 
                                                          
80 House of Representatives, 'House Report No. 94-1476', supra note 39, at 51. 
81 Julia Reytblat, 'Is Orginality in Copyright Law a Question of Law or a Question of Fact: The Fact 
Solution', Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ, 17 (1999). p. 183. 
82 Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. V. Feist Publications, Inc., 1987, 663 F.Supp. 214, United States 
District Court, D. Kansas, ibid. 
83 Ibid. at 218. 
84 Hutchinson Telephone Co. V. Fronteer Directory Co. Of Minnesota, Inc., 770 F.2d 128, supra note 23, at 
132. 
85 Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company V. Associated Telephone Directory Publishers; C.A., 
1985, 756 F.2d 801, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.. 
86 Leon V. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, supra note 35. 
87 Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. V. Feist Publications, Inc., 1990, 916 F.2d 718 United States Court of 
Appeals, Tenth Circuit. It confirmed the decision without opinion. 
88 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
89 Here, the Court intends to mean creative input or creation. 
90 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
349. 
91 Ibid.1, at 341/ 1286. 
92 Ibid. at 364. 
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were creative93 as the criteria to be used to fulfil the originality condition in compilation 
works. 
The Feist’s Supreme Court concluded that the real intention of copyright law and the 
US Constitution was to refuse protection to works depending on the ‘sweat of the brow’ 
doctrine.94 The Supreme Court confirmed that the US Copyright Act’s95 definition of 
compilation96 required selection and arrangement and thus confirmed that this is an 
affirmation that the law required originality in the meaning of creative input and not just 
the ‘sweat of the brow’.97 In addition, the court investigated the protection of facts in the 
US Copyright Act, and found that neither the Copyright Act nor its legislative history 
confer any protection to facts per se.98 The Feist court cited Nimmer’s opinion in 
rejecting the dependence on the ‘sweat of the brow’ interpretation: “[a] copyright in a 
directory, however, is properly viewed as resting on the originality of the selection and 
arrangement of the factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the efforts to 
develop the information.”99  
The Feist’s Court also referred to ‘census data’ as an illustration that the efforts exerted 
in the collection process of data do not qualify for copyright protection due to the lack of 
creativity. 100 Accordingly, despite the huge efforts and extensive expenditure of funds 
required for the collection and arrangement process of census data, it does not fulfil the 
originality requirement.101 
The Feist’s Judge, Mrs Justice O'Connor, confirmed blatantly for the first time in US 
copyright case law that the Constitution is the source of mandating originality on all 
works in order to be copyrighted, as she confirmed, “[a]rticle 1, § 8, cl. 8, of the 
Constitution mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection.”102 
[Underlining added] In another place, she stated: “Originality, for copyright purposes, is 
                                                          
93 Ibid. at 360. 
94 Ibid. at 348. 
95 'Copyright Act of the United States', supra note 22, of 1976. 
96 Which is “a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are 
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original 
work of authorship. The term “compilation” includes collective works.” See, §. 101 of the US copyright act 
1976. 
97 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
1294. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, supra note 64, at §.3.04. cited in Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2 at 360. 
100 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
347. 
101 Ibid. at 347. 
102 Ibid. at 340/1285. 
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constitutionally mandated for all works.” 103 [Underlining added] However, she relied on 
precedent cases to support this argument, as shown below. 
The Feist Supreme Court confirmed that most courts that conferred copyright 
protection to white pages were relying on the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, not on 
originality, and cited Leon v. Pacific Telephone104 and Jeweler v. Keystone.105 For 
instance, it was decided in the last case that “[t]he right to copyright a book … does not 
depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not of matters 
which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either 
in thought or in language, or anything more than industrious collection.”106 So the 
‘industrious collection’ not originality, creativity or any mental effort, was the criterion for 
conferring copyright protection according to the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts.  
The Supreme Court clarified that such a conclusion is based on the previous 
interpretations of the constitutional clause in Art. 1 §.8, at Trade-Mark cases v. 
Steffens107 and Burrow-Giles v. Sarony.108 As the Supreme Court confirmed; “[t]he 
originality requirement articulated in The Trade-Mark cases and Burrow-Giles remains 
the touchstone of copyright protection today.”109 [Underlining added] Regarding the 
requirement of originality, in general, the Court of Trade-Mark Cases confirmed that 
originality was required for the conferring of copyright protection, as it stated, “If we 
should endeavour to classify it under the heading of writings of authors,… originality is 
required”.110 Likewise, the Burrow-Giles Case was used by the Feist Court to justify that 
the originality requirement comes from an interpretation of the US Constitution, not that 
only, but also that the originality of the intellectual conceptions is the stake and not 
manual labour. In Burrow-Giles, although there was a debate around the 
copyrightability of photographs under the US Constitution and the Statutes of 1790 and 
1802, the Court affirmed their protection. In doing so, the Court referred to originality as 
a pre-condition for the protection of any work, including photographs, as it stated, “[w]e 
entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough to cover an act authorizing 
                                                          
103 Ibid. 
104 Leon V. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, supra note 35. 
105 Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. V. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, supra note 35. 
106 Ibid. at 88. 
107 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 1879, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
108 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States. 
109 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
347. 
110 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, supra 
note 107, at 94. 
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copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual 
conceptions of the author.”111 [Underlining added] 
In addition, Judge O’Connor confirmed that the Constitution requires creativity as well, 
as, she argued: “[t]he Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity.”112 In 
confirming this, the Feist Court cited The Trade-Mark Cases case, wherein it was 
mentioned, “… originality is required. While the word writings may be liberally 
construed, as it has been, to include original designs for engravings, prints, &c., it is 
only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The 
writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor.”113 [Underlining 
added] Here, the Trade-Mark Cases Court was explicit in concentrating on ‘intellectual 
labor’114 and differentiating between mental and manual efforts, and confirming that the 
first is that copyright law meant, and that which this thesis argues also. 
The same argument was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California,115 
wording it as follows: “although the word ‘writings' might be limited to script or printed 
material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”116 [Underlining added] 
The Feist Court relied also on the opinions of scholars in justifying this argument, as it 
cited Patterson’s statement: “[t]he originality requirement is constitutionally mandated 
for all works.”117 Nimmer also stated: “originality is a statutory as well as a constitutional 
requirement”, 118 and confirmed that, “a modicum of intellectual labor ... clearly 
constitutes an essential constitutional element”. 119 
The Feist case’s role in reviving personal authorship: 
The general principles acknowledged in this case are considered to be a revival of the 
individualism and personality approach to the authorship doctrine and in deciding 
copyrightability, and the superiority of the author. 
                                                          
111 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 108, at 
58. 
112 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
341/ 1286. 
113 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, supra 
note 107, at 93, 94. 
114 Ibid. at 94. 
115 Goldstein V. California, 1973, 412 U.S. 546, 93 S.Ct. 2303, Supreme Court of the United States 
116 Ibid. at 561. 
117 L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, 'Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law 
Reports and Statutory Compilations', UCLA Law Review, 36 (1988). p. 763, fn. 155. 
118 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, supra note 64. 
119 Ibid. 
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On the implementation of the Feist Court’s decision on compilations, it is evident that 
the Supreme Court is seeking to protect just the creative ways of making compilations 
while excluding any evaluation of the labour or effort expended in the creation process: 
“copyright rewards originality, not effort” 120 [Underlining added], likewise it stated: “[t]he 
Constitution mandates some minimal degree of creativity.”121 
There is also a US Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit case, Baltimore v. Major League 
Baseball122 in 1986 before the Feist123 Case, wherein the Court argued that creativity is 
the requirement for copyrightability, as it stated: “[i]n order for work to meet the 
requirement of originality in order to be copyrightable, work must possess independent 
origin and minimal amount of creativity;”124 [Underlining added] 
The Feist Court, in sweeping words, has announced that any plaintiff should show 
“intellectual production, of thought and conception”.125 [Underlining added] Accordingly, 
manual effort alone is not enough to prove the existence of originality. 126 The Trade-
Marks Cases Court127 referred to by the Feist Supreme Court confirmed the same 
meaning.128 These announcements by the Feist and Trade-Marks Courts that stress 
the protection of intellectual thought and the creative power of the mind of the author is 
supportive to this thesis’s call for dominating personality approaches and individualism 
in authorship. This is especially so under the Feist Court’s assertion that the utility of 
the work should be overlooked as a criterion, as O’Connor confirmed “Rural expended 
sufficient effort to make the white pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to 
make it original.”129  
Tarolli reflected on the Feist case: “the court clearly endorsed conditioning copyright 
protection on the presence of subjective input by the author and explicitly rejected the 
notion that copyright law rewards the industriousness of authors. Its holding endorsed a 
unitary, high authorship interpretation of the scope of copyright.”130  
                                                          
120 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, 
p.341. 
121 Ibid. at 341/ 1286. 
122 Baltimore Orioles, Inc., Et Al., V. Major League Baseball Players, 1986, 805 F.2d 663, United States 
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.. 
123 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
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note 107. 
128 Ibid. at 93, 94. 
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Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 1639 (1997).. p. 1651. 
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3.4.2 Criticism of the Feist Decision 
There are three main criticisms of the policy adopted by the Feist Court. All are related 
to the employing of the ‘selection and arrangement’ criterion by this court.  First, the 
industrious nature of these works make the variation of the selection and arrangement 
of these works impossible, as the adopted way to organize facts in a specific discipline 
cannot vary infinitely. So this will create some kind of monopoly for the first to adopt a 
beneficial and distinctive kind of organization, and if there is only some difference it 
cannot be creative, and this will maintain the doctrine of ‘pretexts’, as described by 
Ginsburg.131 
Second, the usefulness of these works depends on the stabilization of the organization 
and arrangement used, in order to encourage users to utilise such works, regardless of 
the maker, so, again, the fear of monopoly is still existent. Thirdly, the selection 
requirement is criticized as it stipulates that works should not be comprehensive of all 
the related information to be protected by copyright law, although users might prefer 
comprehensive works, especially if the matter is related to all of the facts or data that 
are related to a specific category of interest. As the user will be deprived always of 
these types of works, and compilers have to intentionally overlook some sectors or 
fields to fulfil the selectivity condition. “This selection may create a difficult problem for 
suppliers of data, particularly in the form of electronic databases, because their 
commercial value may depend upon their completeness, even though they may lose 
copyright protection precisely by being complete.”132 
From another perspective, the constitutionality of the originality requirement has been 
criticized by Heald, who argued that this might frustrate the goals of the intellectual 
property clause in the Constitution. 133 He questioned the reliance on the constitutional 
grounds, though there are “several unconstitutional grounds [that] are readily 
available.”134 Heald offered several statutory alternatives the Court could have used for 
denying the infringement of Rural’s copyright, rather than considering originality as a 
constitutional requirement. Heald argues that the Court could have relied on the 
copyright law in requiring originality, and arguing that Rural’s white pages were not 
‘original works of authorship’. 135  
                                                          
131 As she argued that the “[p]ersonality-based characterizations of many low authorship informational 
works seem contrived” see, Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of 
Works of Information', Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990)., p. 1869. 
132 Howard B Abrams, 'Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law', supra note 4 p. 19 
133 Paul J. Heald, 'The Vices of Originality', Supreme Court Review,  (1991). p.144. 
134 Ibid. p. 146. 
135 Ibid. p 146. 
 
 
84 
The mere problem of relying on the Constitution in requiring originality would result in 
one of two options - amending the Constitution to include compilations within the 
copyright law’s scope, or ignoring the Feist decision. It is argued that the latter situation 
is the one that prevailed thereafter; the same fear was expressed by Ginsburg, who 
argued that Feist developed inconsistency. 136  As the invocation of the Constitution, 
although it may reduce the debate around the availability and scope of copyright 
protection regarding original works of authorship, it will enhance uncertainty regarding 
the authority of congress to codify or enact legislations that limit the protection for these 
works,137 for other reasons, e.g., fair dealing. 
Hughes also claims that the Feist Court mixed the meanings of originality, creativity 
and personal expression. As he stated expressly that the three ideas are “so 
thoroughly alloyed in American case law that there may be no principled way to 
disentangle them.”138 Gervais found that being used to interpreting originality as 
meaning that it ‘originated from the author’ has emptied originality of its core 
meaning,139 and he cited the case of Burrow-Giles v. Sarony140 as an advocate for the 
necessity to reflect the meaning of originality that is raised over just origination, which 
is creativity, and this is what this thesis advocates and tries to enhance. 
The Feist decision has reduced the criterion not raised it: 
Although the Feist Court required originality and creativity, it limited their application to 
the different ‘selection or arrangement’ of facts, which is not considered by this thesis 
to be a sufficient evidence of mental labor.141 Even the Feist court supported this by 
arguing that compilations can easily be protected through this criterion - as if the Court 
wanted to send a message that it did not want to dramatically change the 
contemporary practice in protecting compilations. Rahmatian confirmed this final result 
as he argued that Feist is: “a case which abandoned the simple ‘sweat of the brow’ 
approach but did otherwise not constitute a paradigm shift in US copyright law.” 142 
                                                          
136 Jane C Ginsburg, 'No Sweat Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist V. 
Rural Telephone', supra note 41. p. 339. 
137 Ibid.41. p. 339. 
138 Justin Hughes, 'The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property', Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment. Law Journal, 16 (1998). p. 89. 
139 Daniel J Gervais, 'Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright 
Law', Journal of Copyright Society of the USA, 49 (2002). p. 961. 
140 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 108. 
141 See Chapter 7 at 7.3. 
142 Andreas Rahmatian, 'Originality in Uk Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” Doctrine under 
Pressure', IIC-International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 44/1 (2013). p. 30. 
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The Feist Court confirmed that originality is ‘not a stringent criterion’, 143 and considered 
that ‘selection and arrangement’ is sufficient to fulfil the conditions of originality and 
creativity. Although this might have been intended not to frighten the current copyright 
owners of compilation works, this statement was the substantial reason for the later 
diminishing of the Feist decision’s significance. 
It is even maintained that the protection granted by copyright law under the ‘selection 
and arrangement’ of the Feist decision was lowered, not raised. Although the Feist 
Court conceived that its criteria would raise the criteria of protection and “compilations 
will pass this test, but not all will”, 144 which may imply the raising of copyright criteria, 
what happened is that the criterion has been lowered. As, despite courts were 
protecting the efforts exerted in collecting facts, now they are just requiring that these 
facts be arranged differently, and they should not look to the labour or efforts used in 
collecting the facts or from where these facts came. It suffices that their shape and 
arrangement is different from existing compilations, even if the work extracted all its 
facts from previous works.145  
Sacrificing copyright’s fundamentals: 
The selection and arrangement of the elements in a painting, for instance, is meant to 
convey a message to the audience, and the selection and arrangement of events and 
characters in a novel aim to convey a situation or specific thoughts to the readers. 
‘Selection and arrangement’, here, is used as a means to manifest thoughts through 
transferring abstract meaningless symbols to a conceivable body of literature or art so 
that they have meaning or reflect emotions in the viewer’s and the reader’s mind, and 
this is argued to be the general rule applied to all literary, artistic, musical and dramatic 
works. 
Unfortunately, this philosophy was changed for the sake of protecting the investment of 
producers of compilations of facts, to mean that the selection of any facts and 
arranging them in a way not similar to a previous one fulfils the originality condition, 
regardless of why this specific selection or arrangement was chosen and at what it 
aims regarding the subject matter of the work, which is the facts. This is why this thesis 
believes that the ‘selection and arrangement’ criteria adopted by Eckes v. Card 
                                                          
143 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
362. 
144 Ibid. at 358. 
145 Further explanation can be found in Chapter 4 at 4.2.1. 
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Prices146 and afterwards by Feist v. Rural,147 is a kind of compromise of creativity and 
originality, which is believed to be the basis of copyright law protection.  
The actual criteria that are meant behind stipulating the ‘original selection and 
arrangement’ in factual works is actually the ‘novel’ selection and arrangement. This is 
because it looks to whether they have been arranged in a new form that has not been 
repeated from a previous work to fulfil the originality criteria. Though originality has no 
determined meaning, at least ‘novelty’ is the first meaning to be excluded from the 
suggested interpretations of originality. 
How the ‘selection and arrangement’ in Feist led to confusion:  
When the Feist Supreme Court tried to apply this ‘high’ interpretation of originality –a 
minimal degree of creativity- to compilation works, it seems that this did not fit the 
contents of the work – facts and information - so the Court thought it sufficient to apply 
them on the selection and arrangement of these facts. This is apparent from its 
statement: “[o]riginality requirement for compilations of Facts … requires only that the 
author make selection and arrangement independently and display some minimal level 
of creativity”.148 And the statement: “originality is not a stringent standard; it does not 
require that facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way.”149 And also when it 
cited Nimmer’s argument: “[t]o be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; 
even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ 
it might be.”150 
It is argued that applying a high and personal criterion on the ‘format of works’ or the 
‘external shape not contents’ has led to arbitrary judgments about which formats are 
creative. Alphabetical order was the first victim of this new system, as the Supreme 
Court declared its refusal of the alphabetical order followed in such works, and 
opposed considering it an original work. It explained: “copyright rewards originality, not 
effort… and holding that telephone database arranged alphabetically is not sufficiently 
original to qualify for copyright protection.”151 The reason it set for this was that “[i]t is 
an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to 
                                                          
146 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, supra note 62. 
147 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
148 Ibid. at 340 
149 Ibid. at 362. 
150 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, supra note 64. §1.08 [c] [1] cited in Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 345. 
151 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
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be expected as a matter of course.”152 Heald confirmed that this argument makes many 
publications of white pages, both prior to and after this decision, not copyrightable, as 
most follow this mode of arrangement, unless a constitutional amendment be made, to 
exclude them from this condition. 153   
Although the same criterion, namely ‘selection and arrangement’, has been required in 
the UK through the implementation of the EC directive on databases,154 which included 
this criterion regarding databases, we find a different interpretation, by Laddie et al. of 
the Directive, as they found that alphabetical order can be original under ‘selection and 
arrangement’, as explained above. 155 
 
The vagueness of the originality of such selection and arrangement appeared in the 
ProCD case,156 as the court adopted the Feist157 requirement for ‘personal authorship’ 
in order to confer copyright protection to authorial works, and excluded works of 
information, such as ProCD’s database, from copyright protection, although Judge 
Easterbrook confirmed that “it [the database] is more complex, contains more 
information (nine-digit zip codes and census industrial codes), is organized differently, 
and therefore is more original than the single alphabetical directory at issue in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.”158 This confusion confirms this 
research’s argument that factual works cannot cope with any requirements for 
intellectual work or mental and personal authorship, because their nature is totally 
different, and they should be governed by a different system.  
3.5 The thesis’s reflection on Walter v. Lane: 
Although it was occasionally argued that Walter v. Lane159 case is a ‘good law’160 for 
the originality and authorship topics, this thesis argues that this case has caused 
                                                          
152 Ibid. at 361. 
153 Paul J. Heald, 'The Vices of Originality', supra note 133, p. 144. 
154 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', 
96/9/EC (EU, 1996).. 
155 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2 vols. 
(Fourth edn., 1: LexisNexis, 2011). at 32.22 . See more in Chapter 1 at 1.2 and a detailed discussion of the 
selection and arrangement criterion in Chapter 7 at 7.4. 
156 Procd, Incorporated V. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., 1996, 86 F.3d 
1447, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.. 
157 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
158 Procd, Incorporated V. Matthew Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447, 
supra note 156, at 1449. 
159 Walter V. Lane, 1900, A.C. 539, House of Lords 
160 Laddie et el. confirmed that it is "highly probable [that] Walter v. Lane is still good law", see, Hugh 
Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 155, 
Para. 3.52, and this was cited in Lionel Sawkins V. Hyperion Records Ltd., 2005, EWHC 1530 (Ch); 
E.C.D.R. 10; R.P.C. 32 High Court of Justice (Chancery Division), at 3298; and it was argued to be 
“undeniably good law” by Express Newspapers Plc. V. News, 1990, 1.W.L.R.1320, FSR 359, Chancery 
Division at 1326 
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distortion to copyright law doctrine and principles in the UK, and even caused 
confusion on the meaning of terms like ‘author’ or ‘authorship’, and, surprisingly, after 
the enactment of the originality requirement, courts referred to Walter v. Lane to prove 
the low level of composition copyright can protect.161 This spurred the author of this 
research to analyse this case and challenge the arguments of the Lords therein. It was 
found that Lords’ arguments are questionable, except of one lord, and that originality is 
inherent to personality and mental authorship. 
The discussion of this case after the discussion of Feist v. Rural has two aims, first, to 
show how both cases got a renowned influence on the judiciary and jurisprudence of 
the UK and US, but with investigating judges’ arguments they appear questionable. 
Secondly, to show that the influence of non-authorship works on the interpretation of 
originality appears even if the court believes in high standard of originality, as Feist 
case, or do not believe in it, as Walter v. Lane. Which ultimately supports this thesis’s 
call for the need for separating them under different system, thus they can be protected 
but do not affect the interpretation of copyright law concepts. 
 In this case, reporters at The Times Newspaper had written down in shorthand the 
speeches of the Earl of Rosebery which were delivered to a public audience between 
1896 and 1898, and revised and punctuated it to be prepared for publication as a 
verbatim delivery of Lord Rosebery, as the Court confirmed, “the reports were 
published in The Times, the speeches being given verbatim as delivered by Lord 
Rosebery.”162 [Underlining added] Those reports, according to the contract between 
reporters and The Times Newspaper, are considered the newspaper’s property. In 
1899, the respondent published a book entitled ‘Appreciations and Addresses: Lord 
Rosebery’, and it included reports from The Times of the mentioned Lord, and it was 
admitted that these reports were taken substantially verbatim from The Times 
reports.163 
To clarify the subject of this case, two points should be clarified in the beginning. 
Firstly, it may be thought that the report copied by the defendant included a verbatim 
report of the speech and the notes or comments of the reporter, but Lord Robertson 
confirms “those notes are not taken from The Times. All that is taken from The Times 
consists of the words spoken by Lord Rosebery, without addition or subtraction.” 164 
Secondly, it may be thought that such a job that would consist of quickly writing down 
                                                          
161 As Walter v. Lane was relied upon in cases like Lionel Sawkins V. Hyperion Records Ltd., EWHC 1530 
(Ch); E.C.D.R. 10; R.P.C. 32 supra note 160, and Express Newspapers Plc. V. News, 1.W.L.R.1320, FSR 
359, supra note 160. 
162 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159, at 539. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
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the speech of the speaker which at that time was a difficult job and was appreciated 
since sound recorders were not yet invented. Had they then been available, they 
perhaps would not have given protection to those who write down speeches, as it can 
be done by machines without any effort or skill. However, the defendant confirmed the 
existence of recording machines at this age, when he asked “[i]f the verbatim reporter 
is the author, who is the author when a speech is spoken into a phonograph, 
reproduced out of it and printed? Is the phonograph itself the author, or is the inventor 
of the phonograph? And who is entitled to the copyright? Which is the more 
meritorious, the more worthy of protection—the fallible man, or the unerring machine?” 
165 [Underlining added] Which the thesis finds as good questions, however, not one of 
the Lords has challenged such an argument, except -briefly- Lord Robertson. What the 
House of Lords wanted to prove in this case is that verbatim reporters are authors. 
This case is not the first to acknowledge that imitation or repeating the same work 
might be an original work of authorship, as in the Graves case, Judge Blackburn held 
that photographs of pictures are original works, “[a]ll photographs are copies of some 
object, such as a painting or a Statute. And it seems to me that a photograph taken 
from a picture is an original photograph.”166 In this case the ‘Queen's Bench Division’ 
Court considered a photograph of an antecedent picture or engraving an original work, 
although the Fine Art Copyright Act 1862167 required originality for the work to be 
copyrighted, and Judge Blackburn argued “[i]t has been argued that the word “original” 
is to be taken as applying to the word photograph. The distinction between an original 
painting and its copy is well understood, but it is difficult to say what can be meant by 
an original photograph.”168 This argument shed light on how originality is so vague 
concept and that returns to the separation happened between originality and its 
historical development and theoretical origin which is authorship. Judges will not be 
able to reach a proper interpretation of such an abstract word without including the 
associated concepts. That is why this research is focusing on retrieving the relation 
between authorship and originality, and this includes challenging cases that enforced 
this separation like Walter v. Lane which strangely considered a good law in originality 
concept. 
The House of Lords in Walter v. lane case considered verbatim reporters as authors 
and justified this with claims that their work requires effort, and special skills. As Lord 
Davey stated, “[t]he materials for his composition were his notes, which were his own 
                                                          
165 Ibid. at 543-544. 
166 Graves' Case, 1869, L.R. 4 Q.B. 715, Queen's Bench Division at 723. 
167 'Fine Arts Copyright Act', 25 & 26 Vict., c.68 (Britain, 1862).. 
168 Graves' Case, L.R. 4 Q.B. 715, supra note 166, at 723. 
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property, aided to some extent by his memory and trained judgment.”169 Lord Earl of 
Halsbury L.C. added another justification, which is that the work of reporters should be 
valued due to their reserving culture and information for future generations “[reporters] 
preserve the memory of spoken words, which are assumed to be of value to the 
public.”170 
Although the Lords, in Walter v. Lane,171 confirmed that the person who writes from 
dictation cannot be an author, but a “mere agent or clerk of the person dictating, and 
requires to possess no art beyond that of knowing how to write,”172 this thesis finds that 
the same efforts claimed to be exerted by the verbatim reporter and the circumstance 
to which he is exposed can be witnessed by the person to whom words are dictated. 
Lord James of Hereford set an argument is seen by this thesis to be improper, as he 
finds that the reporter is different because he does his job in difficult circumstances, or 
he may has advantageous conditions that only available to him, as he argued “[t]o 
follow so as to take down the words of an ordinary speaker, and certainly of a rapid 
speaker, is an art requiring considerable training, and does not come within the 
knowledge of ordinary persons.”173 Also he assumed a situation of “if a reporter 
attended a meeting of Anarchists intended to be secret and made their speeches 
public, or if in former times a man had secreted himself in one of the Houses of 
Parliament and taken down the words of different speakers, may it not be contended 
that the reporter was doing something more than merely transcribing?”174 However, 
with the recognition of the circumstances that reporter may do his job in, this is out of 
the subject matter of copyright law that cares about the work itself not the 
circumstances surrounded its making. 
The difficult or advantageous circumstances reporters may experience can be passed 
through by any other workers or craftsmen, but the question of copyright is about 
authorship and creation, not about the hazards experienced within the process of 
recording of somebody else’s words. That is why the writer of this research poses the 
question, what if the person who is dictating somebody else was very quick, or talking 
                                                          
169 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159, at 551 
170 Ibid. at 549 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. at 554 
173 Ibid. at 354 
174 Ibid. at 555 Lord James of Hereford in other place argued “[s]upposing a speech were delivered in a 
language little used, such as Persian or Turkish, only a reporter acquainted with such a language would be 
able to report it. Does the work resulting from such special knowledge mean nothing? The proprietor of a 
journal may have paid highly for obtaining a special report of this almost unreportable speech. May he not 
make a claim for protection against a rival journalist who seeks to make equal use of the report thus 
obtained?” [Underlining  added] ibid. at 555 see also Lord Brampton who confirmed that making creation of 
such verbatim reports “It is obvious that the preparation of them involved considerable intellectual skill and 
brain labour beyond the mere mechanical operation of writing.” See, ibid. at 556 
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in a foreign and rare language, or in a busy and noisy place, or if the person dictating 
does not take care of the logical order of discourse, and the person to whom words are 
dictated had to exert efforts in editing and revising the speech linguistically and 
logically, would he considered author. However, this latter argument was refused to be 
considered in this case, although the subject of the both persons, the reporter and the 
person who writes from dictation, are the same which is the exact words of somebody 
else. For instance, Lord Brampton commented briefly “[o]f course, a person who merely 
writes an article from the dictation and as the servant of another can claim no property 
in what he so writes, for that writing belongs to his employer; but that is not this 
case.”175 He did not explain what that difference is. 
Also it can be asked: what if the reporter did not perfectly write what the speaker said, 
and Lord Rosebery was misunderstood by the public? And suppose that Lord 
Rosebery will sue The Times. What is the title of Lord Rosebery in this case? In 
addition, if readers wanted to refer to his speech they should refer to whom as the 
author: Lord Rosebery or the reporter, and, if the latter, which one of the reporters of 
the many journals that reported him? In addition, what if he had prepared what he was 
delivering in writing, or what if he were already reading from a written paper, an 
assumption that was not mentioned in the case. Lord Rosebery has been considered in 
this case as a source of creation like the nature that works can be appropriated from,176 
like painting of landscape or imitating birds sounds, and, if yes, can the nature claim 
damages for wrong representation, or is he the real author, in fact? 
If it may be argued that Lord Halsbury L.C. has discussed the confusion may happen in 
this case, which may be considered as a reply to the thesis’s doubts, which is: “some 
confusion has been created between two very different things. One, the proprietary 
right of every man in his own literary composition; and the other the copyright,”177 or 
that appears in the plaintiff’s argument: “[t]he Court of Appeal confuses authorship of 
the speech with authorship of the report”178. The thesis argues that there is no 
difference between the work and its fixation, both are one thing. The thoughts if not 
fixed have no author, and when fixed the material itself is invaluable, but it is the 
thoughts and expression that are included that get all the rights and exclusivity. The 
House of Lords had to decide if Lord Rosebery were not author of his speech because 
– for instance - he did not record it in a tangible form; or that he is an author and the 
reporters not. But claiming that there are separate authorships in the speech and the 
                                                          
175 Ibid. at 558. 
176 This presumption is inferred depending on the arguments of Locke as will be explained in Chapter 6 at 
6.3. 
177 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159, at 547. 
178 Ibid. at 541. 
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tangible form together is inconceivable. Moreover, it should be asked what if both 
assigned their works to a publisher; will both publish the same work?  
Although the topic of Lord Rosebery’s authorship is of vital importance to this case, 
Lord Halsbury179 argued that discussing whether the speaker owns his speech or not is 
a question the House of Lords has no concern in. 180 However, this question is an 
essential one, as, according to it, the copyright for verbatim reports will be decided. 
Lord Earl of Halsbury justified this because “Lord Rosebery is not here complaining of 
the publication of it, nor claiming any proprietary right in the speeches as delivered.” 181 
This means that, in other cases, if the speaker alleges he wants to restrict publication 
of his words, then he becomes an author and verbatim reporters will not. This thesis 
claims that this is not a law, because allocating authorship should have specific rules 
that do not depend on the request of the persons concerned. This angle of discussion 
supports the research’s argument that Walter v. Lane is not actually a good law. 
Ironically, Lord Davey confirmed this argument although this was not applied in his 
case, “[i]n my opinion the question must be decided on general considerations, and not 
on any grounds which are personal either to the orator or to the reporter”, 182 
On the other hand, this research’s argument has been supported in theory and in 
application by Lord Robertson when he negates any relationship between Lord 
Rosebery’s personal attitude and the decisions that should be related to legal 
concepts, regardless of individuals’ legal attitude: “[t]he fact that the man who speaks in 
public is not a competitor with the reporter for copyright has not the slightest effect in 
altering the intellectual relation of the reporter to the words of the speech, nor does it 
render less inappropriate the result of holding the statute to confer on the stenographer 
a reward which has no relation whatever to his art.”183 Further discussion of Lord 
Robertson’s argument will be explained in next paragraphs. 
This thesis argues that Lord Halsbury is not convinced of the conferral of copyright to 
authors, instead he sees that producers or publishers should have the copyright, and 
he repeats again the questions that arose after the Statute of Anne in 1710.184 This was 
evident from his explicit hostility against attributing the term ‘author’ to the creator of the 
work. “As I have pointed out, the judgment of the Court of Appeal rests solely on the 
use of the word ‘author’, and I cannot help thinking that some confusion has been 
                                                          
179 Hardinge Stanley Giffard, 1st Earl of Halsbury. 
180 As he argued “[w]hether the speech was delivered so as to give it to all the world and to prevent the 
original author of it from restricting its publication is a question with which your Lordships have here no 
concern.” See Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159, at 547. 
181 Ibid.159, at 547. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid.159. 
184 'Statute of Anne', 8 Anne, c. 19 (England, 1710). 
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created between two very different things: one, the proprietary right of every man in his 
own literary composition; and the other the copyright, that is to say, the exclusive 
privilege of making copies created by the statute.”185 Note here he did not talk about 
authorship. In fact, both the exclusive privilege of making copies and property rights 
should be attributed to the author, but he avoids this fact. He further prevails his 
intention to avoid using the word ‘author’, “[t]he question here is solely whether this 
book (to use the language of the Statute), printed and published and existing as a book 
for the first time, can be copied by someone else than the producers of it (I avoid the 
use of the word “author”), by those who have not produced it themselves” 186 
[Underlining added] 
Lord Halsbury’s concentration on the producer’s right made him equate patent and 
copyright, as he confirmed that the ‘first’ producer of the work is the proprietor of that 
copyright, “as I have endeavoured to point out, neither the one nor the other are 
conditions precedent to the right created by the statute. That right, in my view, is given 
by the statute to the first producer of a book”.187 [Underlining added]. It is believed in 
this research that abolishing the doctrine of the author and authorship is the reason for 
ending up to this understanding. Such understanding destroys all stabilised principles 
in copyright law that confirm that nothing is important about the first author or first 
publisher, which Lord Halsbury himself confirmed afterwards, when he stated 
“[s]uppose a favourite view—a dozen artists take, each independently, his own 
representation of it. Is there any reason why each should not have his own 
copyright?”188 
Lord Brampton also negated the idea that the author alone has the right to publish his 
work, as when the Court of Appeal argued that in order for the first publisher to get 
copyright on the work he has to get an authorisation from the author,189 Lord Brampton 
states “I can find nothing in the Act which compels me to assent to this view.”190 The 
thesis asks, should this not have been stabilised since 1710?191 Since it was mentioned 
in the Statute of Anne that the author, or purchasers thereof, are the only persons who 
                                                          
185 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159, at 547. 
186 Ibid. at 547. 
187 Ibid. at 549’ 
188 Ibid. 
189 What is stated exactly is: “in order that the first publisher of any composition may acquire the copyright 
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have the right to print (or publish) the work.192 And publishers, or any other person, 
accordingly, should get authorisation from authors in order to print or publish their 
works.  
This preference for producers – by Lords Brampton and the Earl of Halsbury - if linked 
with the argument of Lord James of Hereford, mentioned above, wherein he stated 
“[t]he proprietor of a journal may have paid highly for obtaining a special report of this 
almost unreportable speech. May he not make a claim for protection against a rival 
journalist who seeks to make equal use of the report thus obtained?”193 [Underlining 
added]. If this can prevail, what actually is the secret justification of the decision in 
Walter v. Lane?194 The House of Lords, in this case, avoided explicitly arguing that this 
justified protection aims to protect The Times’ investments and their expenditure of 
money. This reseach asserts that if a division were made between works that should 
be protected for compensating and protecting producers, and other works that are 
protected for inner features of the work, the current confusion and distortion would be 
less.  
Instead, the House of Lords tried to prove that verbatim reporters are authors - 
although at the same time Lord Halsbury wanted to exclude the principle of the ‘author’ 
from discussions at all - by claiming that the compilers of addresses and importers of 
inventions are protected and it added to them reporters, which reflects the conflicted 
views that this case included. This appears in the appellants’ argument that even if a 
‘phonograph’ were used to record the sound of the speaker, the reporter would be the 
author. As Lord Peterson commented, “[t]he appellants think that if the owner of a 
phonograph publishes the speech as taken down by the phonograph he is the author of 
the report and entitled to copyright. I should have thought (and think) this a reductio ad 
absurdum of the whole argument of the appellants.” 195 One should take into 
consideration that this presumption, although argued by the respondent, was not 
challenged by any other Lords. 
                                                          
192 As mentioned in s. I of the 'Statute of Anne', supra note 184 that: “the author of any book … shall have 
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It is important too to draw attention to Lord Halsbury’s argument that “[e]ach reporter is 
entitled to report, and each undoubtedly would have a copyright in his own published 
report.”196 He equated their position with that of the artists and photographers who can 
register the same view but every one of them can get separate copyright protection, 
and confirms “[t]here is of course no copyright in the view itself, but in the supposed 
picture or photograph there is.”197 It is believed here that this argument includes a 
fallacy, as he supposes that the speech is a source of creation, like nature, although it 
is a finalised version of human creation, wherein Lord Rosebery appropriated ideas 
and thoughts from the public and arranged them, adding his own thoughts, and using 
specific words, he chose to express those whole thoughts in order. In fact, what was 
done was just the copying or reproduction of this process, without interference.  
Lord Brampton, in his support of the reporter’s authorship, argues that we should look 
to the book itself, not to where the inside came from: “I should think the merits of the 
book ought to be determined, having regard to the contents of the book itself, without 
inquiry as to whether any of the component parts of it emanated from the brain of some 
person other than the author of the book.”198 [Underlining added]. This evidently 
ignores that what is inside is not just the ideas of somebody else, but his expression 
also. This claim would be more accurate if there were just ideas or thoughts that were 
appropriated in the author’s work from another work. However, registering the same 
thoughts, and detailed ideas in the same arrangement and words, nothing can describe 
this process but ‘copying’ or ‘dictation’. Otherwise students could claim to be authors of 
every lecture they transcribe from their teacher, depending only on the fact that they 
exerted efforts in writing and adding punctuation.  
In fact this has been proved to be impossible in several cases before Walter v. Lane, 
for instance, Lord Chancellor Eldon in Abernethy v. Hutchinson 199 confirmed that “A 
person who attends oral lectures is not justified in publishing them for profit.”200 He 
viewed the case from two sides, from the side of property or contract, whether express 
or implied, and the side of trust. Although Lord Eldon confirmed that the invasion of 
written work should be decided depending on comparing the composition with the 
piracy, and the information that was orally delivered. However, “although they were 
orally delivered, and although the parties might go to the extent, if they were able to do 
so, of putting down the whole by means of shorthand, yet they … could not publish for 
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profit that which they had not obtained the right of selling”,201 as this is justified to be 
breach of trust. From the contract side, although “there was not sufficient to establish 
an implied contract as between the Plaintiff and the Defendants … the Defendants 
shall not publish.” 202 
The debate was raised about whether the pupils are public audience or not and how 
this affects the case, as in Nicols v. Pitman203 case it was decided that if the audience 
were public so there is no protection to the author’s orals presentation. In other case, 
Greig v. University of Glasgow,204 it was argued that the class anyway like the public 
audience because the teacher has no right to select the students who attend his 
lectures, besides other parties of the public can join the lecture. The most important 
factor that which the latter case also referred to is that if the students were allowed to 
publish the lectures of their students the professor would not be able to publish the 
result of his own work. 205 
In general terms, it was decided in Macklin v. Richardson 206case that although the 
author of theatrical farces never printed or published them, “the representation of the 
farce, in this case, upon the theatre, was no gift to the public, nor entitled the 
defendants to print and publish it. That it was an invasion of the plaintiff's right and 
property, who might chuse whether it should be printed and published or not.”207  
The thesis strongly agrees with the claim of Mr Abernethy in Abernethy v. Hutchinson 
208 that although he may got notes for his oral lectures, but “he had given his lectures, 
as most lecturers did, orally, and not from a written composition.” 209 Accordingly, “they 
would and must necessarily vary” from his notes, but the defendants’ publication called 
‘the Lancet’ “written in as succinct a manner as possible, with a view to exhibit the 
arrangement he had formed, and the facts which he had collected, together with his 
opinions relative to certain subjects of surgery … [which] … cost him much time and 
study for a long series of years.”210 This arrangement is the only expressive factor of 
the author’s personality and cannot be appropriated without his consent and this which 
had to be applied in Walter v. Lane. 
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Lord Robertson’s Argument: 
In the opposite direction to Lords’ arguments in this case, one of the Lords participating 
in Walter v. Lane211 had an opinion that simply reflects this thesis’s argument.212 If there 
is a ‘good law’ in Walter v. Lane213 this will be in the argument of Lord Robertson, who 
agreed with the Court of Appeal in confirming that the verbatim reports which were 
taken included no “addition or subtraction” 214 as what is copied is the speech, not the 
reporter’s notes. Lord Robertson stressed this nature: “[t]he case before your Lordships 
is a case of shorthand reporting, pure and simple.”215 [Underlining added]. 
Lord Robertson’s argument is based on the recognition of the ‘author’ and ‘authorship’ 
concepts for “in the widest sense of the term “author,” we are in the region of 
authorship.”216 And not merely their existence in law, but in understanding ‘authorship’ 
as a composition or creation; not as a word free from any meaning as Lord Halsbury 
thought. Lord Halsbury had argued that it was possible to use the word ‘author’ to 
describe the person who presents a work to the public, regardless of any features in 
that person or the work he presents.217 Lord Robertson’s understanding led him to find 
that there was no trace of composition in those reports: “there is no manner of 
composition…, even in the sense of arrangement, by a shorthand reporter.”218 The 
thesis and Lord Robertson understand this absence of authorship to be attributed to 
the lack of thoughts in this work. This was evident in his statement: “[i]n fact, the merit 
of the reports now before your Lordships is that they present the speaker's thoughts 
untinctured by the slightest trace or colour of the reporter's mind.”219 [Underlining 
added.] 
Regarding the debate about whether originality is required or not, led by Lord 
Halsbury,220 Lord Robertson takes the same direction that this thesis took, that such 
originality requires a pre-requisite for its application, which is authorship, and the first 
question should be whether there is authorship or not. 221 This research finds that as 
long as the term ‘author’ was enacted and is insisted on by legislators of copyright, at 
least in the UK and the US, so it is the ‘ mental creation’ that should be searched for in 
the first place, not the vague expression ‘originality’. Lord Robertson adopted this view 
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also, “[t]he word ‘author,’ occurring as it does, not in the preamble, but in the enacting 
section, seems to me to present a criterion consistent with the widest application of the 
Act to all who can claim as embodying their own thought, whether humble or lofty, the 
letterpress of which they assert the authorship.”222 [Underlining added].  
So, Lord Robertson’s argument supports this thesis’s argument, that choosing the word 
‘author’ is a meaningful signal to the intention of the legislator, as it calls for the 
application of ‘authorship’ which means the creation or the composition that conveys 
thoughts and ideas and which qualifies a person to be an author. Even if there were no 
originality requirement in the Copyright Act 1842, as Lord Halsbury asserted, “the 
statute seems to me to require neither, nor originality either in thought or in 
language”,223 however, there should be an authorship or creation embodied in the 
work, as clarified above. 
If Lord Robertson’s argument had been maintained, the proposed categorisation would 
has been settled since then, and we would theoretically not see conflict in decisions 
and in deciding on copyrightability that we see today. In addition, Lord Robertson, after 
he exposed the composition of tables and catalogues that conferred protection, argues 
that there is some composition in these kinds of works, although they are “not great 
things, there has been structure and arrangement on the part of the maker.” 224 And he 
considers them trivial works “very pedestrian efforts of the mind.”225 [Underlining 
added].According to this argument, Lord Robertson considers compilation works to be 
low authorship works, or trivial works as they only include arrangement. He confirmed 
that although this is not the authorship expected from an author, it can get some 
protection.  
Additionally, in comparing tables or catalogues and verbatim reports, he argued: “I 
think that the recording by stenography the words of another is in a different region 
from the making up of a time-table. I do not say it is lower or higher, but on a different 
plane, because there is no construction.” 226 [Underlining added] He argues, 
interestingly, that verbatim reports should be separated into a different category 
because their nature is different. This is what this thesis calls for and that is why it has 
proposed to separate them into a different category, to be called ‘non-authorship’ 
works. Even Lord Robertson described them as having “no construction”.227 This thesis 
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also makes this proposal, and separating these works that have different nature 
requires the application of different criterion that suit their nature, and different level of 
protection.228 
As a conclusion to the discussion of the Lords’ arguments in Walter v. Lane,229 It can 
be said that this case constituted a shocking move to the legal and judicial fields, and 
due to the Lords’ constitutional position, their decision was taken seriously into 
consideration. However, this decision was mistaken and led to disastrous results.230 
Only one of the five Lords, namely Lord Robertson, gave the most appropriate answer 
in relation to the orthodox concepts of copyright law. Although his view did not win at 
that time, this thesis hopes that his view can prevail after more than a century.  
The Consequences of the Walter v. Lane Case: 
Walter v. Lane has been used to justify the conferral of copyright protection to works 
that actually do not include any creation but only skill and labour in the production 
process. That is why this thesis argues that Walter v. Lane is not a good law but it’s a 
bad law due to the deliberate disregard of authorship concept and the confusion 
occurred in copyright law theoretically and practically. For instance, Garnett and Davies 
relied on Walter v. Lane to argue: “the work of transcribing a piece of music into 
notation will usually be enough to make the new work original, even though the 
transcriber may not have created new sounds, the work will usually be original.” 231 This 
argument is a justification for ending any creativity and allowing infringement of works 
or actually emptying of the substance from copyright law protection, due to the doctrine 
of Walter v. Lane. 
 
Even Garnett and Davies considered the change of medium or form can qualify for 
copyright, “changing the expression of a work from one medium to another will entitle 
the new work to copyright,”232 as they relied on that skill and labour expended on the 
creation of the work can solely gains originality and is vested with copyright protection. 
Subsequently, an engraving, even if a close copy of an existing work, such as a 
painting or drawing, will be considered original. 
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Lord Oliver in Interlego AG v. Tyco233 also said: “if somebody produces a good copy by 
painting, or produces an enlarged photograph from a positive print, but no one would 
reasonably contend that the copy painting or enlargement was an original work, 
because there is no originality.” 234 Garnett and Davies commented on Lord Oliver’s 
speech by stating that this is inconsistent with Walter v. Lane. 
3.6 Skill, Labour and Judgement 
The US interpretation of originality -‘sweat of the brow’- was prevalent for a long time 
and it diminished afterwards in favour of the selection and arrangement criterion, as 
explained above. In the UK, the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ was also a prevailing 
interpretation, yet recently there are pressures to abandon it in favour of a more 
personal interpretation, namely, ‘intellectual creation’, as will be clarified.  
Originality was required in the UK as the main criterion for deciding on the 
copyrightability of intellectual works, as the first section of CDPA provided: “(1) 
Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following 
descriptions of work—(a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”. It was 
agreed by judiciary235 and jurisprudence236 in the UK that originality should be 
interpreted to mean the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ expended by the author in creating 
his work. Vitoria confirmed “[a]n original dramatic work is in general the product of the 
mind of a human author, arrived at by the exercise of substantial independent skill, 
creative labour or Judgement …”237 
It was confirmed in the case of Ladbroke v. William Hill 238 in the Court’s comment on 
the work done by the respondent ‘William Hill’ that “[i]t is not disputed that a vast 
amount of skill, judgment, experience and work has gone into building up the 
respondents' coupon.”239 Lord Reid in confirming this criterion has argued that: “it has 
often been recognised that if sufficient skill and judgment have been exercised in 
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devising the arrangements of the whole work, that can be an important or even 
decisive element in deciding whether the work as a whole is protected by copyright.”240  
Also, in Waterlow Directories Ltd. v. Reed Information Services Mr Justice Aldous 
decided that “no one has a right to take the results of the labour and expense incurred 
by another for the purposes of a rival publication, and thereby save himself the 
expense and labour of working out and arriving at these results by some independent 
road.”241 
Also in Baigent v. Random House Group 242 it was argued that the authors of the Holy 
Blood and the Holy Grail (HBHG) cannot obtain copyright protection because the work 
“was not the product of the application of skill and labour by the authors”.243 It is worth 
noting that this criterion was adopted in the US also, as in the Bridgeman Art Library, 
Ltd. v. Corel Corp case,244 it was argued by Judge Kaplan that “[o]riginality 
presupposes the exercise of substantial independent skill, labour, judgment.”245 
[Underlining added] 
3.6.1 Criticism of the ‘Skill, Labour and Judgment’ Criterion: 
This interpretation or criterion is criticised from several perspectives. First, it resembles 
the precedent US criterion ‘sweat of the brow’; second, it measures the creation 
process and preparatory steps, not the characteristics or contents of the work itself; 
third, the uncertainty surrounding its application. 
-1- Resemblance between the UK’s ‘Skill and Labour’ and the US’s ‘Sweat of the 
Brow’ 
In courts whether, in the UK or US, it seems that the ‘skill and labour’ criterion was 
translated into the ‘sweat of the brow’, both seek to protect any works created using 
individual efforts or capitals that confer market value to the work, not the personal and 
mental characteristics. Scassa confirmed this view, as she stated that skill and labour 
is “a standard for originality that can easily be interpreted so as to offer copyright 
protection to facts.”246 
In Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd. the House of Lords gave more 
detail to the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ to ease its application through adding equal 
                                                          
240 Ibid. at 277. 
241 Waterlow Directories Ltd. V. Reed Information Services Ltd., 1993, E.C.C. 174, The English High Court, 
Chancery Division at 180. 
242 Baigent V. Random House Group, 2007, EWCA Civ The Court of Appeal 
243 Ibid. at 284. 
244 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 1999, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, United States District Court, S.D. 
New York. 
245 Ibid. at 198. 
246 Teresa Scassa, 'Original Facts: Skill, Judgment, and the Public Domain', McGill LJ, 51 (2005). p. 3. 
 
 
102 
expression to the used terminology, as the House of Lords stated: “the appropriate 
odds … is something which only great skill, industry and experience will discover.”247 
They also confirmed that “[i]t is common ground that the preparation of a coupon with 
bets of this sort requires a great deal of industry and skill.” 248 [Underlining added]. 
Laddie et al. have combined stipulation that the work was not copied from pre-existing 
works and the embodying of a substantial amount of skill, knowledge, labour and 
Judgement.249 
 ‘Skill, labour and judgment’ can be used to justify the protection of copyright to any 
work, regardless of the mental contribution, including to compilation works and 
databases. This  view was confirmed by Ginsburg who sees that the ‘the volatility of 
originality’ has offered alternative interpretations for it, and that the ‘skill and labour’ 
standard adopted in commonwealth countries is “formerly known in the United States 
as the ‘sweat copyright’.” 250 Rahmatian argues the same, although he finds that the US 
‘sweat of the brow’ is focused on labour and is too narrow.251 Besides, he confirms that 
“the UK originality concept [skill, labour and judgment] … [has] intrinsic 
inconsistencies.”252 
This view was advocated by Lord Oliver in Interlego AG v. Tyco253 who argued that skill 
and labour are not justifiable conditions that indicate the originality of the work. “Take 
the simplest case of artistic copyright, a painting or photograph. It takes great skill, 
judgment and labour to produce a good copy by painting, or to produce an enlarged 
photograph from a positive print, but no one would reasonably contend that the copy 
painting or enlargement was an ‘original’ artistic work in which the copier is entitled to 
claim copyright. Skill, labour or judgment merely in the process of copying cannot 
confer originality.”254 [Underlining added] It is worth mentioning that Judge Kaplan, in 
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the US Court in the Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp. Case,255 applied Lord 
Oliver’s argument to deny conferral of copyright protection to transparencies, including 
photographic reproductions of paintings. Likewise, Garnett and Davies argue that the 
compilations made under the UK Copyright Act relied on the criterion of the ‘sweat of 
the brow’, not ‘skill and judgment’, in the selection of their constituent parts, so they 
actually are not protected as original works under UK law. 256  
The CJEU in the recent Football Dataco Ltd. v. Yahoo! UK Ltd. Case257referred to that 
skill and labour criterion is not indicative of the existence of intellectual creation in the 
work, and instead stated that the ‘selection and arrangement criteria’ should be used, 
“[t]he fact that the setting up of the database required, irrespective of the creation of the 
data which it contains, significant labour and skill of its author, … cannot as such justify 
the protection of it by copyright under directive 96/9, if that labour and that skill do not 
express any originality in the selection or arrangement of that data.”258 However, the 
thesis opposes this step also. 
The thesis supports Ong’s confirmation that the time, effort or labour, spent in creating 
the work should not have “any direct bearing on the originality of a work for the 
purposes of copyright protection” 259 as “[a] hastily scribbled poem or roughly painted 
canvas may produce a literary or artistic masterpiece, while mediocre monstrosities 
may emerge from authors who labour for years over their works.” 260 This thesis 
supports his opinion, here also, that the work should be produced with the requisite of 
“authorial intent” 261 as this supports the thesis’s search for authorship in works seeking 
copyright protection. 
-2- ‘Skill and Labour’ Measures the Preparation for the Work, not the 
Characteristics of the Work Itself  
There is an enquiry about whether this criterion is required in the process of producing 
the work or in the work itself. Garnett and Davies have confirmed that it is necessary to 
make “a distinction between skill and labour required for the compiling of information 
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and the skill and labour required for the presentation of it, as only the latter being 
relevant for the purposes of the originality requirement and copyright protection.” 262 
The requirement for originality in the work itself has an inherent significance, as it 
measures whether the work benefits people and promotes science and the arts, as the 
preparatory steps may lead to the creation of useless work, or work that is not 
beneficial to people, or may be useful but does not lead to progress in the sciences and 
arts, as stated in the Statute of Anne. 
-3- Uncertainty around the ‘Skill, Labour and Judgement’ Criterion 
In the case of Redwood Music Ltd. v. Chappell,263 although Judge Robert Goff was 
exposed to the skill, labour and Judgement criteria, and though the subject of the case 
was the ordinary arrangement of music, and that “an arrangement of a popular song for 
a dance band is a purely mechanical operation, which musicians can easily carry out 
using ordinary skill,” 264 he confirmed that it suffices that the work originates from the 
author. Judge Goff allowed the arranger of the music to obtain the copyright on the 
arrangement: “All that is required is that the work in question should originate from the 
arranger or adaptor rather than being a mere copy of another's work.” 265  
The strange thing with this decision is that although Judge Robert Goff confessed that 
the unlicensed arrangement of music is an infringement of the adaptation right of the 
original author, he confirmed that this does not mean that the arranger cannot get 
copyright on his arrangement, as he justified this by saying: “it does not of course 
follow that the owner of the copyright in the original work owns the copyright in the 
arrangement, for example, the film script or play; if that were so, it would lead to the 
absurd conclusion that the owner of the copyright in the original work, having licensed 
the adaptation-possibly for a substantial consideration-would be free to exploit the 
adaptation himself.”266 This case raises questions about the validity of the ‘skill labour 
and judgment’ criteria as an interpretation of originality in UK, or was it invented as a 
substitute for the originality criteria; the thesis thinks it is the latter. 
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Ltd and Others V. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004, 5 LRC 428, 2004 SCC 13, Canada, Supreme 
Court Para. 25. 
263 Redwood Music Ltd. V. Chappell & Co. Ltd., 1982, RPC 109, The High Court of Justice–Queen's Bench 
Division. 
264 Ibid. at 115. 
265 Ibid. at 117. 
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Also in G. A. Cramp & Sons, Limited v. Frank Smythson,267 the Court stressed the 
effort put into creating works: “Whether enough work, labour and skill is involved, and 
what its value is, must always be a question of degree.”268 [Underlining added]. There 
is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the ‘skill, labour and Judgement’ criterion’s 
application and the amount of skill or judgment required to prove the existence of 
originality. Lord Reid, in Ladbroke v. William Hill, 269 has affirmed the uncertainty of this 
combined condition. He confirmed that this criterion is not used with great precision or 
disjunctively,270 and may be sometimes used cumulatively, and it is occasionally 
accompanied by other criteria or normative terms, like work, capital, effort, industry, 
knowledge, taste, ingenuity or experience.271  
This view is supported by Ricketson, who said that “there was nothing said in any of 
the speeches defining the minimum degree of labor, skill and judgment sufficient to 
make a work original. Thus, the dividing line between original (and therefore protected) 
works, and unoriginal (and therefore unprotected) works, remains an uncertain and 
shifting one.”272 Laddie et al. argue that the required amount of skill and effort is not 
large, and it suffices if it was insubstantial, or if there is a substantial amount of purely 
routine mental effort, this may be enough to satisfy the originality requirement.273 
Garnett and Davies decided that originality is the mere condition needed to confer 
copyright protection to a work, in the sense that it “originated from an author”.274 They 
additionally thought the requirement of ‘skill, labour, and Judgement’ in the created 
work is impossible to apply as it relies on the amount of those characteristics and 
whether they are sufficient or not.275 They argued that there is a line that “cannot be 
drawn between the efforts involved in developing ideas and that minimal efforts 
required in setting these ideas down on paper.”276 Since the recognised efforts are 
those expended in the expression stage, or in ‘setting ideas down on paper’, not in the 
preparatory procedures, accordingly, Garnett and Davies confirmed that the criterion 
‘skill and labour’ cannot be taken into consideration at all.277 
                                                          
267 G. A. Cramp & Sons, Limited V. Frank Smythson, Limited 1944, A.C. 329, House of Lords. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 273, supra note 235. 
270 Ibid. 
271 L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (third edn.: Oxford University Press Oxford:, 
2009)., p. 95. 
272 S. Ricketson, 'The Concept of Originality in Anglo-Australian Copyright Law', Journal of the copyright 
society of the USA, 39 (1992). p. 280. 
273 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
155, at 3.57. 
274 K.M. Garnett and G. Davies, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, supra note 231, at 3-130 
275 Ibid. at 3-130 
276 Ibid. at 3-147. 
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The same view was confirmed by Ricketson, who contended that as long as there is no 
exact definition of the minimum degree of the elements included in the criteria of skill, 
labour and judgement that can grant originality to a work, so the dividing line between 
original and not original works remains uncertain. Ricketson argued that Judge 
Peterson’s statement, wherein he stated the renowned argument “after all, there 
remains the rough practical test that what is worth copying is prima facie worth 
protecting” 278 is preferable.279 
3.7 Intellectual Creation:  
Though the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ was, and somehow still is, prevalent in the UK, 
this criterion faces strong confrontation with the global trend to raise the interpretation 
of originality in works and to include personal and mental creation as a major 
component of the copyright criteria, even, and especially, a desire to abandon it. We 
have seen in the introduction280 the trend in the international legislation (Berne, TRIPS, 
WIPO, and EU directives) towards adopting intellectual creation as an interpretation or 
substitute for the originality criterion. Though this criterion was settled in the 1996 EU 
Database Directive,281 it was difficult for the English courts to abandon their age old 
skill and labour criterion regarding databases. In this situation, the CJEU has played a 
special role in imposing this criterion on the English judicial system. 
This approach is a step towards complete separation between works that have mental 
authorship and those lacking this characteristic, and there is much evidence for this in 
both the UK and the US. In the UK the whole issue is happening through pressure from 
the CJEU, which will be clarified below. In the US this trend was apparent since the 
Trade-Mark Cases282 and Burrow-Giles 283 cases and has been revived again in the 
Feist v. Rural Case.284 However, due to factual work’s nature is different as they cannot 
cope with the application of conditions that measure mental and personal 
characteristics, so a discussion of the nature of authorship and ‘non-authorship’ works 
is required to settle the suitable conditions that are compatible with the inner features of 
every work, and that which this thesis will do in Chapters Six and Seven.285 
                                                          
278 See, University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 2 Ch. 601, supra note 235, p. 611. 
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The CJEU confirmed this issue in the Infopaq v. Danske Case 286 (Infopaq 1), when it 
required that the author should has done sufficient ‘intellectual creation’ in the work to 
be eligible for copyright protection, and confirmed “[a]ny harmonisation of copyright and 
related rights must take as a basis a high level of protection, since such rights are 
crucial to intellectual creation.”287 This is also apparent in the court comment on Berne 
Convention requirements in this regard: “It is, moreover, apparent from the general 
scheme of the Berne Convention, in particular arts 2(5) and (8), that the protection of 
certain subject-matters as artistic or literary works presupposes that they are 
intellectual creations.”288 
The CJEU has confronted the ‘skill and labour’ criterion and decided that: “the fact that 
the setting up of the database required, irrespective of the creation of the data which it 
contains, significant labour and skill of its author, as mentioned in section (c) of that 
same question, cannot as such justify the protection of it by copyright under directive 
96/9, if that labour and that skill do not express any originality in the selection or 
arrangement of that data.”289 So, skill and labour per se, regardless of their degree, are 
not important. What counts is the original selection or arrangement even if there is 
minimum labour or skill; this means that the UK ‘skill and labour’ criterion has been 
suspended by the CJEU. This is confirmed when the Court argued that selection or 
arrangement is stipulated to be: “an original expression of the creativity of the author of 
the database.” 290 
The ‘intellectual creation’ criterion seems to prioritise the personal creativity 
perspective. However, it is believed that this trend is a high wave that will be followed 
by a lower one, once the investors’ interests in databases are affected to continue the 
precedent practice of uncertainty, unless a separation between works is adopted.  
In the SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd Case291 the Court of Chancery 
Division asserted at the start that originality means whether the work is an “intellectual 
creation”.292 Later, it analysed the elements of originality that we should search for, 
quoting Infopaq v. Danske, “[i]t is only through the choice, sequence and combination 
of those words, figures or mathematical concepts that the author may express his 
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creativity in an original manner and achieve a result.”293 The elements ‘choice’ and 
‘sequence’ are expressing the same meaning of ‘selection and arrangement’ and those 
which this thesis has proposed to rely on to find originality in authorship works. 
Moreover, the CJEU, in Football Dataco v. Yahoo Case,294 confirmed that creating a 
work depending on predetermined rules or techniques does not help to show creative 
authorship. “[T]hat criterion [intellectual creation in the selection or arrangement] is not 
satisfied when the setting up of the database is dictated by technical considerations, 
rules or constraints which leave no room for creative freedom.” 295 Note here, that 
compilations of facts, in most cases, depend on technical selection and arrangement 
and is mostly undertaken by companies that specialise in creating them, especially 
maps, catalogues, and compilations of laws or reports. This was also confirmed by the 
Court in SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming: “elements ‘differentiated only by their 
technical function’ must be disregarded”296 [Underlining added]. 
Eventually, the Court in SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming explicitly advocated 
the civil law system of personality and individuality, stating: “[w]hat is required is 
something on which the author has stamped his ‘personal touch’ through the creative 
choices he has made.”297 [Underlining added]. 
3.8 ‘Originating From the Author’ 
Here, the thesis will expose some decisions that considered that the work be 
‘originated from the author’ sufficed for it to be an ‘original’ work and so eligible for 
copyright protection. Discussing such criteria shows how interpretations of a single 
term without theoretical background can empty the term of its meaning. 
Judge Peterson, in the UK case University of London Press v. University Tutorial 
Press,298 severed ties between the term ‘originality’ and its direct lingual, theoretical 
and historical interpretation,299 when he stated: “The word ‘original’ does not in this 
connection mean that the work must be the expression of original or inventive thought.” 
300 He decided that ‘original’ does not seem to mean ‘original’, but means ‘originate’. 
“The Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but 
that the work must not be copied from another work — that it should originate from the 
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author.” 301 [Underlining added]. In spite of his confirmation that it suffices that a work 
has originated from the author, and that inventive thought is not required, he refused to 
consider work that included the questions of examinations and the creators added their 
answers and criticisms to these questions, as an original work. This was on the ground 
that the included examinations are not created by them but by the examiners, though 
the questions are only a small part of the work. 
In Dr. Lionel Sawkins v. Hyperion Records302 it was also confirmed by Judge Mummery 
that to fulfil the requisite of originality it suffices that the work originated from the 
alleged author,“[a] work need only be ‘original’ in the limited sense that the author 
originated it by his efforts rather than slavishly copying it from the work produced by the 
efforts of another person”.303[Underlining added]. 
It should be confirmed that the ‘originating from the author’ criteria has the same 
meaning as the ‘independent creation’ and the ‘non copying from precedent works’ 
criteria. In the US, this criterion is prevalent,304 as work cannot be copied from other 
work, and should embody some modest amount of individual labour in order to get the 
title ‘work of authorship’ and to get copyright protection. For instance, Circuit Judge 
Frank stated in Alfred Bell v. Catalda305 “No matter how poor artistically the author’s 
addition, it is enough if it be his own.”306 
In the case of Alfred Bell v. Catalda,307 due to the silence of the Copyright Act 1909 in 
determining the requirements for conferring copyright protection, the defendant claimed 
that ‘novelty’ is required for copyrighting works, arguing that the word ‘original’ has 
meanings like “startling, novel or unusual, a marked departure from the past.”308 
                                                          
301 Ibid. at 609, it is worth noting that Judge Peterson attracts attention even today with his renowned 
criterion, “after all, there remains the rough practical test that what is worth copying is prima facie worth 
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Circuit Judge in Novelty Textile Mills, Inc., V. Joan Fabrics Corporation, 1977, 558 F.2d 1090, No. 998, 
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Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the Quantum of Originality Needed to Attain Copyright 
Protection in a Derivative Work', Santa Clara Law Review, 40 (2000)., p. 328. 
305 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 304. 
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However, the Court confirmed that originality, in the context of copyright law, just 
means that “the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to the ‘author. No large measure of 
novelty is necessary.”309 
Durham also confirmed this interpretation “Originality does not require any measure of 
talent. The humblest doodle is as ‘original,’ in the sense of ‘owing its origin’ to its 
creator, as the most sophisticated work of art.” 310 His interpretation just confines 
originality’s meaning to ‘originating’ as he states: “a valid copyright can subsist in a 
work that is indistinguishable from other works that preceded it, so long as it was not 
copied from its predecessors.”311 
Independent creation or the originating from the author interpretation are nothing but 
another expression of the sweat of the brow doctrine. Requiring that the author has 
made the work himself requires investigating the labour, effort and time expended in 
creating this work, which in fact applies protection to the labour of the precedent 
author.”[t]he requirement of independent research comes dangerously close to 
protecting facts themselves”312 
This is consistent with the case of United Telephone Co. of Missouri v. Johnson 
Publishing Co.313 Although the court applied independent creation as a criterion of 
copyright, the court considered the defendant as an infringer because he began with 
the plaintiff’s work through verifying the data included, as the industrious collection of 
the work requires that the compiler do the whole work independently. 
‘Non-Copying From Other Works’, or ‘Little More Than Non-Copying’: 
The ‘non-copying’ criterion used by courts has the same meaning as the latter criterion 
–‘originating from the author’- as the work owes its origin to the author if he didn’t copy 
it from precedent works. At the same time, the work is not considered to be copied from 
other works if the author proves he created it himself, even if there is substantial 
similarity. This criterion is attributed also to Judge Peterson in University of London 
Press v. University Tutorial Press.314 He actually combined the ‘non-copying’ 
interpretation and the ‘originating from the author’ interpretation of originality, when he 
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stated: “the work must not be copied from another work — that it should originate from 
the author.”315 [Underlining added] 
In the US, Abrams also argues that the originality threshold required for copyright until 
the end of the twentieth century was something more than the complete copying of 
precedent works.316 The Circuit Judge in Novelty Textile v. Joan Fabrics317 confirmed 
that a work can be original even if it is completely identical to prior work, provided that it 
can be proved that no direct or indirect copying has happened and the work is a 
product of an independent effort.318 Judge Campbell, in the US case Hoague-Sprague 
v. Frank,319 made his renowned statement in this regard: “the originality required in 
case of copyright means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.”320 [Underlining 
added] 
Most cases that required ‘non-copying’ attached to it also the requirement of 
‘originating from the author’, as, e.g., Judge Frank in Alfred Bell v. Catalda,321 who 
confirmed: "Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual 
copying"322 and that “‘[o]riginal' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the 
particular work owes its origin' to the 'author.'”323 Also, in Batlin v. Snyder324 ‘non-
copying’ and ‘originating from the author’ were taken into consideration, as it confirmed 
that, “[o]riginality, as copyright prerequisite, means that work owes its creation to 
author, and this in turn means that work must not consist of actual copying.” 325 
On the other hand, Ong criticised this interpretation, and especially Judge Peterson’s 
claim, arguing: “[d]oing so would inaccurately reduce ‘originality’ into an unworkable 
negative criterion that could not be sensibly applied to a wide range of cases in which 
some form or degree of copying was involved in the production of a copyright work.” 326 
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In this criterion there are two different approaches; at the first any differentiation 
between the two works suffices, even if there is copying, any addition or amendment 
over this copying can fulfil the originality condition. The other requires complete non-
copying, even if there is similarity it should be of the work of the author. This latter 
approach is apparent in cases which group between the ‘non-copying’ and ‘originated 
from the author’ criteria to raise the originality criteria. For instance, in the Batlin327 case 
a degree of originality was required in addition to ‘non-copying from works’, “[a] 
considerably higher degree of skill is required, true artistic skill, to make the 
reproduction copyrightable.”328 This approach was taken by Drone also as he 
explained: “In all cases, whatever may be the kind or the character of the work for 
which protection is claimed, the true test of originality is whether the production is the 
result of independent labor or of copying.” 329 
In Alfred Bell v. Catalda330 also it was stipulated that if there is copying, a 
distinguishable variation should exist. “Despite statutory provision declaring that no 
copyright shall exist in works in public domain, a copy of something in public domain 
will support a copyright if it is a distinguishable variation.” 331 In addition, the same Court 
argued that copyright needs something more than copying, something beyond trivial 
work, and it should be made by the author independently. As it confirmed: 
“Constitutional provision and statutory provisions relating to copyrights are satisfied if 
the author contributes something more than mere trivial variation in previous work and 
work may be copyrighted if there is something recognizably the author's own and not 
mere copying of another work.” 332  
Criticising the ‘Non-Copying’ Criterion: 
This criterion can lead to two different ends, as its two meanings will lead to protecting 
a work in one case and precluding this protection in another. This is a result of the 
different approaches of Judges in interpreting the meaning of a legal term without 
investigation into it, and the lack of coordination between courts in interpreting cases. 
The system proposed by this thesis to categorise works will clarify much of the 
confusion that has happened and make the conflict of cases less apparent.  
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The UK CDPA 1988 stated that copyright may not subsist in works other than literary, 
dramatic, musical, and artistic works, which are sound recordings, films, broadcasts, 
and typographical arrangements: ‘if, or to the extent that, it [reproduce or infringe the 
copyright] of a previous [work].’333 This conversely means that the former works 
(literary, musical, etc. ) require a higher threshold in order to be protected. The law 
refused to equate the two kinds of works in the meaning of originality. The specification 
of a special requirement that depends mainly on not copying and on originating from 
the author, presumes that originality has a higher meaning than just non-copying.  
3.9 Novelty 
UK and US jurisprudence334 and judiciaries distanced novelty from possible originality 
interpretations by confirming that copyright law does not require the work to be 
unprecedented or new.335 However, we find some calls to equate originality with 
novelty, or to merge some of novelty’s meaning with originality. As an instance for the 
first case we find Boyd determined that: “[w]hile courts continue to shape the concept 
of originality, it is clear that originality is distinct from the concepts of novelty and 
creativity.”336 Likewise, Laddie et al. neglected the role of creativity and inventive 
thought in the process of granting copyright protection by asserting: “It is not necessary 
that the work should be the expression of inventive thought” 337 
Bently and Sherman confirm that one of the shared characteristics in the British and 
European conceptions of originality is that both are concerned with the relationship 
between an author and the work, and novelty is concerned with the characteristics of 
the work itself, so originality cannot mean novelty at all times.338 On the other hand, the 
novelty required in patent law is concerned with the relationship between the invention 
and the state of the art. 339 The same principle is confirmed by the UK judiciary, as in 
e.g., in Christoffer v. Poseidon Film,340 where it was held that the film script entitled 
‘The Cyclops’ based on a tale ‘The Cyclops from Homer's Odyssey’, was an original 
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work, although the story and characters were known ages before.341 So, novelty is 
missing in such cases. 
In the US, the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden342 confirmed that: “[t]he copyright of 
the book, if not pirated from other works, would be valid without regard to the novelty, 
or want of novelty, of its subject-matter. The novelty of the art or thing described or 
explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright.”343 This was also 
approved in the case of Alfred Bell v. Catalda,344 and in the case U.S.A v. Edward 
Hamilton,345 as it was decided that “ [o]riginality requires only that the work display 
something irreducible, which is one man's alone, … not that the work be novel in 
comparison with the works of others. … [and] when a work displays a significant 
element of compilation, that element is protectible even though the individual 
components of the work may not be.”346 In Baltimore Orioles v. Major League347 it was 
decided that: “for a work to be copyrightable, it must be original and creative, but need 
not be novel”.348 
On the other hand, there is contrary opinion, for instance, Castanaro claims that artists 
nowadays like to think of their works as original and unique, but, on the contrary, he 
submits that the public does not think this about most of the works on the market, as 
many seem ‘dubiously’ similar to previous original work, as the public need and seek 
for something more creative.349 Accordingly, he proposes that originality should be 
applied beside novelty in order to promote the creativity of works, suggesting that a mix 
of originality and patent novelty will promote the creation of interesting works that will 
stand for the entire catalogue of pre-existing works and will enhance the literary and 
musical works’ market, ”[a] hybrid of copyright originality and patent novelty would best 
serve the interests of promoting the creation of new works without stifling the creative 
process in music.”350  
In Burrow-Giles v. Sarony351 novelty was mentioned as a condition in literary works. It 
was argued that: “an engraving, a painting, a print, does embody the intellectual 
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351 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 108. 
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conception of its author, in which there is novelty, invention, originality, and it therefore 
comes within the purpose of the constitution in securing its exclusive use or sale to its 
author.”352 This confirms the confusion between originality and novelty in interpreting 
copyright’s requirement for protection. 
3.10 Creativity, Innovation, or Inventive Thought: 
Originality has been interpreted as creativity, innovation or inventive thought in different 
scholars’ opinions and court decisions. It is believed that this interpretation is the 
closest to the true meaning, or what it should be, of originality. 
In the UK, Garnett and Davies have confirmed that creativity should be the 
interpretation of originality, and they ascertained that creativity was only mentioned on 
the author’s side; however, a low level of creativity was required.353 Although Boyd 
refused to connect between originality, novelty and creativity, he confirmed that courts 
are confusing originality, novelty and creativity in the process of shaping the originality 
concept.354 He argued that in the US in order for a work to be original it should combine 
a ‘minimal degree of creativity’ and ‘independent work’. 355 Castanaro has directly 
interpreted the originality threshold by confirming that a work will meet originality 
criteria if independently created with a modicum of creativity.356 Strowel argued that the 
author’s rights system (civil law) does not give protection to works unless they have 
proved an extensive quantum of creativity, whereas the copyright system (common 
law) confers protection with a lower degree of creativity, so he confirmed the stipulation 
of creativity under the US Copyright Act 1976.357 This approach is no longer valid, as 
the EU directives and the CJEU are pushing all EU members’ national legislations to 
adopt creativity and personality as constituent elements of originality. 
US courts have used the criterion of ‘a modicum of creativity’ as an application of the 
originality requirement to determine protected works.358 They have confirmed that the 
level of creativity required is normally low level, as confirmed in the Feist v. Rural Case: 
“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 
                                                          
352 Ibid. at 59. 
353 K.M. Garnett and G. Davies, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, supra note 231, at 3-126. 
354 Steven S. Boyd, 'Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the Quantum of Originality 
Needed to Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work', supra note 304. 
355 Ibid. p. 332. 
356 Valeria M. Castanaro, 'It's the Same Old Song: The Failure of the Originality Requirement in Musical 
Copyright', supra note 349, p. 1287. 
357 Alain Strowel, Droit D'auteur Et Copyright, Divergences Et Convergences, Etude De Droit Compare 
(Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1993). Para 293. 
358 J. Campbell, 'Authorship, Incentives for Creation, and Copyright in the Digital 21st Century', 
Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 43/1 (2006). p. 3. 
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at least some minimal degree of creativity.”359 In Batlin v. Snyder360 it was confirmed 
that a “minimal element of creativity is above the requirement of independent effort.”361  
In Atari v. Ralph362 it was ordered that to fulfil the originality requirement and ensure the 
existence of a work of authorship that deserves copyright protection, the work should 
pass a “creativity test”, proving that it embodies at least a “modest amount of 
intellectual labour”,363 [Underlining added] It is noticed that a US Court has interpreted 
originality by creativity, and then interpreted creativity as a modest amount of 
intellectual labour. 
Criticism of Creativity or Innovative Input: 
Campbell finds that the US Copyright Act of 1976364 confirmed the same principle –
which is the equation between originality, creativity and modest amount of intellectual 
labour- when it demanded that originality be “little more than a prohibition of actual 
copying”.365 He adds that the requirement for an “appreciable amount of creative 
authorship” is null and impractical.366 Abrams confirmed that compilation works were 
protected without any reference to a high originality threshold, so creativity, a fortiori, is 
not required.367 He assures that creativity cannot be required in copyright law at all. In 
fact, Abram’s opinion relies on the consideration that copyright law should adopt one 
interpretation of originality that can be applied to all works of authorship, and if any 
interpretation is not applied to one kind or category of these works it should be 
excluded for other works also. This thesis does not believe in the validity of such a 
claim, as it argues that the works should be separated into three categories and every 
category should have a dedicated interpretation of originality that suits its nature. This 
depends on a belief that the unified criterion is harmful to copyright law, both 
theoretically and practically, as will be shown in Chapters Six and Seven.  
                                                          
359 See, Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, supra note 64. § 2.01 [a], [b] cited by Feist Publications, Inc. V. 
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 345. 
360 L. Batlin & Son, Inc., V. Jeffrey Snyder and Etna Products Co., 536 F.2d 486, supra note 324. 
361 Ibid. at 490. 
362 Atari Games Corporation, V. Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights., 1989, 888 F.2d 878, No. 88-5296., 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 
363 Ibid. at 2 p. 5. 
364 'Copyright Act of the United States', supra note 22. 
365 J. Campbell, 'Authorship, Incentives for Creation, and Copyright in the Digital 21st Century', supra note 
358, p. 6 citing Patry’s understanding, see, Alan Latman, William F Patry, and Herbert Allen Howell, 
Latman's the Copyright Law (Bureau of National Affairs, 1986). p. 23. 
366 J. Campbell, 'Authorship, Incentives for Creation, and Copyright in the Digital 21st Century', supra note 
358 p. 6. 
367 Howard B Abrams, 'Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law', supra note 4, p. 15. 
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Creativity Should Prevail: 
The creativity criterion should be supported and reinforced, whether per se or within the 
selection and arrangement criterion that the thesis supports. ‘Creativity’ has a direct 
influence on the authorship doctrine, as it presumes the intervention of personal 
authorship and mental labour, and whenever creativity is mentioned the personal 
element is confirmed.368 For instance, in the Feist v. Rural Case, it was confirmed 
through the creativity condition that the concept of authorship no longer relies solely on 
the author’s labour in creating work through gathering information, but that 
‘independent imagining’ - as Ginsburg described it- 369 is required, and ‘subjective’ 
selection or arrangement is also required to manifest the authorship in it. “The more 
subjective the choices as to selection or arrangement, the more authorship would likely 
be found.” 370 [Underlining added]. 
Even the understanding of Feist to the decision of the Trade-Mark Cases v. Steffens 
case correlated creativity and the personal intervention, that was evident from the 
‘emphasis’ the Supreme Court used in the quotation of the latter case, “[i]n The Trade-
Mark Cases … The Court explained that originality requires independent creation plus 
a modicum of creativity: ‘[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has 
been, to include original designs for engraving, prints, &c., it is only such as are 
original, and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to 
be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, 
engravings, and the like.’”371 This emphasis, through using italic, refers to the notion 
that the writings can be original only if the fruits of intellectual labour are reflected, and 
this was used as an evidence of the creativity requirement. 
The orientation towards the personalisation of the authorship within copyright law is an 
undeniable fact, for instance, the EU Directive 2001/29372 states in the preamble that 
“[i]f authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to 
receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work”.373 Accordingly, the EU 
legislator expressed the view that it is the author who must be rewarded to achieve the 
                                                          
368 Teresa Scassa, 'Original Facts: Skill, Judgment, and the Public Domain', supra note  246 p. 10. As she 
confirmed that “‘Creativity’ places more emphasis on the effort of the author to “create” something new.” 
369 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law', supra note 250, p. 1078. 
370 Ibid. p. 1078. 
371 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2, at 
346. 
372 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society', 2001/29/EC (EU, 2001), ibid. 
373 Recital 10 of the preamble of the EC Directive 2001/29. 
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continuation of creative works’ production, and it is not the producers’ or society’s 
interests, that should be given priority.374 
3.11 Conclusion: 
In this Chapter all the possible interpretations of originality have been exposed, for two 
reasons. Firstly, to challenge them to show the validity of every interpretation; 
secondly, to use these interpretations under the proposed categorisation of works, as 
high authorship works use the high interpretations of originality, and the low authorship 
works use the lower interpretations.  
The thesis criticises the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine as a general criterion through 
which to protect all works of intellectual creation. Instead, it argues that works should 
be divided into those which require effort in their creation so these can be assessed 
depending on the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, or ‘skill, labour and judgment’ 
criterion.375 Other works with creative elements more distinguished than effort alone 
should not be assessed by the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, but instead through 
examination of the characteristics of the work itself, using the ‘creativity’ criterion, which 
is largely similar to the ‘intellectual creation’ criterion. Both look to the personal and 
mental features of the work. 
Besides a criticism and discussion of some issues, this Chapter was fundamental for 
the thesis’s argument, for instance, in its criticism of the Walter v. Lane 376 Case, which 
had and still has significant influence on UK’s jurisprudence and judiciary, however, it 
has a negative effect to authorship and copyright stability. 377 In addition the discussion 
of the Feist v. Rural 378Case finds that the Supreme Court believed in the personal and 
mental features of works as a condition for copyright protection, but when this collided 
with the nature of databases, the condition’s substance and level was lowered 
substantially. A discussion of this case was necessary to show the reason for the 
reduction in the meaning of creativity when the Court applied it to factual works as a 
typical case of the effect of factual works on judges’ orientation towards originality.379 
                                                          
374 The term ‘author’ here refers to the ‘human author’ not publishers or right holders in general, as in other 
provision in the same directive it was stressed that that the existence of effective copyright protection will 
achieve the: “safeguarding [of] the independence and dignity of artistic creators and performers”. The 
dignity is undoubtedly a characteristic that cannot exist unless in relation to human beings. See, Recital 11 
of the preamble of the EC Directive 2001/29. 
375 It has been shown that the ‘sweat of the brow’ and the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ criteria are similar, 
and both ignore creative input in works. See, this Chapter at 3.6.1 
376 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 159. 
377 See this Chapter at 3.5. 
378 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 2. 
379 See this Chapter at 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
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From these discussions it is concluded that the confusion in interpreting originality is 
not the actual sickness that infected authorship or copyright in general, but is just a 
symptom of several major problems underneath. The real problem is diagnosed to lie in 
disregarding the personality of authorship, which is an inherent characteristic in 
copyright that is generated from its nature as a property right. Therefore, personality 
should be manifest in every work that is considered an intellectual work. 
This disregard for the personality in works returns to their different natures, and the 
difficulty in finding a unique criterion that can be applied to all of them. This was 
supported by Curtis’s argument: “[i]t is very difficult to lay down any legal definition of 
originality in a literary composition, that may be resorted to as a universal test. … 
[because] in every species of composition, in all literatures, there is of necessity a 
constant reproduction of what is old, mixed with more or less what is new, peculiar and 
original. There are also large classes of works, the materials of which are common to 
all writers.” 380 
In the belief in the personal and mental features that every intellectual work should 
show, applying this to factual works will thus entail depriving them of copyright 
protection as due to their nature these works lack personal and mental features. Courts 
were therefore compelled to protect them under any pretext, so as to protect the 
investment expended in creating them, even by twisting the orthodox personality and 
mentality of copyright law and arguing that they exist in such works, as in the Feist v. 
Rural Case in the US, or by arguing that copyright law does not require any personal or 
mental features, as happened in the Walter v. Lane Case in the UK.  
The main argument of this thesis aims to drive copyright law to return to its origins in 
order to overcome the distortions that happened to its fundamental principles. This can 
happen through protecting only works that have personal and mental features, 
separating works that lack these features in a different sui generis system that does not 
need to apply the notions of personal authorship. This proposed distinction will be 
shaped and formulated in the Chapter Eight, and those personal and mental features 
will be extracted from English jurisprudence and confirmed in Chapter Six. However, 
the authorship concept still needs some refinement, due to several challenges and 
claims against it, before it is built upon in the Chapters that follow. This will be done in 
Chapters Four and Five by challenging the ‘death of the author’ and ‘romantic author’ 
doctrines.  
                                                          
380 George Ticknor Curtis, Treatise on the Law of Copyright (London; Boston: A. Maxwell and Son; Charles 
C. Little and James Brown, 1847).p. 171 
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4 Chapter Four:  
Literary Authorship and Legal Authorship 
Refining Authorship from the Claim That It Is Language That Speaks 
Not the Author 
4.1 Introduction:  
The last Chapter established the core concern of this thesis, namely, the level of 
confusion encountered in assessing the existence of protection conferred by copyright 
law in the UK and the US. As was concluded in last Chapter, the conflict that is 
apparent in courts’ decisions is not an actual sickness which has infected copyright 
law, but is instead a symptom of profound problems in the philosophical fabric, or 
principles, that copyright law is based upon. It was argued in the last Chapter that the 
reason for that conflict is the underlying conflict in these philosophical foundations of 
copyright law, which have been encouraged by interested right holders.  
Judges have been put in a bind between legislative shortcomings in reconciling 
copyright’s orthodox concepts and these works (non-authorship works), and the failure 
to provide protection to producers’ interests and their fear of the loss of their capital in 
the case that such protection is not achieved. 
However, before investigating these principles or philosophical foundations, it is of 
equal importance to refer first to the arguments of scholars who have built on this 
confusion and reached a result: ‘the death of the author’1. It is also necessary before 
pursuing the thesis’s proposition, namely, providing a balance in copyright protection 
through dividing works into three grades of authorship and three modes of protection, 
that we ensure that authorship is a stabilised concept in theory and practice.2  
As a synopsis of this research’s approach until now, it can be found that the confusion 
in copyright law rulings on deciding on the copyrightability of works, which were 
explained in Chapters One and Two, has led to two results. First, the confusion around 
the interpretation of originality, which was explained in the second and third Chapters. 
Second, the claim of the death of authorship, which is the subject of this Chapter 
                                                          
1 See Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Cornell University Press, 1980)., also, Woodmansee in her 
works: M. Woodmansee, 'On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. 
Law Journal, 10 (1991). ; Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal 
Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', Eighteenth Century Studies,  (1984). and Martha 
Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and 
Literature (Duke University Press Books, 1994).. And Jaszi in his works Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of 
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', Duke Law Journal,  (1991a). and Peter Jaszi, 'On the 
Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law 
Journal, 10 (1991b). 
2 The thesis’s proposition is the subject of Chapters Seven and Eight.  
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(Chapter Four). The following Chapters will build on this in order to pave the way to the 
thesis’s proposition.  
4.2 Barthes’s and Foucault’s ‘The Death of the Author’ Doctrine: 
The aim of presenting these views in this part is to analyse the counter views to the 
thesis’s approach in defending and upholding the authorship concept, as the  
dependence on authorship, originality and the author’s personality in this research 
needs first to confront any opinions that argue differently and either prove their defects 
or prove that they are baseless. This has been done in regard to the first claim, which 
is based on the thought of Barthes and Foucault, who argued that the death of the 
author was through the birth of his writing. This also was argued through the claim that 
authorship is an alien concept to English law, as will be considered in the next Chapter. 
The death of the author doctrine is based on an article published by Barthes in 1968 
with the percussive title “The Death of the Author”3 and also in Foucault’s lecture given 
in 1969, which was entitled “What Is an Author?”4 These works established “the anti-
humanist slogan of the science of the text, both for his partisans and his adversaries.” 5 
Barthes confirmed that when the author starts writing he enters his own death, for 
when “the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, [and] writing 
begins.” 6 He finds that the ‘death of the author’ is shown in the ‘effacement of the 
individual characteristics of the writer’ through the confrontations that the writer 
establishes between himself and his text that cancel the signs of his particular 
individuality. These confrontations are also confirmed in Foucault’s thoughts.7 Barthes 
cited Mallarmé to confirm how, in France, language had to replace the author, as “it is 
language which speaks not the author … only language acts, 'performs', and not 'me'” 8 
In Balzac’s story ‘Sarrasine’ he wrote “[t]his was woman herself, with her sudden fears, 
her irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness, her fussings, and 
her delicious sensibility.”9 Barthes wonders who is speaking there. Is it Balzac, or the 
hero of the story? Is this a universal wisdom, or romantic psychology?10 Barthes 
reaches the conclusion that writing destroys the identity of the author: “Writing is the 
destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, 
                                                          
3 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', Image, Music, Text (Fontana Press, 1977). 
4 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1. 
5 Antoine Compagnon, Literature, Theory, and Common Sense (Princeton University Press, 2004).p.32. 
6 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 142. 
7 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 117. 
8 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 143. 
9 Honoré de Balzac, 'Sarrasine (1830)', Michel Serres, L’Hermaphrodite. Sarrasine sculpteur, précédé de 
Balzac, Sarrasine, Paris, Flammarion,  (1987)., Referred to in Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', 
supra note 3, p. 142 
10 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 142. 
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oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, 
starting with the very identity of the body writing”11 
Barthes is actually trying to prove the author’s inexistence in his writings, or that 
language does not bear the identification of the person who utilises it. For him, this 
does not - and should not - matter. Although a superficial look at this argument may 
find it destroys the authorial basis of copyright law, a closer look will show that this 
argument has nothing to do with authorship as we understand it in law, as will be 
elaborated later.12 
Foucault tried to prove that authorship and ownership are recent concepts that have 
harmed writing and culture more than they have benefitted them. He argues that in 
older times literary works were accepted and circulated without any question about the 
identity of their authors, because their age-old was a sufficient proof of their 
authenticity.13He also suggests that a discourse was not a product or possession, but 
an action or gesture that might be lawful or unlawful before becoming a possession, 
like the value of property.14 
Foucault imagines a system of culture where discourses are circulated without the 
need to know their authors, in a ‘pervasive anonymity’, and instead of asking who the 
author is, or about the authenticity or originality of works, we ask: what are the other 
modes of the existence of this discourse? Where does it come from? Who controls it? 
And, who can fulfil the diverse functions of the subject? At the end, he concludes: 
“What does it matter who's speaking?” 15  
Krause expressed a similar contention also. He argues that the ideas which are 
included in a book that is sold by the author cannot remain the author’s property, as: 
“[a] published book is a secret divulged”,16 and he asks how the preacher can prohibit 
the printing of his homilies by listeners? Or how a professor can stop his students from 
using his propositions?17 Krause criticises the basis of intellectual property and insists 
that “the concept of intellectual property is useless”18, as he argues that property 
                                                          
11 Ibid. p. 142. 
12 See this Chapter at 4.4. 
13 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 125. 
14 Ibid. p. 124 
15 Ibid. p. 138. As a quick response, this thesis confirms that wondering about the persons incorporated in 
the process of creating or developing a discourse did not disappear from Foucault’s proposed questions, 
as in his question: ‘where does it come from?’ This refers to the author as the source of the work, and his 
name can reveal much information about the time and place of its production. In regard to the question: 
‘Who controls it?’, it mostly asks about the author or the owner of rights. 
16 Christian Sigmund Krause, 'Ueber Den Büchernachdruck', Deutsches Museum, 1 (1783). p. 415-17. 
17 Ibid. p. 415-17 referred to in Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal 
Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', supra note 1, p. 444. 
18 Christian Sigmund Krause, 'Ueber Den Büchernachdruck', supra note 16 p. 417. 
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should be exclusive to the owner, who should have the ability to dispose of it and 
retrieve it unconditionally. 19 The the fact that Krause is a literary and not a legal writer, 
has confused ideas and expression protection in copyright law in this regard, as 
copyright law does not provide any protection for unexpressed ideas. 
Ironically, the arguments of Foucault and Barthes, and that advocated by Krause, are 
similar to those proposed by the pirates of books who published in the age of the 
printing press in England, as they used the same philosophical defences to justify their 
practices. For instance, one contended that “[t]he book is not an ideal object,... it is a 
fabrication made of paper upon which thought symbols are printed. It does not contain 
thoughts; these must arise in the mind of the comprehending reader. It is a commodity 
produced for hard cash.” 20 So both Foucault and the infringing printers of the 
seventeenth century have argued that ‘language’, or ‘symbols’, are what have 
importance, not the ideas of the author. 
It seems that the arguments of pirates, used to defend their acts, resemble those 
argued by post-structuralist theorists, who claim that authors do not have anything to 
be protected in their works, and all their thoughts can be appropriated by others. 
Woodmansee implicitly advocates this view, as she proposes that if the value of the 
book were reduced to its physical foundation (ideas and letters or drawn lines) it would 
be impossible for the author to claim any ownership of it once he has delivered it to the 
publisher. 21  
Though Foucault criticises the current position of the author in his statement “[t]his 
reversal transforms writing into an interplay of signs, regulated less by the content it 
signifies than by the very nature of the signifier.”.22 Actually, this differentiation is 
misleading, as the content and the personality of the writer are two faces of one coin - 
both are correlated and cannot be separated from the other, as will be proved later.23 In 
fact, content, signification and ideas that emanate from the writing are the core 
expression of the personality of the author, as will be demonstrated later.24 
                                                          
19 Ibid.16, p. 415-17, referred to in Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and 
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', supra note 1, p. 444. 
20 Heinrich Bosse, Autorschaft Ist Werkherrschaft: Über Die Entstehung Des Urheberrechts Aus Dem 
Geist Der Goethezeit (Ferdinand Schöningh, 1981). p. 13, referred to in Martha Woodmansee, 'The 
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', supra note 1, 
p. 443. 
21 Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of The'author'', supra note 1, p. 443. 
22 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 116. 
23 See Chapter Six on personal authorship, 
24 See discussion in Chapter Six. 
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Individualisation in literature and Law: 
It is evident that Barthes would like to attack the concept of the author both theoretically 
and historically, since he argued that: “[t]he author is a modern figure, a product of our 
society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French 
rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the 
individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person.’”25 Barthes thus finds that the 
‘author’ concept has discovered the prestige of the individual, and he seemingly looks 
to the issue negatively, as he confirmed that this position has made literature the 
“epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology”,26 since it attaches importance to the 
author. This point constitutes the starting point, or main cause, for Barthes’ criticism of 
authorship.  
Foucault, in his criticism of the ideas of the author and authorship, describes the idea of 
authorship as a modelling of individualisation, affirming that “the coming into being of 
the notion of ‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history 
of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences.”27 He questioned and 
denounced the individualisation of the author concept and the theories of authenticity 
and attribution, as well as the “systems of valorization in which he [the author] was 
included” 28 or the emerging of the concept of “the man and his work.”29 Foucault tries 
to separate ‘authorship’ and the principle of ‘individualisation’ or ‘personality’ in 
intellectual property and copyright law, which are essential components in copyright 
law. Proving the invalidity of this claim will help to support the position of authors and 
the importance of authors’ personalities and unique intellects in works, rather than just 
the language, or the skill or profession of writing. This will not be achieved unless by 
defending personality and individuality, and that is discussed in Chapter Six.  
Foucault’s and Barthes’s claims that authorship reflects individualisation in literature 
are irrelevant to law. As, individualisation, the author and authorship concepts in 
literature are different from those in law. Individualisation in literature means reliance 
on the author alone in understanding or interpreting the text, although, in law, it means 
giving superiority to the author’s personality, rather than to capital or funds. The 
solution lies in separating law and literature in both theories and concepts. 
                                                          
25 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 142-43. 
26 See, ibid. p. 143. 
27 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Aauthor?', in Josue V. Harari (ed.), Textual Strategies: Perspectives in 
Post-Structuralist Criticism (Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1979). p. 141. 
28 Ibid. p. 141. 
29 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 115. 
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For instance, Barthes criticised the ‘author’ concept as it was being used to reinforce 
capitalism and positivism through dependence on the sanctification of the individual 
author. Barthes’ thoughts of anti-individualism and singularity appear when he confirms 
that “[t]he image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on 
the author, his person, his life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for 
the most part in saying that Baudelaire's work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van 
Gogh's his madness, Tchaikovsky's his vice.” 30 Note here that, firstly, in copyright law, 
individualisation, from most sides, has an argument that is parallel to personalisation, 
and that is against the capitalism that cares about funds more than the person. 
Secondly, Barthes finds that the author’s personality or individuality is different from his 
personal circumstances, e.g., illness or personal traits; this differentiation is not 
relevant in law.  
4.3  ‘The Death of the Author’ Doctrine in Law:  
Although Foucault did not address the ‘death of the author’ in the legal context, as 
argued by this thesis,31 and will be more supported below,32 It was Rose who made this 
connection and, accordingly, he is responsible for the confusion that gripped the 
authorship doctrine in copyright law within this scope. This is especially so when he 
confirmed, in his book’s preface: ‘authors and owners, the invention of copyright’, -
although it is a long quotation, is very substantial evidence for the thesis’s argument: 
“As a legal witness, I became conscious of the contradiction between the romantic 
conception of authorship -the notion of the creative individual - that underlies copyright, 
and the fact that most work in the entertainment industry is corporate rather than 
individual. Furthermore, many of the characteristic products of the industry - game 
shows, soap operas, situation comedies, police stories, spy stories, and the like - tend 
to be formulaic. Romantic conceptions of authorship seem as inappropriate in 
discussing these cultural productions as in discussing the equally formulaic productions 
of some older periods, ballads, say, or chivalric romances. I found these contradictions 
between the ideology of copyright and the actual circumstances of litigation intriguing 
and provocative.”33 
The death of the author argument that was initiated by Barthes and Foucault, was 
echoed by legal scholars, who built upon it and argued that, historically: “[i]f the two 
concepts of authorship and literary property emerged at the same time, based on 
common conceptions of individualism, personality and creativity, then it might be 
                                                          
30 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 143. 
31 As discussed above and will be detailed under 4.4.  
32 See this Chapter at 4.4 
33 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press, 1993). p. viii. 
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reasonable to expect the concepts to disappear at the same time.”34 This is not Bently’s 
own argument, but his view about the advocators of the death of the author notion and 
its influence on legal doctrine. For instance, Aufderheide argued that Foucault and 
Barthes developed legal regime policies, if compared to the ‘romantic era notion of the 
author’.35  
Rose builds his argument of the modernity of the author doctrine on the enactment of 
the author in law, although there is some conflict and irrationality in his argument, as 
follows. Rose stated “in practice, English booksellers of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries seem to have recognized an obligation to pay authors for their ‘copies.’”36 
[Underlining added] However, he then affirms that: “[d]espite eighteenth-century 
assertions about authors' ancient common law property rights, no such authorial right 
was ever established or even, so far as I know, asserted by an author.”37 [Underlining 
added] It is proposed that legal theory of authorship can be traced back to practice of 
writing in ancient times, and any proof of the existence of these practices can be 
considered to be an origin of the legal theory of copyright law and author’s rights. 
Rose even confirmed that authors had literary rights –he means moral rights- prior to 
the Statute of Anne, as he confirmed: “[i]n sixteenth-century Venice, for example, the 
Council of Ten decreed that printers must not publish works without the author's written 
consent.”38[Underlining added]. Besides, he adds: “[i]n England, according to an edict 
proclaimed by the Long Parliament … all books identified the author on the title page 
and that no book was published without the author's consent.”39  
On the other hand, Rose’s understanding of the Statute of Anne and the rights of 
authors prior to this statute was imbued by his experience as a professor of English40, 
as although he confirms41 that the author has had property of his work since the 
sixteenth century, “A sixteenth or seventeenth-century author did, of course, own his 
manuscript, and this might be sold to a bookseller or to a theatrical company.”42 
                                                          
34 Lionel Bently, 'Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law', The Modern Law Review, 
57/6 (1994)., p. 976. 
35 Patricia Aufderheide, 'Creativity, Copyright and Authorship', in David Gerstner and Cynthia Chirs (ed.), 
Media Authorship (New York: Routledge, 2012). p. 1. 
36 Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope V. Curll (1741)', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 
(1991)., p. 479. 
37 Ibid. p. 479. 
38 Ibid. p. 478 as he cited Horatio F Brown, The Venetian Printing Press, 1469-1800: An Historical Study 
Based Upon Documents for the Most Part Hitherto Unpublished (Gérard Th. van Heusden, 1969). 
39 Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope V. Curll (1741)', supra note 36, p. 478 
40 Mark Rose is a Professor in the English Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara, see, 
University of California - Santa Barbara, 'Department of English', 
<https://www.english.ucsb.edu/people/rose-mark>, last  
41 In his article Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope V. Curll (1741)', supra note 36. 
42 Ibid. p. 478 
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[Underlining added]. He confirms that: “Prior to the passage of the statute [Statute of 
Anne], authors could not be said to "own" their works.”43 [Underlining added].  
Rose expressed his own belief that this acknowledgment of the author’s personal and 
property rights is based on concepts of honour and reputation, not the acknowledgment 
of the property in the work: “[t]he acknowledgement of the author's personal right to 
control the publication of his texts was a principle based on concepts of honor and 
reputation consistent with the traditional patronage society. It was not necessarily the 
same as the acknowledgement of a property right in the sense of an economic interest 
in an alienable commodity.”44 He maintained this argument with some rhetoric about 
the “image management” that Pope45 practised, that was a reason for suing the 
publishers, and not for protecting his copyright.46 
This treatment of circumstances that surrounded the codification of legal rules is not to 
be considered in the history of legal concepts and doctrines. Rose’s argument 
addresses the issue from a literary angle, that may look to the law like a reflection of 
society, although this may be correct, this is not conditional either for making laws or 
for historical studies of law.47 Bently confirms that the study of the history of copyright 
law is related to the scope for works protected, and not as attached to personal rights 
as to the aim of providing protection: “the history of copyright is the history of its 
expansions into new domains - photography, sound recordings, films, computer 
programs. Only from a very limited viewpoint can its failure to expand into the domain 
of protecting personality rights be seen as signalling copyright's (or the author-in- 
copyright's) demise. Copyright remains a stronger and preferable form of protection for 
creators and proprietors in the considerable area to which it extends.”48 This supports 
the thesis’s view that what copyright law is merely interested in regarding authorship is 
how it can be used to confer protection to works.  
The argument by Rose, has employed Foucault’s deconstructionist philosophy in 
literature in the legal context, as Rose exploited the identical terminology that existed in 
this regard between law and literature, and from then the doctrine of the ‘death of the 
author’ in law started to grow, and that which was later maintained by Woodmansee 
                                                          
43 Ibid. p. 477 
44 Ibid. p. 478-479 
45 That was when he was talking about Alexander Pope as he confirmed that “Despite his involvement in 
the literary marketplace, Pope characteristically presented himself as a gentleman and a scholar rather 
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management.” See, ibid. p. 480 
46 Ibid. p. 478-481 
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something may be related to literary or social studies, but not legal studies. 
48 Lionel Bently, 'Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law', supra note 34, p. 976-977. 
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and Jaszi in their book: “The construction of authorship: Textual appropriation in law 
and literature.”49 From then on, any research on authorship in copyright law tends to 
include authorship in literature, although, as the thesis confirms, the scope of work for 
both is different. 
Ultimately, It worth referring to some attempts by literary scholars to impose a literary 
doctrine on legal discourse and challenge the different nature of the two sciences. For 
instance, the Professor of Literature and English, Jane Gaines,50 confirms the concerns 
about the coherence of law after the emergence of poststructuralist modes of analysis, 
however she finds that this is not as something that affected the foundations of legal 
theory because legal discourse is considered “somehow of a different (oftentimes 
higher) order than that of literary form and language.”51 She claims that lawyers and 
legislators lend an ambiguity in legal language “in order to settle perplexing matters 
with finality”52, depending on the belief that “legal discourse has ‘consequences’ while 
literary discourse does not” 53. Gaines thus argues that “in terms of intellectual property, 
there are structural similarities between legal and literary discourse (both essentially 
positing the bourgeois subject in their notion of what constitutes an author). 
Comparisons of the two in terms of ‘effects’ are irrelevant. In this branch of Anglo-
American law, at least, the two discourses inform each other, because they share the 
same cultural root, buried deep in the seventeenth century.”54 
Reflections by the thesis: 
Those who contend that there is a substitution of authors by language (Barthes and 
Foucault) confirm two points; first, that the language is the thing that expresses and 
conveys information, not the author, so after the expression has been emanated the 
role of the author should disappear. Second, that the author himself does not make 
something ingenious, as he merely interrelates the letters of the language to transfer 
some idea or concept from a space to a form, so the secret or importance lies in the 
language not the author. In fact, they depend on literary and weak historical arguments, 
and that no legal or literary benefits will return from such anonymity.  
                                                          
49 Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law 
and Literature, supra note 1. 
50 See her page on Duke University. 
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51 Jane Gaines, Contested Culture: The Image, the Voice, and the Law (Univ of North Carolina Press, 
1991). p. 23 
52 Ibid. p.23 
53 Ibid. 
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If Barthes and Foucault’s views on the importance of language may find an echo in the 
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law; this is only a superficial resemblance. The 
law does not literally mean to not protect ideas, but, in fact, it protects detailed and 
formed ideas, but only those that are written or recorded, for evidential reasons only. 
As explained by Judge Park in Hadley v. Kemp,55 when commenting on the claim that 
there is no copyright in the musical work until it recorded, he confirmed: “Although the 
songs were not reduced to writing or another material form prior to their being recorded 
by the group, so that copyright did not subsist, this did not mean that the musical works 
did not exist. On the contrary, a musical work could exist before it was reduced to 
material form.”56 [Underlining added] And he considered the defendant’s claim though 
not registering his songs before recording, and depended on the evidence from him 
and plaintiffs to consider the work copyrighted.57 
So the protection of copyright is present in expression exceptionally, not because it is 
the intended subject of protection, but for legal reasons resulting from the difficulty in 
delimiting the exact boundaries of the protected idea, and in determining its attribution 
to a specific person. Besides, this research asserts that language is a fabric that can be 
shaped in limitless forms. However, the resulting form, or the selection and 
arrangement of this language’s elements, depends on the ideas they transfer or want 
to express, so the language is only a way to transfer or convey ideas, whether this 
language is writing, musical notes, the lines of drawing, the movements of dance or 
mime, or even sign language.  
Foucault has committed some obvious legal errors that halt the confidence in, and the 
importance of, his argument for legal discussions. For instance, he did not recognise 
the existence of an author for letters, contracts and posters: “a private letter may have 
a signatory, but it does not have an author; a contract can have an underwriter, but not 
an author; and, similarly, an anonymous poster attached to a wall may have a writer, 
but he cannot be an author.”58 Foucault confirms that there are writers, but they are not 
authors. Note here that he did not relate the writing and the originality of the work in 
deciding the absence of the author from these works, but he offered a general rule that 
all these works do not or cannot have authors. This argument discloses how, in 
literature, there is a big difference between writers and authors; such differentiation 
does not exist in statute, as will be elaborated below. 59 This argument supports the 
thesis’s contention that it is important to distinguish between the literary and legal 
                                                          
55 Hadley V. Kemp, 1999, E.M.L.R. 589, High Court, Chancery Division 
56 Ibid. at 591 
57 Ibid. at 636 
58 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 124. 
59 See this Chapter at 4.4. 
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meanings of authorship, as they are separate areas, dealing with the same terminology 
from separate perspectives or angles. 
Foucault confirmed that he addressed the ‘author’ concept in the limited sense of “a 
person to whom the production of a text, a book, or a work can be legitimately 
attributed.”60 However, he did not talk about determining the author as the person who 
produced the work through his talk about the different roles that the author represents 
or embodies within the writing process. That role of the author as the creator of the 
work is the only facet that interests the law. For instance, when Foucault analysed the 
different personalities can be found in a novel, he found that the author personality 
cannot be distinguished from the fictional personalities or narrator: “[i]t would be as 
false to seek the author in relation to the actual writer as to the fictional narrator.” 61 
Also, in regard to a mathematical treatise, he differentiates between the person who 
indicates the circumstances of composition, and the person who concludes a 
demonstration within the body of the text, and that who tells about the treatise’s 
goals.62 All these roles Foucault considered as separate authors, and it would be tricky 
to define who the author is among those persons. However, he did not address the 
author from the legal side as being the creator of the whole work, as the law does not 
distinguish between all these different roles played by the author in one work. What is 
important to the law is who put the pen to paper and wrote such ideas and thoughts. 
This research maintains that Barthes’s and Foucault’s arguments were all meant to be 
considered in literature, and applying them to law is an improper stretching of such 
claims. This is apparent from Barthes’ argument, when he states, negatively or 
critically, that the explanation of the work is sought through the author who produced it: 
“The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as 
if it were always in the end, through the more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, 
                                                          
60 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 131. 
61 This diversity in the persons in the novel is apparent in his statement “in a novel narrated in the first 
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the voice of a single person, the author 'confiding' in us.” 63 So, all Barthes’ interest is in 
the literary side, or the interpretation of texts, not in the legal aside or in the 
authentication or attribution of the work to a specific author. 
Woodmansee has differentiated between the concept of ‘author’ and the practice of 
‘writing’, arguing that the notion of the author never coincided with the practice of 
writing. 64Foucault also argued that the ‘notion of the author’ is a relatively recent one, 
and does not reflect contemporary practices in writing.65 Likewise, Foucault’s argument 
that the emergence of the author concept is different from the emergence of the writer 
concept, is also irrelevant in law. 
Barthes’ and Foucault’ arguments did not discuss and investigate in depth the 
theoretical and ideological basis of copyright law. They also did not challenge the social 
or economic sides that copyright law addresses, as copyright law is not –as this thesis 
claims- only a bundle of theoretical concepts and philosophical principles, but is a 
mechanism that aims to achieve a balance between legal aims, economic interests and 
cultural needs. However, we find Foucault and Barthes and their followers 
(Woodmansee, Jaszi and Kaplan) confine copyright law’s focus to the characteristics of 
authorship and literature so as to reach a result that is the inexistence or insignificance 
of the author. 
4.4  ‘The Death of The Author’ Is A Literary Doctrine: 
From the above discussion, we can conclude that all that Barthes and Foucault argue 
and wanted to prove from their articles is related to the intention of the author or the 
author’s function in literature or, in other words, the function that literary scholars 
suppose that the author’s existence will perform in interpreting texts. Their arguments 
were not aiming to abolish the author or his name definitively from works. This appears 
from Foucault confirmation that “I shall not offer here a socio-historical analysis of the 
author’s persona. … I want to deal solely with the relationship between the text and 
author and with the manner in which the texts points to this “figure”[he means the 
author].”66 [Underlining added].  
Foucault himself did not intend the extension of his argument into legal discourse. All 
he did was an interrogation, or a call for investigation on when the author became 
individualised and when studies of authenticity and attribution began. Other scholars –
especially in copyright law- caught this thread and built on Foucault’s interrogation. 
However, authorship was not affected, even after that involvement of literary meaning 
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into the legal discourse. Authorship has the main and primary role in copyright law as a 
means for assessing proprietorship. Without authorship, the author and owner of the 
work and subsequent rights cannot be determined. 
In fact, Foucault’s attack on the author was not directed to questioning the existence of 
the author as a person and preferred its disappearance from the legal perspective. 
Foucault was differentiating between the author and the writer and wanted to banish 
the first for the benefit of the latter, or to be confined to the writer characteristic while 
alienating the author, who relates theoretically to the interpretation of texts.67 This is a 
differentiation known in the literature, but the law does not build consequences on it. As 
well, Foucault’s argument does not apply to the legal discourse, “[y]et Foucault, though 
he himself makes this distinction, does not attack the writer. It is the author.”68 We 
believe that the ‘authorial intention’, as a way of interpreting texts, is the main thing that 
literary scholars and philosophers adhere to in interpreting texts and this is what 
Barthes and Foucault wanted to banish. They wanted to eliminate the author’s function 
in doing this job. 
This differentiation between the author and the writer does not just appear in Foucault’s 
own argument, but can be understood even from critics of Foucault’s argument, as all 
of them –Foucault and his critics- discuss the issue from a literary perspective: 
“[w]riters enter a system with a life of its own; many of its features elude their most 
unconscious grasp. … But the author, produced jointly by writer and text, by work and 
critic, is not a person; it is a character who is everything the text shows it to be and who 
in turn determines what the text shows. The author has no depth.”69 [Underlining 
added] Foucault’s treatment of the history of the author figure -his belief that it 
appeared during the enlightenment-70 is also different from the history of the author as 
being causally and legally responsible for the work, which has a longer and more 
complicated history than Foucault offered, as will be discussed in the next Chapter.71 
The research finds that the legal shortcomings in Foucault’s context are many, and that 
is because, firstly, he is not a legal scholar, and, secondly, he did not intend to be 
understood in a legal context. At the end of this discussion it can be concluded that 
Foucault’s opinion is self-defeating, or that the influential discussion depended on 
Foucault’s notion of ‘the death of the author’, is against Foucault’s own idea of the 
death of the author within the literary context. As Foucault’s intention was necessary to 
understand his own doctrine, and delimiting it to literary scope, however, disregarding 
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his intention caused confusion due to it was considered in legal discourse also. 
Accordingly, the ‘death of the author’ or the ‘disregard of the author intention’ can lead 
to confusion and uncertainties as proved by Foucault’s text itself.  
Bently, in his criticism of Foucault’s argument, described what Foucault has argued 
from a literary viewpoint and that had influenced law as follows, “[i]n truth, it seems, the 
author-function [in Foucault’s speech] has operated in different contexts at different 
times and in different ways, all of which have been layered one on top of another.”72 
This is what the thesis argues that Foucault has done in law and literature, even if 
involuntarily. In order to better understand Foucault’s argument it is favourable to 
investigate literary scholars understanding of Foucault, this is believed to help in 
distinguishing authorship doctrine in law away from the use of the term in literature. 
This discussion is important to prove that the author’s ‘death’ argument is not related to 
copyright law but might be valid for literature only. This helps to refine the authorship 
concept from such challenges of death or abolition. 
All that Foucault wanted to express is the abolition of the author from the interpretation 
of texts, as Nehamas confirmed: “His essay [Foucault’s] calls for abolishing this figure 
altogether and for establishing a new and different way of dealing with literary texts.”73 
Although this thesis criticised Foucault through his statement that "[a] private letter may 
have a signer - it does not have an author",74 and has argued that this is a legal flaw in 
his argument according to the legal principles of copyright. None of his legal 
proponents, Woodmansee or Jaszi, addressed this point. This statement is valid in the 
literature rhetoric, and this is clear in Nehamas’ comment on Foucault’s above 
statement, “[t]he distinction is crucial. All texts have writers, but only some have 
authors … [t]o treat writers as authors, therefore, is to take a particular attitude toward 
their texts: it is to ask of them a certain type of question and to expect a certain type of 
answer.”75 It is obvious that whether the person has created the work or not is not 
Foucault’s concern, but that the issue is related to the process of writing itself. 
Nehamas clarified the role of the author in literature that Foucault wanted to attack: 
“[w]e study literary texts in order to determine this (ideally) consistent and profound 
intention and thus to recapture the state of mind that led to their production. But this, 
Foucault argues, is an impossible goal which leads us in the wrong direction.”76 
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Nehamas argues that Foucault’s aim in abolishing the author is merely for literary 
purposes while interpreting the author’s texts only, not by abolishing his name and his 
existence, as is understood by legal scholars. As Nehamas contends that Foucault 
thinks “we appeal to the author in order to exclude, in the name of ‘the correct 
interpretation,’ new uses and extensions of literary texts. We thus cannot see that they 
mean whatever they can be taken to mean, that they are simply occasions for further 
writing.” 77 Foucault also – according to Nehamas - thinks that: “The author allows 
critics to think of their work as purely descriptive, aiming to reveal once and for all the 
underlying meaning of each text and, therefore, rendering further writing unnecessary.” 
78 Accordingly, Foucault proposed this death or –more accurately- ignorance of the 
author when interpreting his texts to open the way for all possible interpretations of that 
text, even if they are “’implausible,’ ... [or]... ‘inaccurate’ readings.” 79 
Likewise, Nehamas posited that the attack to the author doctrine has a critical purpose: 
“[i]n attacking the author, Foucault therefore attacks just this descriptive and 
interpretive conception of criticism as a whole.” 80 [Underlining added]. According to 
Nehamas, Foucault’s argument makes sense regarding the distinction between the 
reality and appearance of the meanings of texts, and bearing the author personality or 
intention in mind when interpreting his texts is one of the things that limit the possible –
and perhaps conflicting - interpretations of a single text.81 
Accordingly, the historic point that is superficially understood from Foucault’s argument, 
that ‘author’ is a modern or new concept that has been confirmed by legal scholars, is 
crashed under the literary understanding when a distinction is made between the writer 
and the author, for “[w]riters are actual individuals, firmly located in history, efficient 
causes of their texts.”82 All that matters is that Foucault wanted literary interpreters to 
consider that “[w]riters truly exist outside their texts. They have no interpretive authority 
over them.” 83 
It appears that Bently has touched on this distinction between ‘the disappearance’ of 
the author in literature and in law in his article ‘Copyright and the Death of the Author in 
Literature and Law’84, as he stated “[a]lthough this radical questioning [he refers to 
Foucault’s and Barthes’ question about the death of the author] … has proved 
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extremely influential within literary scholarship and clearly has potential significance for 
law in general, and copyright law in particular. After all, copyright law is a legal 
institution … to which the notion of the author appears to be central - in defining the 
right owner, in defining the work, in defining infringement.”85 As he reported –in 
explaining other legal scholars’ understanding- : “[i]f the legal walls establishing 
ownership of the text were built on the same intellectual foundations as romantic 
authorship, and those premises turn out to be sand rather than rock, copyright will 
sooner or later come tumbling down”.86  
Bently strongly objected to this consequence, as he sees that this will lead to the death 
of copyright law: “[t]his argument that 'copyright is dead' is, however, unconvincing. 
Although it is true that copyright law has failed to be the prime legal mechanism for the 
expression of the needs or interests of those involved in character or personality 
merchandising, it is difficult to see how this failing represents the death of copyright 
law.”87 One writer confirms that it is the author’s name that leads to the quality, value 
and reliability of the specific thoughts included, it is not a matter of words in a specific 
genre of writings, but the thoughts these words bear: “the biggest reason people buy a 
specific work of fiction is that they’ve read and enjoyed another work by that same 
author.”88  
To advocate Bently’s opinion, we attract attention to the advantages of the author’s 
existence in copyright law in performing the functions of authenticity and the credibility 
of works,89 and even of marketability. For credibility, this thesis argues that author’s 
name is the main requirement for ensuring the credibility of the work and included 
information. Take the case of Herodotus as an example; a lot of his writings were 
questioned in regard to credibility or truthfulness. Imagine if Herodotus’s name was not 
on all his writings, and if it proved that some of his works were not authentic, imagine 
how much information would be considered real and how much mess and conflict 
might occur to reporting on historic events, facts and studies, taking into consideration 
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Association (JSTOR, 1941), 335-55.; Zola Marie Packman, 'The Incredible and the Incredulous: The 
Vocabulary of Disbelief in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon', Hermes,  (1991). ; and also, O Kimball 
Armayor, 'Did Herodotus Ever Go to the Black Sea?', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,  (1978).. 
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the antiquity of his works.90 In regard to marketability, Gasaway confirms that the 
author’s name can add value to work in the market, even if the addition was just notes 
to a digital copy of a book “the fame of an individual could make this annotated digital 
work valuable.” 91 
Authorship has a practical role in copyright law, which is allocating who own the work 
and who is responsible for dealings on the work, it may thus be called ‘the identification 
of the author’ for “[a]uthorship has an extraordinary convenience for this purpose 
insofar as it affixes the origin of the work and provides an original property-holder.” 92 
So, authorship is only a path that leads to ownership, which represents all the powers 
and rights the copyright law confers to the author. 
In fact, Foucault’s contention, that the author’s name or entitlement is not important in 
fictional or historical works,93 is just a personal opinion, as this is an issue that differs 
from one society to another according to cultures or conventions. Furthermore, this 
argument does not reflect upon the legal aspect, as although it may be discussed in 
literary rhetoric that readers are not searching for authors’ names in some works, the 
law cares about these details as long as they still cause legal disputes relating to 
infringement, plagiarism, or breaching legal rules against unauthorised reproduction, or 
pursuant to the unjust enrichment rules, or common law rules. 
Although it was confirmed by Foucault that the language got a superior position over 
the author: “the historical experience of language underwent a fundamental shift toward 
the end of the eighteenth century, when language took on a life of its own and became 
an ‘objectivity’.”94 This claim is found to be untrue depending on the understanding of 
Hobbes’s argument. As Hobbes confirmed that if the opinion or facts told and acquired 
by us were proven to be untrue, the one to be blamed is the historian, not the person 
these facts or biography is about. “If Livy say the Gods made once a cow speak, and 
we believe it not; we distrust not God therein, but Livy.”95 Thus, it is the writer of 
language who is blamed and language itself cannot stand as an evidence of inner 
meaning it bears. 
                                                          
90 See, Wilhelm Spiegelberg and Aylward Manley Blackman, The Credibility of Herodotus' Account of 
Egypt in the Light of the Egyptian Monuments: With a Few Additional Notes by the Translator, Aylward M. 
Blackman, supra note 89; Lionel Pearson, 'Credulity and Scepticism in Herodotus', supra note 89; Zola 
Marie Packman, 'The Incredible and the Incredulous: The Vocabulary of Disbelief in Herodotus, 
Thucydides, and Xenophon', supra note 89; and also, O Kimball Armayor, 'Did Herodotus Ever Go to the 
Black Sea?', supra note 89. 
91 See, L.N. Gasaway, 'Libraries, Users, and the Porblems of Authorship in the Digital Age', DePaul Law 
Review, 52 (2002).p. 1226. 
92 Patricia Aufderheide, 'Creativity, Copyright and Authorship', supra note 35, p. 2. 
93 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 129. 
94 Ibid. p. 8. 
95 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1969 edn.: Scolar Press, 1651). p. 44. 
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To conclude, following this discussion, two consequences will result; firstly, Foucault’s 
and Barthes’ articles should be re-read and understood, but from their point of view. 
Secondly, it seems that the intention of the author does not limit the interpretation of 
the text as Foucault argues, but it is important in directing the understanding of the 
readers, as although the blind interpretation of texts can open a lot of discussions and 
writings,96 these discussions and writings may probably be faulty, and subsequently 
help produce more works that build an unsound doctrine and may be not suitable for 
other disciplines, or cause disruption or distortion, as happened in the effect Foucault’s 
lecture caused to legal doctrine, as the thesis argues.  
4.5 The Misunderstanding of Law by Literary Writers: 
Barthes, in his claim of ‘the death of the author’, has relied on linguistic scholars, such 
as Mallarmé, Valéry, 97 and Proust. 98 He was also a professor of linguistics,99 and his 
argument was within the beliefs of linguistics: that it is language that speaks and the 
author, writers or scribes are just a subject. The ideas of the death of the author are not 
initiated by him. Before him Mallarmé wrote “the elucutory death of the poet, who cedes 
the initiative to words.”100 
Kushner, in his comment on his own play ‘Angels in America’, argues that the belief 
that artistic labour happens in isolation is a fiction, and that such a provenance of 
individual talents is “politically charged and, … repudiated by the facts.”101 Kushner 
confirms that although the primary labour on the play was his, he confesses that he 
depended on “over two dozen people” who contributed “words, ideas and 
structures”.102  
In a quick reference to the thesis’s argument, this discussion aims to clarify that most 
dealings of literary writers with authorship are only from the literary side of that 
expression, and they ignore or misunderstand the legal side of this concept. In this part 
we want to prove that legal scholars should not rely on literary scholars’ understanding 
of authorship and apply this directly to law discourse, a filtering through legal concepts 
is required before making this transfer. 
                                                          
96 As Foucault argued in p. 121 
97 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', supra note 3, p. 143 
98 Ibid. See p. 144 
99 His famous works are Le Degre zero de I'ecriture (1953), Mythologies (1957), Elements de semiologie 
(1964), S/Z (1970), L'Empire des signes (1970), see, ibid.3, p. 2. 
100 Stéphane Mallarmé, 'Correspondance, Lettres Sur La Poésie Éd', (Bertrand Marchal (Préface d’Yves 
Bonnefoy), Paris: Gallimard, coll.“Folio-Classique, 1995). p. 366, cited in Antoine Compagnon, Literature, 
Theory, and Common Sense, supra note 5, p. 32. 
101 Tony Kushner et al., Angels in America (Royal National Theatre, 1995). p. 283. 
102 Ibid. p. 283. 
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Back to Kushner’s play, it is believed that there is a legal misunderstanding here and 
that this play is a collective work. He had to include these individuals: ‘two dozen 
people’, as joint authors, as long as they had expressed their ‘words’ and ‘structures’ 
and not just their ‘ideas’. Although the appropriation of other people’s ideas is not 
protected, the contribution of other persons’ ‘words’ and ‘structures’ is considered 
authorship. So, the problem is not in copyright law and its concepts, but in its 
understanding. Kushner’s misunderstanding of copyright rules and the building of 
concepts on it, is what needs to be corrected.  
This thesis thus cannot agree with Zemer when he argues that copyright law, in its 
rejection of collective authorship, adopts the ‘classical notions of property’, 103 as the 
such classical notions allow the shared proprietorship of physical objects or real estate 
and that which copyright law adopted in joint authorship and collective authorship. 
The mixing of literary and legal concepts of authorship appears also in the reliance of 
Woodmansee in her article in the book ‘The construction of authorship Textual 
appropriation in law and literature’104 on the writings of Herder,105 Goethe,106 
Coleridge107 and Wordsworth,108 who are literary writers in English literature, or are 
history scholars or artists, and this is the reason for looking at the issue from the literary 
side. Even they confess that their perspective is confined only to authorship in literary 
theory. For instance, Lunsford109 and Ede,110 who Woodmansee cited, contend that 
“The concepts of author and authorship, [are] so radically destabilized in contemporary 
literary theory”111, and they do not insist on applying their thoughts in law. 112 
The arguments around the historical perspective of authorship in literature, whether by 
Foucault or Woodmansee,113 are not actually important for copyright law as long as 
they did not affect the laws enacted in their time, so they will not affect the laws 
enacted three hundred years later, simply because the law’s focus is different from that 
of the literature. Bently confirms the thesis’s argument, as he argued that although 
poststructuralist critiques have affected authorship in the literary field, they have had a 
                                                          
103 Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright (Ashgate Pub Co, 2007)., p. 1. 
104 Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law 
and Literature, supra note 1. 
105 Johann Herder (1744-1803) was a German philosopher, poet, and literary critic. 
106 Johann Goethe (1749-1832) was a German writer, poet, novelist. 
107 Samuel Coleridge (1772-1834) was an English poet, literary critic and philosopher. 
108 William Wordsworth (1770-1850) was an English poet. 
109 Andrea A. Lunsford, Professor of English, Ohio State University. 
110 Lisa Ede, Professor of English, Oregon State University. 
111 Andrea A. Lunsford and Lisa Ede, 'Collaborative Authorship and the Teaching of Writing', Cardozo Arts 
& Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 (1991)., p. 681. 
112 Ibid., p. 681. 
113 Woodmansee views will be articulated in next chapter. 
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minimum effect on authorship in the legal context.114 Bently returns this weak effect to 
the flaws that exist in Foucault’s and Rose’s historical justifications. He confirmed that 
the studies ‘suggested by Foucault and maintained by Rose’ to make a historical 
connection between authorship in law and literature were “strongly in need for 
qualification.”115 
In Aufderheide’s study116 she referred to the beliefs or opinions of ‘professors of films’. 
These views reflect the opinion of scholars of authorship in literature. According to their 
views films will be original and creative ‘only’ when makers rely on their work and not 
on others’ works. The flaw here is their belief that the law does not “recognize the 
creative elements in recombining existing works.”117 This belief might logically entail 
their indignation with copyright law legislation. This is why they implicitly argue that 
works relying on existing works can be creative and should be valued. 118 Aufderheide, 
as a solution, referred to their ignorance of ‘psychological studies’ that proved that ‘all’ 
creative works are based on existing culture, 119 but she forgot that the law already 
accepts this fact through rejecting the principle of novelty in protecting literary and 
artistic works.  Thus, romantic authorship is not a legal concept since it combines 
novelty and originality, although the dichotomy between them has been stabilised since 
the seventeenth century.120  
At the end, we should acknowledge that the escape from the genius and romantic 
conceptions of the author cannot be done through resorting to the death of the author. 
As, both are literary extremisms. The focus on the legal substance of authorship is the 
proper perspective that should be adopted.121 Having discussed the first extremism 
                                                          
114 He argued that “The poststructuralist critique of authorship appears so far to have had no significant 
influence on copyright law which has continued to employ romantic images of authorship, at least in some 
contexts. This immunity of copyright law's notion of authorship to the radical destabilisation of the same 
notion in the literary field seems less surprising”, see, Lionel Bently, 'Copyright and the Death of the Author 
in Literature and Law', supra note 34, p. 977. 
115 Ibid. p. 977. 
116 Patricia Aufderheide, 'Creativity, Copyright and Authorship', supra note 35, p. 11. 
117 Ibid. p. 11. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Cropper argued that although the expression ‘new’ may be used in the seventeenth century but it 
meant to express original: “Novelty in painting does not principally consist in a subject never seen, but in 
good and new disposition and expression, and in this way the subject from being ordinary and old become 
special and new.” See Elizabeth Cropper, The Domenichino Affair: Novelty, Imitation, and Theft in 
Seventeenth-Century Rome (Yale University Press, 2005). p. 4. On the other hand, the English 
Monopolies Act in the seventeenth century provided that novelty is required for patents, as s. VI provided 
for “hereafter to be made of the sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this 
Realme”. 'An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures 
Thereof', 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (England, 1623). 
121 Durham advocated this point of view also, see A.L. Durham, 'Copyright and Information Theory: Toward 
an Alternative Model of Authorship', Brigham Young University Law Review,  (2004). p. 72. 
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which is the death of the author in this Chapter, next Chapter will discuss the second 
one which is the romantic authorship. 
4.6 Conclusion:  
The thesis confirms that Foucault’s desire to interpret texts away from the author’s 
intentions may lead to confusion and this was first proved through his own text. This is 
specially so if we look at the quantity of literature built on his article that seeks the 
widespread abolition of the author in law and literature and every field of life, which is 
argued to be impossible and unfounded legally. The nature of things presupposes that 
we know who the creators of them are and nothing justifies why a blind eye should be 
turned to this nature or eternal characteristic. Otherwise, we should remove the 
signatures or names of Picasso, van Gogh, or Shakespeare from their works.  
Proving that literary authorship is different from legal authorship will help not just in 
refuting arguments on the ‘death of authorship’, but also in supporting the thesis’s 
argument, which finds opposition from anti-authorship claims that refuse to confess any 
importance for the author’s personality or for fostering his mind’s creations. The latter 
elements are essential to categorise works into authorship and non-authorship works.  
Legal scholars who are influenced by ‘the death of the author’ argument have the view 
that the author is the romantic generator, or inventor, of works, a definition which was 
never intended by copyright law legislators -according to the belief of this thesis.122 This 
discussion will help to separate legal authorship from all discussions on literary 
authorship. It will also help to understand why authorship, in copyright law, has 
continued its stable and sophisticated functioning, despite the long lasting challenges 
against the concept. 
Though literary discourse has some influence on legal practice and studies: “[r]ecent 
copyright decisions show that even as scholars in literary studies elaborate a far-
reaching critique of the received Romantic concept of ‘authorship,’ American lawyers 
are reaching out to embrace the full range of its implications.”123 It is found that this 
influence is harmful and leads to consequences that are inconsistent with other legal 
theories or that distract the functions the law is supposed to achieve, namely, 
protecting works and conferring rights to right holders. 
Calls for the ‘death of authorship’ were spurred on by those who believed that 
originality and authorship have the same meaning in law and literature. This trend led 
some courts and scholars to adopt originality in its ‘high’ meaning, due to the unclear 
                                                          
122 See Chapter 5 at 5.5.1. 
123 Peter Jaszi, 'On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity', supra note 1, p. 
299-300.  
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principles of copyright law in this regard, and the consequence was the exclusion of 
many works from copyright law’s protection umbrella. Thus, death of the author was a 
way of escape from this consequence, and resorting instead to other determinants that 
go beyond copyright law rules, like the usefulness of works, the protection of business 
and market rules. 
Both arguments, exclusion in one side and full adopting of protection in the other 
regarding non-authorship works, are incorrect. The solution lies in the adoption of a 
dual system that can satisfy their nature and provides proper treatment for them, at the 
same time preserving principles of copyright law and maintain its justifications. In other 
words, copyright law needs to compromise between its literary extracted concepts, - 
originality and authorship - and its legal function. This will be discussed in more detail 
in the next Chapter. 
This Chapter discussed how literary scholars could not distinguish between the legal 
and literary arguments when dealing with the death of authorship argument, and this 
caused disruption to copyright law through them or through legal scholars who relied 
on their arguments. For instance, Rose confirms that romantic authorship is a feature 
of the ideology of copyright that is no longer appropriate to the current circumstances of 
the cultural industries, as romantic authorship is an old concept that contradicts the 
current practices of the collective production of comedies, police stories and soap 
operas. He affirmed: “I found these contradictions between the ideology of copyright 
and the actual circumstances of litigation intriguing and provocative.” 124 This is so, 
although collaborative authorship existed long before the emergence of the romantic 
authorship concept, as Woodmansee confesses,125 at the same time she also argues 
that romantic authorship is no longer appropriate to collaborative authorship 
practices.126 
The Substance of the Originality Criteria within Legal Authorship: 
This thesis contends that what happened in relation to originality as used in law and 
originality used in literature, is just fortuitous, and it is not necessary that authorship get 
the same meaning on the both scopes. It was like lending the terminology used in 
literature to the legal arena, without commitment to any concomitant or inter-mingled 
development of authorship in literature. The same argument was used by Bently, “[t]he 
emergence of the proprietary author at the end of the eighteenth century may thus 
represent the growth of the powerful, modem, romantic conception of authorship, but 
                                                          
124 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright, supra note 33, p. viii. 
125 See, M. Woodmansee, 'On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity', supra note 1, p. 281. 
126 Ibid. p. 288-292. 
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the histories fail to establish conclusively any causative, necessary or determining link 
between the legal and the literary. All there is is a complimentary and reinforcing 
connection, a parallel development.”127 
The change in the meaning of originality in literary and artistic context does not thus 
mean that the same change should happen in the legal context. The law is more 
interested in pursuing its objectives and in achieving a balance between concerned 
interests, rather than keeping pace with the development of the literary substance of 
the terminology used.  
The thesis argues that originality was chosen, not as an application of romantic 
authorship, but as a threshold for the application of legal protection. It is not a reflection 
of an ideology that is adopted by the law to refer to qualities that should exist in human 
authors, but it is a guide to the kind of works that might achieve special purposes if it 
fulfils this criterion, such as being able to ‘maintain learning’ or being ‘useful’.128 The 
law never thus resorted to the ‘genius’, but the law does require special features or 
characteristics in works and the ‘originality’ criteria is required to achieve this aim. 
Accordingly, literary authorship thus relies on the person, whereas legal authorship 
relies on the work. 
  
                                                          
127 Lionel Bently, 'Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law', supra note 34. 
128 To achieve the aim of the Statute of Anne “encouragement of learning”, see the Statute’s title; and 
achieving the aims of the US constitution “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” § 8 (8). 
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5 Chapter Five:  
Romanticism and Legal Authorship 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis argues that authorship, as a component of copyright,1 emerged in the 
antiquity era2, but that the fully developed concept of ‘authorship and ownership’ was 
formulated in the medieval period, especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and 
the connection between ‘individual authorship’ and the concept ‘ownership’ was 
resolved in the fifteenth century in regard to patents, and in the 16th century in regard to 
copyright protection. 3 However, there are many claims –as will be shown below –4 that 
argue that the copyright and author concepts emerged in the eighteenth century,5 yet 
that these claims do not represent the historical facts.  
Accordingly, we should discucss the claim that the ‘romantic author’ concept stands 
against collective authorship practices, and assesses the relationship between 
romanticism and authorship. This discussion will help also in settling the claims that 
argue that authorship should be abolished as it limits the ability of copyright law to deal 
with a wide range of collective works. Challenging this claim will help to reinforce the 
authorship concept and its validity when used by copyright law to deal with all kinds of 
works. Its validity will then be relied upon by this thesis to distinguish between works in 
the proposal clarified in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
5.2 Is Authorship Historically A Concept Strange To English Law? 
(Romanticism and Authorship) 
Rose argues that the German romantic theory was introduced into English thought by 
Coleridge at the start of the 19th century, and what helped the dissemination of 
romantic theory was the long debate in England about copyright. 6 Rose contends that 
notions of originality and authorial personality, as elements of the romantic theory, 
                                                          
1 Long argues that intellectual property has numerous components, which are: “craft knowledge, 
authorship, and invention”, see, Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the 
Origin of Patents: Notes toward a Conceptual History', Technology and Culture,  (1991). p. 848.  
2 As explained below under this Chapter at 5.3. 
3 See discussion in this Chapter about the history of literary property and authorship, and see, Pamela O 
Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a Conceptual 
History', supra note 1, p. 847; regarding the two senses of authorship, Long argues that the authorship 
term is not confined to the copyright concept but “Authorship can refer to written authorship or the 
authorship of making and inventing material things.” see, ibid. p. 847.  
4 See this Chapter at 5.3. 
5 See, Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of The'author'', Eighteenth Century Studies,  (1984). p. 425-27.  
6 M. Rose, 'The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson V. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship', 
Representations, /23 (1988). p. 76.  
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appeared as answers to the questions: “[w]hy should an author have a property right to 
his work? What does that work consist of? How is a literary composition different from 
a mechanical invention?”7 For Rose the notions of romanticism were invented as a 
“necessary completion of the legal and economic transformation that occurred during 
the copyright struggle”. 8  
Rose also affirms that the legal regulation of the author preceded the social 
construction of the title, “[i]t is a striking fact that in England the legal empowerment of 
the author as a proprietor preceded the social formation of professional authorship.”9 
[Underlining added]. Woodmansee argued that England did not experience romantic 
authorship until the end of the eighteenth century through Wordsworth’s writings10 and 
those of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, as she posited that according to historical scholars 
and philosophers, romantic authorship was a concept alien to UK and was imported 
from foreign cultures. 11 Jaszi has the same view. He affirms that authorship was a 
recent regime and negatively resulted in a ‘radical reconceptualization’ of the creative 
process, culminating “less than 200 years ago in the heroic self-presentation of 
Romantic poets”.12 
Woodmansee even argues that the property of one’s ideas is a modern concept,13 as in 
the middle of the seventeenth century German authors were offered ‘honoraria’, and 
she cited Zedler's Universal-Lexikon definition of such an honorarium as a recognition 
or reward to the author for his efforts and not a compensation or wage. 14 
Woodmansee confirmed that intellectual property appeared in Germany only in the 
eighteenth century, when writers began to demand fluctuating honoraria based on the 
sales of their works. 15 What is interesting is that Woodmansee describes the ‘author’ 
as the individual who earns his livelihood from writing, or who is entitled to the property 
of his writings. She claims that after this group appeared in Germany in the eighteenth 
century the concept of authorship found its modern form. 16 
                                                          
7 Ibid. p. 76.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope V. Curll (1741)', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 
(1991). 
10 Woodmansee argues that the modern idea of authorship dates back to ‘radical conceptualization of 
writing’ caused by Wordsworth’s essay ‘Supplementary to the Preface’ in 1815. See M. Woodmansee, 'On 
the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity', ibid. ( p. 280.  
11 Ibid. p. 281.  
12 See introduction to Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual 
Appropriation in Law and Literature (Duke University Press Books, 1994)., p. 3.  
13 Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of The'author'', supra note 5, p. 426.  
14 Ibid. p. 434.  
15 Ibid. p. 430-31.  
16 Ibid. p. 426.  
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Woodmansee and Jaszi argue explicitly that authorship and romanticism were 
imported from Germany and such importation was against the will of English authors, 
and such concepts were strange to English society. 17 Furthermore, Jaszi writes that 
the introduction of the ‘author’ in English law was not an outcome of the 
philosophically-grounded arguments for ‘authors’ rights’ like those that took place in 
Germany. 18 However, he says that the appearance of this term was a result of the 
circumstances of publishing and piracy and the need to establish a law that protected 
publishers’ rights. 19 
This approach by Woodmansee is intended to confirm that authorship did not emerge 
in England, and it has been inserted or imported to the English culture from its 
neighbouring countries especially Germany, and that the motives for its emergence 
were not available in England. This Chapter aims at proving the invalidity of this claim -
among others - in order to prioritise the authorship concept and the author’s position in 
the face of, in particular, concepts of ownership and the position of capitalists who, this 
thesis argues, are the only beneficiaries of the death of the author claim that results 
from these views.  
Aufderheide argued that over the last 150 years, and especially in the last 30 years, 
copyright law privileged the author’s position through extending authorial rights and 
reverencing the authorial role. 20 This argument presupposes the non-acknowledgment 
of the historical background of the author concept or a fragile recognition of it, which is 
believed to be untrue, as the author and his authorial role were recognised centuries 
before the romantic era, as illustrated below.  
Foucault’s understanding concurred with the views of Woodmansee and Aufderheide, 
as he argued that studies should be made around how the practices of writing and 
reading were organised in relation to the idea of the ‘author’, and that the idea of 
authorship was neither natural nor inevitable, and was invented only as a means to 
constrain the "proliferation of meaning”. 21 However, we have confirmed, above, that 
Foucault’s whole focus was on the literary context, and this is even apparent in his 
interrogation here, as he meant by authorship the consideration of the author when 
interpreting texts, and this consideration can constrain the proliferation of meaning that 
                                                          
17 Ibid. p. 433-438. 
18 Peter Jaszi, 'On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity', Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 (1991d)., p. 296.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Patricia Aufderheide, 'Creativity, Copyright and Authorship', in David Gerstner and Cynthia Chirs (ed.), 
Media Authorship (New York: Routledge, 2012)., p. 4.  
21 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Aauthor?', in Josue V. Harari (ed.), Textual Strategies: Perspectives in 
Post-Structuralist Criticism (Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1979)., p. 148-49.  
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may result if the author is ignored, so he proposed the disregard of authorship for this 
purpose only.  
Boyle, on his part, confirms that authorship is a recent concept, as in medieval times 
originality was not preferred for “[o]ur notion of ‘authorship’ is a concept of relatively 
recent provenance. Medieval church writers actively disapproved of the elements of 
originality and creativeness.”22 However, he asserts that, in the middle of eighteenth 
century, “[i]t is the originality of the author, the novelty which he or she adds to the raw 
materials provided by culture and the common pool, which ‘justifies’ the property 
right”23 
Goldschmidt also confirms historical conceptions, such as “‘self-expression’, the 
‘individuality’ and the ‘genius of an author’, fame earned by literary composition, these 
are not medieval ideas at all, they were born in the renaissance period.”24 He clarified 
the opinion of medieval writers on authorship through his statement: “[i]t is a fact we 
must always keep in mind when discussing medieval writers that from their point of 
view the acquiring of knowledge was the difficult and admirable part of a scholar’s life 
work, the displaying of knowledge gained the easy and enjoyable result. ”25 
Finally, Ginsburg argued that copyright law manifested characteristics of two rationales, 
the investments rights in the eighteenth century, as it was grounded in “the need to 
spur investment in the means of disseminating works of authorship”, 26 and a newer 
rational, the recognition of the property rights that arise out of the act of creation. 27  
However, this does not detract from its existence in English law, as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
5.3 The History of Authorship and Literary Property: 
The discussion of the history of authorship is important here in order to reply to 
contentions that authorship is a modern concept, and its importance should be 
diminished or replaced due to the instability it has caused, as it cannot cope with some 
kinds of works. Nevertheless, authorship is inherent to English history, both literally and 
legally,28 thus the reliance on authorship in this thesis is well founded. Firstly, it will be 
proved that authorship and the individuality of the author were characteristics as 
                                                          
22 James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens (Harvard University Press, 1996)., p. 53.  
23 Ibid. p. 54.  
24 Ernst Philip Goldschmidt, Medieval Texts and Their First Appearance in Print (Biblo & Tannen 
Publishers, 1943). p. 112.  
25 Ibid. p. 110.  
26 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'The Author's Place in Copyright after Trips and the Wipo Treaties', International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 39/1 (2008/03/06 2008).p. 4.  
27 Ibid.p. 4.  
28 Subject to qualifications in Chapter four. 
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prevalent in England as in Germany and France, and that they have a basis in writings 
before the enactment of the Statute of Anne. A historical investigation is therefore 
important to prove this issue, following the rule “History matters to philosophy”. 29 
Secondly, it will be proven that romanticism, meaning genius, was never adopted by 
the law and that it is a literary concept, and that individuality and personality are, in law, 
different from romanticism, though this latter point discussed in Chapter Four it will be 
made clear in this Chapter. 
The Rise of the Concept of ‘Authorship’: 
Authorship, as a practice or profession that is used to produce arts and literature, 
returns to a time in ancient civilisations and antiquity when people valued, or were able 
to perceive, intellectual works. 30 However, generally, artists and intellectual creators 
were faced with philosophical beliefs in God’s will and metaphysical theories, while 
people believed that intellectual works were created by God, not by the author himself. 
So the creator of intellectual works was not allowed to own them31 as he was just a 
representative of God’s power, as Dougherty posited: “the gods and heroes of classical 
antiquity … function as sources of creative inspiration for poets, novelists, artists, 
composers, filmmakers and designers.”32 However, some33 in antiquity argued that 
these creatures belong to their creators not God, but this belief in God’s power was 
enforced by “the idealism of Plato and the teleological orientation of Aristotle” 34 until 
the medieval period.  
In the medieval period the belief in God as a source of the authorship and creativity of 
creators was transferred to ancient authors, as it was believed that these authors were 
the reason that new authors obtained the ability to make new works. Even the making 
of a new work was not an acceptable term, but it was believed that reforming and 
                                                          
29 Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth Aldershot, 1996). p. 13.  
30 See, Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes 
toward a Conceptual History', supra note 1 p. 848; and  
31 Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a 
Conceptual History', supra note 1, p. 848.  
32 Carol Dougherty, Prometheus (Taylor & Francis, 2006). p. xii. 
33 Xenophanes, 5th century B. C. , suggested that inventions and discoveries are brought by human 
ingenuity rather than divine gift.  Anaxagoras, a philosopher who lived around 500 B. C. , also believed 
that humans are distinguished from other living beings due to their ability to develop arts and crafts, see, 
Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a 
Conceptual History', supra note 1, p. 849-50, she refers to Xenophanes’ ideas; see also, Desmond John 
Conacher, Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound: A Literary Commentary (University of Toronto Press, 1980). p. 
84, and, as a source for Anaxagoras's writings, see GB Kerferd and Paul Edwards, 'The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy', (Macmillan New York, 1967). 
34 For an extensive discussion of the fluctuations in arguments that have addressed creations by humans 
and whether they were the authorship of humans or God, see Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," 
Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a Conceptual History', supra note 1, p. 848- 
51.  
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representing the old works in a new shape was the maximum that anybody could do. 35 
Long clarified that authorship was known since Athens in the mid-to-late 5th century 
B.C and especially by the Romans in the 1st century B.C. where they placed “greater 
emphasis on the credit and honor” to old authors, and showed “explicit condemnation 
of the theft of writings.”36 Putnam also confirmed that Greek and Roman’s dealings on 
books shown that there was author’s ownership of his works, and there were debates 
between authors and publishers regarding the unauthorised publishing or stealing 
books.37 
To correlate with the research’s argument, this discussion aims to prove the existence 
of author’s rights to his works in ancient times, and that will prove the falseness of the 
claim that authorship and literary property are modern concepts, as 
Woodmansee,Jaszi and Rose argue. 
Authorship in the Middle Ages: 
The ‘Middle Ages’ are intended to mean the period from the fifth to the fifteenth 
century, in this time the theory of authorship ‘i. e. , the literary theory’ was centred on 
the concepts of ‘auctor’38 which means ‘a distinguished writer’ or ‘author’ and 
‘auctoritas’39 which means the ‘authority of writers’ or ‘authorship’. What distinguishes 
authorship theory in the Middle Ages - especially in the later period – is the consistency 
between medieval scholars in understanding and dealing with this theory, although 
there were many categories, degrees, and characteristics of authorship argued by 
scholars in this age. 40 It is worth noting that although ‘auctor’ is meant to refer to the 
author,‘auctoritas’ didn’t just refer to the work of the author or to authorship, but was 
defined by Huguito of Pisa as a ‘sententia digna imitatione’ which means ‘a profound 
saying worthy of imitation or implementation’. 41 
                                                          
35 Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages 
(second edn.: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 2009)., p. 9-11.  
36 Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a 
Conceptual History', supra note 1 p. 851-853. 
37 George Haven Putnam, Authors and Their Public in Ancient Times: A Sketch of Literary Conditions and 
of the Relations with the Public of Literary Producers, from the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Roman 
Empire (GP Putnam's sons, 1896). p. 58. 
38 This term is derived from the Latin verbs ‘agere’ to act or perform, ‘augere’ to grow, ‘auieo’ to tie, and the 
Greek noun ‘autentim’ authority, so ‘auctor’ means that person who has performed the act of writing and 
brought something into being, see, Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, Scholastic Literary 
Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages, supra note 35, p. 10; afterwards the term ‘author’ was derived from the 
term ‘auctor’ 
39 ‘Auctoritas’ meant any abstract or quotation from the work of the ‘auctor’, and it included strong 
connotations of veracity and sagacity, ‘auctoritas’ modern match is ‘authority’, see, ibid. p. 10.  
40 As Minnis argued, see ibid. p. 2.  
41 The phrase was mentioned in Alexander Neckam, Distinctions Verborum (Oxford: Bodleian Library, MS 
Hatton). p. 333, cited in Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, Scholastic Literary Attitudes in 
the Later Middle Ages, supra note 35, Note. 10.  
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It was believed that the term ‘auctor’, or its modern match ‘author’, is “an accolade 
bestowed upon a popular writer by those later scholars and writers who used extracts 
from his works”. 42 This award of an accolade depends on two factors: the ‘intrinsic 
worth’ of the work, and ‘authenticity’. Concerning ‘authenticity’, it was essential for a 
work to be the genuine production of a named auctor, otherwise it would be an inferior 
source for further works43. This attitude was an application of the long-time old 
metaphor which believed that no ‘modern’ writer could decently be called an auctor in a 
period in which men saw themselves as ‘dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants’, i. 
e. the ‘ancients’. 44 
This argument is an evidence not just of the existence of the author and the recognition 
of his work, but included minute details about the principles that are considered the 
origin of modern originality, which was then called ‘authenticity’. ‘Authenticity’ was 
something interesting to old societies, they looked for the works of old writers and 
considered them to be the origin of all useful works, and new works should refer to 
them to have any value. 45 This pursuit of authenticity in works proves the existence of 
the authorship and the interest in details such as: Who is the author? When was the 
work written? What references has the author cited? Even the origin of the originality 
term lies in that age.  
Historical evidence of the existence of literary property in England can be found in the 
case of St. Columba v. St. Finnian,46 in 567 A. D, wherein St. Columba copied the Irish 
Psalter from his teacher St. Finnian, and the copy was reclaimed under the decision of 
King Dermott, in the Halls of Tara. Finnian’s argument was that this book was his work, 
and nobody could copy it unless he agreed. Columba’s response was that neither 
Finnian nor the book suffered from his copying, and the knowledge and the divine 
words enclosed should be spread and shared among tribes. King Diarmait mac 
Cerbhiall, the High King of Ireland, ruled in favour of Finnian, and made this renowned 
statement: “to every cow belongs its calf; to every book its copy” 47, in other words, that 
the author of the original book owns the copies of his book. 48 According to this case 
and the previous arguments, it can be confirmed that authorship was existent as a 
                                                          
42 Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages, 
supra note 35, p. 10.  
43 Ibid. p. 11-12.  
44Ibid. p. 12. 
45 Ibid.35, p. 11-12.  
46 St. Columba V. St. Finnian, 567 The High King of Ireland.  
47 Ibid..  
48 See, Pamela Samuelson, 'Intelletual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to Be Revised', Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 14 (1999). p. 168, 169; see also, 
Howard Abrams, 'Copyright and Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years', Law & Comtemporary Problems 
Journal, 55 (1992). 
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recognised concept in the English culture from the sixth century, but the existence of its 
terminology in statutes was barred for other reasons -mostly political- subsequently, it 
is believed that authorship is inherent to England and this reinforces the thesis’s 
argument, which defends authorship and the author’s position at the moment as an 
issue that has a historical background and is not due to the importing of foreign 
concepts.  
Writers tended to refer in their works to their dependence on old works so as to add 
value to their works, as Lilliat did when he stressed the dependence on the 
‘Prophesies’ of the Bible to gain legitimacy and authorship status for his work.49 Even 
Thomas commented in his article “[t]hat need for legitimation literally frames the 
poem.”50 Likewise, the ‘Dissuasio Valerii’, when written by Walter Map in the twelfth 
century, his contemporaries doubted the attribution of this work to Map, and he 
commented: “my only fault is that I am alive, … and after I am gone … authorship will 
be credited to me … because … old copper will be preferred to new gold.”51 It seems, 
therefore, that the status of ‘auctor’ or author could only be bestowed posthumously. 52 
Although this is an extreme practice, it reflects the interest in old works and the 
necessity for the existence of resources to the work or old authors. How can any 
argument on the death of the author live up to such a history of authorship and 
authenticity? 
However, it is argued by Goldschmidt that in the middle ages compilation works were 
valued more than original or creative works: “almost everyone could now, in a few 
afternoons spent with Migne’s Patrology within reach, bring together an analogous 
accumulation of passages strung together by a few connecting words, it should not be 
forgotten that for the medieval scholar such a work of compilation was not a menial 
task, but an achievement on which years of very real exertion and the utilization of very 
exceptional opportunities had been most usefully employed.”53 
At the end of the Middle Ages and before the emergence of printing press54 “Long 
before books were printed, men knew that by books they could master more than facts. 
Long before printing, therefore, they also knew that there are elements in some books 
                                                          
49 Lilliat’s writings were the focus of Thomas in his article, Max W Thomas, 'Reading and Writing the 
Renaissance Commonplace Book: A Question of Authorship', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 
10 (1991). 
50 See, ibid. p. 677-78.  
51 Cited in Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later 
Middle Ages, supra note 35, p. 12.  
52 Max W Thomas, 'Reading and Writing the Renaissance Commonplace Book: A Question of Authorship', 
supra note 49, p. 676.  
53 Ernst Philip Goldschmidt, Medieval Texts and Their First Appearance in Print, supra note 24, p. 110.  
54 Supposed to be in 1476 according to Harry Huntt Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on an 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710 (University of Texas Press, 1956). p. 18. 
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which cannot be bought and sold.”55 Ransom confirms that “remote sources of the first 
copyright law lay in those early centuries [1476-1559] of activity among authors and 
sellers of manuscript literature; for even thus early, problems of plagiarism and piracy, 
confused text, and justice to the individual author occasionally arose.”56 
To conclude, In the Middle Ages the attribution of discourse to old authors was the core 
of authorship, although this harmed contemporary authors, as the reference to the old 
author was not pushed by the preference of referring to authority but was a necessity to 
prove the validity of the information quoted or appropriated. 57 Concerning 
contemporary authors, it could have been said that it was “easier to say what the writer 
was not than what s/he was.”58 Ultimately, this pursuing of validating works through 
referring to old authors is certainly confirming the importance of author and authorship 
terminology in the Middle Ages.  
Authorship in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century: 
The concepts of quality and authenticity continued through the following centuries, until 
authorship, as the profession of letters, was ‘well established’ in the eighteenth century. 
59 However, the attitude to the old concept of ‘auctoritas’ has changed, as it was no 
longer dependent on old works, and their authors were no longer recognised unless 
posthumously; as by the mid-seventeenth century publishers offered authors an 
‘honorarium’ for their ‘new’ works. 60 This compensation was not limited to the modest 
sums that authors took, but was a ‘token of esteem’, in the shape of ‘acknowledgment, 
reward, recognition, or favor’ and it was not equivalent to the efforts made by the 
author to create his work, and different from wages paid to workers and payments paid 
in contracts. 61 This “honorarium resembled the gifts made to poets by aristocratic 
patrons.”62 Bracha writes that the roots of the authorship concept can be traced back to 
the Renaissance (the cultural movement that spanned the period from the 14th to 
                                                          
55 Ibid. p. 18. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', in Donald F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Cornell University Press, 1980)., p. 126.  
58 Max W Thomas, 'Reading and Writing the Renaissance Commonplace Book: A Question of Authorship', 
supra note 49, p. 679.  
59 Catherine Seville, Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England: The Framing of the 1842 
Copyright Act (Cambridge University Press, 1999). p. 101.  
60 Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (Columbia 
University Press, 1994). p. 42.  
61 Johann Heinrich Zedler, 'Großes Universal Lexikon Aller Wissenschaften Und Künste', Halle/Leipzig, 
1735 ( Referred to in Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of 
Aesthetics, supra note 60. p. 42 
62 Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics, supra note 
60, p. 43.  
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seventeenth centuries) and it gradually developed over time until today. 63 Zimmerman 
explains that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “authorship was not a 
profession; writers could survive economically only on private wealth or through 
patronage.”64 
Foucault affirmed that the seventeenth - eighteenth centuries’ era attests to the 
differentiation between the protection of literary contributions on one side and of facts 
and ideas on the other, as he contends that, in this period ‘authentication was no 
longer required’ regarding scientific texts, as they were accepted on their own merits, 
even if they were anonymous. 65 On the other hand, literary discourses cannot be 
accepted or appreciated unless accompanied by the author’s name, date, place and 
the circumstances of writing, otherwise every effort will be expended to locate the 
author, “Literary anonymity was of interest only as a puzzle to be solved as, in our day, 
literary works are totally dominated by the sovereignty of the author.”66 
This all refers to the entrenchment of authorship in history and its distinct development 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not appear in a vacuum, but was an 
evolution of the same concept and similar practices in antiquity and the Middle Ages. 
So, to confirm again, the argument that intellectual property and authorship are modern 
concepts is undoubtedly baseless, and the contention that the author is dead after he 
has created his work67 is something about which there is no evidence in the history of 
copyright law, but the opposite is actually right, as the author lives, especially through 
his name, after publishing his work and even after his physical death, and that happens 
when works take their validity from referring to the author’s work and his name being 
disseminated and recognised. 
The Situation before the Statute of Anne: 
The situation that prevailed in the two centuries before the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne was very critical, as the printing press was invented in the 16th century led to the 
emergence of the commercial market for books. 68 Although the ‘fraternity of publishers’ 
(later called ‘the Stationers’ Guild’) in London had a monopoly over any publishing 
throughout England, this was endowed by the Crown for the purposes of the 
censorship of treasonous and seditious materials. For instance, in the Lake, Bar. v. 
                                                          
63 Oren Bracha, 'The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early 
American Copyright', The Yale Law Journal,  (2008)., p. 192, note. 5. 
64 D.L. Zimmerman, 'Authorship without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age', DePaul 
Law Review, 52 (2002). p. 1131 
65 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 57, p. 126.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Pamela O Long, 'Invention, Authorship," Intellectual Property," and the Origin of Patents: Notes toward a 
Conceptual History', supra note 1, p. 848, note. 4.  
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King, Ar. Case 69 the Court’s main concern regarding literary works being debated was 
whether “the defendant published ‘a certain false, scandalous, malicious, and 
defamatory libel of and concerning the said plaintiff.’”70 This was also confirmed 
explicitly in the The Company of Stationers v. Seymour Case,71 when the Court stated: 
“since printing has been invented, and is become a common trade … matters of State, 
and things that concern the Government, were never left to any man's liberty to print 
that would.”72 
Throughout the seventeenth century, publishers in London, through their Guild, faced 
tough competition over the printing and publishing of works. 73 That is why the Statute 
of Anne is believed to have been a fallacious victory for the principles of authorship and 
the recognition of authors’ rights, but what is intended is actually the keeping of 
censorship of the published material, through continuing to have publishers as the 
controllers of the rules of the market, whether by ownership of works, or by allowing its 
publishing, or by controlling the facilities of publishing. 74 Jaszi maintained this, saying: 
“[a]lthough labelled ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,’ the Statute was, in 
fact, promoted primarily by the London-based fraternity of British publishers … Their 
preferred solution was to solicit legislation that gave the ‘proprietors’ of ‘copyrights’ a 
right of action against those who trespassed on their literary property. The publishers 
expected, of course, that in most instances, they would be the ‘proprietors’.” 75 
Historically, this thesis does not concur with the belief that publishers are the 
proprietors of the literary works,76 as Jaszi claimed, whether before or after the Statute 
of Anne. As we can find clearly in the The Company of Stationers v. Seymour Case, 77 
that the court presumes that the work should have an author, otherwise the King owns 
                                                          
69 Lake, Bar. V. King, Ar., 1666, Hil. 19 & 20 Car. II. Reg. Rol. 1179.,  
70 Ibid. at. 121. 
71 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 1677, 29 CAR. 2,  
72 Ibid. at 258.  
73 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', Duke Law Journal,  
(1991a)., p. 468.  
74 Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen, and Paul Torremans, Global Copyright: Three Hundred Years since 
the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010). p. 110 as it was argued 
that “the publishers tried to utilize Lockeian rational natural rights theories, and loosely grounded 
references to common law, to argue in favour of a perpetual ownership right … This inevitably led them to 
point to the author as point of attachment.” 
75 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', supra note 73, p. 468.  
76 Stern advocates this thesis’s approach, as he argues that the members of bookselling industry may be 
used the author’s right as “a self-serving feint”, but “its appeal to those who heard the argument may also 
be traced to a fledging Lockean theory that had already been aired during the previous decade.” He adds 
that the limitation of protection inspired by the hostility to legal monopolies that publishers established, and 
also it was extended after the first fourteen years only if the author was alive which reflects its association 
with the author. See Simon Stern, 'Copyright, Originality, and the Public Domain in Eighteenth-Century 
England', Originality and Intellectual Property in the French and English Enlightenment, Reginald 
McGinnis, ed,  (2008). p. 76. 
77 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 29 CAR. 2, supra note 71.  
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the work, and ‘may’ confer this property to the Company of Stationers:78 “The book 
which this defendant has printed, has no certain author; and then, according to the rule 
of our law, the King has the property; and by consequence may grant his property to 
the company.” 79 This research agrees with Patterson’s argument as he claimed that 
the Statue of Anne “was designed to destroy the booksellers' monopoly of the 
booktrade and to prevent its recurrence.”80 Accordingly, ‘literary property’ of the work 
was established before the Statute of Anne, and not only that, but the author was the 
initial proprietor of his works. Consequently, the Statute of Anne did not invent this 
status as Jaszi stated.81  
The political policy applied then does not affect the legal situation, as what was 
established and current is that authors own their works. All the matters is that the 
publishing of these works and the checking of their appropriateness for publishing, from 
the point of view of politics and religions could not be done unless through designated 
booksellers. All related parties knew this and were sure that the transfer of property 
was an arbitrary decision and not based on legal or social foundations. 82 
Thus, the Statute of Anne’s return to the original treatment of this issue through 
recognition of the author as being the real owner of his work, is not a strange thing if 
understood within the peculiar circumstances of English law and the role of politics in 
England. In addition, when the terminology of romanticism appeared after the Statute 
of Anne, some scholars (like Woodmansee and Jaszi) linked it with what the Statute of 
Anne had adopted and extracted from this the notion that the authorship concept 
adopted in this statute was imported from abroad. In fact, this opinion is a shortsighted 
one and the politics of copyright in England restrained the appearance of authorship in 
legislation, although it was recognised, and even practised, in courts centuries before, 
as illustrated above. 83 
In the first instance, Woodmansee’s confirmation that “the property of one’s ideas is a 
modern concept” and that it appeared in Germany from the seventeenth century is an 
incorrect argument. According to Armstrong’s investigation of the history of literary 
property, it seems that the privilege had been granted to authors in Germany and Italy 
from the 15th century. She confirmed that in Germany in 1479 the privilege was granted 
                                                          
78 This is what the court called the Stationers’ Guild in this case.  
79 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 29 CAR. 2, supra note 71, at 257.  
80 L. Ray Patterson, 'Understanding the Copyright Clause', Journal of Copyright Soc'y Usa, 47 (2000). p. 
379 
81 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', supra note 73, p. 468.  
82 See this Chapter p. 144-148 above. and Harry Huntt Ransom, The First Copyright Statute: An Essay on 
an Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, supra note 54, p. 10.  
83 According to the case of St. Columba V. St. Finnian, supra note 46 and the case of The Company of 
Stationers V. Seymour, 29 CAR. 2, supra note 71, see above p. 145, 150. 
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to the author, publisher or printer, when requested. 84 In discussing the issue of the 
author’s property in general, as seems apparent from Woodmansee’s argument, it is 
beneficial to refer to a very important incident to the author’s the property on his work, 
and even its dependence on, it can be said, the ‘sweat of the brow doctrine’ or ‘skill, 
labour and judgment’, and that was in 1492. According to Armstrong the author 
Donatus Bossius requested Letters Patent privilieg on his work ‘Cronaca’ and in 
supporting that Bossius “represented the time and labour he had expended in 
composing the book, and the injustice which would ensue if other people were free, as 
soon as it was in print, to reprint it and so rob him of the profit which he might otherwise 
expect. This argument was accepted by the duke, who added that the author was 
entitled to the fruits of his exertions in addition to the honour and glory which the 
publication would bring to him … and granted a privilege for ten years for the Cronaca 
[the author’s work] whether in Latin or in Italian, within his dominions.”85 
Although it is often stated that authorship was first recognised by the passing of the first 
copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne, 1710,86 wherein the author had his property 
rights recognised by the law and this can be defended. 87 The ‘literary property of the 
author to his work’ was established before the Statute of Anne, as was evident in the 
The Company of Stationers v. Seymour Case,88as stated above.89 Besides, the Court 
in Donaldson v. Beckett90 confirmed that the right of the author in his copies had been 
a stable notion since the introduction of ‘the art of printing into England’, and even the 
name ‘copyright’ had been used before, as it confirmed “[f]rom the first introduction of 
the art of printing into England, this peculiar species of property has been known by the 
expressive name of ‘copy right’” 91 [Underlining added], and even “It is a point too well 
established to be denied.” 92 [Underlining added].  
The Court even confirmed that the privilege of the king on the copies of acts of 
parliament and proclamations was granted depending on his peculiar interest in this 
                                                          
84 Elizabeth Armstrong, Before Copyright: The French Book-Privilege System 1498-1526 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002)., p. 2-3.  
85 Ibid. p. 4. 
86 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', supra note 73, p. 468.  
87 This thesis confirms that the author had property rights on his work in the Statute of Anne, this is 
apparent from the statement: “the author of any book … shall have the sole right and liberty of printing 
such book and books for the term of one and twenty years”. See s. 1 of 'Statute of Anne', 8 Anne, c. 19 
(England, 1710).This confirms a property right to the author on his works, and the right to exploit it.  
88 The Company of Stationers V. Seymour, 29 CAR. 2, supra note 71. Wherein the court confirmed: “There 
is no particular author of an almanack; and then, by the rule of our law, the King has the property in the 
copy.” at 258.  
89 See this Chapter p. 149. 
90 Donaldson V. Beckett, 1774, 1 E.R. 837, HL, II Brown 129.  
91 Ibid. at 144.  
92 Ibid. 
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privilege and not based on his prerogative over the printing process itself. 93 The 
confirmation of the age of the concept ‘literary property’ was also stated in a case five 
years earlier, Millar v. Taylor,94 when the King's Bench inaugurated the case by saying 
“[t]his case was a revival of the old and often-litigated question concerning literary 
property”. 95 [Underlining added].  
For those who claim that copyright law and authorship are modern concepts,96 it is 
agrued that the historical development that led to this law is very important, and it may 
be that there were stable regulations that meant that the law not needed, especially 
under the political and religious circumstances in England at that time –namely, the 
censorship by the church and the king. As will be elaborated below, in England the 
Statute of Anne was the result of a long development of the concept of literary property 
before its enactment, even before Caxton’s printing.97 Also, as a response to 
Woodmansee and Jaszi’s arguments, Barthes, who contended the death of the author, 
has confessed that the modern notion of the author appeared in the Middle Ages, or 
before the 15th century, “The author … emerging from the Middle Ages with English 
empiricism, French rationalism.”98 [Underlining added].  
Although Woodmansee and Jaszi99 have investigated the history of authorship and 
applied this to copyright law in order to conclude the inexistence of romanticism or 
individual authorship in England before the eighteenth century, and then to exclude the 
author concept from the focus of copyright law. Ransom confirms that it is difficult to 
decide which theory dominated the copyright rules before the Statute of Anne. It 
certainly cannot be said whether it is romanticism or not, as the legal history of the 
‘communication of ideas’ has no continuous status or connected history in England. 100 
At one time the Crown obtained the upper hand in deciding and developing the concept 
of copyright, at other time it was the Stationers’ Company, at yet other times it was the 
                                                          
93 Ibid. at 144. As the Court stated: “the copies of acts of parliament, proclamations, and other papers of a 
public nature, belongs to the King and his patentees; not in consequence of any prerogative over the art of 
printing, but on account of his peculiar interest, as the executive power, in all publications and acts of 
state, flowing from himself, or parliament.” 
94 Millar V. Taylor, 1769, 4 Burrow 2303, Court of King's Bench 
95 Ibid. at 202.  
96 See, Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
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parliament who decides. 101 Consequently, there are many ‘stopping places’ at which 
‘theory and practice’ evoke different concepts and procedures according to the 
controller of the legislation. 102 The conclusion is that it is “impossible to trace a steadily 
progressive development of copy-right in England.” 103 
What supports the difference in the English position from that of other neighbouring 
countries is the instability of the legal and social position of authors in English law and 
society compared to other European nations. Authors have tried to impose their right to 
royalties, also, ‘right-in-copy’ and ‘property rights’ on their works as the creators and 
owners of their works. Unfortunately, that was done, but through an unclear mutual 
relationship with book traders that kept authors’ works under their eyes due to the 
connection between cultural works and politics in England at that time. 104 
Authors’ relations with publishers were not stable, as disagreement was more frequent 
than agreement between them,105 and there was neither motive nor a long enough 
history of practice to guarantee stability in dealings in the manuscript era. This situation 
continued in the printing press era. 106 In short, what stood as a barrier before the 
enactment of the author’s position and his legal rights in English law was instability in 
all respects - on the one hand, the political and economic relationship to the invention 
of printing press, on the other, the social and psychological attitudes of English authors 
towards the ownership of their works and towards publishers.107  
However, Ransom confirms that this vague view about authors’ rights was due to the 
individualistic character of English writers, as they were “highly individualistic in 
methods of work.” 108 Accordingly, the individualistic, or romantic, self-view of English 
authors was inherent to English literature before the enactment of the Statute of Anne 
in 1710. In addition, English writers rarely tend to organise their profession or to be 
conformed into patterns, and that was by choice as they tended to be different: “authors 
are highly individualisitic in methods of work, the writing ‘profission’ appears to be 
disordered from the start, and disorganised by choice. [Accordingly] [a]rtistic 
consciousness may stimulate an author [in England] to be different”, 109 this supports 
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the thesis’s view, as the search for the differentiation in their works means that they 
have already guaranteed the property of these works and are looking for originality.  
Thus, we  find that an author’s career in England was less stable than that in Germany, 
France and Italy, largely due to political events in England, but, in any case, the 
importing of the authorship and author concepts from abroad was no more than 
importing the terminology of already existent and applied concepts that had been 
accepted ages before in England.  
These historic glimpses demonstrate that authorship and individuality concepts were 
not strange to the English legal arena, for they were practised on the social and 
economic levels. However, the political or cultural circumstances did not allow for the 
codification of these ideas into an earlier statute. Although England should have 
reached the same result in Germany and France: an established authorship concept 
and copyright laws, the emergence of the printing press and the following sudden bouts 
of illegal reprinting that followed, urged English legislators to adopt the ready concepts 
of authorship from neighbouring jurisdictions, finding general acceptance among 
English society and English authors. 110 Accordingly, this discussion helps to reinforce 
the position of authorship in English society and law and that it is historically inherent to 
England, and not, as Woodmansee and Jaszi argue, it has no foundation in England 
and should be abolished. Ultimately, this proves that authorship can be relied upon in 
English copyright law, as will be explained in the next section.  
5.3.1 Falseness of the Claim That Authorship is a Historically Strange Concept 
in English Culture: 
Saunders sees that the best solution to the historical complexities of copyright and 
authorship development, or to “untamed cultural historicism”, 111 lies in ignoring them, 
and concentrating instead on the modern legal development of authorship, addressing 
the current problems that were facing protection and the copyright balance. 112 He 
argues that resisting this ‘imagined’ continuity of aesthetic and legal development from 
ancient literature to modern copyright law was preferred, and we should instead limit 
ourselves to the legal relations of authorship and publication in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 113 
                                                          
110 Although printing itself reached England at a later stage, as the English printer, William Caxton, had 
been preceded by German and French printers in London, see ibid. p. 14, the Court in Donaldson v. 
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Saunders attributes his opinion to the non-unified meaning or definition of authorship, 
as it did not fall within a “single historical or theoretical space”,114 so it cannot fit into a 
single framework of explanation. In sweeping words, he confirms that: “[t]he delineation 
of legal and aesthetic personalities and the manners of their occupation by individuals 
who write and publish obeyed no single logic or necessity.”115 Although this view has 
some validity when comparing different views, this result or phenomenon does not 
return to the lack of continuity in legal development, but to the confusion that occurs 
between the literary and legal developments of authorship, and the failure to take into 
account the political circumstances affecting this development.  
As mentioned above, Woodmansee argues that the romantic concept appeared in 
Germany and France in the eighteenth century and was exported to England, 
appearing in Wordsworth’s writings. 116 If Woodmansee meant the literary side of 
romanticism, this may be correct, but the legal side of romanticism which means, in 
law, the ‘individual author’ or ‘authorship’ and ‘intellectual property’, has been present 
in England since the 16th century, or even before, according to some sources.117 
One of the main flaws in Woodmansee’s argument is her confirmation of the 
emergence of the author at the end of eighteenth century although Locke and Hobbes 
in the seventeenth century addressed the author and authorship concept.118 Although 
Woodmansee has argued that the ‘author’ concept appeared in Germany in the 
eighteenth century, she claimed that this concept had no unified interpretation. She 
argued that ‘author’ had two meanings. First, the ‘craftsman’, or the person who 
masters a body of rules, using them so he can manipulate traditional materials to 
create the rhetoric and poetics prescribed by the audience in order to earn his 
livelihood. 119 Secondly, when the author makes something “much more than 
craftsmanship” 120 and then is supposed to be inspired by external powers, divine or 
God. 121  
In her promotion of this argument, she cited Alexander Pope,122 who argued that “the 
function of the poet is not to invent novelties, but to express truths hallowed by 
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tradition”. 123 However, Woodmansee cited Pope’s reference to the original writing, as 
he commented: “the other seemingly anomalous view of the writer,” as he argued that 
he: “is capable … of achieving something that has never been achieved before”124 
[Underlining added], and this can be done when the poet “violate[s] the rules of his 
craft”. 125 She contended that this referred to a case of working beyond established 
rules that was an exception for Pope,,126 but she did not provide an explanation of his 
argument, nor how or why she considered it an exception, although, this statement by 
Pope is considered to be an explicit reference to original authorship.  
Jaszi also criticises the authorship concept’s presence in copyright legislation, as he 
argues that the concept of authorship is an “ideologically charged concept” that “has 
been an active shaping and destabilizing force in the erection of copyright doctrine.” 127 
However, authorship per se is not the source of problems but it is the disregard of 
studying and developing or maintaining authorship with the different natures of works 
that is the reason for that authorship being deemed a ‘destabilizing force’.  
5.3.2 Shifts in the Ideology of Authorship 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries different theories that debated 
authorship’s ideological construction appeared, and the analysis of its constituent 
elements were widely discussed, especially regarding the individualism, originality and 
ownership that contributed to the formulating of the relationship between the work and 
its creator. 128 
Authorship as an Expression of the Individual: 
The term ‘author’ was a common issue in the literature of copyright and authorship in 
the mid-seventeenth century, just before the enactment of the Statute of Anne and 
when the creators of literary and artistic works designated themselves ‘authors’. In the 
eighteenth century, ‘romantic authorship’ became a dominant concept in the literary 
and legal fields, and in the late-eighteenth century the doctrinal structures that had 
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dominated copyright until then emerged.129 Drabble asserted that authorship in this 
period became "an extreme assertion of the self and the value of individual experience, 
together with the sense of the infinite and the transcendental."130 Jaszi argues: “In fact, 
British and American copyright present myriad reflections of the Romantic conception 
of "authorship”.131  
Jaszi also confirmed that the term ‘author’ was used before the Statute of Anne, albeit 
it referred to a kind of power, even before the use of ‘authorship’ in the romantic era,132 
and Boyle explained that ‘author’ or ‘authorship’ was a reference to “authority” that 
implies control over individual creation. 133 This meaning was confirmed by Hobbes: 
“For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an owner… speaking 
of actions, is called author. As the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right 
of doing any action, is called ‘authority’.”134 So, authorship was called authority before 
the Statute of Anne.  
This interest in authorship and its principles existed before the Statute of Anne,135 but it 
was theorised in Locke’s writings, in individualism and liberalism, in the late-
seventeenth century. 136 The Romantic Movement was spurred by the Statute of Anne 
and the mention of author’s rights in the copy. This stimulated unexpected movement 
in the direction of romantic authorship, depending from the individualism and property 
rights set by Locke and Hobbes.  
As MacPherson sustains, writing about this time: “the original seventeenth century 
individualism contained the central difficulty, which lay in its possessive quality. Its 
possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the 
proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The 
individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but 
as an owner of himself.”137 Locke privatised the notion of individualism on authorship, 
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and his main theory of the property or ownership of one’s labour was what dominated 
his philosophy of copyright discourse. 138  
Authorship as an Economic Motive: 
Authorship helped to encourage and incentivise authors to make new works, and has 
been kept as a mascot for publishers. As Jaszi confirmed: “ ’authorship’ has remained 
what it was in eighteenth-century England -a stalking horse for economic interests that 
were (as a tactical matter) better concealed than revealed, and a convenient generative 
metaphor for legal structures that facilitated the emergence of new modes of 
production for literary and artistic works.” 139 
Saunders confirmed this shift in copyright ideology from the seventeenth to the 
eighteenth centuries, to the modern day 20th century.140 As the former time 
distinguished the romantic character of authorship or “the 'birth' of the author”. On the 
other hand, the recent times have witnessed the defeat of the structuralism’s account 
of authorship, and the post-structuralist theory of authorship has popularised the 'death' 
of the author theme that criticised the author concept and believed in emancipation 
from the “individualised authorial subject of Romanticism”. 141 
Authorship and the Conflict of Interests: 
Ultimately, although in the time of the Statute of Anne authorship was not an explicit 
concept with inclusive principles, the idea of authorship was already utilised for the 
protection of booksellers, and gradually attracted the ideas of ‘creativity, originality and 
inspiration’142 until it became a complete ideology per se by the early nineteenth 
century. From this point and throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, publishers’ rights 
‘disappeared’ from the general discourse of copyright. 143 From the mid-20th Century the 
conflict between author’s and users’ rights floated to the surface, and in a strange 
development we find authors’ rights and even users’ rights are fading, for the interests 
of a third party, which is publishers rights144 supported again by the countering of 
theories of individualism and structuralism, led by Foucault and Barthes, who, 
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endorsed by extensive utilitarianism, expanded into common law and even into most of 
the civil law of most countries. 145 
This manifestation of the ideologies that affected authorship paved the way for this 
thesis to prove how court decisions have conflicted from the mid-20th century until now, 
and how such conflict can be treated in the future.  
5.4 Is the Notion of Authorship Consistent with Collective Works? 
It is confirmed by many scholars, e.g., Aufderheide, 146 Jaszi,147 Boyle,148 Hyde,149 
McLeod150 and Vaidhyanathan,151 that the concept of authorship is not consistent with 
the collaborative authorship practice or with collective creativity. Kaplan argues that the 
collaborative creation of works by teams will abate the principles of proprietorship in 
literary works and will modify conceptions of copyright, as he thinks that this will 
diminish the principles of original creation and exclusive ownership. 152  
Jaszi insists that the persistence of the notion of ‘authorship’ in US copyright law is an 
impediment to the emergence and maintenance of collective creativity. 153 He argues 
that copyright can no longer adapt to the ‘collective, corporate, and 
collaborative’154authorship that he finds as realities of contemporary writing practice. He 
evidenced his argument by ‘folkloric’ works, as he finds that they have been excluded 
from protection of copyright law due to the non-recognition of collective authorship. 155  
Jaszi thinks that the law does not comprehend the non-individualistic works and that 
the extension of copyright protection to new works entails the suppression of 
complicating details on their mode of production. 156 In order to prove his argument, 
Jaszi contended that the attitude of the Supreme Court in Feist v. Rural157 was not an 
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advocacy of creativity and an application of the simple rule of not protecting facts: “If 
we seek non-circular justifications for the law's refusal to extend protection to such 
information collections, we must look beyond the naive distinction between the pre-
existent and the ‘original.’”158 Jaszi argued that romantic authorship is a ‘live’ concept in 
US legal culture, and the Feist Court could not recognise “non-individualistic culture 
productions” as they are marginalised or invisible. 159  
Jaszi argues that the Supreme Court, instead of investigating the collective nature of 
the telephone listings, simply resorted to a ‘fictitious’ distinction between uncreated 
facts and created works. As he confirms that the problem with facts - telephone listings, 
as, in Feist, is not their lack of human intervention, but the opposite, they have “an 
embarrassment of very human sources.”160 As they “sum up a complex amalgam of 
choices, to which the subject of a given entry, as well as her parents, friends, teachers, 
and others - such as various real estate developers and government employees - have 
made contributions over time”. 161 So, Jaszi finds that telephone listings have 
incorporated several personal and laborious efforts in their creation process, and that 
the Court in Feist, and other previous courts, instead of investigating this reality of 
these factual works, just resorted to romantic authorship as a stalking horse or plea. 
“Feist, once again, provides an example of this process of marginalization [of the 
collective creativity].” 162  
Zemer believes that any intellectual work is in fact a collective work that includes not 
just the efforts of the author named on its cover, but the works of many anonymous 
individuals from society, “[e]very copyrighted entity represents the creative collectivity. 
It is a joint enterprise of both the individual author and the public.”163 Woodmansee also 
holds a similar opinion as she finds that modern authorship is distinguished by 
collaborative or corporate writing,164 she cites Lunsford and Ede165 confirming that most 
areas of writing are not individualistic, whether they are business, government, 
industry, science or social science writings, however, they contend that just arts and 
humanities that are “last bastion of solitary origination.”166 Aufderheide argues that 
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collaborative authorship has banished the synchronisation between copyright law and 
the cultural notion of the author. 167  
Woodmansee adds another hypothesis to support her claim, that authorship is a 
collaborative, not a romantic or individual act. As she quoted a statement by Zinck in 
1753, wherein he defines the book in his dictionary and confirms that the 
manufacturing books is an industry that fed many mouths, the author being counted as 
one of them. “Many people work on this ware before it is complete and becomes an 
actual book in this sense. The scholar and the writer, the papermaker, the type 
founder, the typesetter and the printer, the proof-reader, the publisher, the book-binder, 
sometimes even the gilder and the brass-worker, etc. Thus many mouths are fed by 
this branch of manufacture.”168 Accordingly, Woodmansee concludes that the author, 
since the emergence of writing, has never had a superior position but was “on a par 
with other craftsmen.”169  
The mention of other individuals engaged in the book industry does not mean that they 
are equal with the scholar or writer who was first mentioned, but it is believed that this 
was intended to refer to the fact that book production in general requiring many efforts, 
rather than just the authorship of the scholar, a view that reflects an economic 
perspective. Besides, it is argued that Zincke gave a superior position to the author 
when mentioned him at the beginning. Even, Zincke’s argument is still correct, as the 
cultural industries are a major source of income to countries and those engaged in 
them, and it includes all these crafts and much more, and although the author is the 
first beneficiary, many individuals work in the same ‘profession’, like the paper maker, 
typesetter, proof-reader, editor, printer, book-binder, etc.  
To support this argument, we find Hobbes,170 in the seventeenth century, a century 
before Zinck, arguing that there is a faith and belief in the author of discourse, as when 
we rely on the opinions of the author we have faith in his ability to know the truth, or his 
honesty in not deceiving, so there is ‘faith in the man’ and a belief ‘both of the man, and 
of the truth of what he says’. 171 Such an argument confirms the degree of importance 
and focus that was located on the personality of the author as a source of information.  
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5.4.1 Romanticism and Collective Authorship: 
Woodmansee has insisted that collective authorship was more prevalent in olden 
times, not individual works, and that the romanticism that appeared in the late 
eighteenth century has caused confusion and disruption to copyright law, because 
romanticism and the romantic author concept embedded the inclusion of collective 
works in copyright law. She cited St. Bonaventura’s172 statement, wherein he argues 
that there are four ways to make books, although it is a long quotation, it is worth 
mentioning here, as he states: “A man might write the works of others, adding and 
changing nothing, in which case he is simply called a 'scribe' (scriptor). Another writes 
the work of others with additions which are not his own; and he is called a 'compiler' 
(compilator). Another writes both others' work and his own, but with others' work in 
principal place, adding his own for purposes of explanation; and he is called a 
'commentator' (commentator). . . Another writes both his own work and others' but with 
his own work in principal place adding others' for purposes of confirmation; and such a 
man should be called an 'author' (auctor).”173  
Likewise, St. Bonaventura’s argument supports originality and individual authorship; it 
does not abolish it, as he distinguished accurately between different kinds of 
authorship, as if he describes the contemporary way of writing, including the thesis’s 
proposition in categorising creative skills. St. Bonaventura confirms that those who just 
compile previous works are called compilers, and those who comment on previous 
works are commentators, and those who write his own theories and add others to 
support his opinion, are authors.  
This categorisation filters original authors from other less original writers. This 
argument has facilitated the distinguishing of original authors – or romantic authors, in 
the words of Woodmansee - and works from other writers, and it supports the calls to 
give original authors a superior position over the compilers of factual works or 
compilations, who are not original authors in St. Bonaventura’s -and the thesis’s- belief.  
However, this quotation was used also by Eisenstein174 to justify that there is no work 
that is completely ‘original’ in the meaning of ‘new’ or ‘genius’ work, and that novelty is 
not a condition for literary and artistic works. 175 On the other hand, Woodmansee used 
it to justify that none of literary works are solitary work, and that all works use previous 
works, so none of the works show genius authorship. Then Woodmansee inferred that 
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romantic authorship is a false or erroneous concept and should be replaced by 
collective authorship. 176  
Woodmansee’s criticism of the originality which has seeped into authorship in general 
was initiated by her belief that, historically, authorship emanated from the ‘romantic 
authorship’ concept. Woodmansee argues that the romantic authorship refers to works 
that are new and unique, and has never relied or extracted from previous works, and 
these are created by ‘genius’ individuals.177 She also argues that originality refers to 
this meaning, as she confirms that the notion of the writer is of recent provenance and 
it is “a by-product of the romantic notion that significant writers break altogether with 
tradition to create something utterly new, unique in a word, ‘original’.”178  
In this discussion, this research asserts that romanticism has a literary substance179 
that does not find a place in copyright law. Although in literature it bears the meanings 
of the genius or the sole author, copyright law does not confine itself to the sole author, 
as collective authorship has been recognised in copyright law since its emergence.180 
Besdies, copyright law has never adopted the ideas of the romantic author or the 
genius author. This notion will be reinforced in the next section.  
5.5 Authorship and Originality Do Not Include the Meaning of Genius: 
Firstly, writings and thoughts about genius and originality emerged in England and 
Germany simultaneously, as in England many writers, like William Sharpe, Edward 
Young, William Duff, and Alexander Gerard, have written about it,181 and in Germany, 
at the same time, Friedrich Maximilian Klinger, Johann Georg Hamann, Jakob Michael 
Reinhold Lenz and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote in the ‘Sturm und Drang’ 
period about ‘genius’ and originality,182 as Faflak confirmed: “German Romanticism is 
roughly contemporary with English Romanticism.”183 
Secondly, Tenger argued that the ‘genius’ concept appeared in England to support the 
argument that productive forces in society must be organized according to the natural 
intellectual powers of individuals.184 However, that argument competed with the 
discourse of ‘political economy’, which confined ‘genius’ to discussions of art and 
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literature. 185 It is also argued that ingenuity appeared as a reaction to the growth of the 
commercial market for literature,186 whilst others contended that it was a consequence 
of the autonomy of society, and authors especially, from political and religious 
authorities.187 In the meantime, it is important to mention here that this thesis’s attention 
is not focused on the reason for the emergence of the ‘genius’ concept, but the 
meaning of ingenuity in the literary context and its correlation to law.  
It was argued by Lavater in 1775 that “[g]enius is not learned, not acquired . . . It is our 
unique property, inimitable, divine, it is inspired . . . Gods in human form! Creators!”188 
Accordingly, ‘genius’ in ancient times referred to the person’s disposition or inclination, 
which was thought to be inspired by God. However, its current meaning, under the 
romanticism doctrine, is the “instinctive and extraordinary capacity for imaginative 
creation [and] original thought”189 that is embodied in the term ‘romantic author’ that 
emerged at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The genius term has been 
downgraded the virtues of emulation and education, and was one of the things that 
fuelled the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Europe. 190 This argument, which this thesis is calling 
for is not just that romanticism in literature does not apply in law, but also that its 
meaning should be revised, as it refers to the inspiration that the person has when 
creating his work, something similar to the meaning of creativity in modern times.  
It is worth referring to the fact that one of the main reasons for the deployment of the 
‘genius’ term being the practices of journals in the sixteenth century, which used 
‘romantic’ and ‘genius’ terminology in order to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors. Romanticism was a sort of exaggeration of the importance of their 
publications and emboding them as inventions, in order to protect them from populist 
periodical writings. So the real content of romanticism ‘on the ground’ can be described 
as follows: “Magazine accounts of genius, then, were caught between the supposedly 
debased literary culture in which they were produced and read, and the supposedly 
pure realm of autonomous creativity that they often sought to describe.”191 
Young, although he wrote during the early history of authorship, has differentiated 
between genius, original and imitation. He stated that: “the mind of a man of genius is a 
fertile and pleasant field, pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it enjoys a 
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perpetual spring. Of that spring, originals are the fairest flowers Imitations are the 
quicker growth, but fainter bloom. Imitations are of two kinds; one of nature, one of 
authors. The first we call Originals, and confine the term Imitation to the second.”192 
This statement can serve the thesis’s argument on three points: firstly, that original 
works are the result of the mind of the man that Young described as the fertile land that 
will produce the fairest flowers.193 Secondly, that intellectual works in that age were not 
limited to creation that was based on nature, nor the innovative thinking that produces 
novel works. But also can appear in the ‘imitation’ of the previous works of other 
authors. Thirdly, the term ‘genius’ in the mid-eighteenth century (the supposed time of 
the emergence of romanticism) was not confined to the works that were considered 
‘new’ and ‘novel’, and those do not resemble any other works,194 but Young’s approval 
of the imitation as a type of works that a genius can produce although it is a lower 
grade: “the quicker growth, but fainter bloom”195 confirms that genius was referring to 
the making of intellectual work either novel or imitation of previous work. 
This important statement by Young confirms that the word ‘genius’ was merely 
expressing that the work comes from the mind abilities of the author, distinguishing 
them from other uncreative individuals, or recognising the author’s ability to do what not 
everybody can do. Accordingly, being a genius did not mean –as the current 
connotation of romanticism is claimed to mean - the unprecedented ingenious work, 
but just the ability to produce a mental work. Besides, the language limitations of that 
age enforced the use of this word for any person who has some abilities of mind that 
are different from those of other individuals. The term ‘genius’ was used to refer to 
those who write literary works or invent machines, as both create and mould their mind 
abilities in a work. We have mentioned above,196 St. Bonaventura’s argument, cited by 
Woodmansee as a reference to the non-recognition of the author’s position. However, 
this research understands it – as explained – as having the opposite meaning, so as to 
be consistent with Young’s argument. 
In addition, Woodmansee’s insistence that the romantic authorship concept that 
appeared at the end of the eighteenth century meant new or ‘genius’ authorship, is an 
accusation against contemporary copyright and patent legislation. Namely, that there 
was a confusion of novelty and originality requirements in regard to literary works and 
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inventions. Article 6 (b) of the Statute of Monopolies of King James I in 1623197 granted 
patents for “the term of 14 years ... of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufacture.”198[Underlining added]. This provision confirms the basis of “the grant is 
that the 'manner of manufacture' is new”,199 and “an alleged invention, to be patentable, 
must be new”200, in order to encourage the creation of new inventions.201 On the other 
hand, such a condition was not required in regard to literary works in the Statute of 
Anne, and instead it granted monopolies202 for “useful books” in order to ‘encourage 
authors and learning’,203 - a condition which afterwards was contained within the term 
‘original’ in the cases Gyles v. Wilcox 204 and Millar v. Taylor 205 and afterwards in the 
Fine Art Copyright Act of 1862.206 
Accordingly, the differentiation between novelty and originality and between authors 
and inventors had been an established rule since the seventeenth century, and may 
have been stabilised even before, as the English Crown was granting ‘letters patent for 
monopolies’ in the 16th century, and the first patent was awarded to William Hyde Price 
as the first English patent for invention in 1561. 207 So, the claim that romantic 
authorship or the romanticism that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century has 
meant that an author should be a genius and should write works that are new and have 
never been written before, is something that has not relied on a historical basis or on 
the historical development of laws for intellectual works, or this may be a literary 
doctrine, not a legal and historical doctrine. This trend might be related to the literary 
movements that appeared at this period, but this has nothing to do with the laws that 
were enacted before or after this time. In other words, although the romantic authorship 
concept can be argued within a literary context, this is unsupported and unsound in the 
legal context and according to legal chronicles.  
Woodmansee argues that originality first appeared in the writings of Edward Young 
(1759) and the subsequent writings of Wordsworth. Herein, Woodmansee’s reliance on 
Wordsworth’s argument is criticised, as she confused novelty and originality in 
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intellectual works as if they are equal. Wordsworth argued “[o]f genius the only proof is, 
the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before Of 
genius in the fine arts, the only infallible sign is the widening the sphere of human 
sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit of human nature. Genius is the 
introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe or, if that be not allowed, it is 
the application of powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or 
the employment of them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown.”208 
[Underlining added].  
Wordsworth actually offers two meanings of ‘originality’, first, he argues that in fine arts 
the genius work is “the widening the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, 
and benefit of human nature.”209 Such a definition, is not stringent, as it is similar to 
those which the Statute of Anne and the US Constitution have stipulated in works of art 
and literature that reflect the utilitarian approach, whether through encouraging learning 
or to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’. In his words, ‘genius work’ 
actually means original work, in the legal meaning of originality in contemporary 
thinking.  
Subsequently, in the second half of his statement, he argues that genius is the 
“introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe”, although he supposed 
that works should include a ‘new’ element, this statement does not refer to the strict 
meaning of novelty, as Woodmansee recommends, for two reasons. Firstly, he 
followed this statement by confirming: “if that be not allowed, it is the application of 
powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or the employment of 
them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown.” 210 The other 
alternative conditions that Wordsworth provided indicate that he talks, in the second 
half of his statement, about the patent system not copyright, as he argues that the 
genius may be provided in the ‘application’ of powers to creating ‘new objects', or the 
‘employment’ of these powers in a different way to produce ‘unknown’ or ‘new effects’. 
Such terms are familiar in patent law, and we may recognise a similar application of 
this distinction in our modern patent systems. To conclude, it can rationally be 
supposed that Wordsworth talks about intellectual property in general, without 
differentiating between copyright and patent. Secondly, There are similar statements to 
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that of Wordsworth in later courts’ decisions that express the confusion of some Judges 
who have faced difficulty in interpreting originality in copyright law. 211  
5.5.1 Romanticism is a Literary Concept: 
Regarding the claim that romanticism is against the inclusion of collective or 
informational works in copyright law, romanticism is a literary concept and its parallel 
concept in law is individuality or personality, which is premised on the theory of 
personality that was developed by Hobbes, Hegel and Locke.  
Although not insisting on the ‘death of the authorship’ idea, Aufderheide argues that the 
increase of production of recombinant works, collective works and adaptations 
changed cultural production practices and introduced new kinds of cultural production, 
such as ‘pastiche works, appropriation arts, remixes, mash-ups, and aggregation 
blogs’. She adds that these works show the limitation of copyright law in dealing with, 
or absorbing, such developments and thus it was argued that copyright law should 
change its policies to accommodate these changes. 212 This argument includes an 
improper belief that copyright law cannot deal with collective works, and this belief 
emanates from a literary interpretation of the terminology used within copyright law 
provisions, such as authorship and originality.  
Through investigating the views of Hobbes, Hegel and Locke on personality and 
intellectual works and the rights of authors and inventors, which will be the subject of 
the next Chapter, it can be discerned that they adopted principles of copyright law that 
continue today, including the possibility of making collective works, and even the works 
for hire doctrine. 213 So the literary view of the romanticism where the authors are 
considered as being unique is existent only in literary rhetoric, and it is that view alone 
that is upheld by those literary authors that Woodmansee and Jaszi have cited in their 
writings in endeavouring to prove that romanticism dictates the provisions and 
decisions of copyright law.  
The contention that copyright law disregards the collective nature of authorship 
emanates from the research and analysis of the history of authorship and romanticism 
by literary scholars, who discovered therein the differentiation between the concept of 
romantic authorship in the eighteenth century and the current practices of authorship, 
without investigating the collective authorship practices in law in earlier times also.  
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Literary scholars developed the definition of ‘romantic authorship’ to refer to the genius 
author or the self-contained individual. 214 Consequently, the supposed ‘death of 
authorship’ had an influence on law only when they confronted the literary beliefs of 
genius or romantic authors with collaborative authorship and considered it to be a 
reference to the end of the romantic author era. 215 In fact, this direction is inaccurate 
as it presupposes two claims both of which are questionable. Firstly, this belief 
supposes that collaborative authorship is something that has emerged recently and did 
not exist before the romantic authorship era at the end of the eighteenth century, and 
this has been proven to be untrue, according to Hobbes’ writings.216 Secondly, they 
have supposed that law embraces the concepts of literature and develops with it step 
by step, which is not true, as until today, the law adopts authorship within the scope of 
copyrightability regardless of the situation in regard to literary authorship. Besides, 
literary authorship is totally different from legal authorship, as this thesis maintains. 217  
Although the law of copyright adopted the concept of authorship as the general sphere 
that surrounds all elements of writing, art and culture, it did not adopt the ‘romantic’ or 
‘solitary’ authorship concept, in the meaning that literary scholarship has given it, 
because it has never ignored or rejected collaborative authorship, besides, novelty has 
never been a condition in copyright law. Although the Statute of Anne gave copyright to 
the individual author and did not mention collaborative authorship, this might be due to 
the modernity of such a rule, and the nature of this legislation as the first act 
concerning copyright rules. The following amendments interpreted and broadened the 
scope of authorship to include joint, collective and collaborative authorship. 218Although 
most of the scholars’ opinions offered above219 show the flaws in romantic authorship 
due to the rise of collaborative and collective authorship, it is argued that the typical 
collective works is distinguished by “theoretical ambiguity, methodological pluralism, 
diversity of approach and procedure, and heterogeneity in the fields of study it 
represents.”220 As, creating a work with a unified methodology cannot be achieved 
unless through one author, even if his role was coordination between different 
contributions, so the role of the individual author cannot disappear in making 
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intellectual works as long as every mind is different from the other, with the recognition 
of the importance of the collective efforts in making works.  
The Need for the Author Doctrine:  
In order for copyright law to function it requires, as stated elsewhere,221 the attribution 
of the work to an identified author to facilitate the application of law and the marketing 
of works, and it does not matter whether there is one author or several authors, as long 
as they are all identified as co- or joint authors. In the case of unidentified authors, the 
law, for practical reasons, may decide that specific persons represent other persons so 
as to achieve the functioning of copyright law in regulating dealings or transactions of 
the work. The same argument was offered by Aufderheide, when she argued that 
“copyright law, against the actual reality of production routinely assigns authorship to 
fewer people than contribute to the work to achieve greater efficiency, and where there 
are multiple authors, copyright policy fails entirely to recognize collective creation 
except as an aggregation of individual authors. These practices, which fail to recognize 
any special right of individuals who may have contributed to corporate endeavours 
through work-for-hire arrangements, or a collective process in which the genius of 
authorship is exercised collaboratively, have practical advantages in the 
commodification of the intellectual ‘property’.”222  
Copyright law thus recognises the importance of the individuality of the author, but 
does not insist on it as the law takes collective contributions into consideration, and if 
practical considerations impose that the law determine some individuals to be right 
holders, this is not against the philosophy of copyright law since, from the beginning, it 
did not adopt romanticism but individuality in a relative meaning. This confirms that 
there is an obvious distinction between authorship in the literary context and in the 
legal context.  
Literary and Legal Authorship: 
The conclusion as Aufderheide puts it, is that originality and other romantic terminology 
in literature have no effect on their counterparts in the legal context: “[a]nd finally, 
changes in copyright law changes do not map neatly onto zeitgeist shifts in the 
Romantic conceptualization of the author.” 223 [Amendment done] The law relies on 
them to achieve its own aims and concepts, whether by conferring protection, granting 
property or regulating transactions, but it is not influenced by the changes that happen 
in the field of literature: “the law [is] a product of contingent decision-making, accreting 
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around conflicts over property rights and with an associational but not necessary 
connection with cultural notions of authorship.”224 This distinction between authorship in 
law and the ‘literary notions of authorship,’ due to its fundamental importance to the 
thesis’s main argument in enforcing authorship over ownership in copyright law without 
the impediments of the claims that authorship should be banished for such literary 
substance.  
The practical situation reflects this understanding, as legal regimes continue to employ 
and enforce the concept of authorship, and have not been influenced by literary 
arguments that aim to break up concepts of personality and individuality, although they 
are inherent to many doctrines in law, i. e. , property. Aufderheide confirmed that even 
businesses that deal with collaborative creations, like blogs, Facebook and TwitPics, 
adopt individual property models, as they offer their works on an individual basis not 
through collective property. 225 
5.6 A Distinction between Legal and Literary Rhetoric of Authorship Should Be 
Set: 
The discussion of the death of the author that emerged from literary and philosophical 
scholars and linguistics should be confined to the philosophy and literature fields of 
study, not reflected in law. Though this may seem inconsistent with Derrida’s 
deconstructionist view of the disciplines, subjects and institutions, and the need to 
invent new interdisciplinary branches in science and research.226 Allowing the ‘death of 
the author’ doctrine to be interdisciplinary between literature and law has caused 
destructive effects to the authorship doctrine in law and unfortunately that was done by 
legal scholars.  
As stated above, it was argued by Woodmansee, Jaszi and Kaplan that collaborative 
authorship is challenging romantic authorship. 227 This may challenge the idea of 
romantic authorship in literature and diminish its scale to allow for the concept of 
collaborative authorship, that seems against romanticism in its meaning of solitary and 
genius authorship. However, copyright law regulates the transactions of literary works 
that are formulated by several authors as a practice that should be regulated by law.  
It is posited in this thesis that copyright law is not confined to a single theory or 
concept, but employs whatever beneficial theory or mechanism to achieve its 
regulatory functions. So, although single authorship is the basis of copyright law, this 
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does not mean that copyright law is confined to the romantic authorship that appeared 
in literature at the end of eighteenth century and which referred to as the ‘genius’ 
author. The two concepts are different, it is a matter of coincidence, and the evidence 
for this is the philosophers’ statements of the seventeenth century, who addressed 
singular and collaborative authorship without qualms, as noted below. 228 
It appears from the discussion about the supposed ‘death of the author' that authorship 
offers interesting discussions in literature rather than the law, and the discussions in 
the literary discourse inspires and affect legal discussion. This thesis stresses the 
importance of inspecting that part of authorship that benefits the law and focuses on 
the importance of differentiating between the two sides: literature and law.  
The problem with this confusion between, or mixing of literary and legal studies is that 
the literary discussion on the romantic author addresses the author as the genius 
individual who creates unprecedented and novel works, which is not in accordance with 
the legal perspective. This influenced literary scholars who look to artistic creation as a 
whole, and therefore they resorted to theories of the death of authorship, as a solution 
for the inclusion of other collective practices of authorship under the copyright law, 
which is seen as the patron of individual authorship only. Hence “It is of course 
possible - perhaps even desirable - for copyright law to be responsive to changes in 
artistic thinking and practice, provided that any increased intolerance of imitation and/or 
appropriation is carefully balanced against rights traditionally granted to authors and 
currently protected by copyright.”229 
In addition, this research advocates Compagnon’s opinion, that the author has been 
sacrificed in the death of the author debate. As he questions: “by asserting that the 
author makes no difference in the signification of the text, hasn’t theory pushed logic 
too far and sacrificed reason to the pleasure of a fine antithesis? And especially, hasn’t 
it mistaken its target? Indeed, isn’t the interpretation of a text always a matter of making 
conjectures about a human intention in action?”230 Compagnon’s criticism is confined to 
the literary side of the argument, however, wefind that the ‘author’s intention’ is 
important to that side of the argument. It is evident that considering ‘author’s intention’ 
is better for a proper understanding of texts as explained in regard to Foucault’s own 
argument. 231 
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It is not necessary for literary concepts used in copyright law to be applied with the 
same meaning they have in literature. Although the same terminology exists in both 
discourses, each should be dealt with from a different perspective that complies with 
other theories in that particular discourse.  
5.7 Conclusion: 
This Chapter has discussed that although romanticism’s meaning in the literary context 
is the genius author, the history of protecting authors’ works does not have such a 
conception in the legal context. In other words, the works that include pre-existing 
works, or that have been created by several authors, were not deprived of protection, 
as mentioned in Young’s distinction232 between original and imitation works, and St. 
Bonaventura’s ‘the compiler, scriptor and author’ distinction. 233 Having identified this, 
this thesis insists on the differentiation between the legal and literary contexts when 
dealing with terms like ‘romanticism’ and ‘authorship’. Accordingly, we found that it is 
essential to pose some questions at this stage: Why do modern scholars demonise 
romantic authorship?234 Does it really refer to the individuality or personality of the 
author, or the genius author? Why is it correlated with new works and novelty? 
It is argued that Woodmansee and Jaszi have confused, in their investigation of the 
development of literary property, the literary angle of authorship and its legal angle. 
They did not investigate authorship from the legal standpoint, in terms of who is the 
creator? the relations between authors and publishers; the circumstances of evoking 
authorship in the Statute of Anne, and the history of the author concept and intellectual 
property in English history, which goes back to the 6th century, according to the case of 
St. Finnian.235 
They, instead, looked at the issue from a literary perspective. They looked at how 
authors look to themselves, and the writing profession. They discussed whether 
authors were considered in the 15th or 16th centuries as the real authors of their works, 
or whether they took inspiration from outside through divine power. 236 They confined 
themselves to the literary meaning of romantic authorship that appeared at the end of 
the eighteenth century, although individuality and the acknowledgment of the author 
and his property in the work appeared three centuries earlier. 237 Accordingly, this 
thesis cannot agree with Woodmansee in confirming that intellectual property is a 
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modern concept,238 especially with the examples from Germany and Italy, and even 
England, mentioned above. 239 So, on a legal ground, what was factual and applicable 
is that authors were seeing these works as their own creations and that they deserved 
the full entitlement of ‘authorship’, regardless of these romantic conceptions. Romantic 
conceptions of authorship and discussions thereof should be confined to the literary 
context only, as they were never considered by legal scholars or philosophers in the 
seventeenth or eighteenth centuries.  
Through the thesis’s theoretical and digital treatment of the subject of authorship it 
hopes that it could restate authorship into the language of the information theory, and 
alienating authorship the literary substances associated with it like romanticism and 
fears like the death of the author. This can be done through concentrating on the 
characteristics of the work as personal and intellectual product of the author. “The 
romantic model of authorship can be restated in the language of information theory. 
The mind of the author is the message source. The work is the message, and its 
purpose is to convey the sender's intentions to the awaiting audience.”240 
The individual author is looked at in law as the person worthy of protection, and this 
position is granted to the author, not just in modern laws or as a result of the romantic 
authorship conception, but it was a stable concept in both theory and practice before 
the appearance of romanticism in the literary context, and even before the enactment 
of any related law, as stated above. 241 Furthermore, collaborative authorship, in 
practice, appeared earlier in history and was accepted and absorbed by society and 
contemporary regulating rules,242 so the authorship concept has not stood against 
collaborative authorship in either ancient or modern times.  
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Young University Law Review,  (2004). p. 105. 
241 See above under ‘History of authorship’ at 5.3. 
242 As explained above, at 5.3. & 5.6.  
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6 Chapter Six:  
The Personal and Mental Features of Intellectual Works 
6.1 Introduction 
The theoretical argument of this thesis attempts to elevate or reinforce the values of the 
authorship and originality concepts. However, this theoretical argument intends to solve 
the practical problem which was explained in the first Chapter, namely, the ‘conflict in 
judicial decisions on the copyrightability of works’. The third Chapter showed the 
external or superficial reason for the conflict, which is the confusion around the 
interpretation of the originality criterion regarding not just different works, but also 
works of the same nature. This thesis will investigate the nature of intellectual works 
and what the elements that have to be measured are. Ultimately, this will help to tailor 
the most suitable criteria for every nature or type of work.  
The lack of investigation into the nature of intellectual works and the relation between 
the work and the author has led to a misunderstanding in copyright law and allowed 
literary scholars1 to give suggestions, such as the ‘death of the author’, and, even 
further, it allowed legal scholars2 to adopt it as a solution to the confusion and conflict 
in copyright subsistence decisions.  
This Chapter will investigate how to make copyright law concepts and applications, or 
theories and judicial applications, coherent. The solution proposed by this thesis falls 
between two policies; firstly, the preservation of orthodox theories and concepts; 
secondly, providing a system that can employ these concepts to serve new challenges, 
in brief, confining the authorship concept to works that include personal authorship and 
excluding others into a separate system.  
This Chapter will pave the way for the existence of such a system through proving that 
works can be divided into authorial and non-authorial works, depending on the 
differentiation between their different natures. Such a distinction will help to settle 
confusion in most of the cases relating to the copyrightability of works. However, this 
distinction does not aim to deprive any type of work from protection, as it concludes 
                                                          
1 Like Foucault and Barthes. In the first’s speech: Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', in Donald F. 
Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Cornell University 
Press, 1980).  And the second’s article: Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', Image, Music, Text 
(Fontana Press, 1977). 
2 Like, Woodmansee and Jaszi in their works, Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: 
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', Eighteenth Century Studies,  (1984).; M. 
Woodmansee, 'On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 
10 (1991).; Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', Duke Law 
Journal,  (1991a).; and Peter Jaszi, 'On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 (1991b). 
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that both types of works should be protected, but with different levels of protection. This 
distinction will help Judges to decide the copyright subsistence cases through an 
analysis of the works in front of them and offering several elements to decide upon, 
namely, the ‘nature of the work’, the existence of authorship, the classification of works, 
then, the suitable originality interpretation for each category.  
The focus of this chapter on the personal, mental and creative elements of works, is 
not an advocacy of the idea of romantic authorship or genius. Simply what is discussed 
here is that works are not equal in nature and that there are works existent with no 
intellectual or mental intervention. According to this differentiation, we can conclude 
that criteria that assesses intellectual elements should be confined to works that have 
intellectual elements, and vice versa.  
The work should have personal and mental elements in order to qualify as an 
intellectual work, so the first half of this chapter will focus on personal authorship, and 
the second half will concentrate on the mental intervention by the author. The thesis 
will investigate the opinion of personality philosophers, especially the English ones, in 
addition to an inspection of the development of modern copyright law towards requiring 
personal and mental elements.  
Personal authorship is the main characteristic of intellectual creation in the common 
and civil law systems, however, it may be argued3 that this approach – the prevalence 
of authorship and personality - could not be adopted in the Anglo-American legal 
regime, and that the ‘self-expression’ and ‘self-representation’ concepts are against the 
Anglo-American system and should be rejected. 4 However, personal authorship was 
established in English culture even before the Statute of Anne and, of course, before 
the appearance of literary romanticism, and this can be identified through the writings 
of Hobbes, Locke and Hegel. 
 
                                                          
3 See Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, 'Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship', ibid.25 (2008)., p. 
1066.  
4 As Kim argued that “It may be argued that Kantian principles are appropriate for Continental authors' 
rights regimes, but that they are an anomaly in the United States and the United Kingdom. Reliance upon 
Kant may be said to represent a transplant of foreign ideas.” Ibid. p. 1064. He also explained the difficulties 
facing Kantian theory in Anglo-American system in p. 1066. 
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6.2 Personal Authorship and Literary Property in Hobbes’ Writings: 
The Personality of the Author is Prevalent in his Works (Justifying Literary 
Property): 
In affirming the role of the author’s personality and the importance of his mental work in 
intellectual works, Hobbes confirms that a legal entity, or, as he named it, the ‘artificial 
person’, owns the words and actions of the author in order to represent him in front of 
others. This legal entity is called ‘the actor’, and the person who made the words and 
actions is called ‘the author’, and that this ‘actor’ acts through the ‘authority’ he gets 
from the author, or, as he confirmed: “[o]f persons artificial, some have their words and 
actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person is the actor; and he 
that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR in which case the actor acteth by 
authority.” 5 [Underlining added]. Accordingly, Hobbes clearly confirms that the author 
stays the author and owner of his works and ideas, even if somebody else represents 
him. This is so –as the thesis argues- even if this representation was by law, somebody 
like the employer, or a contract as in collective works (i.e., a newspaper). This 
argument, which is also supported in the following paragraphs, confirms that in 
England, sixty years before the Statute of Anne, the author had his position as creator 
and owner of his works recognised. Any legal entity, such as publishers, just 
represents the author. This consolidates the position of authorship in England and 
opposes any claims of considering authorship a foreign concept.  
Hobbes also confesses the potential for the existence of the artificial person, a 
corporation or entity that can represent the intellectual works of other persons for 
practical reasons, as he confirmed: “When they [words and actions] are considered as 
his own, then is he called a natural person and when they are considered as 
representing the words and actions of another, then is he a feigned or artificial 
person.”6 This also confirms the unique position that the author, or individual author, 
and the human personality had for the authorship of works in the seventeenth century. 
This was confirmed also when Hobbes refuted that inanimate institutions (non-natural 
persons) could be authors. He posited that: “Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, 
… cannot be authors.”7 [Underlining added] This also reflects the personality and 
individualisation approach in which Hobbes believes, and it reflects the understanding 
of the culture of copyright in England in the seventeenth century.  
Accordingly, Hobbes’ writing on the ownership of “words and actions”, and that the 
owner of words may be represented but cannot be neglected, undoubtedly reflects the 
                                                          
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1969 edn.: Scolar Press, 1651)., p. 107.  
6 Ibid. p. 106.  
7 Ibid. p. 108.  
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position of writers as being the owners of their ‘words’, whether written or delivered in 
speech. This appears also in his differentiation between the normal ‘owner’ of ‘goods 
and possessions’, and the ‘author’, as an owner of intellectual things that he called 
‘actions’. This was clear when he argued: “For that which in speaking of goods and 
possessions, is called an owner, and in Latin dominus, in Greek xvewḉ; speaking of 
actions, is called author.” 8 Hobbes argues that the real owner, as regards goods and 
possessions, is called the ‘owner’, and in actions and words is called the author, and 
the author’s right in his works is called ‘dominion’ or authority. 9 So, we can infer that 
Hobbes believed in the author’s own right on his works, and if there are others who can 
represent him (like publishers), they are not considered authors but they deal under 
authority gained from the author.  
In advocating this thesis’s conclusion that ‘actions’ refer to intellectual works, and the 
‘author’ here is meant to refer to the author as we know it today, we find Rose confirms 
that in olden times texts were recognised as actions, rather than as things: “the very 
notion of owning a text as property does not quite fit the conception of literature in the 
early modern period in which it was common to think of a text as an action rather than 
as a thing.”10 [Underlining added] Foucault also affirmed that, in antiquity, literary works 
were considered to be actions. 11 This helps to understand Hobbes’ argument better.  
Hobbes also linked the possibility of obtaining the title ‘author’ with some personal 
traits, like ‘rationality’ or the mental capacity of the author, as he precluded intellectually 
disabled persons from being the authors of their actions or words: “children, fools, and 
madmen that have no use of reason, … can be no authors”.12 This also somehow 
reflects a degree of value that should be in the works in order that they get protection.  
This research contends that Hobbes’ arguments on the personality of the author and 
the importance of the author’s work, and the refusal of corporate persons to be authors, 
are evidence from an English writer of the existence of a special English author’s rights 
system that existed in the seventeenth century. Authorship is thus a concept that is 
inherent to English culture, ,so when we argue that the author should gain a superior 
position and that works that include authorial contribution should be separated from 
works that are devoid of this contribution, this should not be considered a strange 
proposal for English culture. As, that has been the case since the seventeenth century, 
which is why Hobbes’ argument is very central to this thesis’s argument.  
                                                          
8 Ibid. p. 107.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Mark Rose, 'The Author in Court: Pope V. Curll (1741)', Cardozo Arts & Entertainment. Law Journal, 10 
(1991)., p. 477.  
11 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', supra note 1, p. 124.  
12 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 5, p. 108.  
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Hobbes also confirmed that no discourse can end in fact or absolute knowledge, as the 
fact comes from the perceptions of senses, and the knowledge of science and 
consequence is not absolute but conditional: “[n]o man can know by discourse, that 
this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely but only, that if this be, 
that is; if this has been, that has been”13 under the conditional belief of human minds. 
This argument supports the thesis’s contention that it is the author and his mind, ideas 
or opinions, that matter, and when information or knowledge is absorbed, the name of 
the author is attached to this information because - as Hobbes suggested - the scope 
or quantum of facts in our life is so limited, it is all made up of theories or personal 
opinions.  
Works are whether Science or Opinion: 
Hobbes has distinguished two kinds of intellectual work in which the author’s mental 
work is required. The first kind of works includes information that is gathered and 
interconnected through ‘syllogisms’. The author then produces a conclusion. The 
second kind of works is devoid of information, or the information included is not 
logically joined and the author has to insert a conclusion also. A quotation by Hobbes is 
here important for clarifying the thesis’s argument, as he stated: “when the discourse is 
put into speech, and begins with the definitions of words, and proceeds by connexion 
of the same into general affirmations, and of these again into syllogisms; the end or last 
sum is called the conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that 
conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly 
called SCIENCE. But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions; or if the 
definitions be not rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is 
again OPINION.”14 [Capitalising in original, Underlining added]. Accordingly, in both 
kinds of works, Hobbes suggested that there should be a conclusion or a result, 
whether it resulted from justifiable syllogism, when this is science; or if the information 
inserted does not reach a conclusion logically, this is an opinion work. This is 
considered as evidence that the personal intervention of the author and his mental 
work was required in works in England in the seventeenth century, and this, in fact, 
was the basis of copyright at that time.  
A Reply to ‘the Death of the Author’:  
Hobbes,15 in the seventeenth century, argued that there is faith and belief in the author 
of a discourse, as when we rely on the opinions of the author we have faith in his ability 
                                                          
13 Ibid. p. 42.  
14 Ibid. p. 43.  
15 Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), an English philosopher.  
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to know the truth, or his honesty in not deceiving.16 According to Hobbes there is a 
‘faith in the man’ and a belief ‘both of the man, and of the truth of what he says’. 17 
Such an argument constitutes evidence of the importance and focus that was located 
in the ‘personality of the author’ as a source of information, not in the language per se. 
If this argument is accompanied by the practice of the Middle Ages,18 which is reliance 
on the thoughts of old writers and their citing to prove the ‘authenticity’ of the work,19 
this helps to confirm that, even in the seventeenth century in England, it was not the 
language per se that had the importance, as Foucault argued,20 but the importance lies 
in the authors and the relation between them and the works they had created.  
Hobbes stresses the role of the speaker’s personality, arguing that when we rely in our 
discourse on a person or the authority and the good opinion of that person, then this 
person becomes the reference to our argument: “[T]he speaker, or person we believe 
in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our faith; and the honour done in 
believing, is done to him only.”21 This thesis asks: is this argument not similar to the 
definition of the romantic conception of authorship and the sanctification of the author 
which Woodmansee and Jaszi criticised as a modern concept that cannot comply with 
collaborative authorship? If this were understood with Hobbes argument about 
collaborative authorship, as explained in the next section, then the conclusion is that, in 
law, there is, and there was not ever, a contradiction between the superiority of the 
author’s position and the pluralism of the author in the collective works.22 
Hobbes’ Opinion in Collaborative Authorship: 
Hobbes, in ‘Leviathan’ in the mid-seventeenth century, posited the existence of 
collaborative authorship in a concept similar to the modern one, as he confirmed the 
possibility of the existence of many authors in one work.23 Moreover, he supposed the 
necessity for one person to represent them in any transactions, and it is that approach 
which is adopted in modern copyright law. “A multitude of men, are made one person, 
                                                          
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 5, p. 41.  
17 Ibid., p. 43.  
18 See Chapter 5 at 5.3. 
19 As explained above, under the title of ‘authorship in the Middle Ages’, see Chapter 5 at 5.3. 
20 See chapter 4 at 4.2. 
21 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 5, p. 44.  
22 In addition, it is worth noting that Hobbes used the term ‘original writer’ as a direct reference to the 
‘author’, which was in his investigation of “[w]ho were the original writers of the several Books of Holy 
Scripture”. [Underlining added], see ibid. p. 252.  The search for the author and authorship of works has 
been a stable doctrine ever since, and the intellectual property of words or actions was recognised 
regardless of the terminology used. So Hobbes, in the 17th century, was actually following the principles of 
romanticism that Woodmansee criticised and considered something alien to the English culture, or 
invented, by the end of 18th century. See Martha Woodmansee, 'The Genius and the Copyright: Economic 
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of The'author'', supra note 2, p. 426-27, 430-31.  
23 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 5, p. 109. 
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when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the 
consent of every one of that multitude in particular.”24 He also confirmed that the unity 
in representation does not change the reality that every represented person is an 
author: “because the multitude naturally is not one, but many; they cannot be 
understood for one; but many authors, of everything their representative saith, or doth 
in their name”.25 [Underlining added] In brief, he concludes that “everyone is author.” 26 
So, this research asks, is this not an establishment of the collaborative authorship 
concept in modern copyright law, dependant on the collaborative property concepts of 
Hobbes?  
Furthermore, Hobbes has set rules for collaborative workings and how the collaborative 
authors can be represented, and how decisions are taken, and how the opinions of 
authors can be counted in the decision process, and when the authors’ opinions 
contradict the greater number should be considered the voice of all. 27 All these rules 
were settled sixty years before the enactment of the first Copyright Act, however, this 
Act did not provide for them.  
It can be seen from the foregoing that Hobbes has settled for personal authorship and 
also for collaborative authorship. Although he gave the author the potential to own his 
works and the corporate person cannot be the author, he allowed for the existence of 
several authors of the same work, which is the concept of collaborative authorship. 
Although, it was argued that maintaining collective authorship is against the romantic 
view of the author for “[p]reservation of the collective, and conservation of a rich and 
diverse array of cultural and social properties rarely conjure a romantic view similar to 
that of the lone author.” 28 
This research argues the opposite, as the focus on the author refers to the concept, not 
the individual author. In other words, this thesis refers to the requirements or demands 
that should exist to establish the status of authorship, such as originality and creativity, 
whether these requirements have been provided by one person or different persons. 
                                                          
24 Ibid.5, p. 109.  
25 Ibid. p. 109.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. p. 109. As, under the title ‘a multitude of men how one person’ Hobbes argues “[a] multitude of 
men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done 
with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the 
unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, 
and but one person: and unity, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.” And under the title ‘everyone 
is author’ Hobbes states that “because the multitude naturally is not one, but many; they cannot be 
understood for one; but many authors, of everything their representative saith, or doth in their name; every 
man giving their common representee, authority from himself in particular; and owning all the actions the 
representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what, and 
how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to act.”  
28 Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright (Ashgate Pub Co, 2007)., p. 2.  
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To respond to Woodmansee’s argument, mentioned above,29 that the concepts of the 
‘author’ and ‘intellectual property’ are modern; historically, these concepts were 
identified in England a century before the Statute of Anne, according to Hobbes. 30 
6.3 Personal And Mental Authorship in Locke’s Writings:  
This section will investigate the opinion of a second English philosopher, namely 
Locke, and his writings before the Statute of Anne. Locke required personal and mental 
elements in works of authorship. Firstly, we will show how he identified the mental 
elements in works, and how he described in detail the mental operations needed in 
making works, through differentiation between sensations and reflections. Secondly, 
these mental elements will be relied upon to interpret Locke’s personal labour theory, 
which was suggested to support protection for works created by manual labour only.  
Locke’s Differentiation between Sensation and Reflection: 
Locke differentiated two processes of the mind when it deals with external objects, 
namely, sensation and reflection as sources of ideas. 31 For Locke, sensation is the first 
source of ideas, as the senses convey into the mind “several distinct perceptions of 
things.” 32 This process can happen through observation and experience of the work 
around and from which the knowledge is extracted. 33 
The second source of ideas is reflection: “the other fountain from which experience 
furnished the understanding with ideas is - the perception of the operations of our own 
mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got”.34 [Underlining Added]. The 
operations in the mind of the acquirer of this information furnish knowledge and 
generate more ideas. Such ‘furnishing’ (as Locke calls it) happens when the soul 
“comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of 
ideas.”35 [Underlining added]. This reflection or furnishing is a complex process wherein 
the mind does “thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the 
different actings of our own minds”36[underlining added] to get more ideas from within. 
This source of ideas is something related to the internal side of the person, and is 
nothing that senses do or participate in. Locke has called it an ‘internal sense’ for “[t]his 
source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having 
                                                          
29 See Chapter 5 at 5.2. 
30 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, supra note 5, p. 106. 
31 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700)., p. 87.  
32 Ibid. p. 87 as he argued “The objects of sensation are one source of ideas. First, our Senses, 
conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of 
things”.  
33 Ibid. p. 87.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. p. 88.  
36 Ibid. 
 
 
189 
nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be 
called internal sense.” 37 [Underlining added].  
We depend on this argument to conclude that Locke’s ‘internal sense’ is the evidence 
that works created by thinking, doubting or reasoning, etc. are works of the mind and 
sensations and should, then, be called works of intellect or creative works which 
embody the author’s personality and mentality. This is differentiated from works that 
are created using the ‘outer senses’, only registering what the eyes and ears have 
sensed without passing this through any internal thinking, doubting or reasoning. These 
works do not differ from one person to another, as the senses work the same way in all 
humans, but in the internal senses they differ from one person to another, as Locke 
affirms in the next paragraph. Such differentiation, which this thesis attempts to reflect 
in the categorisation of works into authorship and non-authorship works.  
Both categories do not have the same value due to the intellectual effort required in the 
first category of works, which is absent in the latter. Such intellectual or ‘internal sense’ 
has a rare value, and does not exist within every person. When found, its result (the 
resulting work) should be valued over other works. This belief is confirmed by Locke’s 
argument, when he ascertained that individuals have fewer or more ideas depending 
on two factors: the richness and variety of the things he observes and perceives, and 
then the level of the operations of their minds - “[m]en are differently furnished with 
these, according to the different objects they converse with. Men then come to be 
furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they 
converse with afford greater or less variety; and from the operations of their minds 
within, according as they more or less reflect on them.” 38 [Underlining added].  
Accordingly, the first source of ideas put forward by Locke includes the general 
information and facts that humans can obtain from noticing the world around them in its 
abstract status, without processing. What compilers’ work concerns is just the 
collection of these abstract facts and information into one place. The second source of 
information includes works that have been done by special persons who have the 
capabilities to ‘think’, ‘analyse’, ‘reason’, and so on, and that is why we argue that the 
latter kind of works are the only ones that have authorship, which relates to the extra 
work by the author that is done in making these works. The first kind does not include 
such complex processes that require the working of the mind, except perhaps the small 
process that is required to present the information, such as arrangement and 
organisation,39 where the presenter or collector has not touched this information or 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. p. 89.  
39 As explained in Chapter 7 at 7.4. 
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changed it through processing it in the mind. Those who have these factors at a high 
level are the only ones that can produce works rich with internal effects or ideas, and 
these works should be valued over other works that are confined to the collection of 
abstract information and facts.  
6.3.1 Locke’s Personal Labour Theory for Intellectual Property 
Locke is considered the originator of a property theory that is based on personal 
labour, as he founded his idea on two concepts: first, that the earth and the fruits it 
naturally produces belong to mankind in common, second, that everybody owns his 
body and personality: “every Man has a property in his own Person”.40The labour of the 
person’s body and the ‘work of his hands’ are thus his property. 41 Locke combined the 
two concepts to reach the result that the person can remove from what is common that 
with which he has mixed his labour or has gained through his labour, and then it 
becomes his property: “[f]or this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the 
Labourer”. 42 Locke stressed the necessity of resorting to labour as the means of 
appropriating property of things, even in the simplest cases, when fruit is gathered from 
trees it is owned by the gatherer: “if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else 
could.”43 
Although Locke may seem to have a view opposite to Hegel’s (on the role of 
personality and the will in creating works),44 when Locke says: “every Man has a 
property in his own Person,” and follows that by confirming that: “[t]he Labour of his 
Body, and the Work of his hands … are properly his”,45 what may be understood is that 
labour only can justify the property of the produced work.46 Locke’s full understanding 
requires the connection between his labour theory and his ideas regarding the role of 
ideas and thoughts to create works.  
Locke’s theory was criticised by Fichte who argues that although Locke’s theory may 
help to confer upon an author a monopoly or control over his works, Locke, as Fichte 
argues, has failed to express the uniqueness of intellectual works as a special 
                                                          
40 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Lassett ((ed., 1967) edn.; Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1690). §. 26-27.  
41 Ibid. §. 26-27.  
42 Ibid. §. 28.  
43 Ibid. 
44 See above, p. 182.  
45 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, supra note 40, p. 101.  
46 Dan Burk and Tarleton Gillespie, 'Autonomy and Morality in Drm and Anti-Circumvention Law', Burk, 
Dan and Gillespie, Tarleton. AUTONOMY AND MORALITY IN DRM AND ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION LAW, 
Triple C: Cognition, Communication, Cooperation, 4/2 (2006). p. 240, as he argues that Locke’s labour 
theory is depended upon to “redress various artistic violations of cultural works, such as the colorization of 
classic films originally shot in black and white.” 
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expression of the author’s mind and thoughts.47 However, the ‘labour’ term is usually 
separated from the context of Locke’s argument as a whole. We understand that Locke 
meant that the effort that is expended by the person to transfer something from nature 
to his position, or to acquire it, is the main way to gain ownership of that thing provided 
that it reflects creator’s personality when in regard to intellectual works.  
Given that intellectual works –according to Locke- are nothing other than ideas, 
thoughts and general knowledge cannot be acquired unless by expressing them 
through a form of expression - as this is the only way to express and also acquire 
them.48 So Locke’s labour doctrine leads to consideration of the work as the property of 
a person when he creates it by himself, and when his source is only nature, or common 
knowledge. Locke’s theory thus considers any attempt to appropriate from others, or to 
amend their works or imitate them, as not being works, or, at least, as being lower 
grade works, because the work that it is taken from is actually in the possession of 
another person. 49 
Locke’s rule suggests that the liberty to acquire property is limited by the freedom of 
others. 50 He limits copyright works to those ‘completely created by the author’, ones 
that include only his own ideas, thoughts and general knowledge, or facts that are 
available to everybody, and that exclude any adaptation, imitation or appropriation of 
previous works. Appropriating the works of other persons, or relying on any of them, is 
considered –according to the thesis’s analysis of Locke as will be explained below-51 
an assault on the freedom of other persons to enjoy their rights on their works 
completely.  
This direction was confirmed by Mr Justice Holmes in the US Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Case,52 when he argued that we cannot say that portraits by Velasquez or Whistler53 
are common property, because others can “try their hand on the same face” 54 as 
“[o]thers are free to copy the original [the face]. They are not free to copy the copy.”55  
So once ‘nature’ has been recorded, the recorder has copyright over it because his 
                                                          
47 Graham Mayeda, 'Commentary on Fichte’s ‘the Illegality of the Unauthorised Reprinting of Books’: An 
Essay on Intellectual Property During the Age of the Enlightenment', University of Ottawa Law & 
Technology Journal, 5/1&2 (2008)., p. 143. And Johann G Fichte, 'Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting', 
Berlinische Monatschrift,  (1793). 
48 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, supra note 40, p. 102 
49 Ibid., p. 102. 
50 Ibid., p. 102. 
51 Ibid., p. 103-105. 
52 Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 1903, 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, Supreme Court of the 
United States.  
53 Diego Velázquez was a famous Spanish painter of the 17th century (1599 - 1660), and James Abbott 
McNeill Whistler was a famous American born, but British based painter in the 19th century (1834 - 1903).  
54 Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, supra note 52, at 249.  
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personality is reflected in the way he recorded it, and because every person will do it 
differently. “The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality 
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and 
a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone.”56 
This understating tends to raise the originality interpretation not reducing it. 
Bentham also was a proponent of the labour property theory in order to support 
utilitarianism, although he did not discuss it in depth in his writings, he confirmed that 
property can come from labour and, in addition, property can be a result of hand labour 
or mind labour. 57 So he advocated Locke’s property theory of works of mind, as he 
argued that “[b]y a man’s property is to be understood, whatever he has in store 
independent of his labour. By the profit of his labour is to be understood the growing 
profit. As to labour, it may be either of the body principally, or of the mind principally, or 
of both indifferently nor does it matter in what manner, nor on what subject, it be 
applied, so it produce a profit.”58 Although he recognised the role of labour in approving 
property to the person who exerts it in the products of his labour, and although he 
distinguished manual and mental labours, Bentham did not build on this differentiation, 
as he argued that what matters is that such property can produce a profit, which helped 
his own theory of utilitarianism.  
From analysing copyright philosophies, Hughes contends that personality theory is 
more welcomed under copyright law than labour theory, as “there seem to be no 
categories of intellectual property that are especially more or less hospitable to the 
labor theory. This is not true with the personality justification. Some categories of 
intellectual property seem to be receptacles for personality; others seem as if they do 
not manifest any ‘personality’ of their creators.”59 However, he adds “Poems, stories, 
novels, and musical works are clearly receptacles for personality.” 60  
Young’s Personality and Mentality: 
Young61 has backed the special position and importance of the author’s mind in 
creating works. He argues that the creation process of original works from the roots of 
genius resembles the growth of plants, and he distinguished this from imitations that 
are not independent in their emergence and suggests they should be in a lower grade, 
“[a]n original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the 
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vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made; imitations are often a sort of manufacture 
wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labour, out of pre-existent materials not their 
own.”62 Young confirms that the more original the work, the better it is, because original 
works “extend the republic of letters, and add a new province to its dominion”,63 so he 
has identified original works and preferred them to imitations. He confirmed that 
imitations, although they may provide something profitable, are duplications: “[i]mitators 
only give us a sort of duplicates of what we had”. 64  
Young gives an interesting depiction of this distinction between original and imitation 
works that is worth quoting here: “[t]he pen of an original writer, like Armida's wand, out 
of a barren waste calls a blooming spring. Out of that blooming spring an imitator is a 
transplanter of laurels, which sometimes die on removal, always languish in a foreign 
soil.” 65 [Underlining added]. He even describes the glamour of original works in that 
“[t]hey engross our attention, and so prevent a due inspection of ourselves; they 
prejudice our judgment in favour of their abilities, and so lessen the sense of our own; 
and they intimidate us with the splendour of their renown and thus under diffidence 
bury our strength.”66 An expressive statement by Young, in differentiating between the 
original and imitated works, must be quoted again: “[t]he mind of a man of genius is a 
fertile and pleasant field, pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it enjoys a 
perpetual spring. Of that spring, originals are the fairest flowers. Imitations are of 
quicker growth, but fainter bloom. Imitations are of two kinds; one of nature, one of 
authors. The first we call Originals, and confine the term imitation to the second.”67 
Goethe expressed the same meaning: “the reproduction of the world around me by 
means of the internal world which takes hold of it, combines, creates anew, kneads 
everything and puts it down again in its own form, manner.”68 
In antiquity, Aristotle said that ‘auctoritas’, by which he means authorship, is the 
judgment of the wise man in his chosen discipline,69 and he defined wisdom as the 
combination of comprehension and knowledge, which not every normal person can 
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have. 70 This argument specifically shows how authorship, since its emergence, has 
been based on mental work.  
It is worth referring to Young’s advice about how the mind works and how authors use 
the thoughts and the ideas they have. “Learn the depth, extent, bias and full sort of thy 
mind; contract full intimacy with the Stranger within thee: excite and cherish every 
spark of Intellectual light and heat, however smothered under former negligence or 
scattered through the dull, dark mass of common thoughts; and collecting them into a 
body, let thy genius rise (if a genius thou hast) as the fun from chaos.”71 
Herder’s personality: 
Herder deepened our understanding of the nature of thinking and the perception of 
human soul,72 as he matched the process of making intellectual works with the process 
of digesting food and transferring it as new beneficial elements to our bodies, since he 
finds that ideas are consumed and processed in the mind, and then authors produce 
new forms of work that differ from pre-existing works he has previously read.73  
In addition, it is interesting to refer to Herder’s argument that every poem is a betrayer 
of its creator.74 However, his argument is different from that of Foucault,75 as he finds 
that the poem describes everything about its writer, as people can see through it his 
senses, inclinations while writing it, how he understands events, the favourite places of 
him. 76 Herder thus concludes that intellectual work is an imprint or record of the living 
human soul, which is its author, and that language does not separate itself from the 
author. Indeed, conversely, it expresses the author, and we find that this notion more 
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reflective of the truth of authorship, and the personal relationship between the author 
and his work. 77 
Conclusion- English Philosophers:  
Hobbes, Locke, and Young who are all English philosophers, all support the thesis’s 
claim that authorship in England, both before the Statute of Anne, and since the 
formulation of the first sense of literary property in the seventeenth century, was 
imbued with personality, and the mental creation of the work was one of the distinctive 
characteristics that make it original. Works that lack these personal and mental 
characteristics should be considered to be in a lower grade of authorship as they are 
not of the same importance. It has been confirmed that originality was an established 
conception even before the Statute of Anne, which did not mention it.  
This historical justification is important in combination with a theoretical discussion of 
the different natures of factual works that lack authorship, and the conflict these works 
have caused to copyright subsistence decisions. All serve the argument of this 
research that authorship should be put in a higher position, and copyright law should 
be confined to authorship works since, historically and theoretically, this was the rule 
and still should be. Otherwise instability and unlimited uncertainties will exist in 
copyright law. The works that lack authorship should also be separated into a different 
category and be regulated through different concepts and rules. The next section in this 
Chapter will resort to German philosophers, namely, Hegel and Kant, to complete the 
image of personal and mental authorship in order to conclude the elements of 
authorship that should exist in a work so it can be called a work of intellect or an 
authorship work.  
6.4 Hegel’s Role in Personality Theory: 
In supporting the personal and mental elements in works we resort to the most famous 
philosopher in this regard, namely, Hegel, though he was a German philosopher, he 
strongly supports the personal approach and his opinion is important for the thesis. 
Many of his views are logical and can be used to support personal and mental 
authorship in any society. Hegel explicitly expressed the ways in which an author 
creates a work himself and manifests his personality in it, so as to be considered an 
author and the creation is considered an intellectual work. 78  
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Works Created by Free Will vs. Works Created Only by Hand: 
Hegel differentiated between works made by the free will of the author and reflecting 
his personality, and works that are made by his hands but do not reflect his personality, 
this is evident in his statement: “[t]he Athenian slave had possibly lighter occupation 
and higher kind of mental work than is the rule with our workmen. But he was a slave 
notwithstanding, since the whole circle of his activity was controlled by his 
master.”79[Underlining added]. Accordingly, although the ‘Athenian slave’ does a higher 
kind of ‘mental work’ than ‘workmen’, his works do not express him, because his 
activity was ‘controlled by’ his master. Here, the will or personality of ‘the worker’ did 
not control the production process, and he cannot claim property over this work, since 
he was not ‘an author’ and he executed the work by ‘physical effort’. This philosophy 
supports this thesis’s argument to exclude any skills or efforts that are not a reflection 
of mental will or personal ideas, from the character of intellectual work.  
This is confirmed when Hegel differentiates between property and personality, and puts 
intellectual works between them as including the two concepts. He argued that as long 
as the property of something is owned by the will, then it may be relinquished by will 
also. However, he affirms that although the product of personality, and freedom of will 
can be transferred to others, they do not ‘perish through lapse of time’. 80 However, he 
writes that this connection between personality and property can be dismantled in the 
case that a person relinquishes his will or acts according to somebody else’s will. Such 
relinquishing of reason, or disposal of will, only happens when “I delegate to others the 
authority to prescribe for me what kind of acts I shall commit,”81 as then it is not the 
individual’s will which has participated in acquiring the property, but somebody else’s 
will.  
Hegel relies heavily on the ‘will’ as it is what makes the human acquires the property of 
anything, for “[e]very man has the right to turn his will upon a thing or make the thing an 
object of his will.”82 What might have an influence on intellectual property is Hegel’s 
argument that the object has no end in itself as the object “receives its meaning and 
soul from his will”.83 
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6.4.1 Hegel’s Differentiation between Mechanical and Spiritual Activity: 
Hegel confirmed that the registration of art in material form, or, as he called it, the 
materialization of art, or the sensuous side of art, is not the entire thing we can have, 
but this sensuous side should bear a spiritual side, which cannot be perceived unless 
by mind, and this consequently requires that spiritual meanings are expressed through 
mind effort also not through senses’ work only. As he stated “[t]hese sensuous shapes 
and sounds appear in art not merely for the sake of themselves and their immediate 
shape, but with the aim, in this shape, of affording satisfaction to higher spiritual 
interests, since they have the power to call forth from all the depths of consciousness a 
sound and an echo in the spirit. In this way the sensuous aspect of art is spiritualized, 
since the spirit appears in art as made sensuous.”84 This argument, with the next 
argument, help to differentiate between works that include spiritual values, because 
they are created by spiritual skills, and works that do not, because they are created by 
mechanical or manual skills.  
Hegel confirms that no work can be considered a work of art unless it bears or conveys 
spiritual values from the author to the audience: “an art-product is only there in so far 
as it has taken its passage through the spirit and has arisen from spiritual productive 
activity.”85 Hegel has described how the process of creating works is a spiritual process 
that included the transfer of internal spirits into sensuous material, and he explicitly 
refuted that the process of creating works of art can be mechanical, although it can 
include some mechanical aspects, such as the use of tools, and so on, it cannot be ‘a 
purely mechanical work’. 86 This is evident in his answer to the question “in what way is 
the necessary sensuous side of art operative in the artist as his subjective productive 
activity?” 87 His answer was that: “[t]his sort and manner of production contains in itself, 
as subjective activity, just the same characteristics which we found objectively present 
in the work of art; it must be a spiritual activity which yet contains, at the same time, the 
element of sensuousness and immediacy. Still, it is neither, on the one hand, purely 
mechanical work, a purely unconscious skill in sensuous manipulation, or a formal 
activity according to fixed rules to be learnt by heart, nor, on the other hand, is it a 
scientific production which passes over from the sensuous to abstract ideas and 
thoughts or is active entirely in the element of pure thinking. In artistic production the 
spiritual and the sensuous aspects must be as one.” 88 [Underlining added].  
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Hegel’s argument merely focused on works that aim to satisfy spiritual interests, so he 
refused to consider works that are created by mechanical process or those that include 
abstract ideas and thoughts. By default, Hegel refuses to consider those works that do 
not include either sensations or thoughts as works, because although they are made by 
persons they have been made by purely mechanical or unconscious skills. This 
mechanical feature has been refuted by Hegel through investigating the inner values 
that the work bears, this thesis has also resorted to investigation of the nature of the 
skills used to create these works, in order to have certain proof that they do not include 
authorial or mental skills, but only manual and mechanical skills.89 
for clarification purposes, it is argued that the term ‘works of art’ is meant to refer to 
authorship works in general (literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works) in Hegel’s 
and Collingwood’s writings also. For instance, Collingwood has argued that the: “artist 
… must have means of communication…; and these means are something bodily and 
perceptible, a painted canvass, a carved stone, a written paper, and so forth.” 90 
Likewise, Hegel confirmed that: “The absolute shape has the connection of content and 
form, soul and body”,91 and this presupposes “a real existent equally subjective through 
its bearing on the other ideas, feelings, and thoughts of the spirit.”92 
The Work should have Inner Meaning:  
Hegel has required that works should have an inner meaning, as this is what makes 
the work meaningful to us, otherwise it will be an abstract, external thing. 93 He gives an 
example of symbols and words, as, without the inner meaning we know about them 
they are nonsense shapes. Though a long quotation but important to the research’s 
argument, as Hegel stated that “[i]n a work of art we begin with what is immediately 
presented to us and only then ask what its meaning or content is. The former, the 
external appearance, has no immediate value for us; we assume behind it something 
inward, a meaning whereby the external appearance is endowed with the spirit. It is to 
this, its soul, that the external points. For an appearance that means something does 
not present itself to our minds, or what it is as external, but something else. Consider, 
for example, a symbol, and, still more obviously, a fable, the meaning of which is 
constituted by its moral and message. Indeed, any word hints at a meaning and counts 
for nothing in itself … It is in this way that the work of art is to be significant and not 
appear exhausted by these lines, curves, surfaces, carvings, hollowings in the stone, 
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these colours, notes, word-sounds, or whatever other material is used; on the contrary, 
it should disclose an inner life, feeling, soul, a content and spirit, which is just what we 
call the significance of a work of art.”94 [Underlining added] This section completes the 
last one, on the mechanical and spiritual activity, as the work should have an inner 
meaning, which is embodied in the feeling, soul or spirit that the work bears, in order to 
be considered an intellectual work. Accordingly, the work that lacks these elements 
cannot be an intellectual work, and this will be included in the elements of authorship 
that the thesis has extracted. 95 
Evaluation of Inner Feelings: 
Hegel argues that deciding whether a given work is beautiful, expressive, etc., is a 
matter of individual perception that differs from one person to another as what 
somebody may see as a fantastic, fine work of art, others may see as a trivial work.96 
Though the work of art is a sensuous object which can be apprehended by one of 
human senses,97 it is meant to be apprehended by spirit and to achieve some 
satisfaction of a spiritual need.98 For Hegel, it is proven that the time and place that 
witnessed the creation of the work affects judgement of its value.99 In addition, the artist 
himself and his technical development of his art has an important role in the evaluation 
process, as all these elements should be taken into consideration when practising 
connoisseurship in regard to works of authorship. 100 
This level of satisfaction is what is expressed by words like the: ‘innovation, originality 
or creativity’ of the work, to decide its eligibility for copyright protection, Hegel has 
called it ‘capacity’ or ‘fancy’ which is said to be “the most prominent artistic ability”.101 
Accordingly, Hegel argues that unless a work of art arouses these spiritual reflections it 
cannot be considered a work at all. 102 Thus, in order for the work to be considered a 
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work of art, it has to be apprehended by the spirit to have an inner reflection, thus such 
a spiritual reflection is one of the authorship elements the thesis argues.  
6.4.2 Hegel’s Perception Theory: 
Hegel concentrates on the issue of perception of works to deduce that works that 
thoughts and sensations are perceived from are intellectual works, if no thoughts and 
sensations come from the work it cannot be considered a product of mind.  
Hegel addressed works of art103 especially and insisted that they are product of 
humans, produced for the apprehension by man’s senses and this is meant to arouse 
feelings,104 so it is some kind of means of communication. He affirmed that: “[t]he work 
of art is a bodily and perceptible thing, and earns the title of work of art by producing in 
the audience the desired result. The artist's relation to his audience is thus essential to 
his being an artist.” 105 
Hegel confirms that the investigation of the aesthetic and expressive values of fine art 
is an investigation into the feelings that rise in individuals, not just those who are meant 
to receive the work, but also those who created it.106 However, the problem here is that 
such investigation cannot get far because: “feeling is the indefinite dull region of the 
spirit”, 107 as what the individual feels is something vague and cannot be fully expressed 
and cannot be unified among those who see or hear the same work.108 For example, 
“fear, anxiety, alarm, terror are of course further modifications of one and the same sort 
of feeling, but in part they are only quantitative intensifications, in part just forms not 
affecting their content, but indifferent to it.”109 This contention is not a problem for this 
research’s argument, as what needs to be proven is whether works have feelings or 
not, and the degree of that feeling does not matter, for what is required is to know 
whether they are authorship works or not.  
 
Locke also discussed the difference in perception depending on the mind of the 
receiver, as “[m]en are differently furnished with these, according to the different 
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objects they converse with. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple 
ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less 
variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less 
reflect on them.” 110 Hegel argues that the perception of feelings or sensations depends 
on which ones the author intended to include in the work, and he cites Hirt111 in this 
regard. Hirt argues that the corner stone in the recognition of taste, i. e., ‘beauty’, is ‘the 
concept of the characteristic’. Accordingly, he defines the term ‘beautiful’ as “the 
perfect which is or can be an object of eye, ear, or imagination” 112, in addition, he 
defined the term ‘perfect’ as “what corresponds with its aim, what nature or art intended 
to produce in the formation of the object within its genus and species”.  
Consequently, following Hirt’s theory, in order to Judge something as beautiful, we 
have to assess whether the art has characteristics that correspond with its aim or not, 
which already constitutes its ‘essence’. 113 As an application of Hirt’s law of art, all the 
following characteristics are important in deciding the beauty of the work of art: ‘forms, 
movement and gesture, mien and expression, local colour, light and shade’,114 and the 
importance of these factors is that they connect the characteristics of the content with 
the expression of that content. As these characteristics refer to “the degree of 
appropriateness with which the particular detail of the artistic form sets in relief the 
content it is meant to present.”115 
To conclude this discussion, this thesis adopts this approach, the investigation in the 
essence, and adds it to the personality and mentality notions of Hobbes and Locke in 
order to reach the elements that should exist in the authorship process so as to be 
considered personal and mental authorship work. Accordingly, a work cannot be an 
‘intellectual’ work unless through the existence of these elements. Ultimately, this will 
help to clarify that the process of creating factual and information works, and the 
selection and arrangement thereof do not reflect any mental or spiritual side, because 
they do not convey any thoughts or sensations. Accordingly, they cannot be considered 
works of intellect or sensation.  
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On the other hand, the opinion of Collingwood is worth noting, as he argues that 
although the work of art includes emotions and sensations, extracting or perceiving 
them depends on the audience, not the author himself. Collingwood argues that: “[a]rt 
… contains nothing that is due to intellect. Its essence is that of an activity by which we 
become conscious of our own emotions. Now, there are emotions which exist in us - at 
the level of psychical experience - but of which we are not yet conscious.”116 Art 
therefore, according to Collingwood, finds, through psychical experience, a space to 
induce the emotions and ideas of the audience, nothing to do with the intention of the 
artist or author. As Collingwood asserted, “the work of art, as we have seen, is not a 
bodily or a perceptible thing, but an activity of the artist; and not an activity of his 'body' 
or sensuous nature, but an activity of his consciousness.”117 He amplified this argument 
by assuming that perception is an inward experience that happens in the mind of the 
person who enjoys it. 118 He asserted that: “if aesthetic experience in the artist is 
something wholly independent of such outward things, but in the audience is something 
dependent upon them and derived from contemplation of them, how is it an experience 
of the same kind in the two cases, and how is there any communication?” 119 
In addition, Collingwood  argued that the artist paints to identify the experience and 
ideas that occupy his mind, and not to enjoy himself or the audience through his 
aesthetic experience. 120 Moreover, he argues that the person who paints well can see 
well, and who sees well can paint well, and he argues that, here, ‘see’ refers to the 
awareness not the sensation, or noticing what you see. 121 
This thesis opposes this opinion, arguing that the thoughts that emerge in the mind of 
the reader depend on the thoughts behind these symbols, as symbols themselves are 
meaningless. For instance, if these symbols are just put in random order would they 
lead to the emergence of any thoughts, besides, if their order expressed a modest 
thought from the writer, will the same thoughts emerges that would emerge from 
symbols ordered by a genius or a creative writer or painter. So, it is the writer’s mind 
and his abilities which give the book its value, and not the symbols or the writing, or the 
physical embodiment itself. It is something not seen by the eyes but by the mind.  
                                                          
116 Robin George Collingwood, The Principles of Art, supra note 90, p. 293.  
117 Ibid.p. 300.  
118 Ibid.p. 301.  
119 Ibid.p. 302.  
120 Ibid.p. 303.  
121 Ibid.p. 304.  
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The Need for the Object vs. the Desire of the Audience: 
In confirming the role of personality in copyright we can cite Hegel’s confirmation that 
the search for the property of objects does not emanate from the ‘need for this object’ 
but from whether the elements and factors of property put by theories and laws are 
available in a certain object or not, regardless of the desire of the audience: “[i]f 
emphasis is placed on my needs, then the possession of property appears as a means 
to their satisfaction, but the true position is that, from the standpoint of freedom, 
property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a substantive end.”122 
Hegel’s view here is considered to be a rejection of the utilitarian justification for 
property, as he articulated how such a dependence on needs will produce a distorted 
concept of property,123 which is why we advocate the abandonment of the utilitarian 
approach for the sake of the personality justification to include utilitarian works under 
copyright protection.  
Hegel has linked personality and freedom: “[a] person must translate his freedom into 
an external sphere in order to exist as Idea. Personality is the first, still wholly abstract, 
determination of the absolute and infinite will, and therefore this sphere is distinct from 
the person, the sphere capable of embodying his freedom, is likewise determined as 
what is immediately different and separable from him.”124 Building on this, Hegel adopts 
the personality theory that takes the person’s will or freedom as a source of the 
property, or, in other words, the work or the owned object is an embodiment of the 
person’s will.  
That relation between the person and the things into which he put characteristics of his 
personality is something definite: “a person has a natural existence partly within himself 
and partly of such a kind that he is related to it as to an external world”.125 This natural 
existence of the person in his works is that which the thesis attempts to use in dividing 
works, as the collection of facts does not embody the personality of anybody, thus they 
are not the property of the person who collected the facts.  
                                                          
122 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. TM Knox (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1952). p. 42. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. p. 40, also, according to the translation by Wood and Nisbet, the same paragraph is translated as 
“The person must give himself an external sphere of freedom in order to have being as Idea. The person is 
the infinite will, the will which has being in and for itself, in this first and as yet wholly abstract 
determination. Consequently, this sphere is distinct from the will, which may constitute the sphere of its 
freedom, is likewise determined as immediately different and separable from it.” See, Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. NISBET (Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
125 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, supra note 122, p. 40.  
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Hegel allowed dealings on intellectual works when the author expresses them, or their 
‘alienating’ (as he calls it), but he stressed the nature of these works as part of the 
personality of the author: - “It may be asked whether the artist, scholar, &c. , is from the 
legal point of view in possession of his art, erudition, ability to preach a sermon, sing a 
mass, &c. , that is, whether such attainments are 'things'. We may hesitate to call such 
abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c. , 'things', for while possession of these may be the 
subject of business dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also 
something inward and mental about it,… Attainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, 
are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, 
but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in something external and 
alienate them”. 126 [Underlining added]. This is a confirmation by Hegel that intellectual 
works are mind works and can be owned by the person who expressed them. This 
means that works devoid of mental inner values are not to be considered works, and 
when the person registers mental values that are not his own, then the work cannot be 
owned by him, as he will be considered just a registrar, not an author of these values.  
6.5 Kant: The Work Expresses the Author’s Personality: 
Kant is also a renowned philosopher in the argument around personal authorship, as 
he confirmed that the work bears or presents the author’s personality as the work is a 
registration of his speech: “In a book, as a writing, the author speaks to his reader; and 
the one who has printed the book speaks, by his copy, not for himself but simply and 
solely in the author's name.”127 Although Kant may be seen to advocate or support the 
publishers rights in trading in authors’ works, depending from utilitarian or capitalism 
theory, but a closer look at his argument shows us how he prioritises the author’s rights 
over publishers’ powers, especially when addressing the publisher as “the agent of the 
author”. 128 Fichte cited an argument by Kant, which stated: “an author has a ‘natural, 
inborn, and inalienable right of ownership’ in his work.”129 
In addition, Kant, when talking about the unauthorised publisher, reassured about the 
superiority of the author in this regard and how such un-authorisation had happened 
because the publisher did not take permission from the author, as he stated that “an 
unauthorized publisher not only takes upon himself, without any permission of the 
owner, the affair (of the author) but does so even against his will. The reason he is an 
                                                          
126 Ibid. p. 40-41.  
127 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, eds Mary J. Gregor and Allen Wood (The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). at 8. 80.  
128 Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, 'Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship', supra note 3, p. 1062.  
129 Johann G Fichte, 'Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting', supra note 47, p. 461. Cited in Anne Barron, 
'Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom', Law and philosophy, 31/1 (2012)., Note. 18.  
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unauthorized publisher is that he attacks in his affairs another who has been 
empowered to publish by the author himself.”130 
The above discussions confirm that this thesis’s approach is sound, as proving the 
sustainability of the author’s personality and intellect is something that supports the 
thesis’s main argument of prioritising the creativity element in authorship in the face of 
works that lack such mental and creative elements. This distinction between the 
characteristics of works is the main requirement for the categorisation of works and 
then the resolution of the confusion and uncertainty in judicial decisions on copyright 
subsistence.  
6.6 Personal and Mental Contributions in Modern Copyright Law: 
Copyright law is concerned with authorship and works that contain authorial 
contributions and thoughts, ideas or sensations that need to be conveyed through the 
work, and to be perceived by the audience. Theoretically speaking, it is the authorial 
contribution, the personality expressed in the work, that copyright law wants and with 
which the personality theory is mainly concerned. “Copyrighted works reflect their 
makers' knowledge and abilities such as the creative ability and the ability to internalize 
social and cultural external elements, then translate and embody them in different 
ways.”131 
This argument was stressed by Nimmer, who stated that: “[t]he one indispensable 
element of authorship is originality. One who has slavishly or mechanically copied from 
others may not claim to be an author.” 132This is also confirmed in the US Copyright Act 
of 1976,133 and the US ‘Code of Federal Regulations’, where it is written that “Works 
consisting entirely of information that is common property, containing no original 
authorship, such as, for example: Standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape 
measures and rulers, schedules of sporting events, and lists or tables taken from public 
documents or other common sources.”134 Copyright law in the US is thus limited to 
works that only show "originality" or "authorship.”135 
                                                          
130 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, supra note 127, at 8. 81, also see his essay, Immanuel Kant, 'Of 
the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books', Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political and Various Philosophical 
Subjects (1; London, 1798)..  
131 Lior Zemer, 'Towards a Conception of Authorial Knowledge in Copyright', Buff. Intell. Prop. LJ, 3 (2005). 
p. 86. This is explained in the discourse of explaining ‘Shapin's Formula’. 
132 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas (M. Bender, 1990). §. 1. 06[A].  
133 §. 102 stated that all works protected by copyright law are described as “original works of authorship”. 
See, 'Copyright Act of the United States', Ch8-10; 12-17 of Title 17 of the US code (US, 1976). 
134 s. 202. 1 (d) of Unitied States Government, 'Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37 Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights', (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014). 
135 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', 
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 23 (1989)., p. 350.  
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It is argued that the US Constitution implies the original authorship requirement in 
works, as in the statement “[c]ongress shall have the power to ‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’”136 The mention of 
‘authors’ implies that authorship is the essence of the right to protection. 137 Talking 
about the progress that such works should achieve, presumes also that works should 
have creativity and a contribution to current knowledge in order to make such progress, 
that was confirmed in the Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Case,138 when Judge Frank 
confirmed “[t]he constitutional power to grant monopolies or exclusive franchises to 
authors whose works promote the progress of science and the useful arts does not 
authorize such a monopoly grant to one whose product lacks all creative originality.”139 
[Underlining added]. The report of the register of copyrights on the general revision of 
the U.S. copyright law (1961), has explicitly mentioned that the work is “an author's 
intellectual creation [that] has the stamp of his personality and is identified with him.”140 
[Underline added] 
The philosophy that stipulated the conditioning of novelty in patents is the same one 
that requires the addition of an authorial contribution in copyright works, as in the US 
both were organized by the same constitutional provision. This is confirmed in John 
Deere v. Cook Chemical,141 when the Court stated that “[i]nnovation, advancement, 
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent 
system which by constitutional command must promote progress of useful arts”142 
Accordingly, only the addition to current knowledge that is qualified for protection and 
that cannot be achieved unless by requiring the addition of thoughts to created works 
to get protection.  
Recently, the US Copyright Office has stated its opinion that although some works are 
intangible, they are not a work of intellect. For instance, in the ‘Compendium of US 
Copyright Office Practices’ it is mentioned that copyright cannot protect intellectual 
works made by animals,143 as although they were photographs, paintings, or other 
                                                          
136 Art. 1, S 8, cl. 8 of 'The Constitution of the United States of America', No. 110-50 (United States, 1787)..  
137 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas, supra note 132, §. 1. 06[A].  
138 Chamberlin V. Uris Sales Corporation, 1945, 150 F.2d 512, United States Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit.  
139 Ibid. at 512-513.  
140 'The Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law ', (July 
1961). 
141 John Deere Company of Kansas City Et Al. V. Cook Chemical, 1966, 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 
Supreme Court of the United States.  
142 Ibid. at 688.  
143 The copyright office gave examples of these works, as “• A photograph taken by a monkey. • A mural 
painted by an elephant. • A claim based on the appearance of actual animal skin. • A claim based on 
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artistic or musical works, the office refused to register these works due to the 
inexistence of a human author. 144 Under the title “The Human Authorship 
Requirement”,145 the US Copyright Office expressly required that the office could 
register a work “provided that the work was created by a human being.”146 [Underlining 
added]. The office also refused to copyright any work that was created by machines 
without any intervention from people: “the Office will not register works produced by a 
machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without 
any creative input or intervention from a human author.” 147 
The office in supporting its argument cited two major cases. Firstly, Trade-Mark 
Cases,148 in its argument that the copyright law only protects “’the fruits of intellectual 
labor’that ‘are founded in the creative powers of the mind’”.149 Secondly, the Burrow-
Giles v. Sarony150 case in its confirmation that copyright law is limited to the “original 
intellectual conceptions of the author”.151 It is believed that this reference to cases of 
the 19th century is a return to the theory of personality as the principal reference in 
interpreting copyright terminology to lessen the distortion to copyright law concepts. 
The rule that governs the above example, regarding the US copyright office and works 
deprived of registration, is the ‘existence of authorship’ in the work as the main and 
initial criterion for copyrightability before originality.152 These works did not include any 
mental work of authorship that include the desire to transfer ideas in the form of words 
or shapes to convey them to the reader or viewer, but they were random shapes which, 
although ‘intangible’, were not ‘intellectual’. On this basis, this thesis reminds of the 
categories of works that Hobbes excluded from being authorship works such as the 
works of young children or intellectually disabled,153 as although the resulting work may 
not be copied from antecedent work, and thus may be said to be original, it is not an 
‘intellectual work’ as it was not intended to transfer any sensations or ideas. This partly 
brings to mind the authors’ intention as a condition for recognition of the work as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
driftwood that has been shaped and smoothed by the ocean.” See, United States Copyright Office, 
'Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices', (Third edn., 2014)., Para. 306.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Trade-Mark Cases V. Steffens, 1879, 100 U.S. 82, 10 Otto 82, WL 16583 (U.S.N.Y.), 25 L.Ed. 550, 
Supreme Court of the United States.  
149 United States Copyright Office, 'Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices', supra note 143. at 
306. 
150 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States 
151 United States Copyright Office, 'Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices', supra note 143. at 
306. 
152 As stated above at 1.3. 
153 See this Chapter at 6.2. p. 178. 
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copyright work, applying this to support the research’s categorisation of works into 
authorship and non-authorship works is essential.  
In proving that the work is original and fulfils the originality condition of the Copyright 
Act 1911, the Court in University of London v. University Tutorial154 confirmed that the 
work of the examiners is that: “[t]he setting of the papers entailed the exercise of brain 
work, memory, and trained judgment, and even the selection of passages from other 
authors' works involved careful consideration, discretion, and choice.”155 [Underlining 
added]. This thesis attempts to show the importance of the element of ‘brain work’ for 
returning stability between copyright law’s theoretical principles and applications. 
In the US, the Supreme Court confirmed that what is required for copyright protection is 
the personal contribution, and then the work can be considered to be an authorship 
work, as Mr Justice Holmes confirmed: “[t]he copy is the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its 
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man's alone.”156 [Underlining added]. The terms, ‘personal 
reaction’, ‘personality’, ‘unique’, ‘singularity’, ‘one man’s alone’, all undoubtedly show 
that the work should be a product of the person’s mind and creative thinking. However, 
“this concept of personality [it appears in this case] has been overlooked in the factual 
works decisions.”157 
Regarding the situation in UK legislation and case law, it is claimed that the mental 
authorial contribution is what is mainly required in CDPA for intellectual works, although 
it has not been explicitly expressed. The CDPA, in separating databases into a different 
system under sui generis provisions -according to the Databases Regulations-158, and 
by limiting the originality interpretation for these works to the “author’s own intellectual 
creation”,159 reflects the desire of law makers to keep the originality interpretation for 
other works (literary, artistic musical and dramatic) in a different interpretation, 
particularly a higher one. As, the latter works were preceded by the term ‘original’ 
without limitations. However, we believe that the term ‘intellectual creation’ bears also a 
lot of meanings that are related to the personal mental creation which databases lack.  
                                                          
154 University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 1916, 2 Ch. 601, Chancery Division.  
155 Ibid. at 604 
156 Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, supra note 52, at 250.  
157 Elizabeth M Saunders, 'Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the Originality Standard 
Allow Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection', Notre Dame L. Review, 62 (1986)., p. 767, as 
Saunders confirmed as a comment on the Bleistein v. Donadlson Case, that “Holmes seems to have 
rested his opinion of originality on the idea that the author’s personality is its key.” See, ibid. p. 767.  
158 'The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations', (UK, 1997). 
159 s. 3[A] 2 of the 'Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (Cdpa)', (UK, 1988). 
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In the nineteenth century there was a consistency on situations of England and the US 
regarding the personal and mental features that had to exist in works. For instance in 
Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, Judge Miller referred to the English case of Nottage v. 
Jackson,160 decided in the previous year, and the definition of the author proposed by 
Judges Bowen and Cotton161 in this case to infer that the understanding of the nature of 
authorship and originality and intellectual creation expressed in this English case is the 
same that he wanted to prove within the US constitution.162 As, Judge Bowen in 
Nottage v. Jackson 163 confirmed that “the true definition of “author” for the purpose of 
the Act … the man who really represents or creates, or gives effect to the idea or fancy, 
or imagination.”164 
In the case of Infopaq v. Danske,165 the CJEU’s argument reflects the situation in the 
EU regarding the authorial contribution, as the court confirmed in multiple places that 
the author, as a human person, is the priority of the EU directives, and intellectual 
creation is what copyright law should protect.166 For instance, in deciding whether the 
extracts made by Infopaq from the newspaper were a reproduction, the CJEU 
confirmed that the national court should make sure that the part taken: “contain[s] a 
number of elements which are such as to express the intellectual creation of the author 
of that work.”167 Note here that the CJEU did not resort to a quantitative criterion to 
decide whether there was substantial copying or not, but it insisted that there should be 
intellectual creation elements that cannot be inserted unless by a human being. The 
CJEU thus confirms that the issue is not in the originality of the selection and 
arrangement or in the quantity of copying, but in the authorial effort or creativity 
embodied in the work.168 This is also confirmed in the EU Directives, for instance, Art. 1 
(3) of Council Directive 91/250,169 and Art. 3(1) of Directive 96/9.170 According to these 
                                                          
160 Nottage and Another V. Jackson, 1883, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 627, The Court of Appeal. 
161 Judge Bowen defined the author as “the man who really represents or creates, or gives effect to the 
idea or fancy, or imagination.” See ibid. at 637. Also, Judge Cotton’s definition is that “’author’ involves 
originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be protected, whether 
it be a drawing, or a painting, or a photograph.” See ibid. at 635. 
162 As he claimed that “[t]hese views [of Judges Cotton, and Bowen in the English case Nottage v. 
Jackson] of the nature of authorship and of originality, intellectual creation, and right to protection, confirm 
what we have already said.” See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 
L.Ed. 349, supra note 150, at 61. 
163 Nottage and Another V. Jackson, L.R. 11 Q.B.D. 627, supra note 160. 
164 Ibid.160, at 637. 
165 Infopaq International a/S V. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, E.C.D.R. 16, C-5/08, Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (Fourth Chamber).  
166 Ibid. at 261, 272. 
167 Ibid. at 272, 273.  
168 Ibid. at 271. 
169 Art. 1(3) of 'Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs', 91/250/EEC (European 
Community, 1991). provided that: “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it 
is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for 
protection.” 
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provisions, the database and computer software were to be conferred copyright 
protection only if they were the author’s intellectual creation.  
In the UK, in the Interlego v. Tyco Case,171 the plaintiffs claimed that they had copyright 
in Lego bricks, the defendants copied their design from the blocks. The plaintiffs were 
granted an injunction. The defendants appealed, basing their case on the fact that the 
drawings existed pre-1973 and were not copyrightable, as they were designs 
registered under the Registered Design Act of 1949, and those post-1972 were 
protected by copyright as original works even though they were re-drawings of earlier 
works. Here, Lord Oliver differentiated, rightly, between the authorial contribution and 
the technical or manual contribution, as he argued that drawing a picture is not like 
imitating a preceding drawing, even if there is much labour and time consumed in this 
process - even if it were perfect, it does not reflect ‘original’ authorship. As Lord Oliver 
confirmed: “The significant thing about all these changes is that they involve no 
substantial alteration to the drawing as such.”172 Note here that substantial alteration of 
the previous work is required, and that the alteration should be of an authorial nature 
and not a technical or mechanical one: “[t]he significant changes, however important 
technically, are not indicated by any substantial alteration of the drawing as an artistic 
work. That remains basically the same and was admittedly copied from the 1968 
drawing in the same way as if it had been actually traced.” 173 [Underlining added].  
In applying this general rule to the case of reproducing a previous work, and showing 
the irrelevance of the skill used for copyright law concepts, Lord Oliver stressed: “the 
re-drawing of an existing drawing with a few minimal visual alterations does not make it 
an original artistic work, however much labour and skill may have gone into the process 
of reproduction.” 174[Underlining added]. To apply that to the disputed works, he 
explained that although the mechanism used to prepare the dimensions and figures 
that are considered ‘manufacturing instructions’ for those who will design the moulds, 
‘from which the finished articles will be produced’ and it “may be and no doubt is the 
case that that information involves important functional concepts, and even a good deal 
of technical research.”175 He rectifies this by saying that they do not make an original 
artistic work: “What is important about a drawing is what is visually significant, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
170 Art. 3(1) of 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Databases', 96/9/EC (EU, 1996). provided that: “In accordance with this Directive, databases which, by 
reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation 
shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for 
that protection.” 
171 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., 1989, A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 Privy Council.  
172 Ibid. at 258.  
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. at 258. 
 
 
211 
re-drawing of an existing drawing with a few minimal visual alterations does not make it 
an original artistic work, however much labour and skill may have gone into the process 
of reproduction, or however important the technical significance of the verbal 
information that may be included in the same document by way of information or 
instruction.” 176 
Judge Floyd in Football Datco Ltd. v. Britten Pools Ltd.177 cited the German Court of 
Appeal’s decision in order to support his argument in separating: “[a] purely 
deterministic” or “manual labour or schematic” work, and “individual creative work” to 
support his argument that the latter group of works are only those which satisfy the 
copyright law criteria. 178 On the other hand, Gorman has an opposite opinion, as he 
argues that what copyright law protects is not the social value in the work, or its mark of 
personality, or its reference to individuality, but the effort, time, expense and, in certain 
cases, the skill employed to produce the work “which does not require special 
intellectual competence”.179 Actually, such a requirement equates intellectual work with 
manual or a mechanical work. Others oppose the latter opinion and stress that 
authorship is not a mechanical act because “[a]uthorship is not a purely mechanical 
act. The notion of authorship indicates something more than just a mechanical act, 
perhaps hinting that there is a degree of originality present, rather than a mere 
transcription.” 180 
6.7 Elements of Authorship (conclusion of philosophers’ views): 
According to the personality philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Kant on the 
elements that should exist in a work for it to be considered a work of intellect, the thesis 
has extracted the elements that, if they exist in a work will be evidence that it is a work 
of intellect, and if they are not found in a work, it is not a work of intellect - even if it 
were an intangible work. These elements are called the ‘elements of authorship’.  
Depending on these elements, we can differentiate between authorship and non-
authorship works, and then use this to separate the originality interpretations that are 
                                                          
176 Ibid. at 258.  
177 Football Dataco Ltd V. Britten Pools Ltd, 2010, R.P.C. 17, High Court of Justice (Chancery Division).  
178 As the Court in Pharma Intranet Information Ag V. Ims Health Gmbh & Co. Ohg, 2005, ECC 12, 
Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) used several interesting phrases to support this view, as cited by the 
CJEU at 544, “the individuality differentiates the work protected … from purely physical labour, routine 
performance. A selection or organisation that anyone would undertake in a particular manner does not 
constitute individual creation. … then there is no room for individual creative work. …, the decision goes 
beyond that which is manual labour or schematic and the decision allows sufficient manoeuvering room for 
an individuality”.  
179 Robert A Gorman, 'Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts', Harvard Law 
Review, 76 (1962). p. 1570.  
180 J.G.H. Griffin, 'The Need for a New Paradigm in Ip Law: A Focus on Authorship', Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 14/3 (2005)., p. 268.  
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explained in Chapter Three into two groups, one to measure the authorial elements of 
mental and personal authorship, and the other to measure the manual and mechanical 
efforts and investment expenditure in works that are devoid of authorship.  
Ultimately, such a differentiation between works and the separation of originality 
interpretations will reduce the current conflict in copyright decisions, especially around 
decisions on which interpretation of originality used is not suitable to the nature of the 
disputed work. According to the opinions of previous philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, 
Kant and Hegel, in order for work to be a work of intellect it should manifest the 
following characteristics: Firstly, for Hobbes, the work should include syllogisms of 
information and a conclusion that depends on this information, thus, if the work does 
not include such a relationship between its contents it cannot be considered a work of 
intellect, which confirmed also in the thesis’s view around the wholeness of the work.181 
Secondly, according to Locke, the work should be the result of mind processes that 
information has passed through, and which then produce something different that 
bears the personality of the author and his mentality. The produced work will, then, 
include the thoughts and sensations of the author through his reflection on the 
perceived information. Otherwise, if the work is perceived through registering or noting 
what the senses have perceived, without passing on any mind processes, the resulting 
work is not a work of intellect. Young has also confirmed that the work should be the 
result of mental effort. 182 Hegel also offered a similar argument, as he confirmed, firstly, 
that the work should be the result of the free will of the creator, so any steps dictated by 
another person, or following a mechanical pre- determined way of production, do not 
produce a work of intellect. Secondly, Hegel emphasised that works of art should 
reflect sensations as the registering of any intangible elements in a material form does 
not per se constitutes a work of art.  
Thirdly, for Hegel, Kant and also Locke, the work should have inner meanings, 
something to be perceived by the mind or spirit of the recipient. They confirm that the 
work is to be considered a work of authorship only if created by the intellect or spirit, 
and perceived also by the intellect or spirit. Otherwise, it will be something external to 
the mind and spirit and cannot be named a work of intellect. As Hegel put it: “there is 
also something inward and mental about it… Attainments, erudition, talents, and so 
forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to 
it.”183 This was confirmed by Palmer in his interpretation of Hegel’s statement: 
                                                          
181 See Chapter Eight at 8.5.1. 
182 Edward Young and Samuel Richardson, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author 
of Sir Charles Grandison, supra note 62, p. 10.  
183 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, supra note 122, p. 40-41.  
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“[p]ersonality does not simply require external objects for its development. Its 
development is its objectification through externalization of its will.”184 So it is not a 
matter of putting intangible works into a material form, but what these intangible works 
represent, or from where they emanate. If they have emanated from thinking or spirit 
and should be perceived only by mind or spirit, then they are intellectual works, 
otherwise they are only intangible works and should not be dealt with under the same 
principles and rules as intellectual works.  
This conclusion is what the thesis attempts to use to put dividers within the big 
category of intellectual works in order to distinguish between works with authorship and 
those without it. Authorship, here, expresses that the work is a product of the mind or 
spirit of the author. On the other hand, other manual or mechanical work that the author 
does without incorporating his free will, mind processes, thoughts or sensations, into 
every work produced is considered a product of a mechanical process, not a work of 
intellect. Such as, when following specific learned rules or mathematical measurments. 
It is confusing to think about, analyse and investigate authorship in works in which no 
authorship processes have actually happened. Authorship is all about the work of 
minds, and not mechanical efforts.185 Works of utility can be made by computer 
software, like telephone directories, maps, and catalogues of pictures, that then can be 
owned by the person who made the necessary procedures or the programmer, but they 
are not authorship works, as will be detailed in the following paragraph. 
Practical example: 
A software code can be copyrighted as long as the selection and arrangement is 
different from antecedent ones; but the works created by this program have different 
legal situations. If the program collects materials and presents it in a specific way, 
using a formula put in by the programmer, the situation differs according to the nature 
of that collection. If the programmer or the user of the program uses it to produce any 
kind of intellectual works the programmer or the user owns the produced work, as long 
as the computer program is used as a tool with which to execute the detailed 
instructions entered by the programmer or user.  
Regarding any collection job that the program may perform, the situation depends on 
whether the process is intended to present the information as it is, regardless of the 
way this information is presented, or whether the author wants to present his thoughts 
                                                          
184 Tom G Palmer, 'Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified-the Philosophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects', Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y, 13 (1990). p. 838.  
185 As Hegel argues, see this chapter at 6.4.1 p. 191. 
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through this specific arrangement –such as proving something, then the arrangement 
will be original and thoughtful.  
In the first case, in regard to presenting information as it is, the work does not have an 
author; it is a non-authorship work, although the work can be owned by the author of 
the program, or the user who applies the software to specific information, herein the 
program is the compiler of the information and nothing else has been done, or we may 
say that the work expresses no more values than dispersed pieces of abstract 
information not connected in logical way. In the second case, regarding the presenting 
of thoughts through specific arrangement, the work is an authorship work and its author 
is the author of the program, as the program was used as a tool to present his ideas, 
as the computer cannot put thoughts in a human logic way to convey thoughts or 
sensations. The work thus holds this author’s specific ideas and modes of thinking.186  
6.8 Distinction between Mental and Manual Skills in Creating Works: 
Depending on the elements of authorship explained above, we maintain that the skills 
and capabilities used in creating novels or photographs, sculptures and paintings are 
different from the skills and capabilities used in making databases, compilations, 
anthologies, catalogues, dictionaries and travel guides, the first are authorship skills 
and the latter non-authorship skills.  
In the UK, the difference between the two skills was confirmed in the case of Hadley v. 
Kemp187 as it was stated: “there is a vital distinction between composition or creation of 
a musical work on the one hand and performance or interpretation of it on the other.”188 
[Underlining added]. The Judge also said: “It is certainly true that the members of the 
band sang or played in their own ways (and, in so far as I am able to Judge, did so 
excellently). But these are matters of performance, not matters which go to the creation 
of a new musical work.” 189  
There are two skills to be differentiated between in the making of works, the skill of 
mere collection and the skill that includes collection and then processing in the mind 
and presenting the content as a creative or original product. Knowledge and facts: 
“never exist[s] in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge, which all the separate individuals 
                                                          
186 This differentiation between human authorial contribution and others is the reason of why the 
programmer is the author of the computer generated works as the person who takes the necessary steps 
in creating the program. 
187 Hadley V. Kemp, 1999, E.M.L.R. 589, High Court, Chancery Division.  
188 Ibid. at 646.  
189 Ibid. at 646.  
 
 
215 
possess.” 190 Two separate processes can be done in relation to these pieces of 
knowledge, whether that is the mere collection of them in order to present them to the 
audience to serve their need for the collection of facts in a specific field, or, the 
processing of the facts to build different thoughts or sensations that are based on them 
and that were not previously existing.  
When courts give great importance to collectors of this knowledge and equate them 
through protection and rights with those who absorb these dispersed bits of knowledge 
to produce a consistent and coherent piece of art or literature, the courts are not just 
unfair with the latter group of works. But, they sacrifice the established philosophies 
and concepts of intellectual property in prioritising those latter works, or even by 
considering them the only works of intellect, according to the philosophies of the work 
of intellect and the necessary elements they should include, as explained above. 191 
Hayek advocated this argument as he stressed that society does not need such 
allocation or collection of knowledge – as represented in factual works - but what 
matters is the use of such knowledge. “The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources …. It is rather a problem of how 
to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society.”192 
[Underlining added]. According to Hayek, then, the collection, gathering, organizing, 
arranging or selecting of information is not a problem, or not an important issue for 
society. What is important is the use of this information, and that which the mind or 
intellect does, which gives the work an importance. This serves the thesis’s argument 
directly to propose that collections of facts are not intellectual works because – 
according to the Hayekian theory - they do not include that stage where information is 
used to reach unknown results.  
Although Hayek’s argument strips efforts at collection of any importance or value, some 
kind of protection should be given to such works, as they ease the job for those who do 
the analysis and processing of such information, and so sustaining such efforts is still 
important. However, we should bear in mind the grades that every category of works 
should occupy.  
6.9 The Idea/Expression Dichotomy is Confusing:  
The idea/expression dichotomy was established in cases before being codified in law, 
especially in University of London v. University Tutorial193, as mentioned above. 194 
                                                          
190 Friedrich August Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', The American Economic Review,  (1945)., 
p. 520.  
191 See this Chapter at 6.7.  
192 Friedrich August Hayek, 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', supra note 190, p. 520.  
193 University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 2 Ch. 601, supra note 154.  
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However, it has not been codified in the UK, although this does not detract from its 
status as an established concept in the UK. It finds its legal basis in the TRIPS 
agreement, as Art. 9(2) stated that “Copyright protection shall extend to expressions 
and not to ideas…”. 195 The US Copyright Act of 1976 provided for the idea/expression 
dichotomy concept in § 102 (b). 196 
 ‘Expression’ has been understood to mean the words and lines that express the ideas. 
Such a claim was briefly confirmed in the case of Chamberlin v. Uris Sales,197 when 
Judge Frank confirmed that “[t]he right secured by a copyright is the right to that 
arrangement of words which the author has selected to express his ideas and not the 
right to employ ideas expressed thereby.”198 And also in Judge Peterson’s claim that 
“the Act does not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but 
that the work must not be copied from another work.” 199[Underlining added].  
It is argued in this research that the idea/expression dichotomy has confused Judges in 
regard to the principles and bases of copyright law, as Lord Hailsham stated in L. B. 
(Plastics) Ltd v. Swish Products Ltd.:200 “it all depends on what you mean by ‘ideas’.”201 
We confirm that copyright law is only concerned with the authorship, thoughts and 
ideas that the author adds to the work through his personality and mind operations, not 
the expression itself, which is nothing but abstract lines and letters. However, copyright 
law failed to recognise this formula. As a result of this, Judges have experienced a 
problem in the “distinction between fact and expression [which] is not always easy to 
draw.”202 
It is difficult to determine the difference between ideas and the expression of these 
ideas: “Saying that only original expressions, but never facts or ideas, are 
copyrightable proves to be far easier than applying the notion consistently and 
coherently.”203 As Judge Hand states in Peter Pan v. Martin Weiner204 that: “[o]bviously, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
194 Especially when Judge Peterson stated that: “Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of 
ideas, but with the expression of thought” see ibid. at 608.  
195 'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Trips)', O.J. 1994 L. (1994). 
p. 213.  
196 As it stated “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C §. 102 (b) 
197 Chamberlin V. Uris Sales Corporation, 150 F.2d 512, supra note 138.  
198 Ibid. at 513.  
199 University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press, 2 Ch. 601, supra note 154, at 609.  
200 L.B. (Plastics) Ltd V. Swish Products Ltd., 1979, R.P.C. 551, House of Lords.  
201 Ibid. at 629.  
202 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. V. Nation Enterprises, 1983, 723 F.2d 195, United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit. at 203.  
203 Paul J. Heald, 'The Vices of Originality', Supreme Court Review,  (1991)., p. 152.  
204 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. V. Martin Weiner Corp., 1960, 274 F.2d 487, United States Court of Appeals 
Second Circuit. 
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no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' 
and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”205  
What the thesis stresses is that the protection of ‘words and lines’ alone is dangerous 
and, as always, the change in the form of expression will entail allowing copyright of 
infringing works: “[i]t is of course essential to any protection of literary property, whether 
at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited literally to the text, 
else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations.”206 The originality of the ‘words 
and lines’ is insufficient to confer copyright protection, and the same judgment should 
be applied to the requirement for originality in the selection and arrangement itself of 
factual works.  
As Pila confirms: “[a]n LDMA207 work is, and ought to be, an intentional expression of 
an LDMA idea; meaning an intentional expression of a particular idea associated with a 
tradition of LDMA authorship. This explains why even skilfully produced records of 
works ought not to attract LDMA copyright: because they are not LDMA works. If the 
creators of such records are to be rewarded with copyright it ought to be mechanical 
copyright of the type already granted to the makers of records of other LDMA works.”208 
There is an important distinction should be set between whether the originality is 
required in the selection and arrangement itself, or in the words and lines themselves, 
or, on the other hand, is originality required in the thoughts that a specific selection and 
arrangement bears. In regard to works of authorship, the selection and arrangement of 
the elements of the works which is its structure, is the thing that expresses that the 
work has had an intellectual creation and that is why it should be protected.  
6.10 Authorship is in the Structure of the work not the Raw Material of 
Authorship: 
One of the problems of copyright law is the confusion that happens due to the 
idea/expression dichotomy, because ‘expression’ is interpreted to mean the words and 
lines in literary and artistic works.209 This interpretation does not provide protection 
against up and coming authors who can just use their words to express the same 
thoughts with the same arrangement that the first author followed. For instance, in 
novels, the selection of characters and places and the arrangement of the events is 
what the protection of the novel is depending upon, not the words or the expressions, 
                                                          
205 Ibid. at 489 
206 Nichols V. Universal Pictures Corporation, 1930, 45 F.2d 119, Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
at 121.  
207 LDMA refers to ‘Literary, Dramatic, Musical and Artistic’ works. 
208 Justine Pila, 'An Intentional View of the Copyright Work', The Modern Law Review, 71/4 (2008). p. 557 
209 See for instance, Donald L Gelpi, The Gracing of Human Experience: Rethinking the Relationship 
between Nature and Grace (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008). p. 215. 
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as these can be changed in unlimited number of times. A sculptor who makes a 
sculpture out of a painting is copying the thought and the expressive form, with a 
change in the physical form.  
The reason to support this view is that we understand that expression means the path 
the author followed in order to transfer his ideas into a material form. Although the 
ideas are not protected, the way it is materialized in is protected. The registration of 
ideas or sensations in material form is something emotional that is related to 
personality, and that appears from the combination of all these elements in a unique 
way that cannot be repeated. The way to deliver ideas to the audience is where 
originality lies, and it is not conceivable that originality lies in the choice of a word and 
the leaving of another, but that the choice of all of the elements of the work and to 
arrange them in a special order is key, and that this order of these specific elements 
reflects the personality of the author.  
This was confirmed by Mr Justice Laddie, when he differentiated between the words 
and lines themselves and the ideas these words and lines expressed.210 He confirmed 
also that it is wrong to deem the person who make the expression the author, but s/he 
who provides the ideas is a joint author: “[i]n my view, to have regard merely to who 
pushed the pen is too narrow a view of authorship. What is protected by copyright in a 
drawing or a literary work is more than just the skill of making marks on paper or some 
other medium. It is both the words or lines and the skill and effort involved in creating, 
selecting or gathering together the detailed concepts, data or emotions which those 
words or lines have fixed in some tangible form which is protected. It is wrong to think 
that only the person who carries out the mechanical act of fixation is an author.”211 
[Underlining added]. Furthermore, he applied this rule to the case and decided that the 
provider of ideas is not just a joint author, but is the main author. 212 The thesis thus 
concludes that the expression of thoughts is not the words or the lines used to express 
them, but the selection of all of the raw materials of the work and putting them into a 
specific arrangement, so the whole work works as a communication means that can 
convey the thoughts and sensations of the author. Words and lines themselves are 
abstract, devoid of any importance, and cannot bear any thoughts or sensations. 
Changing them does not change the work.  
                                                          
210 Cala Homes (South) Limited and Others V. Alfred Mcalpine Homes East Limited, 1995, F.S.R. 818, The 
High Court of Justice—Chancery Division. at 835.  
211 Ibid. at 835.  
212 When he confirmed: “In this case Mr Date was a joint author of the drawings for the New Standard 
House Range. Indeed, not only was he a joint author, in my view he was the major author.”, see, ibid. at 
836.  
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The announcement by Mr Justice Laddie can result in several outcomes. Firstly, 
copyright law primarily protects the ideas and thoughts. Expression is just required for 
evidence purposes, even if skill is required in the expression itself. Secondly, 
adaptations, especially those that rely substantially on antecedent works, may not be 
high authorship works, due to the author of the resulting work use the ideas and 
thoughts of the original author. Furthermore, if the adaptation just depends on changing 
the expressive or the physical form of the work, the resulting works may not be an 
authorship work at all. We confirm that copyright law is concerned in the first place with 
authorship; Goldstein confirms that copyright law is about authorship, and both about 
the act of creation and sustaining the conditions of creativity.213  
The authorial selection and arrangement is the structure or order which produces 
thoughts that can be perceived by the audience of the work, these thoughts are limited 
by the amount that the author wanted to transfer, if that arrangement changes, then the 
thoughts and sensations perceived will change. It is a matter of substance and the 
arrangement of these substances whether the elements employed are words, 
expressions or symbols is that constitutes authorship. Otherwise, we will allow for 
rewritings to be considered original works due to the change in words. Suk attacked 
such an argument: “I won't bother to write my own work, because I'll be losing money 
to the rewriter of my book after it becomes famous.”214 
This argument has been confirmed expressly in the Simms v. Stanton case in 1896 
when the court cited Drone’s statement “[t]he true test of piracy, then, is not whether a 
composition is copied in the same language or the exact words of the original, but 
whether, in substance, it is reproduced; not whether the whole, but whether a material 
part, is taken. In his view of the subject, it is no defense of piracy that the work entitled 
to protection has not been copied literally; that it has been translated into another 
language; that it has been dramatized; that the whole has not been taken; that it has 
been abridged; that it is reproduced in a new and more useful form. The controlling 
question always is, whether the substance of the work is taken without authority.”215 
[Underlining added] Drone’s argument referred to most adaptations or derivations of 
works that now are called to be creative works although they have just manipulated the 
same substance and arrangement already created by previous mental efforts. 
                                                          
213 Paul Goldstein, 'Copyright', Law and Contemporary Problems, 55/2 (1992)., p. 80. 
214 Jeannie Suk, 'Originality', Harvard Law Review, 115 HVLR (2002)., p. 1998.  
215 Eaton Sylvester Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain 
and the United States: Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, and Playright in Dramatic and 
Musical Compositions (Little, Brown, 1879). p. 385 cited in Simms V. Santon, 1896, 75 F.6, C.C.N.D. Cal. 
at 9 
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6.11 Conclusion: 
Throughout this Chapter, this thesis has presented the evidence that can support its 
argument, namely, the elements of authorship. The opinions of the English 
philosophers Hobbes, Locke and Young constituted the main basis upon which this 
thesis relied to extract these elements, besides the views of Hegel and Kant. 
Accordingly, in order for a work to be an authorship work, or a work of intellect, it 
should include a personal, mental or spiritual contribution by the author. It should 
“manifests traits of ‘high authorship,’ subjective or creative elements that reveal the 
author's own personal influence”216 
This argument is important at this time, when the EU is following a path that is tending 
towards the civil law system in copyright law, which considers the personality of the 
author as the main criterion for the protection of any intellectual work.217 Even in the US 
we find the case of Feist v. Rural, and other recent cases,218 as well as the 
‘Compendium of the US Copyright Office’ tend to revive the personality and mental 
elements in the work in order that it be copyrighted.219  
Though this concentration on personality may seem strange to the orthodox situation 
that is followed in the UK and the US, as is apparent in the difficulties that UK cases 
have faced in applying the ‘intellectual creation’ criterion regarding databases, the 
thesis argues that it is an inevitable direction. However, if this trend is not adjoined to a 
categorisation of works, the situation will return to the current conflict and confusion, as 
there should be a path available that provides protection to works that are devoid of a 
mental and personal contribution, but are made by extensive expenditure of time, effort 
and investment.  
In this situation, protection to be applied through categorisation of works, is a necessary step. 
Works including personal and mental elements will get the current protection of copyright and 
will smoothly be able to be the subject of the application of originality in its higher interpretations 
that measure the author’s personality and creativity. Separating works that do not include any of 
these characteristics, or where “the authorship is de minimis or the work does not contain 
authorship”,220 in a different category will spare the court of the need to reduce the originality 
interpretation to fit any of these works, and will spare the right holders of these works any risks 
of not protecting their works if the judge has adopted a high interpretation of originality regarding 
their works. 
                                                          
216 Stephen P. Tarolli, 'Comment, the Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 1639 (1997). p. 1650 
217 See Waelde argument, Charlotte Waelde, 'Database Copyright: The Story of Bhb', Copyright Law: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research (2009), 109. p. 125. 
218 See Chapter 3 at 3.10. 
219 This was especially apparent in their recourse to the Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles cases. 
220 § 201. 7 of Unitied States Government, 'Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37 Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights', supra note 134, p. 537.  
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7 Chapter Seven:  
Works that Lack Mental and Personal Contribution  
(Non-Authorship Works) 
 
7.1 Introduction: 
The non-protection of facts and the pieces of information are supported by the Berne 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. As Art. 2(8) of the Berne Convention says: 
“[t]he protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day nor to 
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.”1 Art 9(2) 
of the TRIPS Agreement provided that: “Copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such.”2 However, the courts and laws have allowed for the protection of 
these facts, if they are selected or arranged in an original way, and also if the collection 
included other original work. However, in both cases, it is only the original selection and 
arrangement of original work can get copyright protection, and not the facts 
themselves. 3 
 
The thesis argues that if the given works include information gathered and organized 
without the existence of thoughts or ideas behind that information. These works are 
considered devoid of any authorship, because the author did not do any work as an 
author, but he instead acted as a craftsman. Personal or mental elements cannot 
appear in mere selection and arrangement. This is why it is argued in this research that 
selection and arrangement do not include any of the elements of authorship extracted 
from the philosophers of personal authorship: Hobbes, Locke, and Hegel,4 as will be 
explined in a separate section below. 5 Unfortunately, this distinction between what is 
an authorship work and what is a not, is unclear in copyright law.  
Collections of facts and information, although they are important for a lot of individuals, 
they have not been authored, this because they are devoid of any subjective mind 
processing. Accordingly, we must prove that, and not attempt to contrive such personal 
characterization or find a pretext in order to claim the existence of authorship in these 
works. “Personality-based characterizations of many low authorship informational 
                                                          
1 'Berne Convention', (Switzerland 1886 (Paris act 1971)). 
2 'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Trips)', O.J. 1994 L. (1994). 
3 American Code Co. V. Bensinger, 1922, 282 F. 829, 2d Cir. at 834.  
4 See Chapter 6 at 6.7. 
5 See this Chapter at 7.4. 
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works seem contrived”,6 as happened in the Supreme Court Case, Feist v. Rural,7 as 
the thesis has argued and explained above.8  
Copyright law can provide protection to these works without giving a false impression 
of the existence of authorship or creating an illusion of the existence of subjective effort 
in organizing this information, which these works do not need to do in order to perform 
their essential role in conveying information. This is why Ginsburg suggested: “[m]ore 
importantly, these characterizations [Personality-based characterizations] seem wholly 
beside the point. Even if one could discern subjective "arrangement" in works such as 
maps, address directories, and compilations of judicial decisions, that arrangement 
may bear little, if any, connection to the work's central importance as a source of 
information.” 9 [Underlining added]. 
Demanding something that is not required for the factual works’ construction is not fair 
or logical. When originality in authorship works is required, it is something logical in 
order to make sure that authorship is there as a foundational element in literary, artistic 
and musical works, which are created by mind operations. However, factual works are 
not required, from the beginning, and are not presumed to be the result of any mind 
operation, but they do represent efforts and expenses used in the collection. This is 
why the EU provided protection to collections of facts when they cannot fulfil the 
copyright criteria under the sui generis system10 as the protection of the expended 
investment is a vital aim that should be achieved even outside copyright law, and that 
has been achieved, in the UK, through the sui generis database regulation.11 This is 
what this thesis attempts to generalise in regard to all non- authorship works, not to 
databases only, and through a theoretical justification that raises the authorship 
substance and the originality interpretation regarding authorship works depending on 
English philosophers, and abolishing it regarding non-authorship works. This is argued 
in order to reach the practical goal of reducing the conflict in copyright subsistence 
decisions.  
According to this argument, ownership is believed to exist in more instances than 
authorship. We argue that ownership can be approved in works that are devoid of 
                                                          
6 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', 
Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990)., p. 1869.  
7 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 1991, 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, Supreme 
Court of the United States.  
8 See Chapter 3 at 3.4.1. and especially 3.4.2. 
9 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1869.  
10 Through 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', 
96/9/EC (EU, 1996)..  
11 'The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations', (UK, 1997). 
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authorship for regulation and marketing purposes, but authorship requires specific 
elements that are personal and mental, in order to exist to describe a work as an 
authorship work. The thesis’s title has put ownership before authorship as a confession 
of this phenomenon in modern copyright law.  
The cases where absence of authorial contribution appear have been briefed by 
Durham: “Some works, however, do not so clearly exhibit an ‘author's’ influence-highly 
factual works, such as telephone directories, with unremarkable characteristics of 
selection and organization; works that nearly reproduce existing works by other 
authors; or works created by mechanical processes with little human intervention. In 
such cases, the concept of authorship demands closer scrutiny.”12 [Underlining added] 
and that is why mental contribution and ‘selection and arrangement’ are seen as the 
real characteristics or indications of authorship. 
7.2 Compilations Protection in Legislations and Case Law: 
 
S. 3 of the CDPA articulated that a literary work includes any written or spoken work, 
including, tables, compilations, computer programs, and databases.13 The ‘originality’ 
criterion is required for these works to be protected by copyright law. However, s. 3A 
specified a special interpretation of the originality criterion for databases, which is ‘the 
selection and arrangement’ of the contents, which constitutes ‘the author’s own 
intellectual creation’. 14 
This means that originality is required in regard to all literary works, including fictional 
works, novels, fantasy, scientific books, etc. , as well as, anthologies, dictionaries, 
catalogues and travel guides. In addition, originality is required for artistic works, 
including graphic works, photographs, sculpture, collage, architecture and also artistic 
craftsmanship works.  
Though §. 102 (b) of the US Copyright Act of 1976 provided that: “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
                                                          
12 A.L. Durham, 'Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative Model of Authorship', Brigham 
Young University Law Review,  (2004). p. 70. Durham even argued that such scrutiny through 
“distinguish[ing] between the original and unoriginal, or ‘authored’ and ‘un-authored,’ aspects of a 
copyrighted work”. Ibid. p. 72. 
13 See S.3 of 'Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (Cdpa)', (UK, 1988). 
14 S. 3 stated “(1) In this Part— “literary work” means any work, other than a dramatic or musical work, 
which is written, spoken or sung, and accordingly includes— (a) a table or compilation [other than a 
database],  . . (b) a computer program; . . . [(c) preparatory design material for a computer program][and 
(d) a database]” and s. 3A (2) states: “(2) For the purposes of this part a literary work consisting of a 
database is original if, and only if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the 
database the database constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.” see, ibid. 
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the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”15 
Factual works in US law are included within the definition of compilation works, which 
are defined thus: “Compilations are works formed by the collection and assembling of 
pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a 
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”16 
 
The US Copyright Act 1976 and the US Copyright Code require originality in all works, 
whether literary, artistic, musical or dramatic works, and even compilations and 
derivative works. 17 Accordingly, the US law confers protection to telephone directories, 
stock market indexes, racing forms, or any other works that are described as original 
works of authorship. However we find the ‘Code of Federal Regulations’ explains: 
“[w]orks consisting entirely of information that is common property containing no 
original authorship, such as, for example, Standard calendars, height and weight 
charts, tape measures and rulers, schedules of sporting events, and lists or tables 
taken from public documents or other common sources.”18[Underlining added].  
Here, this thesis would like to focus on the fact that courts in the US have been divided 
in interpreting the conditions of originality and when it can be said to exist in a given 
work, yet, they ignored the other half of the condition, which is authorship, according to 
the full condition: “original works of authorship”. As, courts had to make sure that the 
disputed work is authored first before searching whether this authorship is original or 
not. If this was first ensured, the interpretation and application of originality would be 
easier, but, as argued above,19 judges were left alone before the pressure of the 
authorship concept and copyright law’s delay in coping with technological changes, and 
the result was inconsistency everywhere, as stated.20 
                                                          
15 'Copyright Act of the United States', Ch8-10; 12-17 of Title 17 of the US code (US, 1976). 
16 §. 101 of ibid. 
17 As, according to §. 102: “(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. Works of authorship include the following categories 
(1) literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audio-visual works; 
(7) sound recordings; and 
(8) “architectural works.” See, ibid. 
18 §. 202. 1 (d) of Unitied States Government, 'Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37 Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights', (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014)..  
19 See Chapter 1 at 1.1. 
20 See Chapter 2 at 2.4 and 2.5. 
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Compilations of facts and information struggle to comply with copyright law principles 
and theories, and even with current legislation of copyright law. Judge Feinberg in 
Eckes v. Card Prices21 argued that “copyright law and compilations are uneasy 
bedfellows.”22 Goldstein confirms that protecting factual works under copyright law is 
“the most troublesome aspect of copyright protection.”23 Denicola allocated the problem 
and offered the solution also, as he stated that: “the very vocabulary of copyright is ill 
suited to analysing property rights in works of nonfiction. Although copyright 
prerequisites such as originality or creativity may carry significance when applied to 
Macbeth or Ulysses, their utility is less apparent in the context of a financial report in 
the Wall Street Journal, and even more obscure with respect to the Manhattan 
telephone directory. Yet copyright law must concern itself with each.”24 [Underlining 
added]. Although, the reason for this uneasy relationship is the thing that needs 
investigation, that separate dealing with each is the ultimate way out.25  
Haungs also after discussing the selection and arrangement criteria’s application on 
compilations of facts and the conflict it causes regarding the protection of underlying 
facts has concluded that “copyright law should recognize that what is protected in 
compilations is the effort expended in their creation”,26 not that minimum selection and 
arrangement done. 
Confusion also exists in scholars’ understandings of the foundations of copyright law, 
including the concept of authorship that initially requires the existence of an ‘author’. 
For instance, Geller, in his discussion on the nature of intellectual works as 
expressions of authors’ personalities made a separation between the author’s thought 
and personality, and he argued that it is not necessary that the author’s thoughts 
express his personality, especially in his discussion of Kant’s argument: “[Kant]… 
                                                          
21 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 1984, 736 F.2d 859, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit..  
22 Ibid. at 862.  
23 Paul Goldstein, Stella W Lillick, and Ira S Lillick, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (2: Little, 
Brown Boston, 1989)., p. 180.  
24 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', Columbia Law Review, 81/3 (1981)., p. 516.  
25 There was a an attempt in (1910) to undertake such differentiation between authorship and non-
authorship works by considering the functions of every category, that was done by Judge Ward in the US 
case, West Pub. v. Edward Thompson, when he stated: “there is a great difference between text-books 
and volumes of reported cases or digests of those cases … A poem or a novel or a history or a directory or 
a dictionary or a scientific treatise is intended to please, interest, instruct, or satisfy the reader, so to speak, 
in itself; but a digest considered by itself is nothing. Its purpose is as a tool to enable Judges to write their 
opinions, lawyers to write their briefs, and authors to write their text-books.” See, West Pub. Co. V. Edward 
Thompson Co., 1910, 176 F. 833, Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. at 838 However, this 
distinction was not theoretically founded.  
26 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', 
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 23 (1989). p. 359 citing Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in 
Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works', supra note 24, p. 516 
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observed that authors expressed their own thoughts, not necessarily their personalities, 
in their 'discourse.”27  
Although, as discussed before,28 the Supreme Court in Feist v. Rural29 has settled for 
the selection and arrangement criterion in compilation works as a condition for 
conferring copyright protection to them: “[the Supreme Court] established a 
constitutional barrier to the copyrightability of compilations that lack a ‘modicum of 
creativity’.”30 The selection criteria has been settled since the List v. Keller Case31 as 
“each directory is original to the extent that the selection is original; hence where the 
compiler of such directory uses a previous directory of the same character, to save 
himself the trouble of making an independent selection …. he infringes the first 
compiler's copyright.”32 [Underlining added].  
Although the case of Feist v. Rural was thought to constitute a change in the history of 
the protection of the collection of facts and the interpretation of originality, what 
happened is that although courts “purported to require originality as a prerequisite for 
copyright protection, in practice, it simply measured originality as a function of 
industry.”33 
7.3 The Different Nature of Collections of Facts: 
Ginsburg argues that the ‘fluctuation’ or ‘confusion’ within the ‘copyrightability’ in courts’ 
decisions is returning to “the basis for copyright protection underlying judicial 
decisions”,34 as she argues that throughout the eighteenth century and until the mid-
19th century, the focus was on the labour expended in creating the work as a criterion 
used when deciding copyrightability, rather than the “inspiration” of the author, due to 
the excess of interest in informational and utility works. She described this era, “[n]o 
matter how banal the subject matter, if the author's work resulted from original efforts, 
rather than from copying pre-existing sources, the author was entitled to a copyright.”35 
                                                          
27 Paul Edward Geller, 'Must Copyright Be for Ever Caught between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?', 
Of authors and origins: essays on copyright law,  (1994)., p. 168.  
28 See Chapter 3 at 3.4.1.  
29 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7.  
30 Anani S Narayanan, 'Standards of Protection for Databases in the European Community and the United 
States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality', Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ., 27 (1993)., p. 460.  
31 List Pub. Co. V. Keller, 1887, 30 F. 772, Circuit Court, S.D. New York. 
32 Ibid.31, at 772.  
33 Robert Brauneis, Intellectual Property Protection of Fact-Based Works: Copyright and Its Alternatives 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009). p. 25.  
34 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1874. 
35 Ibid.p. 1874, she cited the cases, Longman V. Winchester, 1809, 16 Vesey Junior 269; 33 E.R. 987, Ct 
of Chancery and Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 1903, 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, Supreme 
Court of the United States 
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Ginsburg confirmed that from the mid-19th century courts adopted a different approach 
to decide copyrightability which was to focus on ‘personality’ or the author’s “unique 
individuality” which should manifest in the work to make it distinctive to other works. 36 
She further argued that since the emergence of the personality approach the labour 
approach has not disappeared, but both – although they have conflicting substances 
and implications – have continued to coexist: “throughout the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth, the concept of original authorship embraced both original labor and 
original creative activity.”37 [Underlining added] and that has caused the conflict in 
courts’ decisions.  
This paradox has been referred to by some scholars, Gorman, for instance, stressed 
that “[d]espite the significant difference between the elements protected in fact works 
and in creative works, courts have nonetheless used the same terms and same tools of 
analysis in dealing with both types of copyright.” 38 This practice has led to “occasional 
use of traditional copyright language and concepts in a distorted manner”39. Gorman 
has even argued that copyright law may not be suitable to protect factual works due to 
this law’s adoption of the protection of expression, for “it must be recognized that the 
law of copyright, which avowedly protects expression only, may not be the ideal vehicle 
for the protection of fact works, the value of which is generally attributable to the labor 
they embody rather than their mode of expression.” 40 For Gorman, if the elements that 
deserve protection are the labour, effort and expense, so the unfair competition and 
misappropriation doctrines are the most suitable for application here. 41 In the UK 
Laddie et al. have argued that case law on databases’ protection shows that “a 
substantial amount of purely routine mental labour may equally well satisfy the 
statutory requirement,”42 and that copyright protection can be granted to directories 
although “no imagination is required to produce these and no skill beyond knowing how 
to read and write.”43 
We ascertain that the focus on the assignment of works has concealed the analysis of 
authorship in the works, as authorship does not hinder the development of works, but 
                                                          
36 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1874, she cited the cases, Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 
298, supra note 35 and Charles Jefferys V. Thomas Boosey, 1854, 10 E.R. 681, House of Lords 
37 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1875.  
38 Robert A Gorman, 'Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts', Harvard Law 
Review, 76 (1962)., p. 1570.  
39 Ibid. p. 1570.  
40 Ibid. p. 1571.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2 vols. 
(Fourth edn., 1: LexisNexis, 2011). at 3. 57.  
43 Ibid. 
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has been neglected, and the concept blamed for the inappropriateness of the 
application of copyright law principles to collaborative works and collections of facts.  
 
Ginsburg confirmed the existence of this confusion in the US courts through the joining 
of personal convictions and utilitarian justifications to justify protection. When she 
discussed the application of the personality or individualism theories of copyright, as 
judges required personality imprint in a work in a system wholly immersed in 
utilitarianism.44 She concluded that: “[c]ourts have reached contradictory results 
respecting both the originality requisite to inclusion of a work within copyright's subject 
matter and the kind of copying that constitutes infringement”. 45 So, a criticism of 
authorship, such as arguing that: “[t]he unusual power and persistence of ‘authorship,’ 
demonstrating that far from being a non-controversial generalized ‘source’ of copyright 
doctrine, it in fact is the specific locus of a basic contradiction between public access to 
and private control over imaginative creations”,46 is considered an improper criticism, 
as authorship does not persist in all works. It is the failure of lawmakers to discover that 
authorship and its elements are not present in them.  
According to this confirmation on the different nature of works under copyright law, and 
the different principles that are suitable to each, it has become impossible to find a 
theory, concept or criterion that can be applied on all works: “both the making of 
generalizations as to how to copyright works and the establishment of broad principles 
that may be of equal applicability throughout those fields of activity have become 
increasingly challenging tasks.”47  
The negative impression towards authorship in databases began to appear in UK 
cases. For instance, in Football Datco Ltd v. Britten Pools Ltd. case48 Judge Floyd 
demonstrated that fixture lists involved very significant labour and skill; he confirmed 
that they were “not mere ‘sweat of the brow’, i. e. , the application of rigid criteria to the 
                                                          
44 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1871 
45 Ibid. p. 1871, As Ginsburg articulated: “On the one hand, some recent decisions, adhering to the 
personality concept of original authorship, have held fact compilations insufficiently original to qualify for 
copyright. On the other hand, some courts are willing not only to include fact compilations within copyright 
subject matter but also to accord the information contained in these works a very broad scope of protection 
against copying.” 
46 Peter Jaszi, 'Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship', Duke Law Journal,  
(1991). p. 457.  
47 Jeremy Phillips, 'Authorship, Ownership, Wikiship: Copyright in the Twenty-First Century', Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 3/12 (2008)., p. 789.  
48 Football Dataco Ltd V. Britten Pools Ltd, 2010, R.P.C. 17, High Court of Justice (Chancery Division).  
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processing of data; it was unlike the compiling of a telephone directory, in that at each 
stage there was scope for the application of judgment and skill.”49 
Authorship is a process that includes the creation and registration of ideas and 
thoughts that came into the mind and it is different from registering what is directly 
sensed by eyes or ears. Collections of facts are just the registration of what is sensed 
by eyes and ears, as they are lacking any processing by mind. Thus, collections of 
facts are non-authorship works.  
Herein, it is worth referring to St. Bonaventura’s50 statement, which supports this 
thesis’s view on the differentiation between authorial and non-authorial efforts, as he 
argues that there are four ways to make books, the scriptor, compilator, commentor 
and auctor.51 Accordingly, he classified the degrees of efforts used into four classes, 
from non-authorship works that the ‘scribe’ and ‘compiler’ do, to the authorship efforts 
which ‘commentators’ and ‘auctors’ do. 
We claim that authorship efforts are superior, more valuable and worthy of appreciation 
than non-authorship works that are confined to the work of hands, efforts and even the 
expenditure of money. Thus, authorship works should be given a degree of protection 
higher than that given to factual works. Phillips has criticised the conferral of copyright 
protection to databases, and that their creators are considered authors, in an 
interesting statement: “those august bodies, in directing the legislative drift of their 
neophyte subject matter, steer their attention away from a work of creative authorship 
and focus instead upon what is effectively the work of tidy office management, the 
arrangement of something even as trivially uncreated as raw data, in a systematic or 
methodical manner by means of which each piece of data is individually accessible. 
This is to bestow the title ‘author’ on the street-sweeper who brushes facts into tidy 
piles of data all along the information highway.”52 So, rightly, Phillip finds that factual 
works are made through ‘tidy office management’ not through creative authorship. 
7.4 ‘Selection and Arrangement’ of the factual works Lacks Authorship: 
Originality in the selection and arrangement of data is of the kind that differs from time 
to time and from community to another, depending on the level of culture and 
advancement in technology this community has. Actually, what may be considered a 
creative arrangement in some places may not be considered so in another, and over 
time this approach will deter the protection of many future factual works due to the 
                                                          
49 Ibid. at 523. 
50 St. Bonaventura, (1221-1274) an Italian medieval scholastic theologian and philosopher.  
51 As cited in Chapter 5 at 5.3. 
52 Jeremy Phillips, 'Authorship, Ownership, Wikiship: Copyright in the Twenty-First Century', supra note 47, 
p. 791.  
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similarity between arrangements of works and the lack of possible variations, especially 
if we compare arrangement of factual works in all fields of knowledge. The 
arrangement may be the same in a factual work in medicine and in mathematics, but 
both works will be original, and in the same field the protection of some arrangements 
will give monopoly rights to the first compiler using that method or arrangement.  
Invoking the idea that creativity and originality can exist in the ‘expression’ in factual 
works is no longer valid with the technological advancements that have led to software 
that can paraphrase texts and rearrange information works. Judge Ward rejected this 
possibility: “extensive copying or paraphrasing of the language of the syllabi would not, 
we think, be a fair use.”53  
Evidence of this is that we find in cases where the selection and arrangement is missed 
or non-existent the court still looks to whether the intellectual creation is there or not. 
For instance, in Infopaq v. Danske54, when the eleven words extracted from the 
newspapers are separated from the selection and arrangement they do not show 
original selection or arrangement.55 Nevertheless, the Court decided that what is 
important is whether they convey the ideas of the author and work as a means of 
communicating his thoughts or not. If yes, they can be copyrighted.56 Accordingly, in 
compilations of works and factual works, requiring originality in the selection and 
arrangement per se has nothing to do with the conveyance of thoughts, as thoughts 
are missed in the underlying material, which are facts, and their arrangement. Even in 
compilations of works, the underlying works are already the works of precedent authors 
that are collected and arranged merely for the mere collection and not to convey any 
thoughts. Both should thus be denied authorship and the originality requirement, 
because its subject matter (thoughts) is non-existent.57 
“The notion of an arrangement as protectable expression does little violence to basic 
principles. It is sufficiently narrow to avoid the statutory and constitutional obstacles to 
                                                          
53 West Pub. Co. V. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, supra note 25, at 838.  
54 Infopaq International a/S V. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, E.C.D.R. 16, C-5/08, Court of Justice of 
the European Communities (Fourth Chamber).  
55 Ibid. at 272. 
56 This appears in the Court of Justice confirmation that “the possibility may not be ruled out that certain 
isolated sentences, or even certain parts of sentences in the text in question, may be suitable for 
conveying to the reader the originality of a publication such as a newspaper article, by communicating to 
that reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the intellectual creation of the author of that 
article. Such sentences or parts of sentences are, therefore, liable to come within the scope of the 
protection provided for in art. 2(a) of that Directive.” See, ibid. at 272.  
57 As was discussed earlier in chapter six.  
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protecting individual facts or ideas and satisfies the requirement of originality.”58 
[Underlining added]. 
In the US also, some courts have used ‘selection and arrangement’, not for authorship 
purposes but to protect the collection per se, e. g., in the case Financial Information v. 
Moody59 Fll argued that what it presents is a kind of “simplicity and conciseness of the 
cards, describing them as appearing in ‘outline form’ without any ‘superfluous 
matter’.”60 Besides, the Court’s description of Moody’s work was that it “includes not 
only the bi-weekly news reports, but also the annual Municipal and Government 
Manual, which is a comprehensive work containing a great deal of financial information 
about municipalities. The Moody's publication serves a far wider audience than the 
Daily Bond Cards, including libraries and government agencies, as well as financial 
institutions.”61 [Underlining added]. Both works are just collections of facts that cannot 
be considered as authorship works, due to the lack of an authorial creation or 
contribution to knowledge and the inexistence of any thought or idea that the author 
wants to convey through this work that the contents of the work express or reflect.  
 In addition, it is argued that the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ criterion in the UK and the 
US62 is used only to justify the conferral of protection to databases in case there was 
no specific selection or arranagement identified. ‘Skill, labour and judgment’ is an easy 
criterion with which every work can comply, e. g., in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William 
Hill (Football) Ltd. case, the Court affirmed: “In the present case, if it is permissible to 
take into account all the skill, judgment and labour expended in producing the 
respondents' coupon, there can be no doubt that it is “original.”63  
 
Selection and arrangement in works based on facts cannot be original or subjective for 
many reasons, as explained in the subsequent sections:  
7.4.1 First, The Nature of Works Based on Facts is Different from Other Works: 
The nature of databases is different from other literary and artistic works, as the 
content of the database or its body is dispersed pieces of information, and arranging 
them is a superficial or supplementary procedure to facilitate the use of these contents. 
Lack of arrangement will not substantially affect either the significance of the work or its 
                                                          
58 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', supra note 24. p. 527. 
59 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1986, 808 F.2d 204, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
60 Ibid. at 206 
61 Ibid. 
62 See chapter three at 3.6, especially the discussion around the use of this criterion in the US case 
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 1999, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, United States District Court, S.D. 
New York.  
63 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1964, 1 W.L.R. 273, House of Lords p. 278.  
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nature as benficial or functional factual work. This is different from other literary or 
artistic works, as the selection and arrangement is the body of the work, what gives the 
abstract words or lines that are used a meaning is the selection and arrangement itself, 
and changing this selection or arrangement changes the whole meaning of the work 
and the thoughts included. On the other hand, changing the selection and arrangement 
of data will not change the database, as what the audience are searching for is the 
contents themselves, regardless of the specific selection and arrangement chosen.  
 ‘Selection and arrangement’ in factual works is not the thing through which the author 
– or compiler in this case - will benefit knowledge and science with, this thesis does not 
believe that this criterion is really designed to measure whether compilations will 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”64 Nor can it decide whether works 
will help in “the encouragement of learning”.65 
From another angle, although selection and arrangement is a constituent feature in 
creating all literary, musical and artistic works, as all works consist of factual parts and 
elements of public domain that are arranged in different ways or presented with 
creative additions from the author, since “there is no new thing under the sun”,66 and 
that “all writing is, in some sense, rewriting”.67 ‘Selection and arrangement’ cannot be 
applied in regard to compilation works.  
This thesis’s opinion depends on the belief that selection and arrangement can work in 
a specific way regarding all authorship works. However, in compilation works it works in 
a different way. All authorship works comprise of elements from the public domain (raw 
materials), and the selection and arrangement of these elements can produce a final 
product that, in sum, is different from previous works, although in its details may have 
the same elements as a previous work. For instance, a novel consists of letters and 
words that are in the public domain, and plots or events that are, probably, also in the 
public domain, but the selection of special words and events and the arranging of them 
in a special or personal way can convey thoughts or sensations from the author’s mind 
or intellect to the minds of readers that is different from previous works. In paintings, all 
the elements used are in the public domain, whether natural or industrialised objects, 
                                                          
64 According to article 1 §. 8 (8) of 'The Constitution of the United States of America', No. 110-50 (United 
States, 1787)., 
65 According to the title of the 'Statute of Anne', 8 Anne, c. 19 (England, 1710)..  
66 Originally from the Bible, Ecclesiastes 1:9, "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that 
which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.” and is quoted in many 
cases to refer to that all works having originated from previous works or common knowledge, see for 
instance, Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russell Williams, 2000, 1 W.L.R. 2416, House of Lords at 2418.  
67 Jeannie Suk, 'Originality', Harvard Law Review, 115 HVLR (2002). Note 7, Suk even confirms that 
“[a]uthors of the myriad rewritings of Shakespeare probably learned from Shakespeare himself, whose 
plays often rewrote prior texts.” Ibid. p. 1990 
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and lines and bends that cannot be copyrighted, but the selection and arrangement of 
them in a specific and personal way can each time reflect thoughts and sensations in 
the minds of viewers that were not found in previous works, and this is also the case in 
musical and dramatic works.  
On the other hand, the selection and arrangement of facts and information in 
compilation works does not aim to reflect any thoughts or sensations that address the 
minds of readers or viewers. Facts are collected and compiled in that form or another 
for the mere purpose of collection and compilation. This does not exist in literary or 
artistic works where the work is not considered a work unless it conveys thoughts and 
sensations, the public domain elements are not collected merely for the collection and 
to present that collection to readers. A book that consists of a random selection and 
arrangement of words that do not aim to convey any meaning to the reader is actually 
not a book. A child’s drawings containing lines and circles that are randomly done does 
not convey any personal thoughts or sensations. However, such random display can 
be protected by trademarks if taken as a trademark, but they cannot be a copyright 
work, and this is so also in other works.  
This view was apparent especially regarding the criticism of the Feist Case, as 
although personal expressions – if there are any - are limited in compilation works, 
O’Connor’s belief in the principle that “[o]riginality remains the sine qua non of 
copyright”68 and that it is a personal feature pushed her to stipulate originality in the 
little expression added by the compiler, which is the selection and arrangement of the 
collected data in such works as the only common personal intervention in them. This 
opinion is supported by O’Connor’s statement that if the author did not add any 
expression, then “[t]he only conceivable expression is the manner in which the compiler 
has selected and arranged the facts”. 69  
This approach in protecting works through the shape or form they apply, ignoring the 
labour and investment expended in their creation, “would severely diminish incentive”70 
to create, and what will happen is one of two probabilities: 
Firstly, courts could ignore the limitations of copyright law and protect the information, 
or facts themselves, as corroborated in the following quote by Denicola: “[w]hen 
appropriated data are used to construct a work that is virtually identical to the original, 
                                                          
68 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7, at 
348.  
69 Ibid. at 349.  
70 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', supra note 24, p. 528.  
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courts can be expected to find infringement without regard for the theoretical limitations 
of doctrine.” 71 Copyright principles have then been sacrificed.  
Also, this is apparent in in the List Pub. Co. v. Keller72 case, when the Court prohibited 
defendants from using the plaintiff’s work, also, in College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco 
Book Co. ,73 when the defendant was prohibited from using the choice of words and 
translations in the plaintiff’s vocabulary lists. Likewise, in Edward Thompson Co. v. 
American Law Book Co.,74 although the Court decided that while the defendant could 
use the plaintiff’s work as a guide, he could not remove the citation from a book of 
quotations and put the texts or references from the original works. Even the decision in 
Leon v. Pacific75 was described as “a case whose result can rest only upon a theory 
that extends copyright protection to the particular collection of data gathered by the 
compiler.” 76 
Laddie et al. have even argued that databases created by collecting and compiling raw 
materials “from numerous and diverse sources (as in the case of a street directory), the 
product would be entitled to copyright as an original compilation on the same principles 
as any other; and here the owner would get a copyright in the underlying text.”77 This 
approach was properly settled in the EU Database Directive, as although it explicitly 
mentioned that copyright only protects the arrangement of data and not the data itself, 
it allowed for the protection of the data themselves under the sui generis system, in 
order to protect the investment made to collect these data. 78 
Secondly, whether the court respects copyright law and allows for the appropriation of 
the facts and information gathered, the selection and arrangement criterion can then be 
proven easily to be inadequate protection for databases on the ground that: “[w]ith its 
                                                          
71 Ibid. p. 528.  
72 List Pub. Co. V. Keller, 30 F. 772, supra note 31. 
73 College Entrance Book Co. V. Amsco Book Co., 1941, 119 F.2d 874, 2nd Cir.  at 875.  
74 Edward Thompson Co. V. American Law Book Co., 1903, 122 F. 922 2d Cir. .  
75 Leon V. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 1937, 91 F.2d 484, Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.  
76 The National Commission, 'National Commission Report on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works,' "CONTU Report" Final Report (1978). 
77 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
42, at 32.12.  
78 As Recital 15 provided: “Whereas the criteria used to determine whether a database should be 
protected by copyright should be defined to the fact that the selection or the arrangement of the contents 
of the database is the author's own intellectual creation; whereas such protection should cover the 
structure of the database;” [Underlining added]. Recital 38 of the EC Directive stated that “Whereas the 
increasing use of digital recording technology exposes the database maker to the risk that the contents of 
his database may be copied and rearranged electronically, without his authorization, to produce a 
database of identical content which, however, does not infringe any copyright in the arrangement of his 
database;” [Underlining added], see, 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal 
Protection of Databases', supra note 10.  
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emphasis on the effort of ordering rather than gathering, it fails to furnish an acceptable 
approach when the often minimal effort of arranging has not been appropriated.” 79  
The question arises: what if the next compiler uses the same information, but puts it in 
a different arrangement? In fact, according to copyright theoretical principles he will get 
copyright protection on his work without the need to prove any effort or money 
expenditure. This shows the injustice that this criterion will cause, especially if we take 
into consideration the ease of using technology to arrange pieces of information and 
even to apply specific criteria for selection to already compiled facts in order to make a 
different work, without any substantial effort or money. Denicola supports this thesis’s 
opinion, as he finds that selection and arrangement: “[a]t its extreme it would permit a 
defendant to choose at random bit after bit of data from an alphabetical directory and 
then simply rearrange the resulting miscellany into the desired scheme… If the data 
are reordered without resort to the prior work, the protected arrangement would not 
have been copied”. 80 that ‘extreme’ application here is deemed an application of 
copyright orthodox principles of originality and idea (or fact)/ expression dichotomy 
which was confirmed in recital 38 of the EC Database Directive.81 
This is confirmed in Simms v. Stanton:82 “[t]here is no recognized principle which will 
prevent a subsequent compiler from copying common materials from an existing 
compilation, and arranging and combining them in a new form . . . copyright protects 
only his [compiler’s] own arrangement of the materials which he has selected.”83This is 
also confirmed in Feist: “a compilation's copyright protects only against unauthorized 
uses of the work as a whole, however, it does not extend to individual facts.”84 Nimmer 
commented on the tendency of courts to protect facts themselves, as their attitude is 
against the principles of copyright.85 That is why Denicola confirmed that this conflict is 
“not inevitable”.86  
We can conclude that selection and arrangement, which has personal attributes, is not 
suitable for protecting investments and efforts in collection of facts, which are in need 
                                                          
79 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', supra note 24, p. 528.  
80 Ibid. p. 528.  
81 See note 79 above. 
82 Simms V. Stanton, 1896, 75 F. 6, 13, C.C.N.D. California.  
83 Ibid. quoting, Eaton Sylvester Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in 
Great Britain and the United States: Embracing Copyright in Works of Literature and Art, and Playright in 
Dramatic and Musical Compositions (Little, Brown, 1879). 
84 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7, at 
350.  
85 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic 
Property, and the Protection of Ideas (M. Bender, 1990)., §. 3. 04.  
86 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', supra note 24. p. 527, note 64. 
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for protection. “[T]o the extent that the worth of the work lies in the information, rather 
than in the form imposed on the facts, modem copyright's emphasis on personality-
manifesting characteristics fails to secure the commercial value of these kinds of 
endeavors, even though the demand for productions such as directories and data 
bases is ever increasing.” 87 Besides, that constant search for personal features in 
collections of facts will not succeed. 
7.4.2 Second: Selection and Arrangement of Facts Cannot Be Personal: 
In UK law and the EC Database Directive 96/9, databases can be original if “the 
selection or the arrangement of the contents of the database is the author's own 
intellectual creation.”88 It has been argued that being an intellectual creation presumes 
that some personal features should be available in the selection and arrangement, e. 
g., Garnett and Davies affirmed: “[h]ow much creativity is required is not made clear in 
the directive, and will no doubt vary from case to case, but the requirement imposes a 
significant qualitative factor on the test, requiring some subjective contribution by the 
author.” 89 [Underlining added].  
Garnett and Davies add that the criterion of the sweat of the brow isn’t enough to 
subsist originality, and confirmed that “[t]he Judge according to recital 16 will not 
exercise a qualitative test to determine the existence of originality or not, but the author 
must have exercised Judgement, taste, or discretion in selecting the contents, thus e. 
g., all poems written by someone between 1900-1910 doesn’t acquire originality, 
although a selection by someone of their 1000 favourite poems would be original.” 90 
So, here, Garnett supports the qualitative test.  
However, even the latter example of selection cannot justify considering the collection 
of facts as a work of authorship, as this does not reflect the elements of authorship 
stated above.91 Having said this, we find Garnett and Davies even going lower, and 
arguing that: “although a qualitative test is not included, the quantitative test is more 
dependable in determining the originality and then the protection, therefore, the 
quantity of 1000 poems would satisfy the quantitative test and get the originality.” 92 So, 
Garnett and Davies are trying to articulate a vague provision by another inconsistent 
                                                          
87 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1869 
88 Recital 15 of 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of 
Databases', supra note 10, the same meaning is repeated in Art. 3(1) of the same directive, and s. 3.A (2). 
89 K.M. Garnett and G. Davies, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (16th edn., 1: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2009). at 3-148.  
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91 See chapter 6 at 6.7 
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point of view. The truth is that the way to assess originality is unclear when it is related 
to collections of facts or compilations of pre-existent works.  
The thesis completely refutes this criterion, namely the quantity of the data included, as 
the number or the quantity of the data that exists in the database will thus determine if 
it has originality or not. For instance, huge databases should be considered original on 
the basis of the number of pages or amount of data included. Consequently, we can 
find a common custom: if somebody wants to guarantee copyright protection to his 
database, he should make it above a certain number of pages in length, which is 
plainly not sensible.  
Databases are merely based on abstract facts and are limited by the nature of the facts 
that should be included and the desire of the audience. The role of the database’s 
maker is so limited, and there is no place to show his personality, even if the selection 
and arrangement is different it will be due to the nature of facts, to distinguish his 
database from similar ones, or just for to fulfil the copyright requirement. “Works of 
information, though commercially valuable, generally are deemed works of ‘low 
authorship’ containing little personal expression. ' Their value lies in the fact that they 
are accurate and useful, rather than fanciful or creative”. 93 Tarolli highlights this 
practice’s adverse effects on copyright law: “Observing that the value of compilation 
resides in its "collection of information, not its arrangement. If [its) protection is limited 
solely to the form of expression, the economic incentives underlying the copyright laws 
are largely swept away. . [Given the nature of] electronic compilations. . an emphasis 
upon arrangement and form . . becomes even more meaningless than in the past.”94 
Accordingly, the claim that selection and arrangement should be made by subjective 
decisions to bear the personality imprint is not a proper statement, as personality 
initially does not appear in the random selection of common materials, but personality 
appears in the selection that bears thoughts and sensations. Doing any random 
selection and arrangement that then is claimed to be subjective and considering the 
resulted work original or a work of intellect is not a proper argument. Any person can 
do unlimited different arrangements of given facts, say for instance the database about 
the decisions of courts of appeal, anybody can arrange them according to the subject, 
the plaintiffs, the place of the court, decisions taken, etc. This although may reflect 
mental effort but it does not aim at conveying personal thought of the person created 
the database to the audience that can never –or rarely- be repeated in a similar 
                                                          
93 Stephen P. Tarolli, 'Comment, the Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 1639 (1997)., p. 1650.  
94 Ibid. p. 1650, as he cited, National Business Lists, Inc. V. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 1982, 552 F. Supp. 89, 
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database. Any person can do the same arrangement exactly, and this is the core of 
personal and mental authorship that this thesis addressed and attempts to prove its 
inexistence in compilations of facts regardless of the selection and arrangement 
included. That is why we advocate Hicks statement “[c]opyright's primary purpose is in 
fostering the creation of new works, not superficial rearrangements of existing 
compilations.”95 
7.4.3 Overstatement of Authorship in Factual Works under Copyright Law: 
Courts, when conferring protection to collections of information and facts, recognise 
that what needs protection is the collection itself, not the arrangement, but there is a 
lack of a theoretical basis to do so, as copyright law principles cannot adapt due to their 
nature. “When courts do in fact protect a compilation's commercial value, they express 
disconcertion at the incongruence between the result and standard copyright 
rationales.” 96 Such a situation has been expressed, for instance, by Judge Moran in 
National Business lists v. Dun & Bradstreet,97 who confirmed: “[c]ompilations … have 
value because the compiler has collected data which otherwise would not be available. 
The compiler's contribution to knowledge normally is the collection of the information, 
not its arrangement. If his protection is limited solely to the form of expression, the 
economic incentives underlying the copyright laws are largely swept away. 
Recognizing this, the courts have long afforded protection under the copyright laws 
against appropriation of the fruits of the compiler's industry.”98 [Underlining added]. So, 
although ‘form of expression’ is the subject matter of copyright protection judges tend 
to protect the form and the underlying facts against copyright philosophy. 
This interpolation of information works under the umbrella of copyright law and its 
current principles and philosophies, without adopting a different theoretical basis or a 
justification to suit these work, is uncomfortable, and will help the conflict between 
courts’ decisions to continue, not just regarding the information works, but regarding all 
works, due to the distortion to principles that it causes. Latman confirms this view also, 
“[o]wing, however, to the current conceptual confusion over the proper theoretical basis 
for protecting conventional compilations, and the occasional (but unfortunate) mixing of 
the separate issues of protectability and infringement, it is likely that future disputes 
                                                          
95 Jack B Hicks, 'Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate', Texas 
Law Review, 65 (1986). p. 1010 
96 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 6, p. 1869.  
97 National Business Lists, Inc. V. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, N.D. I1., supra note 94.  
98 Ibid. at 92.  
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over electronic data bases will be subject to the same uncertainties as now face their 
conventional counterparts.”99 
The major objection to the conferring of protection to factual works emanates from the 
simple idea that: “it is anomalous that bare facts not subject to copyright are protected 
when collected or compiled, … under the same statute used to protect completely 
original works.”100 This latter contradiction is what the thesis challenges, through a two-
part approach, firstly, proving that collections of facts and their selection and 
arrangement are devoid of any authorship; secondly, proposing a separate system that 
will achieve stability through protecting them by a different approachthan that used to 
protect other literary and artistic works.  
This overstatement of the theoretical basis in protecting information works and the 
resulting paradox will be deepened further due to the technological facilities that are 
characterised not just with the speed of transferring files, but also of the speed in 
organizing them. So the arrangement and organization of facts is actually a non-sense 
requirement, as long as the basic functions of computers can do unlimited 
arrangements of the same work in no time. The Court, in National Business Lists, Inc. 
v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,101 confirmed this view: “[t]he computer programs are, after all, 
automated electronic compilations. The information is stored without arrangement and 
form, capable of being called forth as sheets of stickers at the touch of a button. In 
those circumstances an emphasis upon arrangement and form in compilation 
protection becomes even more meaningless than in the past.”102 [Underlining added].  
This research believes that selection and arrangement cannot be original or creative 
unless it is different or new. So, this requirement is a requirement of novelty, and not 
originality, as there is nothing creative in stipulating only differentiation. As Ginsburg 
confirmed – and cited above also:103 “Personality-based characterizations of many low 
authorship informational works seem contrived. … Even if one could discern subjective 
"arrangement" in works such as maps, address directories, and compilations of judicial 
decisions, that arrangement may bear little, if any, connection to the work's central 
importance as a source of information.” 104 For instance, in the famous case Ladbroke 
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Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd.,105 the dispute was about ‘fixed odds of football betting coupons 
arranged in a certain general form’, this work merely includes facts and mathematical 
suggestions that are made for betting purposes.106 There are no thoughts or sensations 
to be sent to the audience. It is just a presentation of facts -which are the matches that 
will be held in the next week and the expected results.  
The selection and arrangement included were not meant to constitute an intellectual 
work, as it was not meant to use the included elements to make them, and the work as 
a whole, expressing something different than if they existed in a different arrangement. 
From another angle, if one of these lists were taken away –and this is current from time 
to time- this does not affect the usefulness of the work. That is different from novels or 
musical notes or paintings. On the other hand, all the efforts expended in the selection 
is what preceded the stage of making the work itself, and, in the opinion of the thesis, 
that cannot be copyrighted. Thus, the work disputed in Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd. 
should be considered a non-authorship work and should not be protected according to 
authorship principles and originality, although it can be protected according to a sui 
generis system.  
Another example of non-authorship works is the trades’ directory that consists of 
advertisements classified under different headings, as although, in the case of Lamb v. 
Evans,107 Lord Judge Bowen stated: “They are the result of literary labour, both as 
regards the composition of the headings themselves and their collocation or 
concatenation in the book.” This thesis finds that headings cannot be relied on in order 
to give protection to compilation of advertisements, as confirmed in the cases of Dicks 
v. Yates,108 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corporation Ltd. 109 
and West Publishing v. Mead Case.110 As, in the latter case although the Court started 
its analysis by confirming that: “The Copyright Act provides copyright protection for 
‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.’”111 It 
considered that “considerable labor, talent, and judgment” was invested by West in 
making the arrangement of the courts’ decisions; although the arrangement was not 
more than ‘an arrangement in numerical order’,112 as it explained. Haungs in 
commenting on this case confirmed that “one senses that the overriding concern of the 
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Eight Circuit was not honestly assessing whether West’s compilation was truly original 
but rather protecting West’s labor.”113 
This argument does not just show the lack of rationality in requiring this condition, but 
also the inherent problems that will revolt by not sticking to the philosophies of laws, or, 
specifically, the philosophies upon which the conferring of copyright protection is 
based, namely personal authorship and rewarding creativity, and not the mere labour 
or expenses used to create works that lead to disregarding other philosophies of 
copyright law.  
In brief, the originality criteria was required just to ensure that works protected are 
those with authorship. This is based on a belief that copyright law intends to protect the 
author’s personality, or his mind operation, which is embodied in the work. Accordingly, 
information works lack authorship and its protection through copyright law will harm its 
philosophies and the whole system. “the industrious collection doctrine allows courts to 
lower the originality threshold below the level intended under the Constitution, the 
Copyright Act, and the case law, thus limiting public use of information and overlooking 
the principle that the law grants the copyright monopoly only to original works that 
reflect the author's personality.”114  
7.4.4 Third: Selection and Arrangement of Facts does not Require any Mental 
Effort or ‘Reflection’: 
Any arrangement made of the collected facts, whether made in a logical or a random 
way, does not reflect any creative input or inspiration or desire to convey specific 
thoughts or sensations through this specific selection and arrangement. This feature 
distinguishes intellectual works, whether literary, artistic or musical from factual works: 
“[t]he arrangements for which protection is sought tend to be alphabetical or numerical 
- hardly the sorts of works associated with artistic inspiration. In addition, the quantum 
of effort involved in executing the arrangement is also frequently minimal.”115 
According to Locke’s opinion, in differentiating between sensation and reflection, we 
find that selection and arrangement that is not a reflection of previous information has 
been sensed and passed through an ‘operation of the mind’, and has then appeared in 
that specific selection or arrangement is not a product of mind. Selection and 
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arrangement of factual works are just a mechanical procedure that is proved not to be 
a work of intellect, according to Hegelian and Lockean philosophies.  
Selection and arrangement in compilation works is something that can be done without 
any creativity, or mental effort, 116 for instance, through computer software. As Denicola 
confirmed: “[o]nce the data have been accumulated, the arrangement is often dictated 
exclusively by function and accomplished with the push of a computer key or the 
shuffling of index cards.”117 So, this low requirement has somehow kept the application 
of ‘the sweat of the brow’ as usual, although the terminology used has differed.  
7.4.5 Fourth: Selection and Arrangement Is Not Suitable to The Main Function 
of Factual Works: 
Selection and arrangement can be a barrier to the making of comprehensive and 
extensive compilations. As, in some instances, the characteristic of 
comprehensiveness of the database may be favourable, but ‘selection and 
arrangement’ imposes something beyond the main function of these compilations. This 
research argues that customers are not concerned with such differentiation, all that 
matters to them is the inclusivity that such compilations provide of the data concerned 
in a specific field, and the stipulation of the differentiation of the selection and 
arrangement may go against the purpose for which this compilation is made.  
For instance, it was decided in the English case Whitaker & Sons Ltd v. Publishers 
Circular 118 that it does not matter whether the collection of information was done in a 
comprehensive or selective way, as long as there is labour to ensure that the collection 
or database is complete, and that this collection is made by hand.119 This adds 
confusion to the current rule, which has been confirmed in the condition of ‘selection 
and arrangement’ that is stipulated in the EU Directive and the UK CDPA, confirming 
that copyright just protects the arrangement. 120 
Likewise, in the case of Eckes v. Card Prices,121 the US Court of Appeal reversed the 
decision of the District Court which had refused to confer copyright protection to a 
compilation of baseball flipping cards. The Court of Appeal relied on the collection per 
se as a justification for protection, not authorship, originality or arrangement, although 
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such dependence on comprehensiveness goes against any arguments on stipulating 
the creative selection of facts. “The Guide is a comprehensive listing of baseball cards 
manufactured in the 70-year period from 1909 to 1979. Appellees concede that the 
Guide is the first extensive listing of its kind.”122 [Underlining added]. Denicola also 
argues that aggregation of facts per se can be a justification of authorship: “the courts 
have had difficulty finding in this latter aspect of the copyright owner's contribution an 
act of authorship to which copyright may attach. One promising approach is to find 
authorship in the act of aggregating isolated pieces of information.”123 
Note here also the kind of skills that the Court relied upon to consider the collector and 
arranger as the author of an authorship work, as the Court stated that: “Beckett testified 
that he worked on the Guide for 40 hours a week for eight straight months. Relying on 
his extensive knowledge of trading in baseball cards and his background in statistics, 
Beckett compiled the prices for all the cards and placed them into either the premium 
or common category.” 124 [Underlining added] So, the court relied mainly on the labour 
and time expended. 
 The reliance on authorship and originality here will make the issue confusing and 
difficult to decide, as the variations in the defendant’s work cannot help to assess 
whether they make the work original or not, as long as the elements of authorial 
contribution are missed. As the Court confirmed that the issue is “extremely difficult”.125 
7.4.6 Fifth: Selection and Arrangement of Facts Lessen the Criteria for All 
Works of Authorship and Increase Distortion 
The main issue that exaggerates the confusion in US law is that it does not specify a 
specific provision for databases, as the UK or EU law do. The US courts have to 
construe the general provisions to protect databases and factual works. That is why the 
interpretation or requirement of originality and authorship has been reduced so as to 
fulfil this job.  
Nimmer, for instance, has lowered the originality interpretation –in general and 
regarding all works- to include any kind of skill or labour, whether authorial or 
mechanical: “a very slight degree of such labor[,] ... almost any ingenuity in selection, 
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combination or expression, no matter how crude, humble or obvious, will be 
sufficient”126 to make the work copyrightable.  
In addition, the use of selection and arrangement to protect compilations of facts was 
very thin and did not provide any real protection to them unless wholesale copying 
happened, “most [compilation works] will pass muster and be protectable, but that does 
not mean much because the protection will be very thin and infringed only by wholesale 
reproduction.”127 
Accordingly, the alienation of databases and factual works, and any works devoid of 
authorship, into a different category with separate rules will solve this difficulty, and 
allow more strong protection to the authorship works.  
7.4.7 Sixth: Selection and Arrangement in Factual Works Increases the 
Chances of Getting Monopolies in Copyright Law  
Sometimes the available arrangements are limited in regard to some specific facts, or 
in some fields of knowledge, thus, the best arrangement may be reserved for the first 
compilation work in a specific field, and this goes against the philosophy of copyright 
law, as ‘the merger of idea and expression’ doctrine should prohibit this monopoly. As 
the BellSouth v. Donnelley128 court confirmed that the claim of copyright depending on 
the arrangement of facts fails because according to the merger doctrine expression 
cannot be protected when there is “only one or so few ways of expressing an idea.”129 
The explicit treatment of works according to their nature is more beneficial, and this can 
be done through providing a separate category to protect these works that depend on 
the time, effort and money expended. Denicola supports this view: “the effort that elicits 
judicial concern with unjust enrichment and disincentive, lies not in the arranging, but 
rather in the compiling. It is the effort of collecting that must be rewarded in order to 
preserve incentive and safeguard the author's investment of time and money, not the 
act of placing Abbott before Baker.”130 
What this thesis thus tries to prove is the importance of differentiating between works 
that require manual labour in their creation and those that require mental labour, 
whether in terms of the criteria used in deciding copyrightability, or in terms of the 
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extent of the protection they get. This system would help to maintain a healthier way of 
operating copyright law, both theoretically and practically.131 
Lastly, we maintain that the application of copyright protection on compilations 
depending on just expression is useless. If a compilation work has obtained copyright 
protection, either on the expression created by the author or as a result of the selection 
and arrangement, the facts themselves, which are the subject matter and valuable 
content of the compilation, are not protectable. 132 So, anybody can take, use or exploit 
them. Although the compilation work has thus passed the copyrightability criterion, it 
will fail at the first infringement test, unless, of course, the whole has been copied 
literally. This was expressly stated by the Feist Court, when it stressed that granting 
copyright protection to compilation works does not mean that the law gives the author 
the power to “keep others from using the facts or data he or she has collected.”133 
Although this may constitute a secession from the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine, it 
encourages right holders to resort to other laws and technologies for more efficient 
protection, such as DRM technology. Such a system has neither profited right holders 
nor copyright law principles. On the other hand, the proposed categorisation system 
will afford complete copyright protection to right holders in this regard, as explained 
above and more detailed in next chapter. 
 ‘Selection and arrangement’ is the ultimate interpretation of originality and can achieve 
not just relative stability in copyrightability decisions, but the differentiation between 
works into authorship and non-authorship works and the division of authorship works 
into high and low grades for the benefit of increasing certainty in judicial decisions. 
However, compilation works actually need other means of treatment, away from the 
orthodox concepts of copyright law. Thus, we suggest that if the Feist Court had 
insisted on the same principle, but regarding other literary, artistic, or dramatic works, 
like books, music, paintings, etc., it would have got more success in its application. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s attitude in Feist v. Rural, stipulating ‘selection and 
arrangement’ in intellectual works, is encouraged by this thesis and is believed to be 
the correct interpretation of originality to be applied to all authorship works, but the 
Court attitude has been taken regarding the wrong works, namely factual works, as 
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they are non-authorship works.134 Though ‘selection and arrangement’ can analyse the 
constituting elements of any work, in factual work it does not work in the same way as 
in all other works, due to in factual works it is not related to the creation of the work but 
to its appearance.  
Compilations are of a different nature and consequently need special treatment, as, as 
stated by the Supreme Court of Feist case, they do not necessarily contain enough 
expression to be examined in terms of their originality. As Judge O. Connor confirmed: 
“Many compilations consist of nothing but raw data-i.e., wholly factual information not 
accompanied by any original written expression. On what basis may one claim a 
copyright in such a work? Common sense tells us that 100 uncopyrightable facts do not 
magically change their status when gathered together in one place.” 135 Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court resorted to the ‘selection and arrangement’, as the only addition the 
creator may do while creating such compilations. However, the thesis confirms that 
compilation works even after inclusion of selection or arrangement are still non-
authorship and non-intellectual works, although they are in the shape of intellectual 
works, they contain no authorship to be examined as original or not, but it rather can be 
judged whether a specific selection is novel or not.  
The pretexts used for conferring copyright protection to whatever the kind of the work 
should be banned, and explicit differentiation is needed between works protected for 
creative skills and others protected for their usefulness or legal necessity. The 
inexistence of such differentiation or categorisation between works will force courts to 
adopt some pretexts to give protection to non-creative works, which already do not 
have the same elements as creative works so that they cannot be measured by the 
same criteria. A separate category for non-creative works, with a sui generis protection, 
will spare copyright law a lot of confusion in both theory and application.  
7.5 Imitation Lacks Authorship 
Imitation or replication of pre-existing works, with or without changing their physical 
form, or its size, lacks authorship. This category includes those works created using 
expenditure of capital, effort, time and skill, but do not include any kind of analysis, 
investigation, desire to convey feelings or thoughts, and do not differentiate from the 
original work in the selection and arrangement of the elements of the work, and even 
the expression form. All that is changed is the physical form. As in transformation from 
one material to another of the same work, such as changing between photographs, 
paintings, portraits and sculptures of the same work.  
                                                          
134 As explained in the last sections. 
135 Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7, at 
345. 
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In Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger 136it was decided that the “[plaintiff’s] copyrighted 
work embodies and resulted from its skill and originality in producing an accurate scale 
reproduction of the original. In a work of sculpture, this reduction requires far more than 
an abridgement of a written classic; great skill and originality is called for when one 
seeks to produce a scale reduction of a great work with exactitude.”137 Laddie et al. 
argue that ‘material alteration’ can be proof of ‘originating something different in kind’, 
and that “a text in a computer memory is not the same thing as a text written on sheets 
of paper.” They even confirm that this work can be copyrighted. 138 Laddie et al. have 
supported their argument by citing Lord Atkinson’s confirmation that imparting the work 
with some quality or character that was not in the raw material can satisfy the skill and 
labour threshold. 139 They also cited the Walter v. Lane 140 decision, wherein the report 
mirrored the speech of Lord Roseberry, but included a quality or character not in the 
source. 141 We argue that what Lord Atkinson mentioned does not fall within the same 
meaning to which Walter v. Lane referred, especially if the next phrase by Lord 
Atkinson is taken into consideration. As he confirmed that: “copying, per se, however 
much skill or labour may be devoted to the process, cannot make an original work. A 
well-executed tracing is the result of much labour and skill but remains what it is, a 
tracing.”142 Even Judge Kaplan in Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.,143quoted 
with approval the Privy Council’s statement in Interlego A. G. v. Tyco Industries Inc., 
that: “[s]kill, labor or judgment merely in the process of copying cannot confer 
originality.”144  
Hegel, in ‘Philosophy of Right’, argues that the body does not conform with the mind, 
and they can be in a coherent relationship that reflects the individual mind in a case: 
“[i]f it is to be the willing organ and soul endowed instrument of mind, it must first be 
taken into possession by mind”. 145 This statement inspired the thesis in proposing the 
convergence between imitation and dictation. Though the work of the scribe is a result 
of his body’s work, his effort and labour, he does not own that work. This is because it 
                                                          
136 Alva Studios, Inc. V. Winninger, 1959, 177 F.Supp. 265, United States District Court S.D. New York..  
137 Ibid.at 267.  
138 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
42, at 32. 11.  
139He said: “to secure copyright for this product it is necessary that labour, skill and capital should be 
expended sufficiently to impart the product some quality or character which the raw material did not 
possess, and which differentiates the product from the raw material.” See, Macmillan & Co V. K & J 
Cooper, 1924, 40 TLR 186, Bombay High Court at 188.  
140 Walter V. Lane, 1900, A.C. 539, House of Lords, ibid. 
141 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
42, at 32. 11 
142 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., 1989, A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 Privy Council at 372.  
143 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, supra note 62 at 198.  
144 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 supra note 142, at 371.  
145 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. TM Knox (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1952). p. 43.  
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was not the work of his mind, he just had a skill, though not everybody has, which is 
that of writing quickly and perhaps also performing language amendments to the 
dictated text or speech of the kind that rules of language require. So, he should not get 
any author’s rights on that text.  
The person who imitates a painting to make a sculpture, although the process contains 
a lot of skill and labour, he does not use his thoughts but uses his skills, not his mind 
but his manual skill or craftsmanship, so the work actually does not belong to him but to 
the original author, and instead of being an author he can easily be considered a 
‘handicraftsman’. However, if the work was in the public domain he can only get the 
protection of non-authorship works, as a result of labour and expense invested in 
producing this work. As, the proposed sui generis system can afford protection to those 
who invest labour or capital in creating works even when there is no authorship 
expended, as the work is then protected as a commodity or commercial product, 
something similar to the database sui generis protection in the EU Database 
Directive,146 but this one is more broadly applied and theoretically founded. 147 To add a 
further justification, Hegel argues that property over a thing is acquired if the person 
created or got occupancy over that thing, that is why it is called private property: 
“[s]ince my will, as the will of a person, and so as a single will, becomes objective to me 
in property, property acquires the character of private property.”148 The imitator or 
dictated-to individual does not or cannot practice his will when creating the work, he 
just copies the will of another person in a perfect way. This meaning was confirmed by 
Palmer in his interpretation of Hegel’s statement “[p]ersonality does not simply require 
external objects for its development. Its development is its objectification through 
externalization of its will.”149  
Those who help somebody to make a sculpture according to his instructions cannot be 
authors, as they just use their manual skills, not their thinking, mind processing, or 
analysing, because the specific idea and instructions in which it is expressed, selection 
and arrangement of the elements of the work, were what the author had told them. 
None of the executors -workers- amended anything; they just executed a craft, like the 
person who manufactures chairs, tables or shoes, or the person to whom words are 
dictated. Being an intangible work does not qualify the work as an intellectual or 
                                                          
146 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', supra 
note 10. 
147 See this Chapter at 7.1 and 7.3. 
148 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, supra note 145, p. 42 at 46.  
149 Tom G Palmer, 'Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified-the Philosophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects', Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y, 13 (1990)., p. 838.  
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authorship work, as then it misses this intellect or mental effort element, as will be 
explained in the following section.  
Elements of authorship are missed in imitation 
The theoretical basis for the non-protection of imitations is unclear, so the thesis here 
attempts to apply the philosophies of personal and mental authorship in the last 
Chapter on the issue of imitation to educe the lack of authorship in these works.  
Firstly, imitations are made only by the senses, and the mind’s operations are not used 
in their creation, as, according to Locke’s philosophy, the operation of mind (thinking, 
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing)150 appears when the ‘furnishing’ of the 
available knowledge happens to produce another set of ideas. ‘Furnishing’ happens 
when the soul “comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with 
another set of ideas.” 151 So, the ideas that emanate from painting, for instance, will not 
be different if the same painting were on stone. The work is thus made by ‘outer 
senses’ only, so there is no mental authorship in it. Young confirmed that imitators, 
although they may provide something profitable, it is a duplication: “[i]mitators only give 
us a fort of duplicates of what we had”. 152 
Secondly, the creation of an exact imitation of a work requires a different skill to that 
used to create original works of authorship. On the one hand, the author of the original 
work attempts to transfer the inner sensations and thoughts into a sensuous material 
that can bear his thoughts to the audience. He attempts to choose the most suitable 
elements in the public domain that can, if put in a specific arrangement, convey his 
thoughts and sensations. On the other hand, the creator of the imitation has the 
thoughts already materialised and structured in the work and he uses technical skills to 
transform the same work from stone to wood, or from painted paper to stone.  
From a different perspective, the latter work differs according to the proficiency of the 
creator, and this proficiency comes through education and training. However, the 
quality of the work of authorship depends in the first place on the creativity and talent of 
the author. This was confirmed by Judge Park in Hadley v. Kemp: “Contributions by the 
plaintiffs, however significant and skilful, to the performance of the musical works were 
not the right kind of contributions to give them shares in the copyrights. … When each 
song was presented by the first defendant to the group it was a musical work and the 
first defendant was the sole author of it. The songs in their recorded form were the 
                                                          
150 See, John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700)., p. 88.  
151 Ibid. p. 88.  
152 Edward Young and Samuel Richardson, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author 
of Sir Charles Grandison (Printed for A. Millar, 1759)., p. 10.  
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same musical works which the first defendant had composed, not new and different 
works.”153Accordingly, it is the authorial –or creative- addition that this thesis is looking 
for and classifies works according to it. This was argued also by Judge Park in other 
place: “It must have been a contribution to the creation of the musical work. … [This] is 
particularly important.” 154 
This argument, namely differentiating between creation and imitation, finds its 
foundation in Hegel’s answer to the question, “in what way is the necessarily sensuous 
side of art operative in the artist as his subjective productive activity?” 155 His reply 
included the elements that support the notion of considering imitation void of 
authorship, as he argued that: “[t]his sort and manner of production contains in itself, as 
subjective activity,… it must be a spiritual activity which yet contains at the same time 
the element of sensuousness and immediacy. Still it is neither, on the one hand, purely 
mechanical work, a purely unconscious skill in sensuous manipulation or a formal 
activity according to fixed rules to be learnt by heart, nor, on the other hand, is it a 
scientific production which passes over from the sensuous to abstract ideas and 
thoughts or is active entirely in the element of pure thinking. In artistic production the 
spiritual and the sensuous aspects must be as one.” 156 [Underlining added]. In fact, all 
of these prohibitions are present in the process of creating imitations of previous works.  
This is what was confirmed in the Intergelo case157 in the UK and the Bridgman Art 
case in the US, Judge Kaplan in the latter case stated that: “a photograph, which is no 
more than a copy of the work of another as exact as science and technology permit, 
lacks originality. … Surely designing the technology to produce exact reproductions of 
documents required much engineering talent, but that does not make the reproductions 
copyrightable.”158 [Underlining added].  
This argument is also corroborated in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Jeffrey Snyder when it 
was decided that the requirement of originality in US law cannot be “satisfied simply by 
the demonstration of ‘physical skill’ or ‘special training’”,159 [Underlining added], the 
court even confirmed that “[a] considerably higher degree of skill is required, true 
                                                          
153 Hadley V. Kemp, 1999, E.M.L.R. 589, High Court, Chancery Division at 590-591. 
154 Ibid. at 643. 
155 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated by T.M. Knox, Vol.1 (I: 
Clarendon Press, 1988). 
156 Ibid., p. 39. Though this quotation repeated in another place in this thesis but it serves both places in 
equal importance. 
157 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 supra note 142 
158 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, supra note 62.  
159 L. Batlin & Son, Inc., V. Jeffrey Snyder and Etna Products Co., 1976, 536 F.2d 486, United States 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. at 491.  
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artistic skill, to make the reproduction copyrightable.”160 This research advocates the 
decision in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Jeffrey Snyder, when it was argued that the change 
in physical form cannot prove originality in the work: “to support a copyright there must 
be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur 
in the translation to a different medium.”161 [Underlining added].  
Thirdly, imitation is not a product of free will, as, according to Hegel, the personality of 
the author disappears from the work when, as Hegel stated-:“I delegate to others the 
authority to prescribe for me what kind of acts I shall commit,”162 and the thesis finds in 
the keenness of the imitator to follow the same structure and lines of the original work 
an elimination of his will, as if the original author is there and dictating to him the steps 
he should follow and he obeys the instructions. This was clear also in the example of 
the Athenian slave whose work is ‘controlled by’ his master, as then the slave cannot 
own the work.163  
This was also confirmed in Interlego A. G. v Tyco Industries Inc., 164 where the Privy 
Council assessed whether a simple imitation or copy of a drawing is original or not, and 
the Council ascertained that any specialised craftsman can do such imitation, “Skill, 
labour or judgment merely in the process of copying could not confer originality. There 
must in addition be some element of material alteration or embellishment which 
sufficed to make the totality of the work an original work, having regard to the quality 
rather than the quantity of the addition”. 165 This was confirmed in Hadley v. kemp case 
explained in the below section.166 Laddie et al. argue that the core issue here is 
whether the work replicated is simple or complicated, as if the work that has been 
replicated is a complicated painting, for instance, then making an exact copy is an 
original work. 167 Laddie et al. argue that the Privy Council –in Interlego v. Tyco- stated 
a general statement that could be true regarding the disputed work then, but “[t]his 
should be contrasted with, e.g. a painting by Vermeer, where it will be obvious that very 
few persons, if any, are capable of making an exact replica.”168 Laddie et al. explained 
that the replicator here should be considered an author.  
                                                          
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. at 491.  
162 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 'The Philosophy of Right (1820), Translated by Sw Dyde, Originally 
Published in English in 1896', (Prometheus Books, London, 1996)., §. 66.  
163 See the example of the ‘Athenian slave’ suggested by Hegel and explained in Chapter 6 at 6.4. 
164 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 supra note 142.  
165 Ibid. at 346.  
166 See the next section titled ‘Imitation is similar to performance’. 
167 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, supra note 
42, at 4.42.  
168 Ibid.42, at 4.42. 
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Laddie et al. find this is a solution to the confrontation that will happen in the case if 
many individuals set out to copy a painting. Most will do a replication that differs from 
the original, and then they can obtain copyright because the differentiation will be 
considered as a reflection of his personality, but if somebody succeeded to make a 
faithful copy will be deprived protection. “If, however, one of these renders the original 
with all the skill and precision of a Salvador Dalí, is he to be denied a copyright where a 
mere dauber is not?”169 So the solution is that all of them should get copyright 
protection according to Laddie et al. whether depending on the existence of alterations, 
as then personality is reflected, or if there were no alterations, because the original 
work was difficult to duplicate. Ong also advocates this opinion. 170 
We do not agree with this argument, as copyright law should not be concerned with the 
process of replication or copying, but the resulting work. If it has the same structure, or 
the same authorship elements, the thesis asks what is the difference or contribution 
that this work adds to previous works, to humanity, or for the development of science or 
the arts? Copying is always copying, and the skills and efforts expended in creating the 
work can be appreciated under a different system, but not under the same category of 
original authorship works. 171 That is why the existence of a parallel system for non-
authorship works is important in order to deal with such cases. That this is why the sui 
generis system for databases is enacted by the EU Directive for this purpose when the 
databases do not satisfy the said originality criteria of ‘selection and arrangement’.172 
Imitation is similar to performance: 
The process of imitation is similar to the process of performance. The performer 
presents the original work in front of the audience in a different way, and the imitator 
also represents the work in a different quality every time, however, this cannot qualify 
him or her as an author.  
For instance, in the UK Case Fylde Microsystems v. Key Radio Systems173 although Mr 
Justice Laddie confirmed that the defendant had participated in making the software by 
adding several features and requirements so that the plaintiff could complete his work. 
                                                          
169 Ibid. 
170 As, he argued: “whether or not acts of “copying” ought to be capable of giving rise to “original” artistic 
works should depend on the qualitative complexity of the antecedent work from which copying has taken 
place and the probability or likelihood of successfully making an exact replica of that work.” See, Burton 
Ong, 'Originality from Copying: Fitting Recreative Works into the Copyright Universe', Intellectual Property 
Quarterly, 2 (2010)., p. 148.  
171 See this Chapter at 7.7.  
172 In the 'Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protection of Databases', 
supra note 10. 
173 Fylde Microsystems Ltd. V. Key Radio Systems Ltd., 1998, F.S.R. 449, High Court of Justice—
Chancery Division 
 
 
253 
He refused to consider him as an author, because he was not considered to contribute 
in the authorship process of the software. Mr Justice Laddie confirmed that the 
defendant had fixed errors, reported faults and bugs; made a functional contribution by 
setting the specifications of what the software was to do; designed a technique for the 
radio to detect a transmitter signal;174 he suggested the reasons for some faults; 
provided technical information about the characteristics of the hardware into which the 
software fitted; and set parameters and timings within the software.175 However, Mr 
Justice Laddie refused to consider this any contribution to the authorship of the 
software: “[a]lthough all of Mr Barrett's contributions took a lot of time and were very 
valuable, they did not amount to contributions to the authoring of Keyport.”176 
[Underlining added].  
In the Hadley v. Kemp Case177 it was stated that: “[w]hen each song was presented by 
the first defendant to the group it was a musical work and the first defendant was the 
sole author of it. The songs in their recorded form were the same musical works which 
the first defendant had composed, not new and different works. Although it was true 
that the members of the group played and sang the songs in their own ways, these 
were matters of performance and not of creation of a musical work.” 178 [Underlining 
added].  
This is a matter of performance, not a matter of creation; in this differentiation between 
performance and creation many groups were long ago separated from the authorship, 
and the category should have been left open to including the new forms of performance 
or any acts that are not creation. For instance, singers who perform the same song with 
the same melody and same lyrics, but in their own way in terms of performance, 
sensation, and talent. The recitation done by a person who makes the poem more 
sensual than if it were recited by the original poet, does not make him an author. The 
same can be said regarding the process followed by a painter of a picture, or a sculptor 
in making a transparency of a painting or picture, etc. All of this is a matter of 
performance; learned not gifted skills are used.  
The investigation about authorship and its level, whether high or low, should not be 
applied only in cases where disputes arise between the author and his assistants 
regarding which contribution has an authorial nature and deserves copyright protection, 
and which is just performance. This investigation should be used also when similar 
nature of non-authorial acts or even less technical ones are performed by individuals or 
                                                          
174 In substance of only specifying what the software was to do, not how it did it. 
175 Fylde Microsystems Ltd. V. Key Radio Systems Ltd., F.S.R. 449, supra note 173, at 459 - 460 
176 Ibid. at 460 
177 Hadley V. Kemp, E.M.L.R. 589, supra note 153, at 591 
178 Ibid. at 591 
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legal entities, such as imitation of works, and the law confers them copyright protection 
and even the same level of protection given to authorial works. This practice lacks 
theoretical basis, and maintain instability through such unjustified differentiation. Unless 
there will be a differentiation between the level of protection that every category of 
works gets and the theoretical foundation that justifies the conferral of protection to 
both.  
In the Millar v. Taylor Case,179 the Court distinguished between the mechanical copying 
that does not draw conferral of copyright protection, and imitation or appropriation of 
ideas only, as the Court stated, in differentiating between the patent and copyright 
protection, that imitation is allowed in patent law and is not allowed in copyright law,180 
and confirmed: “The imitated machine, therefore, is a new and a different work, the 
literary composition, printed on another man's paper, is still the same.” 181 Hegel also 
made this comparison, as he confirmed that in literary works “the thought is presented 
not en bloc … but in a series of separable abstract symbols, while in the second case 
[invention of a machine] the thought has a mechanical content throughout. The ways 
and means of producing things of that mechanical kind as things are commonplace 
accomplishments.”182 
7.6 Is There Authorship in the Creation Process and the Preparatory Steps? 
The question that the thesis poses here is: is originality concerned with the work itself, 
its contents and characteristics, or the preparatory steps and the creation processes 
are also included in deciding the originality of the work? 
There are several examples of courts that have supported the taking of preparatory 
work into consideration, like Collis v. Cater, Stoffell & Fortt Ltd. 183, Canterbury Park 
Race Co. Ltd. v. Hopkins and Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd. 184 For instance, in the 
last case, Lord Hodson was of the opinion that preparatory works should be considered 
when conferring copyright protection, “I cannot accept that preparatory work must be 
excluded in this case so as to draw a line between the effort involved in developing 
ideas and that minimal effort required in setting those ideas down on paper.”185 Lord 
                                                          
179 Millar V. Taylor, 1769, 4 Burrow 2303, Court of King's Bench.  
180 Ibid. at 227, as the Court stated “the property of the maker of a mechanical engine is confined to that 
individual thing which he has made; that the machine made in imitation or resemblance of it, is a different 
work in substance, materials, labour and expense, in which the maker of the original machine cannot claim 
any property; for it is not his, but only a resemblance of his, whereas the reprinted book is the very same 
substance; because its doctrine and sentiments are its essential and substantial part; and the printing of it 
is a mere mechanical act, and the method only of publishing and promulgating the contents of the book.” 
181 Ibid. at 227.  
182 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, supra note 145, p. 54. 
183 Collis V. Cater, Stoffel and Fortt Ltd., 1898, 78 LT 613,  
184 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 273, supra note 63.  
185 Ibid. at 287.  
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Devlin, in the latter case, explained the efforts done in preparing the creation of the 
work: “The respondents are bookmakers who devoted a great deal of time, skill and 
experience to the preparation of a fixed odds betting coupon for football matches. … It 
is common ground that the preparation of a coupon with bets of this sort requires a 
great deal of industry and skill.”186 Ong also confirmed that “recreative works” (works 
substantially derived from antecedent works)187 can be original depending on the 
preparatory steps: “when evaluating the originality of such works, the focus of the 
inquiry should lie in the process by which they were made, rather than by the final 
output that is produced by such recreative endeavours” 188 
Such claims on the copyrightability of pre-operational steps is one of the main reasons 
for the misinterpretation of originality and the distortion of copyright law conceptions, as 
Raskind confirmed: new technologies and the changes in making and distributing 
works are good reasons for reviewing the structure of copyright law,189 due to the 
extension of authorship to include the preparation of products which are “remote from 
literature and the fine arts in which traditional copyright analysis is steeped.” 190 Even, 
Castanaro explicitly argues that: “[t]he existing concept of originality is concerned only 
with the creative process and not the product.”191 
This thesis advocates Garnett and Davies’s notion that the preparatory steps to 
creating works are not counted in deciding on the copyrightability of the work: “a 
distinction between skill and labour required for the compiling of information and the 
skill and labour required for the presentation of it, as only the latter being relevant for 
the purposes of the originality requirement and copyright protection.”192 [Underlining 
added] That is, the main reason that the criterion of ‘skill, labour and judgment’ in the 
UK is criticised, because it assesses the features and circumstances out of the product 
itself. We ask; while copyright protects the work itself, why other elements outside the 
work should be measured? This has been supported also by the Privy Council in 
Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Industries Inc. as it confirmed that although making a painting as 
a faithful copy of other painting or photography need extensive skill, it cannot confer the 
                                                          
186 Ibid. at 289.  
187 Burton Ong, 'Originality from Copying: Fitting Recreative Works into the Copyright Universe', supra note 
170 p. 167. 
188 Ibid. p. 167. In this article, Ong defined ‘recreative works’ as those works that “are essentially a 
particular sub-species of derivative works. They are works that have been derived from, and which purport 
to be perfectly accurate copies of, antecedent works that were created at an earlier point in history.” See, 
ibid. p. 167.  
189 Leo J Raskind, 'The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copyright Principles', Colum.-VLA JL 
& Arts, 14 (1989)., p. 125.  
190 Ibid. p. 126.  
191 Valeria M. Castanaro, 'It's the Same Old Song: The Failure of the Originality Requirement in Musical 
Copyright', Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 18 (2007)., p. 1287.  
192 K.M. Garnett and G. Davies, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, supra note 89, at 3-147.  
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resulting work any originality because: “Skill, labour or judgment merely in the process 
of copying cannot confer originality.”193 Shipley also confirms that all actions done in 
order to gather the data for a directory are “techniques for the discovery of facts, not 
acts of authorship”194 
Works containing authorial contributions and others that are devoid of it are totally 
different categories of works. Mental labour appears in the content itself. However, 
manual labour requires the investigation of things outside this content. For instance, by 
looking or listening to the authorship work we can know how much thinking and genius 
are invested in it through the perception of the included thoughts and ideas put by the 
author. On the other hand, regarding the non-authorial works we have to listen to the 
creator’s explanation to know how much money and effort s/he has exerted, because 
the work itself does not contain or show any thoughts or sensations, so, preparatory 
steps are important only to the latter category.  
The reasons that the Supreme Court, in Burrow Giles v. Sarony,195 considered for 
protecting photography works, are worth mentioning here. As in its description of the 
work’s contents or elements it confirmed that the intellectual work is a product of the 
original mental conception of the author and that is apparent from its explanation: “… 
posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the 
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the 
subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, 
suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, 
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in 
suit.’”196 Note here that the Court described how the work was original and depended 
on the elements of the photograph itself, and it did not require or describe anything 
about the skill the author practised or the effort or time expended in the preparation of 
the work.  
Although the elements described were prepared before the moment of the creation of 
the work, they appear in the photograph and can be perceived by the audience. The 
author is not required to explain hidden or precedent procedures in the preparation of 
the work that cannot be discerned from looking to –or perceiving- the work. 
Accordingly, the described procedures in the historic decision of Burrow Giles were 
authorial procedures because they can be seen in the final work and constitutes its 
                                                          
193 Interlego A.G. V. Tyco Industries Inc., A.C. 217; R.P.C. 343 supra note 142, at 371. 
194 David E Shipley, 'Thin but Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works', 
supra note  127, p. 102. 
195 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States.  
196 Ibid. at 60.  
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contents, then they are justified to be taken in consideration to decide copyrightability 
of the work. However, procedures that precede factual works or even other authorship 
works like historic books or biographies, etc., that require research and investigation, 
cannot be taken into consideration and describing them in judicial decisions to justify 
copyrightability is not logic in copyright law, because this latter law is just concerned 
with the subject of protection which is the final work not outside circumstances. This 
has reflections also on the Walter v. Lane 197 case discussed above.198 As what is 
important to copyright law was the work of reporter not other circumstances existent in 
the time of creating the intellectual work, if it was initially intellectual. 
Collections of facts increase confusion: 
There is a debate around the copyrightability of the research for facts when creating 
compilation works of facts. For instance, the District Court in Miller v. Universal199 
argued that although facts are not protected by copyright law, the ‘research’ done by 
the author and his ‘expenditure of money’ and ‘time’ in gathering facts, should be 
protected, otherwise, this information and the derived profits would be pirated. It stated 
that: “an author could not be expected to expend his time and money in gathering facts 
if he knew those facts, and the profits to be derived therefrom, could be pirated by one 
who could then avoid the expense of obtaining the facts himself.”200 The Court 
concluded: “in the age of television ‘docudrama’ to hold other than research is 
copyrightable is to violate the spirit of the copyright law and to provide to those persons 
and corporations lacking in requisite diligence and ingenuity a license to steal.”201  
Such an argument confused the research intended by copyright law as being embodied 
in the expression, and the research that is done through the creation of the work or in 
preparing for its creation, and that will not be manifest in the work. As the Second 
Circuit in Miller v. Universal City202 confirmed: “[t]he issue is not whether granting 
copyright protection to an author's research would be desirable or beneficial, but 
whether such protection is intended under the copyright law.”203 [Underlining added]. 
The latter court confirmed also that the District Court erred in instructing the jury that 
research is copyrightable, as this sentence reflects an incorrect legal conception which 
                                                          
197 Walter V. Lane, A.C. 539, supra note 140. 
198 See Chapter 3 at 3.5. 
199 Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 1981, 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., United 
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. 
200 Ibid. at 1369.  
201 Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 1978, 460 F.Supp. 984, United States District Court, S. D. Florida 
at 988.  
202 Gene Miller V. Universal City Studios, Inc., Et Al., 650 F.2d 1365, C.A.Fla., No. 78-3772., supra note 
199.  
203 Ibid., at 1369.  
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affected the final decision. Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that saying that 
there is a liability against the copying of research is contrary to the intention of 
legislators. 204 
The research wonders what it is in this equation that provides an incentive for creative 
creation. As long as the research and effort in collecting information is not protected, 
then, the direct result of this attitude is the refraining of authors from spending time and 
effort in such works, as any other author can use the same incidents in doing other 
works. Alternatively, the most suitable protection for these kinds of works is the 
protection of the effort and investment expended under a sui generis system that differs 
from copyright law which should not provide protection to these works.  
Facts and historical incidents are free to be cited and appropriated, regardless of the 
writer’s authorisation who first mentioned or collected them. However, copyright law’s 
scope should begin from the outer edge of this border, in the sense that any 
interpretation, analysis, linking events, or drawing conclusions should be protected by 
copyright law. As then a mental effort which is the core of authorship process has 
occured using these abstract pieces of information or facts, then copyright law should 
be present to protect this authorial contribution.  
7.7 Justifications for Protecting Factual Works and Imitations: 
According to case law information works are not protected unless there is some kind of 
personal influence that appears in the organization of the pre-existing works. Then the 
organization is protected from being copied, but the pre-existing works are free to be 
copied if they are in the public domain, or there is an authorization to be utilised or 
copied. 205 
Some courts have conferred copyright law protection for the original selection or 
arrangement. Such as the argument by some court that: “[a] compilation containing no 
protectable written expression will meet the minimal degree of originality for copyright 
protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.”206 [Underlining added], 
and when confirmed by another that: “sufficient contribution is present when the work 
evinces originality either by the presence of creative expression within the work or by 
the selection or arrangement of the pre-existing material”207 [Underlining added].  
                                                          
204 Ibid., at 1372.  
205 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. V. Nation Enterprises, 1985, 471 U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218, Supreme 
Court of the United States, at 547, and Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7, at 350.  
206 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. V. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218, supra note 205, at 
547.  
207 See, Stephen P. Tarolli, 'The Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 46 (1996). p. 1651, commenting on Feist 
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However, the real justification for collections of facts’ protection is the manual labour 
and the investment expended in their creation, for mostly the person who is protected 
is not an author, but an investor or entrepreneur. The thesis, even under the sui 
generis system, supports following this approach to justify the protection of these works 
and not depending on authorship and personality, which are unsuitable for these works’ 
nature.  
7.7.1 Depending on Manual Labour to Justify Copyright Protection: 
One of the most renowned cases in establishing copyright protection on manual labour 
only, and refuting any authorship, literary skill, or thoughts, is the Jeweler v. Keystone 
Case,208 when Judge Learned Hand stated that: “[t]he right to copyright a book upon 
which one has expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon whether the 
materials which he has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or 
whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, 
or anything more than industrious collection.”209 [Underlining added]. He even further 
explained that the person who walks in the streets and collects the names and 
numbers of houses and streets “acquires material of which he is the author. He 
produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, 
and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of his work.” 210 [Underlining 
added].  
 
This decision did not just refuse the need for originality but also the authorship and the 
personal contribution and allowed that copyright law protects any ‘industrious 
collection’. However, this aids this thesis’s argument, as he rightly describes the 
process of collecting information in a directory as an ‘industrious collection’ that is 
devoid of any originality or literary skills. But arguing that copyright protects 
industrialised and not personal creation has been proved to be an invalid argument, as 
discussed in the last Chapter. 211 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Publications, Inc. V. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, supra note 7, see also 
Publications Intern., Ltd. V. Meredith Corp., 1996, 88 F.3d 473, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh 
Circuit. 
208 Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. V. Keystone Pub. Co., 1922, 281 F. 83, Circuit Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit. 
209 Ibid. at 88.  
210 Ibid. at 88, when he argues: “The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the 
names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, acquires material of 
which he is the author.” 
211 See Chapter 6 at 6.6 & 6.7. 
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The important point in this case is that it put it clearly that there is no personal 
authorship in collections of facts. That is not mentioned in other cases and legislations, 
which presumes the existence of originality in the creation process of these works or in 
the selection and arrangement of facts, which the thesis has found to be untrue. 212 
 
Other cases conferred copyright protection on the industriousness of the work, labour 
undertaken and funds invested by the author, as in the case of Matthewson v. 
Stockdale, 213 and Longman v. Winchester,214 in the latter case it was held that the 
calendar is an original work that deserves protection against the copying of substantive 
parts, depending on the expenses and labor expended and the usefulness of the work. 
Courts also conferred protection to directory of business listings, compilation of court 
rules, and navigation charts.215 However, this research stresses that authorship only 
means the personal mental labour of the author, not the manual labour, and this 
distinguishes works of authors from works of manufacturers or manual workers. This 
belief was confirmed by Saunders, when she stated that “originality is found in the 
creative powers of the mind; it is the fruit of intellectual labor. To determine the 
copyrightability of contributions to pre-existing factual material, courts often overlook 
this creative foundation, and focus instead on the labor portion of the process rather 
than the original fruits of such labor.”216 [Underlining added] Haungs confirms that 
although the terms, ‘selection’, ‘arrangement’ and ‘co-ordination’ found in the statutory 
definition of compilations of facts reflect the law makers’ desire in requiring originality in 
these works, it seems that courts applying “the industrious collection standard have 
sometimes effectively ignored originality, looking to labor itself, rather than to the 
product of the labor, as the touchstone of protection.”217 [Underlining added].  
The reliance on manual labour in cases of copyright has caused confusion, as some 
courts have required the exertion of labour and effort in order to confer copyright 
protection; others argued that works can rely on the preceding work to save labour, 
effort and time, accordingly, the labour in their tenet is not protected. Such confusion 
                                                          
212 See this Chapter at 7.4.2. 
213 Matthewson V. Stockdale, 1806, 12 Vesey Junior 270; 33 E.R. 103, Court of Chancery.  
214 Longman V. Winchester, 16 Vesey Junior 269; 33 E.R. 987, supra note 35.  
215 See Trow Directory, Printing & Bookbinding Co. V. Boyd, 1899, 97 F. 586, Circuit Court, S.D. New 
York. Which is relating to directory of business listings; and see Banks Et Al. V. Mcdivitt Et Al., 1875, 2 
F.Cas. 759; 13 Blatchf. 163, Circuit Court, S.D. New York. for compilation of New York state court rules of 
practice; also, Blunt V. Patten, 1828, 2 Paine 397; 3 F.Cas. 763, Circuit Court, S.D. New York. for 
navigation charts. 
216 Elizabeth M Saunders, 'Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the Originality Standard 
Allow Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection', supra note 114, p. 769.  
217 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', supra 
note 26, p. 351.  
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was expressed in the case of Eckes v. Suffolk,218 when Judge Glasser stated: “The 
signposts along the way were not compelling in any direction. One such sign temptingly 
beckoned in the direction of the plaintiffs to discourage these defendants and those 
who might come after them from using the plaintiffs' work to save themselves the 
‘expense and labor of arriving at those results by some independent road.’ Another 
sign pointed in the direction of the defendant to permit society to benefit from further 
improvement that results from the use by another of the same subject matter.”219  
7.7.2 Economic Justifications of Copyright Law  
The economic justification of copyright protection appeared with the rise of industrial 
works that were as important as literary and artistic works and required to be protected 
by the law. As Curtis wrote: “… every literary laborer shall find in them [the laws] an 
adequate protection to whatever he can show to be the product of his own labor. … 
whether it be a purely original thought or principle, unpublished before, or a new 
combination of old thoughts and ideas and sentiments, or a new application or use of 
known and common materials, or a collection, the result of his industry and skill.”220 He 
also stated that economic incentive is necessary: “gIory may be the reward of genius in 
solitary and irregular cases; but no man ever wrote a spelling-book or compiled an 
almanac for that unsubstantial and thankless commodity.”221 
The research confirms that the protection of intellectual works was never related to 
their usefulness, whether in the US or UK, and the economic justification never 
appeared unless regarding collections of facts. For instance, the Supreme Court in 
Bleistein222 (1903) decided that artistic works should be protected, regardless of the 
aesthetic value, as Judges are not qualified to test this, and that every personal 
reaction must contain something ‘unique’, and express its ‘singularity’, whatever 
people’s evaluation. The US Supreme Court in Bleistein neglected recognition of the 
usefulness of works as a criterion for conferring copyright protection, as it stated that: 
“[t]he Constitution does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily 
needs.”223 Consequently, it conferred protection to any paintings, whatever the reason 
they were used or made for, due to the ‘personality influence’ that every work reflects. 
The Supreme Court supported its decision by claiming that any photograph includes 
more originality than directories that are protected by copyright law: “[t]he least 
                                                          
218 Eckes V. Suffolk Collectables & C.P.U., 1983, 575 F.Supp. 459, United States District Court, E.D. New 
York. 
219 Ibid. at 464.  
220 George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright (1847). p. 171 
221 Ibid. p. 21 
222 Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, supra note 35.  
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pretentious picture has more originality in it than directories and the like, which may be 
copyrighted.”224  
Tarolli argues that early scholars and judges gave great importance to financial returns 
rather than personal considerations, as: “Labor-intensive works of information were the 
subject of much early copyright litigation as well, with courts protecting useful works 
because of the author's efforts, rather than his creative or literary contributions.” 225 
However, the economic justification may not be suitable to all kinds of intellectual 
works. Denicola argues that unitary dealing with all intellectual works is impossible. 
“There is little reason to suspect that authors of law review articles, road maps, and 
detective stories will respond identically to a fixed set of economic stimuli.”226 Other 
problem with scholars is the confusion between creativity and usefulness as 
justifications of copyright, Haungs for instance has criticised those who calls for the un-
copyrightability of databases when rearrange materials of antecedent ones, due to they 
may be useful to the public, according to Haungs, and he ignores whether there is 
authorship or creativity in these works or not.227 
Landes and Posner argue that copyright protection depends on two factors: the reward 
that copyright law offers to incentivise creative labour, and the safeguard it provides for 
the authorial personality of the author that exists in the work. 228 From this statement it 
appears that Landes and Posner adopt also the personality theory to determine 
intellectual works, thus, the economic justification of copyright law that they used was 
directed towards reinforcing the position of the author’s property. Landes and Posner 
argue that, in copyright law, striking a balance between access and incentives cannot 
be achieved unless by “maximize[ing] the benefits from creating additional works minus 
both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering copyright 
protection.” 229 They required the existence of a kind of trade-off with which copyright 
law is supposed to engage in, between the costs of limiting access and the incentives 
for creating more works, as they argued: “[c]opyright protection -the right of the 
                                                          
224 Ibid. at 250 the Court referred to Eaton Sylvester Drone, A Treatise on the Law of Property in 
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copyright's owner to prevent others from making copies - trades off the costs of limiting 
access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the 
first place.” 230  
 
So, the concentration on the authors’ rights and their stimulation is the key to 
developing a correct copyright balance. Zemer also made this connection when he 
reflected on Posner’s argument and confirmed that free riding creates the risk of not 
recovering the production costs, which will in turn affects the production of intellectual 
works. The solution, he argued, lies in: “[t]he allocation of exclusive rights of authorship 
… in order to avoid such economically inefficient outcomes” 231 
Bentham also has an argument that might support Landes and Posner, as he stressed 
that if the author were not compensated for the effort and creativity he had made, he 
will be driven out of the market, and he stated: “[once] one has invented, all the world 
can imitate. Without the assistance of the laws, the inventor would almost always be 
driven out of the market by his rival, who finding himself, without any expense, in 
possession of a discovery which has cost the inventor much time and expense, would 
be able to deprive him of all his deserved advantages, by selling at a lower price.'”232 
Bentham’s argument about the inventor is intended to include authors too, and his 
argument entails that both can be diminished significantly in numbers if such 
compensation is not taken into consideration.  
In fact, the economic justifications can be regarded as belonging to the utilitarian 
approach in its idealistic substance, as proposed by Bentham, as ‘happiness’ can be 
achieved through incentivising authors. 233 The designation of a specific theory as 
being economic, utilitarian or instrumental, depends on the angle from which we see it. 
Although Landes and Posner did not refer explicitly to the utilitarian approach, their 
view on rewarding the author to incentivise the creation of socially valuable intellectual 
works which will ultimately achieve the interests of society is the same view as that of 
the utilitarian scholars. Both insist on the social interest constantly when conferring 
protection and property to authors, so, it is a matter of superficial variation. As per 
Zemer: “[t]he incentive structure in utilitarian arguments focuses on promoting the 
general public good, not on placing the individual creator as an independent object 
entitled to a right.”234 Whether putting author, society or the happiness of both in the 
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focal point of discussion, all lead to the same result, that protection is necessary as a 
reward to achieving interests.  
7.8 Difference between the Current Sui Generis Database System and the 
Proposed System:  
The satisfaction with a single system to be applied to all intellectual works has entailed 
that some intellectual works have had to deal with concepts that are inappropriate to 
their nature and constituent elements. Authorship works normally reflect creativity and 
originality that cannot be measured by quantity, and, on the other hand, the utilitarian 
works usually relate to effort, time, and investment. “The purpose of copyright is to 
provide encouragement for creative endeavour, and differs in that respect from the sui 
generis right which is designed to encourage investment in particular types of data 
gathering.”235  
 
The thesis’s categorisation of works and its proposal for a dual system of protection - 
the copyright system for authorial works and another sui generis one for non-
authorship works, is similar to the current dual system applied regarding databases in 
the EU Database Directive. However, the thesis’s proposal is not limited to databases, 
but is useful for any other works that are missing the elements of authorship, explained 
above, like maps, timetables for trains, or matches, receipts, imitations of works, news 
reports, etc.  
The proposal to generate a different category for the non-authorship works aimed at 
providing protection to these works, and, at the same time, expressly exempting them 
from the theories and principles of copyright law and authorship that are not suitable to 
their nature. Accordingly, these works are proposed to have ownership only without 
authorship. In other words, the protection granted through the sui generis system will 
definitely be attached to somebody as the owner of the work and who will have 
exclusive rights to the work, however, this ownership did not pass through authorship 
test, that according to it the author is the first owner, because merely they will fail it. So, 
although the creator may be considered the owner but he cannot be an author. This 
policy is believed to achieve the interests of creators of these kinds of works and the 
interest of the works that can show authorship and originality values.  
Relying on authorship and originality to decide copyrightability in all works has caused 
the confusion we saw in courts’ decisions due to the differentiation in natures of works 
as explained in the second Chapter. Here, the thesis offers a way to lessen the hustle 
around whether we should protect those works that have used extensive labour and 
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expenses and have difficulty in extracting originality from them, and raising the level of 
certainty around protecting these works and – consequently - the works of authorship. 
236 
The proposed distinction between works of authorship and non-authorship works is 
expected to help to identify and recognise the reasons for the conflict in decisions on 
the copyrightability of works and in the theoretical foundations that they adopt in 
justifying these decisions. Additionally, the research questions why should we 
specifically allocate a special system for databases and then resort to widening its 
definition to include any compilations of facts or anthologies? Also, why only these 
works? What is the theoretical justification behind allowing for their protection under a 
separate system that does not adhere to copyright protection rules and criteria?  
The thesis did not start from the sui generis system in the EC Database Directive, but it 
started with an investigation into the conflict in copyright decisions in interpreting 
originality and authorship, and the justification of protection in different works, and 
found that the nature of the work is the reason for that conflict. It then proposed a 
categorisation of works. That proposed categorisation may be superficially similar to 
the copyright vs. sui generis system in the EC directive, but it is broader in scope, as it 
is not limited to specific kinds of works, but can be applied to any current, or maybe 
emerging, kinds of works. In addition, this categorisation is theoretically founded on the 
concept of authorship and its philosophical elements - their disappearance makes the 
work a non-authorship work and then beyond the scope of copyright law, and attracts 
concepts of labour, effort and investment under a ‘sui generis’ style system.  
7.9 Conclusion: 
Having identified the elements that must exist in any intangible work in order to be 
considered a work of intellect, namely, the elements of authorship in the last Chapter. 
This Chapter was concerned with analysing whether selection and arrangement of 
collections of facts can reflect any personal or mental elements that can allow for 
considering them authorship works. 
Though facts per se are not protected in the courts, collections of them have been 
recognised by some courts to be copyrightable, or as being authorship works, so, an 
investigation into the nature of collections of facts was important in this thesis’s 
argument, as the collection of facts, in their mere presentation, cannot bear any 
authorship.  
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The thesis then exposed the trend in courts and legislations to consider the selection 
and arrangement of facts as being original. Then an investigation of whether selection 
and arrangement can include any of the elements of authorship explained in the last 
Chapter, and, through six points, the thesis attempted to prove that selection and 
arrangement cannot reflect enough personal or mental elements to qualify a work as 
being a product of authorship.  
Authorship is about the mental effort of human beings and the personal ideas and 
messages he or she wants to express. This is why the presentation of the views of 
English and German philosophers was an essential step towards proving the inherent 
existence of personal and mental elements in works of authorship in England since the 
seventeenth century, and even earlier, as has been presumed by scholars and courts 
in the old eras. This was important as well in responding to the claims of the death of 
authorship and of romantic authors, as foundations for the claims of banishing the 
author concept. Likewise, this was used in this Chapter to criticise the trend that 
collections of facts can be original if the selection or arrangement was original.  
In this Chapter, the criticism of applying selection and arrangement to factual works 
showed that mental and personal contributions cannot appear through just arranging 
facts. Selection or arrangement of facts cannot be original, it only can be novel, 
because there is no inner aim or meaning intended through choosing this specific 
selection or arrangement.237 This thesis proved that authorship has a deeper meaning 
than just looking for a difference in form, but that mental or spiritual values are 
required, as explained in the last Chapter.  
The next Chapter will rely on this analysis to support the separation of factual works, 
and similar works that are devoid of authorship, into the non-authorship category. The 
authorship works will be seen to also have two grades of works - one high and the 
other low, depending on the level of authorial contribution involved.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
237 The same concept applied when registering a trademark, as it should not be similar to previous ones in 
the same field. 
 
 
267 
8 Chapter Eight:  
The Formulation and Implementation of the Thesis’s Proposition 
8.1 Introduction:  
This thesis argues that when applying the originality criterion of copyright on any 
intellectual work, we have to first ask whether the given work is an intellectual work? 
With all what the word ‘intellectual’ means, whether the work is a product of 
authorship? Whether the elements of authorship are present in the work? And whether 
the work is a product of intellect or manual labour? 
Throughout the investigation in this research of the protection of research and facts it 
became evident that the expansion of the protection of copyright and the conferral of 
extensive protection to facts, as in the case of Financial Information (FII) v. Moody,1 is 
not consistent with copyright law.2 On the other hand, diminishing any legal protection 
to such works, as in the case of Eckes v. Card Prices,3 is not a good policy too, as 
protection of the investment and the extensive effort expended in making a work is one 
of the functions of the law.4 Also, this appears from the conflicted views and decisions 
on the protection (or not) of mental and manual efforts.  
This is why it is argued that copyright law has to incorporate two distinctive systems of 
protection, one for creative intellectual works, and the other for non-creative works. The 
lack of dichotomy within copyright law will deprive society of very useful kinds of works 
that are needed in daily life for individuals when the originality criterion is raised, or will 
lead to distorting authorship values when get manipulated to suit the nature of non-
creative works.  
Lack of categorisation will lead to more distortion of authorship and originality: 
The lack of the proposed distinction between authorship and non-authorship works will 
increase uncertainty about theoretical issues in copyright law, whether uncertainty of 
courts about the originality interpretation to be applied, or what the justification of 
copyright is regarding the specific work disputed. This uncertainty leads to the 
dispersed interpretations of the courts of the originality criteria. 5 It was even argued 
that protecting factual works will lead to a diminishment of copyright principles and 
                                                          
1 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1986b, 808 F.2d 204, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
2 See chapter 3 at 3.3. 
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5 As shown in chapter three. 
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inherent doctrines due to a lack of need for them, as stated in the US Seventh Circuit in 
the case of National Telegraph v. Western Union Telegraph.6  
Denicola agrees with this thesis’s view when criticising the way copyright dealt with 
both kinds of works, as he asserted that the ‘vocabulary of copyright law’ is not suitable 
for fictional and factual works together.7 He added that although originality and 
creativity may have a significance when deciding on the copyrightability of works like 
‘Macbeth or Ulysses’, they are less apparent in regard to financial reports or telephone 
directories, and the variety of such later works deepens the complexity of the situation, 
or, as he noticed: “Copyright law has always dealt more comfortably with the novelist, 
painter, or composer, than with the historian, reporter, or compiler.”8 His argument 
reaches a result, which is that copyright law applies an unfair treatment,9 as although 
compilers get the protection of a limited monopoly for their collections, the writer of a 
historic treatise or a ‘biography’ is deprived of this protection, and his researched facts 
are free for appropriation, which is why he says that copyright law “must concern itself 
with each [work]”. 10 [Underlining added]. Accordingly, this thesis proposes that 
copyright law should incorporate two distinctive systems of protection, one for 
authorship works, and the other for non-authorship works.  
8.2 Qualitative Originality and Quantitative Originality: 
After demonstrating the difference between the nature of authorship and non-
authorship works, how this distinction will help to mitigate the conflict between 
copyright law decisions and theories should be articulated. The key here is the 
qualitative/quantitative originality distinction. The copyrightability of ‘authorship works’ 
should be decided according to ‘qualitative originality interpretations’ that measure the 
existence of personal characters and the intensity of their contribution. On the other 
hand, non-authorship works are measured using ‘quantitative originality interpretations’ 
that take into consideration the amount of effort exerted and the amount of information 
included.  
                                                          
6 National Telegraph News Co. V. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1902, 119 F. 294, Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit.. at 297, as the Court of the Seventh Circuit stated: “Little by little copyright has 
been extended to the literature of commerce, so that it now includes books that the old guild of authors 
would have disdained; catalogues, mathematical tables, statistics, designs, guide-books, directories, and 
other works of similar character. Nothing, it would seem, evincing, in its makeup, that there has been 
underneath it, in some substantial way, the mind of a creator or originator, is now excluded.” [Underlining 
added], as the Court held that ticker tapes listing telegraph transmissions of market quotations, sports 
scores, and race results are not copyrightable.  
7 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', Columbia Law Review, 81/3 (1981)., p. 515.  
8 Ibid. p. 516.  
9 Ibid. p. 518-519 
10 Ibid. p. 516.  
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Note here that the use of the qualitative and quantitative terms here refers to the 
difference between the mental effort, measured by qualitative tests, and manual work, 
which is measured by quantitative tests. This is not the same qualitative/quantitative 
test used in deciding on substantial copying in infringement cases, as in the case of 
Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd, when the House of Lords confirmed “reproduction 
means copying, … And, if he does copy, the question whether he has copied a 
substantial part depends much more on the quality than on the quantity of what he has 
taken.”11  
Accordingly, the interpretations of originality shown in the third chapter should be 
divided into two types. One measuring the qualitative personality features in the works 
that contend to be authorship works, and that include the selection and arrangement 
criterion and creativity criterion, which will be applied through the elements of 
authorship. The other type of originality should be used to measure the quantity of 
financial and effort expenditure used to create non-authorship works, and that will 
include the sweat of the brow doctrine, and the skill, labour and judgment criterion, as 
the latter has already been used in many instances to justify protection to non-
authorship works that depend on manual skill and manual labour. 12 
The thesis’s proposal runs against the argument that equates the quantitative and 
qualitative requirements in intellectual works, as there is a difference between them 
depending on the nature of the work. For instance, in British Horse Racing Board v. 
William Hill Organization Ltd. 13 it was mentioned that: “for copyright to subsist, it must 
be shown not only that there is a relevant collection of information, but that it is also 
original. Although there is no requirement to demonstrate aesthetic or qualitative 
criteria, there must be a quantitative baseline for originality before protection is 
acquired.”14 [Underlining added]. This argument is based on the idea that industrious 
collection in all works is sufficient, and that cannot be applied to high authorship works, 
such as novels or musical works, where the quantum of the work can never adequately 
reflect the creativity it may include.  
Regarding the qualitative interpretation of originality, the thesis will resort to the 
‘selection and arrangement’ test. As for the quantitative interpretation of originality, it 
should adopt the ‘skill, labour and judgment’ test, or the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine. 
Such a criterion is important to prove that there is some effort and labour that has been 
expended to create them, to prove that they are independently created. The only 
                                                          
11 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. V. William Hill (Football) Ltd., 1964, 1 W.L.R. 273, House of Lords at 276.  
12 See Chapter 3 at 3.6. 
13 British Horse Racing Board V. William Hill Organization Ltd, 2005, EWCA Civ 863; RPC 35 Court of 
Appeal 
14 Ibid. Para. 28.  
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limitation here is that ‘skill, labour and judgment’ is limited to measuring manual efforts, 
which is why it is applied to compilation works that are devoid of mental authorship.15 
8.3 Factors of Authorship: 
Having decided, above, on the elements of authorship which must exist in any work to 
be considered a product of authorship or a work of intellect, there are also ‘factors’ that 
express or show these elements, which are the selection, arrangement and expressive 
form. These three factors work together to reflect the author’s personality and mind 
work, as the author chooses the ideas, words, lines and symbols, which are the raw 
material of any intellectual works and mix them together in a specific selection and 
arrangement, or what we might call a structure. This structure is the expressive form 
that with which copyright law should be concerned. The author does not convey his 
thoughts only through the choice of words, for this is the last stage after many stages of 
thinking and investigation in choosing the proper arrangement of his very detailed ideas 
and facts in a specific sequence. This sequence is what constitutes the vehicle of his 
thoughts and sensations which the audience receives.  
As an example, in literary works, the elements of the work are the ideas included, not 
the general idea, but the detailed ideas in a specific selection and arrangement which 
the author found to be the most appropriate to convey his thoughts. This selection and 
arrangement is what distinguishes the work from previous works, and which is thought 
to make the work original. For instance, the CJEU in Infopaq v. Danske16 established 
the factors of authorship with which we can consider the work an intellectual creation: 
“As regards newspaper articles, their author's own intellectual creation, … is evidenced 
clearly from the form, the manner in which the subject is presented and the linguistic 
expression.”17 The ‘linguistic expression’ is the expressive form, or the selection of 
words and expressions, chosen by the author to express his ideas. ‘The form’ and ‘the 
manner in which the subject is presented’ represent the arrangement of the ideas of 
the author in a specific order.  
The raw material of artistic works are lines, circles, figures and graphical elements, 
selected and arranged by the author. For instance, in the case of Designers Guild Ltd. 
v. Russell Williams18 the raw materials of the disputed artwork ‘Ixia’ are (as described 
by the court) as follows - drawing flowers on a striped background (this is the general 
idea). Whereas, the detailed ideas are the vertical stripes, the petals (in the form of a 
comma), ‘the centres of the flower heads are represented by a strong blob, rather than 
                                                          
15 See Chapter 6 at 6.7 & 6.8. 
16 Infopaq International a/S V. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009, E.C.D.R. 16, C-5/08, Court of Justice of 
the European Communities (Fourth Chamber).  
17 Ibid. at 272.  
18 Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russell Williams, 2000, 1 W.L.R. 2416, House of Lords.  
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by a realistic representation’, the chosen colours of the petals and background, and 
‘the leaves [that] are painted in two distinct shades of green, with similar brush strokes, 
and are scattered over the design’. These are the detailed elements that were selected 
specifically, expressed in a special form and arranged by the authors of Ixia. The 
District Court19 found that the defendant’s work included all the elements in the same, 
or a largely similar, selection and arrangement of the plaintiff’s work and thus it decided 
on the infringement. This way to apply the factors of authorship to the raw material is 
called, in the Designers’ Guild Case, “dissecting the Ixia design into its component 
elements.”20 [Underlining added], and that is what the thesis calls for in its 
generalization of its system to all works.  
Regarding musical works: the factors of authorship appear in the selection of a specific 
tune or melody in a chosen rhythm with the harmony or composition that expresses the 
author’s subject or feeling. In dramatic works they appear in the plot -the main story of 
the work-, themes, sequence of events, dialogue, mood, setting, pace,21 the 
accompanying music, characters, although dramatic characters themselves are not 
afforded copyright protection.22 Accordingly, the selection of the specific elements of 
any work in the arrangement in which the author put them, constitutes the structure that 
defines the originality of the authorship work.  
The raw material of authorship is normally abstract pieces of information in common 
that, per se, have no value or substance. As Mr Justice Story explained in 1845, “[i]n 
truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which 
in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, 
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which is well 
known and used before.”23 The author picks some of them and arranges them in a 
special way so as to make a form that can express or convey his thoughts and 
sensations. This research believes that works of culture are a complicated type of 
speech as a communication means. 
 
                                                          
19 Designers Guild Ltd V. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (T/a Washington Dc), 1997, F.S.R. 275, The High 
Court of Justice—Chancery Division 
20 Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russell Williams, 1 W.L.R. 2416, supra note 18, at 2419.  
21 Kouf V. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 1994, 16 F.3d 1042, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth 
Circuit.at 1045. 
22 As, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that: “even if the Owners assigned their complete rights in the copyright 
… such assignment did not prevent the author from using the characters used therein, in other stories.”, 
see Warner Bros. Pictures V. Columbia Broadcasting System, 1954, 216 F.2d 945, United States Court of 
Appeals Ninth Circuit. at 950. 
23 Emerson V. Davies Et Al., 1845, 8 F.Cas. 626; 3 Story 768; 8 F.Cas. 615, Circuit Court, D. 
Massachusetts. 
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When applying the proposed criteria through the use of the raw materials of intellectual 
works that will be the subject of the selection and arrangement – factors of authorship - 
we should settle on a criterion that can be technically used to decide on the originality 
of works. However, it was argued in Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams24 that the 
visual comparison between works as a whole is a good criterion for deciding whether 
there is a similarity between works or not.25 On the other hand, the dissection of the 
elements of the work was criticised as: “it dealt with the copied features piecemeal 
instead of considering, as the Judge had done, their cumulative effect.”26 The selection 
and arrangement criterion fulfil the two requirements, as the elements of the work can 
be compared in detail, and then the selection and arrangment of these elements will 
show whether works are, in totality, similar or not.  
8.4 First Stage Categorisation, Authorship and Non-Authorship Works: 
The conflict in copyright subsistence decisions that was demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
and the ensuing discussions on the different natures of cultural works in Chapters Six 
and Seven urged the thesis to adopt the separation solution of works to two categories. 
Authorship works, to which we can apply orthodox theories of authorship, personality 
and originality, and non-authorship works that are excluded from these theories, but 
could be protected under a sui generis system.  
 
The call for a binary system in copyright law has been advocated by Tarolli, who 
supports the thesis’s argument: “[t]he copyright system, which only protects works 
demonstrating a subjective authorial presence, or high amounts of creative authorship, 
neither consistently serves copyright's original purposes nor adequately protects many 
utilitarian works that facilitate the dissemination of valuable information. Rather than 
continuing to require utilitarian works to evidence authorial personality, copyright law 
would better fulfil its purposes with the adoption of a binary system of protection.” 27 
[Underlining added]. However he did not take the further step in detailing the 
foundations of this system, its substance and application, which this thesis has 
showed. Ginsburg also argues that modern copyright law only protects factual works 
through applying a threshold relying on personality, besides, she contends that 
copyright law had to protect the works that have commercial value, such as directories, 
calendars, etc. which are increasingly demanded by the public. 28 The tenor of her 
                                                          
24 Designers Guild Ltd. V. Russell Williams, 1 W.L.R. 2416, supra note 18.  
25 Ibid. at 119, 123. 
26 Ibid. at 2421 
27 Stephen P. Tarolli, 'Comment, the Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', American University Law Review, 1639 (1997)., p. 1664.  
28 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', 
Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990)., p. 1869.  
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speech refers to that copyright law recourses to two separate systems to deal with 
intellectual works, one that take in consideration personality characteristic and another 
that considers commercial value.  
 
Copyright law is still the relevant sphere of competence for factual works as a kind of 
intellectual works, or, to be more accurate, intangible works, even if those works do not 
include authorship as such, Tarolli agreed that “[a]lthough present in early court 
decisions as well, the high authorship rationale for copyright did not prevent protection 
of low authorship works. The presence of commercial value in utilitarian works 
coexisted with high authorship as a justification for securing the privileges of copyright 
even into this century. It is within copyright's traditional prerogative, therefore, to protect 
both the subjective expressions of an author's personality and the objective elements 
of commercially valuable works that manifest authorial industriousness.”29 However, 
due to the inconsistencies explained throughout this thesis that result from treating both 
by the same principles, it can be argued that protecting factual works cannot be done 
unless through following one of three options. Firstly, through suspending authorship 
completely for all intellectual works, and which many scholars who advocated the 
‘death of authorship’ doctrine have argued directly. 30 Secondly, through lowering 
authorship to require just a spark of creativity, or a very low level of originality, and then 
a lower level of authorship. The third option to allow factual works to be protected by 
copyright law through the invention of a ‘new route to these works’, wherein authorship 
is suspended for such works only, and also the protection offered is proposed to be 
less than other authorship works. The latter proposal is the one that we think it is the 
most important amendment to copyright law in order to maintain its theoretical 
foundations and functionality. Through this proposition we can be assured of the 
constant flow of the ingenuity of traditional authorship works through preserving their 
traditional criteria, and, at the same time, providing protection and assuring the 
maintenance of marketability circumstances for the production of utilitarian 
informational works. 31 
Imposing authorship and originality requirements on factual works regardless of their 
nature to gain protection is considered as if the originality condition is a bureaucratic 
procedure that should in any case be fulfilled to comply with the law, throwing out all 
logical and legal meanings ‘authorship’ or even ‘intellectual works’ terminology bear, 
                                                          
29 Stephen P. Tarolli, 'Comment, the Future of Information Commerce under Contemporary Contract and 
Copyright Principles', supra note 27, p. 1665.  
30 Such views have been discussed and investigated, and we have shown the disadvantages and effects 
that may result from such arguments. See, Chapter 4 at 4.2 & 4.5. 
31 See, Chapter 7 at 7.7 & 7.8. 
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and the theoretical foundations of copyright law. 32 This trend is criticised for its 
overstatement of authorship in all works, even those that lack any mental 
contribution,33 for instance, Ginsburg questioned how, in West Publishing v. Mead 
Data,34 the Court’s finding that arrangement of judicial decisions in reports is 
copyrightable despite, no evidence being presented that the arrangement of decisions 
was anything other than random.35 Also, in Southern Bell v. Associated Tel. Directory 
case,36 the Court stated that Atlanta Yellow Pages telephone directory met the 
standard of original selection and arrangement without explaining how an 
alphabetically arranged directory satisfies such a standard. 37 It is also criticised from 
another angle as this approach constitutes an obstacle to the protection of factual 
works produced, as it imposes something that is not required by these works to 
perform their basic role, “[t]hese notions of original authorship and of copyright scope 
provide little hospitality for works essentially manifesting not creative individuality but 
‘sweat of the brow,’ or its modem technological equivalents.”38 
To confirm, if the work produced has the same selection and arrangement of elements 
as a previous work, and the same form of expression and even physical form, as, for 
instance, by making larger copies of a painting or sculpture, or a better quality copy of 
a painting. Although it may include skill and labour, it is devoid of any authorship and 
should be called a ‘non-authorship work’. The only case in which copyright protection 
might be available to it is when the imitated work is in the public domain, as then the 
protection can be justified by a sui generis system through non-authorship justifications 
such as for protecting investment and labour expended. Here, the work will be treated 
not as an authorship work, but as a new performance of an authorship work. What is 
sold is not the authorship included but the craftsmanship with which it is made, the 
perfection of execution, with no authorial intervention. In addition to factual works that 
do not include any creation or authorship, but merely collection. 39 
                                                          
32 As explained in chapters 6 and 7, this argument was advocated by Ginsburg, see Chapter 7 at footnote 
9. 
33 As discussed above, see Chapter 7 at 7.4.3. 
34 West Publishing Company V. Mead Data Central, Inc., 1986, 799 F.2d 1219, United States Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit.  
35 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note  28 p. 1868, note 13. 
36 Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company V. Associated Telephone Directory Publishers; C.A., 
1985, 756 F.2d 801, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. 
37 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information', supra 
note 28, p. 1868.  
38 Ibid. p. 1868. 
39 See Chapter 6 at 6.7 & 6.8.  
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Practical example:  
The main obvious example of the non-authorship of imitation works is the case of 
Rogers v. Koons,40 wherein Jeff Koons created a sculpture called ‘string of puppies’ 
based on a copyrighted photograph, Koons claimed that his a sculpture is a parody 
because it meant to comment critically on the incorporated object and the political and 
economic system.41 The Second Circuit refused his claim and decided that his work is 
not a parody of the original work, and only parody that allows for the appropriation from 
the original work.42 
However, applying the selection and arrangement criteria would be more efficient in 
this case and others, as the existence of the same selection of elements of the work in 
the same arrangement that the original author has put them through refer to that both 
works bear the same thoughts, and as long as no change happened so no authorship 
incorporated, so the work is deemed a non-authorship work. And if protection of non-
authorship works adopted by the copyright legislation for the sake of protecting 
investment and labour, then the ‘sweat of the brow’ or the ‘skill labour and judgment’ 
criteria can be adopted to decide whether such works deserve protection or not 
depending on the quantum of investment or labour involved under a sui generis 
system. 
8.4.1 The Proposed Sui Generis Protection for Non-Authorship Works: 
This thesis proposes that a sui generis system should be specified to protect non-
authorship works under copyright law, so they are not subject to the authorship and 
originality concepts. Under this system factual works can be protected for the 
investment, labour, effort and time expended in creating them, without protecting the 
facts themselves.  
Any objection to the protection of factual works according to the labour and time 
expended due to the fear that this: “will hinder creators of new compilations… [due to] 
creating monopolies . . over . . facts and ideas themselves”,43 will thus not be justified, 
as protecting investments cannot hinder the use of facts. Accordingly, facts are not 
protected as long as their use does not conflict with the investments through using 
them to produce competing works and save the effort and investment that was 
expended to produce the original works. So, using the internal facts for any other use - 
educational, research, or anything outside commercial use - cannot be prohibited. 
                                                          
40 Art Rogers V. Jeff Koons, 1992, 960 F.2d 301, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
41 Ibid. at 309, 310. 
42 Ibid. at 310. 
43 Michael J. Haungs, 'Copyright of Factual Compilations: Public Policy and the First Amendment', 
Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, 23 (1989). p. 349 
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Additionally, if anybody else wanted to create a similar compilation of facts, he has to 
obtain them from the source, not using the same investment and time expended in 
creating works. We thus support the use of ‘the sweat of the brow’ doctrine in regard to 
non-authorship works under the proposed sui generis system.  
8.4.2 Supporting the ‘Sweat of the Brow’ Doctrine for the Sui Generis System: 
Selection and arrangement in compilations of facts fails to protect compilers of facts 
adequately, as for instance “[i]f a compiler decides to use one of two equally effective 
arrangements, a second comer may use the second method after the first compilation 
is put on the market. In so doing, the second compiler reaps the benefits of the original 
author's work without having to expend much effort.”44 The first compiler’s effort and 
investment in creating the first compilation should be protected, otherwise “the original 
compiler has little incentive to gather the information in the first place.” 45 
Accordingly, the use of the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine should be adopted regarding 
factual works. Although, this may seem to go against the personality approach in 
copyright law, this thesis confirms it is not, as this will save the authorship and 
originality in other works from claims to reduce their interpretation to allow for the 
protection of works already devoid of authorship, which will result in distorting those 
concepts and spread uncertainty in copyrightability of all works. 
In the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee in drafting the EC Database 
Directive 96/9, “’sweat of the brow’ databases were not intellectual creations and 
therefore not within copyright protection but that they were within the proposed sui 
generis right.” 46 So, there is no subject to be measured by originality and creativity. 
The sui generis system in the EU Database Directive has been codified as a revival of 
the ‘sweat of the bow’ doctrine as it measures only the investments and the labour 
incurred in the process of the collection of databases, in order to fulfil the requirements 
of the sui generis system. This is also confirmed by Laddie et al. 47 
Non-authorship works can be copyrighted because of the labour and expense invested 
in its creation, so no originality or authorship is required for its protection, thus, if a 
newer work is similar to a precedent work then the creator should prove if there is 
separate labour or expense invested in creating the new work. Also relevant will be 
whether s/he relied on the previous work as a guide through the collection process or 
                                                          
44 Jack B Hicks, 'Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate', Texas 
Law Review, 65 (1986). p. 1003 
45 Ibid. p. 1003 
46 The travaux preparatoires (preparatory works) of the Database Directive 96/9, cited in Hugh Laddie, 
Peter Prescott, and Mary Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 2 vols. (Fourth edn., 1: 
LexisNexis, 2011). at 32. 28.  
47 Ibid. at 32. 28.  
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revision, and so forth, otherwise the exact copying or substantial similarity will be 
considered an infringement.  
The interpretations of the originality criterion as an industrious collection, or skill and 
labour (meaning mechanical skill and manual labour) can still be the only criterion to be 
used in deciding the copyrightability of non-authorship works, like maps, directories and 
catalogues. The other interpretations used in authorship works should not be used 
here, for instance, the selection and arrangement, as explained above,48 cannot be 
applied to non-authorship works, as long as the ‘selection and arrangement’ is not 
something that is related to its constituent elements, and the work without it is till 
beneficial. The audience can still choose the more utilitarian work, but copyright law is 
not concerned with the utility of works.  
 
In addition, recent technological developments provide constantly more sophisticated 
ways to facilitate doing such a job, namely ‘selection and arrangement’, in little time.49 
‘Selection and arrangement’ cannot measure the quantum of effort or capital expended 
in creating the work, so it cannot cooperate or cope with other interpretations that 
employ the labour, skill or effort expended, but applying it on such works will ease the 
conferral of protection to non-authorship works that might infringe pre-existent non-
authorship works, which might has been created by skill, labour and capital, but 
missing authorial or creative addition and even expenditure of separate labour and 
investment. Applying ‘selection and arrangement’ criteria will undoubtedly harm those 
pre-existent works.  
8.5 Second Stage Categorisation, High Authorship and Low Authorship Works: 
Deciding on the originality or infringement of authorship works requires the recourse to 
the common factors of authorship: selection, arrangement, and form. The research 
argues that a difference in one of these factors can change the level of authorship in 
the work. For instance, if the selection of the raw material of authorship in the work is 
different from previous works, then this work has authorship, and may even be 
considered a high authorship work. If the arrangement of previously selected elements 
from a previous work is different, then the work also should be considered a high 
authorship work. However, if the form is only different because the same selection and 
arrangement of the work was used in precedent work, then the work is a non-
authorship work.  
                                                          
48 See Chapter 7 at 7.4.  
49 As explained in Chapter 7 at 7.4.4. 
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Here, the thesis differentiates between the ‘expression form’ and the ‘physical form’, 
the first is the form that the author chooses to express his ideas through, like choosing 
specific words in writing or specific figures or graphics in drawing with which to express 
his thoughts. The physical form is the material that the author chooses to bear his 
ideas, whether writing, painting or making a sculpture.  
The change in the ‘type’ of physical form: 
In regard to the physical form, hawse should differentiate between written, audio and 
visual forms, as the transfer of a written description of a situation (words in a novel, 
etc.) to a painting or sculpture makes the painter or sculptor an original author. The 
written work is a source from which every painter or sculptor can derive an original 
work, and here the transfer is made from the written physical form to a visual physical 
form. On the other hand, with regard to the sculptor who transfers a painting to 
sculpture, this process should be considered a non-authorship one, since the 
imagination and visualization of senses and thoughts has already been embodied. 
What he or she did is just transfering this material that bears that visualization from 
paper to bronze, stone or wood. Despite the change in the physical form, the same 
selection and arrangement and the expression form are there as the first author has 
made or described them. The resulting work, that relies on the same selection and 
arrangement of the original work is devoid of any authorial contribution and should be 
called a ‘non-authorship work’.  
The change in expression form was a source of conflict between cases, as in the case 
of Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts the second circuit considered the faithful 
reproduction of painting into mezzotint engravings as original work, due to the 
alteration of material and the tedious job associated.50 The research maintains that if 
mere differentiation between humans is the basis of protection, then no point of the 
copyright law, unless the exact copies made by printers or sound recorder, as any 
duplication by other humans will certainly include some differences. However, the 
second circuit in the case of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Jeffrey Snyder refused to consider 
the change of the physical form of the mechanical toy ‘Uncle Sam’ Banks as sufficient 
to meet originality requirement though there are some alterations, as the court stated 
that “[i]n any event, however, the articles should be judged on their own merits, … Here 
as elsewhere in the copyright law there are lines that must be drawn even though 
reasonable men may differ where.”51 The dependence on the existence of any 
                                                          
50 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 1951, 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, United 
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. at 975 
51 L. Batlin & Son, Inc., V. Jeffrey Snyder and Etna Products Co., 1976, 536 F.2d 486, United States Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. at 492. 
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alteration is not a logic requirement to consider a work as an intellectual, otherwise, “an 
accidental bump experienced while making a copy would result in enough originality to 
warrant copyright protection to the secondary artist.”52  
This argument can justify why films, for instance, get lower protection than the novels 
that they have been extracted from or have relied upon. The thesis answers that this is 
because the selection and arrangement of the events and characters and plots is the 
same, so the structure of the work, which is the expression of the thoughts, is copied. 
The film makers have changed the physical form from the written to audio-visual form, 
although using the mental and personal capabilities of the director and script, they 
relied on the structured authorship that have been put by the author of the novel. 
However, this thesis questions: what if the film did not copy the selection and 
arrangement of any previous novel? We think that then this film has authorship 
elements that are higher than that in the film mentioned in the latter example, as the 
selection and arrangement made here are original, so this film should be considered a 
‘high authorship work’.  
Benefits of the proposed categorisation of works: 
The existence of a categorisation of works into high/low and non-authorship works will 
be a motivation for creativity, especially under the technological system proposed, as 
authors will be required to provide information about the source of their inspiration, the 
works they have read to prepare for their creation, and the works that they derived from 
their work.  
 
On the other hand, this categorisation will serve the interests of non-authorship works’ 
right holders by providing them with stable protection that depends on concepts that 
take into account their works’ nature and constituent elements. Thus, Curtis’s opinion 
should be still advocated: “[t]he laws which protect literary property are designed for 
every species of composition, from the great productions of genius, that are to delight 
and instruct mankind for ages, to the most humble compilation that is to teach children 
the art of numbers for a few years, and then to disappear forever.” 53 Even Curtis has 
proposed the reliance on labour as a justification of conferral of copyright protection: 
“[i]n whatever way he claims the exclusive privilege accorded by these laws, he must 
show something which the law can fix upon as the product of his and not another's 
                                                          
52 Judith M Nelson, 'Art Forgery and Copyright Law: Modifying the Originality Requirement to Prevent the 
Forging of Artworks', Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ, 8 (1989). p. 707 
53 George Ticknor Curtis, Treatise on the Law of Copyright (London; Boston: A. Maxwell and Son; Charles 
C. Little and James Brown, 1847)., p. 171.  
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labors.”54 This thesis calls for the use of the criterion that Curtis adopted, ‘the labour’, 
but in relation to specific works in a sui generis system, which are non-authorship 
works. 
The categorisation of works will achieve a degree of consistency between copyright 
law’s several applications on the ground depending on the stable treatment of works 
with the same nature. For instance, the selection and arrangement criteria can be used 
to apply in the pre-emptive checks used in academic article publication: “'[t]oday, law 
review editors search the field of literature to see whether the article submitted adds 
anything to those articles already available to readers. This pre-emption check is 
designed to eliminate some duplicative material from the legal literature”55 Accordingly, 
the plagiarism check can be integrated in the copyright system through the selection 
and arrangement criteria. 
8.5.1 Selection and Arrangement as a Criterion for Second Division (High/Low 
Authorship): 
 
Selection and arrangement’s main function is materializing thoughts: 
Selection and arrangement is ‘a universal criterion’ that distinguishes any original 
authorship work from non-authorship works. If two novels are similar but the 
arrangement of events is different in the newer work and it has a different form of 
expression, then this will refer to that the newer work has a different arrangement of the 
detailed ideas and different expression, so it can be original, depending, of course, on 
the Judge’s evaluation of the substantiality of such changes. If two paintings have 
similar elements –raw materials- (say; lady, sun, trees, sea, flower, etc) the 
arrangement of the elements of the painting on the layers of that painting56 has an 
essential role in deciding the originality or infringement of the newer work. In music 
also, the selection and arrangement (of melody, chorus, etc.) is the thing that decides 
the originality, or infringement, of the newer work.  
The role of selection and arrangement in showing the originality of the work appeared 
in the US case Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,57 as after Judge Miller 
stipulated that the author should show the: “originality, of intellectual production, of 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Howard Denemark, 'How Valid Is the Often-Repeated Accusation That There Are Too Many Legal 
Articles and Too Many Law Reviews', Akron Law Review, 30 (1996). p. 224.  
56 About the layers of painting see, Robert P Taylor et al., 'Authenticating Pollock Paintings Using Fractal 
Geometry', Pattern Recognition Letters, 28/6 (2007). and also: Andrea Kirsh and Rustin S Levenson, 
Seeing through Paintings: Physical Examination in Art Historical Studies (1: Yale University Press, 2000). 
57 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 1884, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, Supreme Court 
of the United States.  
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thought, and conception”58 in the work in order that it be copyrighted. He detailed that 
the selection and arrangement of elements of the photograph was the reason to 
consider it original, as follows, though this mentioned in other place,59 it serves the 
argument here also,“ [the plaintiff] … gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde 
in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other 
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful 
outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the 
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made 
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit. ’”60 [Underlining added] Judge Miller 
depended on this selection and arrangement in deciding originality of the work, as he 
stated, “[t]hese findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original work of art, 
the product of plaintiff's intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author.”61 
[Underlining added] 
Curtis argued that finding originality in works is something impossible, because: “There 
are … large classes of works, the materials of which are common to all writers, existing 
in nature, art, science, philology, history, statistics, &c. , where there must be 
considerable resemblances.” 62 [Underlining added]. However, extracting the specific 
selection and arrangement the author used will facilitate the search for original works. 
Although the same raw materials (ideas, and expressive forms) may be copied, putting 
specific selected material in the same order is something that does not happen every 
day, it has rarely been repeated, even if there are some similarities, there cannot be a 
duplicate. So, selection and arrangement can always works as evidence that the work 
is original if selection and arrangement of theses raw materials is different and there is 
any indication that the work bears any thought or sensation.  
This thesis supports the argument of the Appellee in the Eckes v. Card Prices63 Case, 
who confirmed that: “copyright protection does not extend either to the idea of a 
baseball card compilation, … or to facts and information contained in the compilation, 
[and that] once the idea of a baseball card compilation and the facts contained in it are 
removed from the Guide, there is simply nothing left to protect, especially where the 
format is required by the nature of the subject matter.”64 [Underlining added]. This 
thesis confirms that it is difficult to balance the rule that facts are not protected, and 
then afterwards giving protection to facts for the originality of their compilation.  
                                                          
58 Ibid. at 60. 
59 See Chapter 7 at 7.6. 
60 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349, supra note 57, at 282.  
61 Ibid. 
62 George Ticknor Curtis, Treatise on the Law of Copyright, supra note 53, p. 171.  
63 W. Eckes V. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, supra note 3.  
64 Ibid. at 862.  
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Selection and arrangement of words does not count towards authorship: 
In literary works, we find that the CJEU in Infopaq v. Danske,65 confirmed that the 
selection and arrangement of words are the only things that can show the originality of 
the work and prove the existence of authorship and that it is a result of intellectual 
effort: “Regarding the elements of such works covered by the protection, it should be 
observed that they consist of words which, considered in isolation, are not as such an 
intellectual creation of the author who employs them. It is only through the choice, 
sequence and combination of those words that the author may express his creativity in 
an original manner and achieve a result which is an intellectual creation.”66 [Underlining 
added].  
However, words are the raw material that is used to express the background selection 
and arrangement of ideas and thoughts. Words are just the superficial appearance of 
the thoughts and do not even express the structure of the work. They are the weakest 
element to rely on into deciding on the authorship of works. There are other more 
substantial elements in the work than words, and that their selection and arrangement 
can show authorship more clearly than words, for example, facts, detailed ideas, plots, 
etc. although all are public domain elements – like words - but their choice and how 
they are put in order is more reliable in establishing the originality of the work as this 
reflects the personality of the author. As, this order and that choice signifie that the 
work bears thoughts and sensation. In brief, the thesis calls the CJEU to look at the 
order of meanings, not the order of words, as the thesis opposes its opinion stated 
above. As confirmed in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 67 in order to decide on the 
copyrightability of fair use whether through appropriation or parody the secondary or 
subsequent work should “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”68 
For instance, in cases where facts or events are organised in a specific way – not only 
historically or chronologically - with focus on specific events per se in order to reach a 
result different from that known to the public, then the author wanted to convey his 
thoughts and ideas, not just facts without any processing. This appears specifically in 
the case of Hoehling v. Universal City Studios69, here, the work had to be considered 
an original authorship work, as although it contains facts and events, the selection of 
specific events and the arrangement of them in a special way to show some sides to 
                                                          
65 Infopaq International a/S V. Danske Dagblades Forening, E.C.D.R. 16, C-5/08, supra note 16.  
66 Ibid. at 272.  
67 Campbell V. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994, 510 U.S. 569, Supreme Court of the United States 
68 Ibid. at 579 
69 Hoehling V. Universal City Studios, 1980, 618 F.2d 972, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.  
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the events that are not apparent to the average individual, is a processing of facts that 
reflects original thinking and mind processing, not just mechanical collection or 
presentation of abstract facts. However, the work in this case was denied protection.70 
This case raises the question: if the mere collection of facts gets protection in copyright 
law like databases or compilation of facts, why do works that include further stages of 
mind processing, thinking, selection and arrangement that have been followed to put 
such facts in a consistent order and to achieve meaningful aims, do not get even the 
same level of protection, if not higher?  
The selection and arrangement of facts in any way, even in a new or unprecedented 
form of arrangement, is not a creative thing, as no authorship is involved in doing it. 
Although it may be new or novel in form, it is not creative in terms of the authorship and 
thought, and it is that latter side which the copyright law meant, due to the absence of 
‘elements of authorship’ that are extracted in the last Chapter, and, most importantly, 
the absence of ‘inner meaning’ or thoughts or ideas to be conveyed to the audience. 
Besides, the arrangement is done, not for the purpose of authorship, but to help users 
to reach the specific facts they want. So it was made for utility purposes, not for literary 
or artistic authorship purposes.  
The work ‘as a whole’: 
The selection and arrangement of raw material in authorship works, whether literary, 
artistic, etc. , aims to reach a point of completeness. For instance, in authoring a 
literary work, the facts, pieces of information, the detailed ideas of the author, and 
personal expressions, etc. , are all gathered and organised in a specific order that the 
author finds is the most suitable selection and arrangement (of these raw materials) to 
deliver to the audience his own thoughts or sensations. When the author arrives at this 
point, we can say that the work, ‘as a whole’, operates as a one unit to deliver these 
thoughts, and if any of the constituent materials, fact, idea or pieces of information are 
taken away, the whole work will not do its job as intended by the author. This is 
because the resulting thought will be changed, distorted or just disappears. This 
concept works in regard to all authorship works of art, music and drama.  
This concept is not so relevant in relation to compilations of facts, as they aim to collect 
facts in whatever way and to present them without intellectual aim that justify the 
correlation between these specific facts. Even if the selection and arrangement was 
creative, this does not affect the facts but their appearance. In one work –for instance- 
facts are ordered according to geographical criteria, in another, in chronological order, 
and so on, but there is no point of completeness that the work should reach. In 
                                                          
70 Ibid. at 979. 
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addition, the work is never stable, but is continually changeable, due to the fact that 
most collections of facts are in need for updating from time to time. This is different 
from all other literary, artistic or musical works, which do not need this update and that 
they expresse their integrity and completeness at any time, as long as they were not 
distorted by external circumstances.  
It is worth noting that, in the definition given by the US Copyright Act 1976 to 
compilations, that they are works “formed by the collection and assembling of pre-
existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way 
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”71 
[Underlining added] The legislator mentioned that the work ‘as a whole’ should 
constitute an original work. Whether there is subjective selection or not, the important 
issue is not how the author chose or selected the information, but why he chose it. Is it 
merely to present it, or to use it to convey something behind it, an inner idea or 
thought? Some courts have refused protection due to the lack of such ‘subjective 
selection’, like the District Court decision in FII v. Moody,72 after the case was 
remanded by the Second Circuit of Court of Appeal. The District Court commented: 
“[s]he used no subjective analysis, but ‘just took the information from what I saw in the 
tombstones and the articles in the paper. ’”73 The ‘work as a whole’ is a key element 
that justifies the thesis’s refusal to consider compilation as authorship works, because 
the work does not operate as a one whole unit. 
To confirm, this external or superficial selection and arrangement74 does not make 
every fact participate in the whole work, because removing any of them will not affect 
the wholeness of the work, or the integrity or the coherence in its wholeness status. 
Take a telephone directory as an example, the facts are selected and arranged 
according to the standard chosen by the maker, but selecting every detail does not 
take part in reaching a degree or a level of perfection that makes the ‘whole collection’ 
a single interconnected unit. In other words, selection and arrangement of these facts 
is not made to serve a specific relation between those specific facts. The statement: ‘as 
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship’, was not mentioned for no reason, 
but refers to the integrity between the details of the work. Otherwise, it would be easier 
for the law makers to stipulate the originality in the selection and arrangement of all of 
                                                          
71 §. 101 of the 'Copyright Act of the United States', Ch8-10; 12-17 of Title 17 of the US code (US, 1976)..  
72 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 808 F.2d 204, supra note 1.  
73 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1986a, 1986 WL 7791, United States 
District Court, S.D. New York. at 2. 
74 We mean here the selection and arrangement of the shape of the work that does not aim per se to put 
contents in a specific order, as that is applied in collections of facts.  
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the compilations, not the originality of the work, if they intended to stipulate only a 
superficial requirement.  
This interpretation of the text and a general understanding of when compilations are 
protected is found also in the Financial Information v. Moody Case75 in the US Second 
Circuit. Through discussing the copyrightability of the daily published index cards, 
including information of municipal bonds and the annual compilation of these cards, the 
Court made a clear point only when it excluded the desire to just protect the cards 
against copying, as Judge Oakes stated: “I doubt that protection of each card may 
arise simply because denial of protection would impair the value of the copyright in the 
annual volume. That argument seems to be boot-strapping.”76 His following argument 
supports this thesis’s understanding, as he confirmed that the daily components of a 
serial publication (the daily published cards) might be copyrightable: “because of their 
relationship to each other as issued, as distinguished from their relationship to each 
other as collected in an annual volume.”77 [Underlining added]. This argument 
reinforces the thesis’s view that necessitates a relationship between the work’s 
contents, not only as a collection but to reinforce the ‘whole’ work principle found in the 
US Copyright Act to be the original authorship of the person, and to prove that the work 
really conveys his thoughts and ideas.  
This understanding was confirmed by Judge Oakes when he gave a general example 
to broaden the scope of this concept: “[f]or example, a mystery story published in the 
form of daily clues might secure protection for each clue because of its relationship to 
what has previously appeared and perhaps even to what will appear.”78 The judge then 
confirmed that this theory could not apply to the work in dispute, which was compilation 
of facts, as every separate component has its significance separately, and there is 
nothing common between them that, if they are collected, will make a different thing. 79 
The Court, in this case, refused to give copyright protection to the disputed compilation 
works due to the lack of this relationship between its parts.80  
                                                          
75 Financial Information, Inc. V. Moody's Investors Service, 1984, 751 F.2d 501, United States Court of 
Appeals, Second Circuit.  
76 Ibid. at 511.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. at 511.  
79 This was confirmed by the judge, when he confirmed: “The application of that approach to reported facts 
like those appearing on FII's cards is arguable, though doubtful since these facts appear to have primary 
significance as issued each day.” See, ibid. at 511.  
80 Ibid. at 511. However, the Court allowed for the protection of works that are void of authorship under the 
‘unfair competition’ doctrine. Eventually the Court held to remand the case for further inquiry. Ibid. 
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The Modus operandi of selection and arrangement in authorship works: 
Firstly, we emphasize the exclusion of any attempt to measure the level of artistic 
value, as nobody can measure this, otherwise the result will prohibit the emergence of 
many new works that may not be appreciated on their emergence, and hence this will 
impede the creativity and progress of art.81 In employing the selection and arrangement 
criterion to categorise works, this thesis still follows Judge Frank’s statement in Alfred 
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts:82 “no matter how poor artistically the author’s addition, 
it is enough if it be his own.”83 Also, the ‘selection and arrangement’ criterion cannot 
work when independent creation is missing, so independent creation first should be set 
in the beginning. If then the selection and arrangement was similar to other work and 
no evidence of copying, the work should still obtain copyright protection. Nimmer 
confirmed and the Second Circuit approved that: “a work is original and may command 
copyright protection even if it is completely identical with a prior work provided it was 
not copied from such prior work but is rather a product of the independent efforts of its 
author.”84 
 
The first question is whether the elements of authorship are present in the work or not. 
So, we investigate whether the author has expressed his personality and mental work 
in the work or not, and this can be known through several steps. We should first know 
what the thoughts or sensations that the author wanted to express through his work 
are, and how the selection and arrangement of the work’s raw materials – as the author 
sees them - will operate to convey these thoughts to the audience. Secondly, how did 
the author reach this selection and arrangement? The answer will be decided by 
assessing whether the author used his or her mental labour to reach the final work, and 
what circumstances or even previous works inspired him or her with these ideas.  
 
These questions are believed to show us whether the personal and mental aspects of 
the work are available or not. If not, then the work is considered a non-authorship work, 
and so exits outside of copyright law, and it should enter under the sui generis 
protection, which depends on the copyright law in the country and the policy followed. 
As whether a country will adopt the proposed sui generis protection to protect the non-
authorship works or just suffices with protecting the authorship works, depends on 
                                                          
81 This is confirmed in Bleistein V. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 1903, 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, 
Supreme Court of the United States at 252. 
82 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 50.  
83 Ibid. at 103. 
84 Melville B Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (1976).at 34. Approved by Novelty Textile Mills, Inc., V. Joan 
Fabrics Corporation, 1977, 558 F.2d 1090, No. 998, Docket 77-7067., United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit. at 1093. 
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other economic policies and whether it wants to benefit the right holders and producers 
of such works. If the personal aspects are available in the work, then this work is 
considered an authorship work. And then the second question that will follow is to 
decide whether the authorship work belongs to high or low authorship categories.  
 
In the second stage, investigation should be made of the contents of the work itself, 
and the main question is whether the work as a whole has the same selection and 
arrangement in its raw materials as was used in a previous work. This question is not 
similar to the one that the Supreme Court in Feist case asked the plaintiff and the 
defendant, because in this thesis it is applied only to authorship works, and is preceded 
by a filter for that purpose. Besides, selection and arrangement in authorship works has 
a functional character, but in collections of facts it is required for its mere existence, 
that the selection or the arrangement itself be different, and hawse have discussed this 
issue and concluded that it cannot be applied in relation to collections of facts. 85 
 
If it is commonly argued that the best way to decide on the originality of works is to 
measure the similarity between the work and previous works,86 this similarity should not 
rely on overall perception of the work by a lay person or by the Judge, but should 
depend on analysing the elements of the work, and using the ‘selection and 
arrangement’ criterion on these elements. This research argues that the similarity 
between works and the opinion of the lay person can be used regarding the intellectual 
rights related to commercial products, like trademarks, but literary, artistic and musical 
works cannot be compared through the external shape or appearance. There are inner 
details that can make a huge difference but the lay person may not notice. The thesis’s 
discussion does not dive into the specific details of every kind of authorship works, yet 
it argues that the selection and arrangement of the details of the work can determine 
this differentiation. 
 
One of the major concerns that selection and arrangement can help with is the 
rewriting practice, as this criterion is not confined to the expressive form itself, but to 
the elements of authorship which the rewriting cannot change. Unfortunately varied 
works that are rewritten cannot be discovered easily, as this practice is becoming very 
                                                          
85 See Chapter 7 at 7.4.3. 
86 For instance it was argued in the Suntrust bank v. Houghton Mifflin co. case that “[i]n order to prove 
copying, the plaintiff was required to show a ‘substantial similarity’ between the two works.” See Suntrust 
Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001, 268 F.3d 1257, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh 
Circuit. at 1266. Also, it was confirmed in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Limited Inc. case that “a factual 
question and the appropriate test for determining whether substantial similarity is present is whether an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted 
work.” See Ideal Toy Corp. V. Fab-Lu Limited Inc., 1966, 360 F.2d 1021, United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit.at 1022 
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common, as confirmed by Suk: "[r]ewriting has become a more distinctive, self-
conscious genre in which the ideas of copying, pastiche, quotation, and citation are 
themselves developed, played with, and rewritten.”87 He added that: “[r]ecent years 
have seen a proliferation of literary works --novels, poems, plays, and films -- that self-
consciously repeat and refashion material from our common literary heritage. These 
works draw, to various degrees, on pre-existing plots, characters, scenes, and text. 
Rewritings of canonical texts have become a popular, well-recognized genre, a 
standard subject of study in academic literature departments, and a technique 
employed by the brightest of literary luminaries.” 88 
 
Regarding the change in the selection of ‘elements of authorship’ in authorship works, 
we argue that the change in selection is a matter of changing the basis of the work, and 
proves per se the making of original work, without the need to investigate the 
arrangement or form, as it will already be different as long as the underlying ideas 
arranged or registered are differently selected.  
In regard to the change in the arrangement of ‘elements of authorship’ that exist in the 
antecedent work, it is argued that changing the arrangement of the same selection 
used in a previous work can be considered an authorship if the change in arrangement 
has the aim of expressing thoughts or ideas, and not carried out merely to differentiate 
the work, and this is left to the Judge’s discretion. Most works in the same category 
(novels, paintings, etc.) share the same selection of raw materials, facts, and may be 
ideas, although they differently arrange them to produce different intellectual work that 
is needed to convey the thoughts of the author.  
In literary works (novel, book, song, etc. ), changing the arrangement of the detailed 
ideas to make another intellectual and thoughtful literary work, using different 
expressions, even with the same physical form (the same kind of work, e. g. , making 
another novel, song, etc. ) makes the subsequent work a high authorship work. 
Changing the arrangement of elements of the artistic work, even with the same 
physical form (painting, sculpture, photograph, etc. ) can produce an original work, 
provided that expression form is changed too. However, the change in the form of 
expression, while keeping the selection and arrangement the same, such as drawing 
                                                          
87 J. Suk, 'Originality',  (2008)., p. 1990.  
88 Jeannie Suk, 'Originality', Harvard Law Review, 115 HVLR (2002). p. 1989, Suk mentions myriad 
instances of rewriting, and these are some of them: (with the works they rewrote indicated in parentheses): 
Kathy Acker, Great Expectations (Charles Dickens, Great Expectations); the film Apocalypse Now (Joseph 
Conrad, Heart of Darkness); Margaret Atwood, Alias Grace (Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre); Robert Calasso, 
Marriage of Cadmus and Harmony (Greek myths); Peter Carey, Jack Maggs (Dickens, Great 
Expectations); Francois Ceresa, Cosette, ou le temps des illusions (Victor Hugo, Les Misérables); Aimé 
Cosaire, A Tempest (Shakespeare, The Tempest); the film Clueless (Jane Austen, Emma);… etc.  
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the same elements (e. g. , flowers, lady and boat), but drawing them without copying in 
order to make a superficial differentiation, makes the work a non-authorship work, even 
if it was in different physical form.  
In regard to musical works, change in the arrangement of the melody, rhythm and 
harmony is not enough to make an original work, but it has to be accompanied by a 
change in the expression of that melody or harmony. In dramatic works, change in the 
plot and the dialogue is required to prove the originality of the work. However, if the 
same selection and arrangement is similar or identical to an antecedent work, this 
cannot preclude the conferral of copyright protection, unless fraud or cheating is 
proven, and these are issues of fact that courts should investigate.  
It is worth referring to Denicola’s statement, wherein he describes this complicated 
relationship between selection and arrangement and the form: “isolated incidents or 
scenes may be appropriated provided the literal expression is not lifted, but the taking 
must not be so extensive as to duplicate the overall structure of the work.”89 
[Underlining added] It is worth noting that Denicola may here have expressed the same 
issues that the thesis has detailed, as he talked about the structure of the work which 
the thesis finds that its main aspects are the selection and arrangement, also raw 
materials, words, lines, facts, or events etc., were mentioned by Denicola in his 
expression ‘isolated incidents or scenes’. He even separated that from the form of 
expression. Accordingly, Denicola has reached the factors of authorship this thesis is 
relying on, though he did not build on his analysis.  
In relation to artistic works, excluding the copying and duplication that is already 
considered an infringement of copyrighted work, if the original works are in public 
domain; if the selection and arrangement of the elements of the painting or sculpture 
are similar to a previous work, with some variations that do not add any ideas or 
thoughts to the resulting work, then the resulting work is considered a low-authorship 
work, provided that no copying happens. It can thus get protection, but lower level than 
that conferred for the original work. The reason for this is that, in artistic works, 
convergence or similarity between works is likely to occur, besides, the nature of 
artistic works make the possibilities of variations in the expression of the same 
thoughts very limited. If the selection of the same elements as are present in a previous 
work, but the arrangement is different, the resulting work is also considered low 
authorship. However, if the selection and arrangement of the elements of the work did 
not exist in previous works, the resulting work can be a high authorship work.  
                                                          
89 Robert C Denicola, 'Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary 
Works', supra note 7, p. 531-532.  
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8.5.2 Practical implementation:  
The categorisation to high and low authorship works can find application in the case of 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card90, wherein the plaintiff made greetings cards that 
included public domain phrases (like, ‘I Love You’) with his own illustrations. The 
defendant made greetings cards that also contained the same public domain phrases 
and his own illustrations, but which were similar to the precedent work. The Court 
decided that the defendant had infringed the copyright of the plaintiff. In this case, the 
defendant should get the protection of low authorship works, as considering similarities 
in artistic works as infringement is a kind of evaluation of these variations, and artistic 
works cannot be evaluated. Inventing the in-between category, namely ‘low-
authorship’, will be useful especially for artistic works. It helps original authors to keep 
their works at a different level of evaluation and draws the singularity they need, so 
they can be considered real creative authors of original works, and the works that 
extract some of their elements will be considered authorship works also if not 
infringement but will be considered semi original works, or as the thesis called them 
‘low authorship works’. This also will reduce the influence of the arbitrary decisions of 
Judges when artists do similar works, as if judges were in doubt they can confer the 
author low authorship protection if there are similarities instead of hesitating between 
authorship and infringement, especially in cases when subconscious copying happens. 
91 
It worth referring also here to two conflicting decisions regarding the same issue, and 
how the thesis’s proposal can provide mitigation in such conflict. In the US case of 
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,92 the plaintiff (Bell) made 'mezzotint' copies of 
public domain paintings and the defendant (Catalda) reprinted some of Bell's 
mezzotints. The Judge, in order to protect the 'mezzotint', argued that originality means 
that the work "owes its origin" to the author, and gave copyright protection to the 
plaintiff’s work, considering the defendant to be an infringer, and the Judge referred to 
the extensive effort and skills expended in creating these 'mezzotints'.  
On the other hand, in the Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp. Case,93 the plaintiff 
(Bridgeman) made reproductions of art works found in museums, which were in the 
public domain, and he started selling them on CDs. The defendant (Corel) started to 
sell his own CDs, which contained some of the reproductions (Bridgman) had made. 
                                                          
90 Roth Greeting Cards V. United Card Company, 1970, 429 F.2d 1106, United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 
91 This view on artistic works may be what led the UK CDPA to exclude the adaptation of artistic works 
from infringement, according to §. 21.  
92 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 50.  
93 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 1999, 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, United States District Court, S.D. 
New York. 
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The Court decided that originality means that the work should include “a 
distinguishable variation” from previous works to be considered an original work, and 
accordingly it did not copyright the plaintiff’s works.  
Since both works in the two cases are artistic works, and there is no variation at all, 
and since the resulting work is a ‘duplication’ of the original work, and thus the 
selection and arrangement of elements is the same, so there is no addition of an 
authorial contribution. The resulting works are thus non-authorship works. The 
originality and authorship concepts should thus not be discussed in this regard, and the 
personality theory cannot be applied here either, but the criterion that should be applied 
is that applied in a sui generis system, which is the sweat of the brow, to measure the 
efforts expended in making the work to get protection for it against copying.  
With applying the categorisation proposed, it is not required that the Judge in the Alfred 
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts Case94 claims that originality means that the work 
originated from the author, as this harmed the authorship and originality concepts for 
the sake of providing protection to the efforts expended in the disputed work, as the 
research discussed.95 As, the judge can still give protection to low authorship works 
depending on less authorship elements, and even if there is no authorship. As, if the 
court wanted to protect the efforts expended, it can do so under the proposed sui 
generis protection of non-authorship works. 
Parody: 
Parody is one of the main examples of low authorship works, and it will be apparent 
through the case study in next paragraphs that grading works to high and low 
authorship is important to solve the dilemma that some types of works should be 
allowed to enrich the knowledge and the culture although including extensive 
appropriation and substantial similarity to antecedent works.  
This is apparent in the example of the Suntrust bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 96 case, as 
although the District Court found that the defendant’s novel ‘The Wind Done Gone’ 
(TWDG) is a ‘clear cut’ and ‘unabated piracy’97 of the plaintiff’s work ‘Gone With The 
Wind’ (GWTW) and the US Court of Appeals confirmed approximately the same 
argument, as Judge Birch argued that: “[o]ur own review of the two works reveals 
substantial use of GWTW. TWDG appropriates numerous characters, settings, and plot 
twists from GWTW. … all characters in GWTW, appear in TWDG. … TWDG copies, 
                                                          
94 Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. V. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. Et Al., 90 U.S.P.Q. 153, 191 F.2d 99, supra note 50.  
95 See this chapter at 8.1. 
96 Suntrust Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, supra note 86. 
97 Suntrust Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Co., 2001, 136 F.Supp.2d 1357, United States District Court, N.D. 
Georgia, at 1369 
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often in wholesale fashion, the descriptions and histories of these fictional characters 
and places from GWTW, as well as their relationships and interactions with one 
another.” 98 [Underlining added] Finally, Judge Birch agreed with the District Court’s 
argument that granted an injunction relief to the plaintiff when he wrote that: “we agree 
with the district court that, particularly in its first half, TWDG is largely ‘an encapsulation 
of [GWTW ] [that] exploit[s] its copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings as the 
palette for the new story.’”99 
This case proves to be a thorny one in that in order for the judge to reach his final 
decision he had to read in depth the two novels in order to search for the substance of 
authorship. In regard to substantial similarity between the two cases, the Court of 
Appeal decided that there is a substantial similarity: “As we have already indicated in 
our discussion of substantial similarity, TWDG appropriates a substantial portion of the 
protected elements of GWTW.”100 However, it rebutted that this has any importance in 
deciding the case as the issue is deeper than just the view of the lay person. This was 
clear in the Judge Birch’s discussion of the GWTW as he finds in this novel “[f]ree 
blacks are described as ‘creatures of small intelligence ... [l]ike monkeys or small 
children turned loose among treasured objects whose value is beyond their 
comprehension, they ran wild—either from perverse pleasure in destruction or simply 
because of their ignorance.’”101 However, Judge Birch argues that TWDG “flips 
GWTW's traditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as stupid or feckless, and 
generally sets out to demystify GWTW and strip the romanticism from Mitchell's 
specific account of this period of our history.”102 The judge’s discussion reached a 
conclusion that the two novels are complementing each other “further fact finding may 
well reveal that these two books will act as complements rather than substitutes,” 103 
and that the TWDG is a parody of the GWTW as “[a] parody is a work that seeks to 
comment upon or criticize another work by appropriating elements of the original” 104 so 
‘just’ appropriations are justified. 
The facts of this case reveals that TWDG’s author has relied on the same selection of 
the GWTW of the events and characters and scenes as confirmed by Judge Birch105 
but has arranged them differently in a different treatment of the same elements in order 
to convey different thoughts that bear his personality and opinion. That was clear in 
                                                          
98 Suntrust Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, supra note 86, at 1267 
99 Ibid. at 1267 
100 Ibid. at 1272 
101 Ibid. at 1270 
102 Ibid. at 1270 
103 Ibid. at 1277 
104 Ibid. at 1271 
105 When he confirmed that “[o]ur own review of the two works reveals substantial use of GWTW. TWDG 
appropriates numerous characters, settings, and plot twists from GWTW.” See ibid. at 1267 
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Judge Birch’s description of the TWDG novel as “the last half of TWDG tells a 
completely new story that, although involving characters based on GWTW characters, 
features plot elements found nowhere within the covers of GWTW.” 106 Depending on 
the orthodox principles of authorship TWDG’s author should not do an arrangement of 
specific selected elements unless after an authorisation from the GWTW’s author. 
However, the existence of the fair use exception and inclusion of the parody exception 
by the Supreme Court in the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.107 case has allowed 
for considering this work as an authorship work, and Judge Birch has depended upon 
that. 108  
Accordingly, parody works should be considered low authorship works, as they are 
basically depending on specific antecedent works and not the common knowledge; 
they are reworkings of previous works. For instance, in this case the ‘The Wind Done 
Gone’ novel obtained its substance and popularity from the popularity of the ‘Gone with 
the Wind’ novel. This research’s proposition of classifying works to different grades can 
solve this dilemma, as according to the proposition, classifying the TWDG in a lesser 
grade category with less protection as a ‘low authorship work’ than GWTW is a fair 
recognition by the law of the different levels of authorship found in both novels. Also, 
the recognition by the law that the TWDG has been inspired and taken from an original 
work can have a financial return to the original works, as readers of the TWDG if they 
have not read the GWTW before, they are ‘psychologically’ pushed, through this 
categorisation, to buy the original work that this novel has depended upon. 
Appropriation:  
Appropriation as another example of fair use has caused disruption to principles of 
authorship, we suggest that appropriated works ought to be classified as low 
authorship works, and elements of authorship should be used to differentiate between 
appropriation and derivation –or adaptation- as will be explained in the following 
example.  
What we understand from the US legislator regarding fair use - although the provision 
is vague in this regard - which can be discerned from the examples that the legislator 
gave ‘comment, criticise, teaching, reporting’, that the work allowed to appropriate 
expression from previous original work should not be made for commercial use. 
                                                          
106 Ibid.  at 1270 
107 Campbell V. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, supra note 67. 
108 As the Supreme Court has confirmed that although parody not specifically listed in §107-120 of the 
copyright act, “We thus line up with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, 
may claim fair use under § 107.” See ibid.at 1171 
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However, Judge Parker in Cariou v. Prince109 case argued that “[a]lthough there is no 
question that Prince's artworks are commercial, we do not place much significance on 
that fact due to the transformative nature of the work.” 110 And he cited the statement by 
the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. That Congress “could not 
have intended such a rule”111 which is “that commercial uses are presumptively 
unfair.”112 This raises this thesis’s suspicions about the effect that fair use has made to 
authorship, as it is argued that fair use interpretation substantially exceeded the effect 
of just an exception to an amendment of the whole concept. This is one of the 
purposes of this thesis, as the interpretation of concepts like originality, and here fair 
use, need to be disciplined to comply with each other, and that cannot be done unless 
through complying with only one principle which is authorship. 
As, although the Second circuit in the case Suntrust bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 113 
tried to extrapolate from the fair use provision that the legislator’s intention was that any 
act that include commenting on or criticising of an antecedent work can be considered 
fair use under parody, and appropriation then can be justified. 114 In the Cariou case 
even this understanding was abandoned, as although Cariou published a book entitled 
‘Yes Rasta’ that included classical portraits and landscape photographs that he took 
over six years he spent living among Rastafarians in Jamaica.115 Judge Parker argued 
that the Prince work that “included a collage, titled Canal Zone (2007), comprising 35 
photographs torn out of Yes Rasta and pinned to a piece of plywood,”116  “could be 
transformative even without commenting on Cariou's work or on culture, and even 
without Prince's stated intention to do so.”117 [Underlining added] 
Judge Park although he discussed the differentiation between derivative and 
appropriated work regarding the commercial influence on the original work, he 
confused regarding prince works between derivation and appropriation. The research 
claims that Prince’s works are derivative works not fair use works and could not have 
been allowed without an authorisation from the original author because they missed the 
requirements of fair use doctrine. And since “Prince never sought or received 
                                                          
109 Cariou V. Prince, 2013, 714 F.3d 694, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
110 Ibid. at 708. 
111 Campbell V. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, supra note 67 at 584. 
112 Ibid.67, at 584. Also it was stated in this case that “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and 
research ... are generally conducted for profit.” See ibid. at 584 
113 Suntrust Bank V. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257, supra note 86. 
114 Ibid. at 1271 
115 Cariou V. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, supra note 109. at 699.  
116 Ibid. at 699 
117 Ibid. 
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permission from Cariou to use his photographs”,118 so, his works are considered an 
infringement of Cariou’s works. Prince can be considered an author of low authorship 
work, depending on firstly considering his works derivative works, and if he took 
permission from Cariou. Otherwise, his works are infringement of copyright law.  
This case is one of the examples that needed a clear view of authorship, and 
classification of works would give the judge other options to choose from, not just to 
consider the works as a low authorship work, but also, to conclude that the elements of 
authorship do not exist in works of Prince. Because he did not use raw materials that 
are ideas, words or even works in public domain, but he used copyrighted parts from 
other work, so he depended on previous work, something like what films do regarding a 
novel. So the work is in fact a derivation not a fair use appropriation.  
Making a separate work depending on previous work that does not care with its 
contents119 is a derivation not appropriation for fair use. Even Judge Parker quoted 
prince’s description of his work, “he ‘completely tr[ies] to change [another artist's work] 
into something that's completely different.’”120 Fair use doctrine has been expanded out 
of its intended borders in a way that distorted authorship and copyright law.121 In fact, 
copyright law is in need for such distinction between works to save the logical 
substances of authorship and originality from the pressure for protecting works even on 
the detriment of pushing these concepts to the edge. 
Translations:  
The research argues that translations, although they bear the thoughts of another 
person in previous works in the same selection and arrangement, and the same 
structure is followed, with just a change in the words (literally) used, they requiree 
some judgment and sensible linguistic skills. Here, the process is different from 
imitation, as the personality of the author (translator) appears in choosing the proper 
expression, although he keeps the same selection and arrangement and structure that 
the original author chose to convey his thoughts.  
Though translation does not have the same level of authorship as original books, there 
is a degree of authorial and technical skill, and this hinders considering them as non-
authorship works. For that reason, it may be argued that authorship works can be 
divided into high and low authorship works, and, accordingly, works of translation may 
                                                          
118 Ibid. at 703 
119 That is a claim that confirmed by Prince himself, see ibid. at 707. 
120 Ibid. at 699 
121 Shane Ferro, 'Authorship Is Quickly Dying, and Artist Richard Prince Is in Legal Trouble Again', 
Technology <http://uk.businessinsider.com/authorship-is-dead-and-richard-prince-is-in-legal-trouble-again-
2015-2?r=US>, last accessed 17/02/2015. 
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be considered low authorship works. Such confusion was even expressed by Kant, 
when he stated: “translation into a foreign language cannot be taken as unauthorized 
publication; for it is not the same speech of the author, even though the thoughts might 
be precisely the same.”122 
The translated work does not bear the personality of the translator, as it may be 
argued. Philosophers of personality, as explained above,123 correlate the thoughts, 
sensations included, the mind work and free will in order to consider the work a product 
of personality. All of these are missed here, as the translator does not have personal 
thoughts or sensations to be expressed, besides he adheres to the same structure and 
same expression of the original author, and he only does a professional job through 
finding the most similar words in other language that can convey the same expression 
or meaning that the original author wanted to express. His job is similar to performers 
in the music band that tries to find the best performing of the note put by the composer, 
like what happened in the case of Hadley v. Kemp. Herein Judge Park’s expression will 
be useful, as this supports this research’s contention that translator’s job is a matter of 
performing the work in another language, not creation. The thesis has the same belief 
of Judge Park when he stated: “When each song was presented by the first defendant 
to the group it was a musical work and the first defendant was the sole author of it. The 
songs in their recorded form were the same musical works which the first defendant 
had composed, not new and different works. Although it was true that the members of 
the group played and sang the songs in their own ways, these were matters of 
performance and not of creation of a musical work.” [Underlining added] Accordingly: 
“Contributions by the plaintiffs, however significant and skilful, to the performance of 
the musical works were not the right kind of contributions to give them shares in the 
copyrights.” Finally, the thesis adopts and insists on the elements that Judge Park 
proposed for considering a work as an authorship: “There are four elements. (1) The 
claimant must have made a contribution of some sort. (2) It must have been significant. 
(3) It must have been original. (4) It must have been a contribution to the creation of the 
musical work. The last point is particularly important.” [Underling added] To conclude, 
we confirm that as along as translator did not create something original that is 
considered a contribution to the original work, which differs from what has been already 
presented, so he cannot be an author of original work. 
Although the process of creating the translation is similar to the imitation made when 
changing from painting to sculpture, as the author follows the steps of the original 
                                                          
122 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, eds Mary J. Gregor and Allen Wood (The Cambridge Edition of 
the Works of Immanuel Kant; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). at 8. 87.  
123 See Chapter 6 at titles from 6.2 to 6.7. 
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author and adheres to his structure; the translator goes behind the literal words used 
and investigates the meaning the original author wanted to convey, trying to express it 
again but using the expressions of another language, which requires operations of the 
mind such as ‘thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing’,124 according to 
Locke’s argument. It is this that raises this type of creation so that they are authorship 
works. However, since the selection and arrangement is still there within the same 
structure that the original author chose and used, the translator’s work is thus 
somehow like the making of a film based on a novel,125 and may be the film goes far 
from the exact detailed structure and ideas of the original work than translation which 
sticks to it. However, although the mental contribution of the translator does not qualify 
to authorship, he may get a protection of low authorship. 
The proposition of categorising translation as a low authorship work is consistent with 
considering it as a derivative work or adaptation in US126 and UK127 copyright laws, 
which entails considering it as subsidiary to the original work’s author. Also the reliance 
on the personality and mental authorship will solve the inconsistency in these laws, as, 
as long as the current principle is that it is expression only that is protected, it can be 
argued that translation is a different expression from the original work as “the translator 
uses another language for the foreign text and therefore can be understood as creating 
an original work.” 128 This led Venuti to argue that “in copyright law, the translator is and 
is not an author.”129 
To conclude, translation includes mind operations and mental labour, but does not 
include personal authorship because the translator did not mean to convey something 
of his thoughts or ideas to the audience, or, to be brief, he did not add another structure 
for the thoughts he read and translated. There are two things that express the 
personality of the author, first: the thoughts, ideas and sensations; second: the 
structure these thoughts are expressed through, and both are missing here.  
8.6 Technological Implementation of the Thesis’s Proposition: 
8.6.1 Introduction: 
This thesis, in its attempt to find a solution to the conflict in copyright subsistence 
decisions, has resorted to analysing the interpretations of originality by Judges or 
scholars that are used to confer copyright protection to a given work, and it has 
                                                          
124 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700)., p. 88.  
125 That explained above, see Chapter 8 at 8.5. 
126 In § 101 of the US Copyright Act, translation is included in the definition of derivative works. 
127 In s.21 (3) (a)(i) of the UK CDPA translation is included within the kinds of adaptation. 
128 Lawrence Venuti, The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation (Routledge, 2008). p. 8. 
129 Ibid. 
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investigated the confusion around the nature of works and the influence of this on 
authorship concept.  
Thus a categorisation of works to ‘high/low/non authorship works’ was proposed 
depending on the differentiation between the mental and manual skills used in the 
authorship process of the work. A different theoretical justification to each category was 
allocated, and a different level of protection proposed to be granted to each category. 
However, the application of this proposed system is complicated if put through the 
legislation’s amendment only, and that is why this thesis proposes that there should be 
a technological mechanism to facilitate the allocation of works in the corresponding 
category that depends on their constituent elements. this technological proposition has 
many benefits, as will be elaborated below.  
8.6.2 Substance of the Proposed System: 
Having discussed the confusion that happened to the authorship concept and 
originality and the influence this had on copyright protection in general, the thesis 
proposed a different categorisation of works in the last Chapter. The proposed 
categorisation is suggested to be applied through several questionnaires that right 
holders answer to recognise the category their works belong to, however, the process if 
done through paper application will be complicated and time consuming. 
Thus, we propose a digital website that can implement this categorisation, and 
proposed to be called the ‘Digital Cultural National Gate’ (DCNG). This Gate’s main 
aim is reducing confusion within copyright subsistence decisions, it is also is proposed 
to do several functions. Its main job is identifying originality of works, and this will allow 
it to have a great database of works and copyright identification information. This can 
qualify it to work as a licensing portal wherein the data of the owners and publishers of 
works can be preserved, which has been tried to be done through the Global 
Repertoire Database (GRD) but unfortunately failed, and a similar project is undergone 
which is called the Copyright Hub. However, the Copyright Hub still follows the same 
philosophy of the GRD. The proposed Gate can do this job as a secondary one beside 
its main job which is applying copyright law in the online environment through the 
proposed categorisation of works, and this will increase the success chances for the 
identification copyright information to succeed in licensing issues as will be explained in 
next paragraphs.  
The proposed DCNG can be considered as an online database which gathers the 
entire cultural, educational, artistic, dramatic, etc. heritage of the nation, wherein 
authors can register their works and obtain a license for their registration in the 
category of protection for which their work is eligible. Anybody can access these works 
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if the law, legal exceptions, fair dealing, contracts, or licenses have been held under 
the umbrella of the law or concerned parties have allowed that access. In the 
meantime, it is considered a Gate for distributing works or accomplishing transactions 
and, in this case, publishers and producers can take the marketing role.  
Ginsburg also underlined the necessity of involving individual authors in using 
technologies and not leaving the space to the producers to manage everything, as she 
said that: “[w]here technological protection measures and copyright management 
systems can prove very relevant to authors, while producers today may be the principal 
users of DRM, the technology involved need not be beyond the reach of individual 
authors, much less of authors' collectives. The hopeful prospects of new business 
models built around access protections, such as the many streaming music services, or 
around limited download, such as iTunes, and around a variety of watermarking 
technologies, are not confined to large producers.”130 This opinion supports the thesis’s 
proposal for authors to use a technological solution, not only to distribute their works, 
but primarily to protect and authenticate their works for their own benefit and that is for 
the users’ and publishers’ interests as well.  
Castanaro expressed the desire to use technology as a means for applying originality 
in copyright law, proposing that copyright law needs to: “rework the existing originality 
requirement for musical copyright,”131 and to resort to technological facilities as “the 
access of the entire music catalogue made possible by the Internet could be used to 
prevent potential infringement disputes.”132 
The Gate will follow a process similar to the system followed regarding registration in 
the US Copyright Office. The gate will also contribute in privileging the more creative 
works by putting them in a ‘higher’ position of protection, and by recognising the works 
that are mostly depending upon, both through the different levels of protection and the 
proposed licensing system. In addition, it will achieve a level of stabilisation in copyright 
law through spreading the knowledge of the elements that the law recognises as 
authorship, and those which are recognised as non-authorship. Ultimately, this system 
                                                          
130 Jane C. Ginsburg, 'The Author's Place in Copyright after Trips and the Wipo Treaties', International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 39/1 (2008/03/06 2008)., p. 3.  
131 Valeria M. Castanaro, 'It's the Same Old Song: The Failure of the Originality Requirement in Musical 
Copyright', Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 18 (2007). p. 1287. 
132 Ibid., p. 1287, as she believes specifically that original works are rare in the age of technology. His full 
argument was: “[i]n the midst of a culture marked by copycat artists and technological advancements that 
encourage infringing activity, one may wonder what, if anything, can be done to bring original and creative 
music back from the dead. One possibility is to rework the existing originality requirement for musical 
copyright. By raising the standard for originality, the access of the entire music catalogue made possible 
by the Internet could be used to prevent potential infringement disputes.” Castanaro proposes that “A 
hybrid of copyright originality and patent novelty would best serve the interests of promoting the creation of 
new works without stifling the creative process in music.” See, ibid. p. 1287.  
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will achieve the interests of all parties and different kinds of efforts and also people’s 
interests in finding useful works.  
Functionality of the DCNG: 
Regarding the modus operandi of the DCNG, it can allocate works in the corresponding 
category and determine the corresponding protection depending on the information that 
authors provide the DCNG with. Accordingly, if an author has created a novel, scientific 
research, a painting, drawing, musical or dramatic work, he or she will be required to 
provide the DCNG with information about the elements and factors of authorship in his 
work. The information that will be provided is about: the reason as to why he or she 
selected specific elements and arranged them in a specific way? What are the general 
and detailed ideas or thoughts he or she wanted to express? Where he or she got 
these thoughts from? What is the relation between his or her thoughts and the raw 
material of authorship used? Whether the author has derived these thoughts or 
elements of authorship from antecedent works? Whether he or she was inspired by 
antecedent works or relied on any other work, and what these works are? The 
percentage of the parts he quoted and the percentage of the part that he did not quote 
or derive directly from previous works, will also be mentioned. 
According to the answers to this questionnaire, the system should provide the applicant 
with a second questionnaire relating to the criterion suitable for his work. For instance, 
if the applicant’s answers in the first questionnaire show that the work is a compilation 
of facts or precedent works, without any addition from him unless in selecting and 
arranging these facts or works, the system will ask him questions relating to the criteria 
applied for non-authorship works, which is ‘skill (manual skill), labour and judgment’ or 
‘sweat of the brow’, to ensure that s/he exerted enough effort, time or funds in creating 
this work, and, according to his answers, he might or might not get protection. On the 
other hand, if the answers to the first questionnaire show that the author has added his 
mental effort, through adding his own thoughts or analysis, criticism of previous works 
or inventive thoughts, then the system will provide him with a questionnaire that will 
decide whether his work includes high or low authorship, according to the table 
mentioned above. 133 
Ultimately, in regard to the registration of works on the Gate, this should be free of 
charge; registration can be done by uploading digitalized works, or registering hard 
                                                          
133 See Chapter 1 at 1.3.1. 
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copy works at the Gate’s terrestrial address, such as in the countries’ intellectual 
property or copyright offices.134  
Such a system would provide an easy, quick, and efficient way to recognise whether 
the work is a high, low or non-authorship one, according to the theoretical discussion135 
and the dichotomy proposed above. 136 The author will thus know the level of protection 
for which his/her work is eligible. However, this mechanism will need an appeal council 
that might then be operated by the ‘copyright offices’ in the various countries.  
Digital portals for rights’ licensing: 
The main focus of the DCNG is not the licensing but the transfer of copyright law rules 
from theory to practice and to avoid the distortion that could happen to its principles 
when applied in courts, through founding a united body that governs the copyright 
rules, their principles and their interpretations and applies them to works directly 
through an online user friendly environment.  
Despite the continuous evolution of digital technology relating to cultural products, 
there are enormous numbers of works and authors whose ownership and authorship 
are completely unidentifiable. This has raised interest in readily available accurate data 
about the different works for the purposes of attribution and licensing in judicial cases. 
This registration will have benefits far beyond the ordinary registration of works, as it 
will help proving the existence of the work and its attribution to a specific author, 
locating the place or the address of the copyright holder whether the actual or virtual 
one, and identifying authorship and ownership of the works which combine different 
types of subject matter (text, photographs, etc.). 137  
Countries cannot compel individuals to register their works to obtain copyright 
protection due to the Berne convention obligation in this regard.138 So, voluntary 
registration is done separately by each country and there are a lot of policies adopted 
                                                          
134 It was required by TRIPS agreement that member states establish intellectual property offices, as Art. 
67 of TRIPS agreement provided that: “Such cooperation shall include assistance in … shall include 
support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these 
matters.” 'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Trips)', O.J. 1994 L. 
(1994). 
135 That has been articulated in chapter 6. 
136 See this Chapter at 8.4, and Second stage division: High authorship and low authorship works: at 8.5. 
137 WIPO, 'Copyright Registration and Documentation', Copyright and Related Rights - Current Topics 
<http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/copyright_registration/index.html>, last accessed 31/12/2011. 
138 As Art. (2) of Berne convention provided that: “The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not 
be subject to any formality.” 'Berne Convention', (Switzerland 1886 (Paris act 1971)). 
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by each of them,139 some countries have called for the establishment of a global 
system for voluntary registration. 140 
Also, though the Copyright Collecting Societies [CCS] are specialised bodies in 
licensing works, the concern was directed towards founding a united body that can do 
this job online and cope with the quick creation and reuses of digital content of works 
online.141 The attempts started in the UK since 1983 through the Copyright Licensing 
Agency [CLA] which aims at “obtain fair reward for authors, visual creators and 
publishers for the copying of their work” 142 and even has a compliance arm which is 
called Copywatch.143 Also, in the US we find the Copyright Clearance Centre [CCC] 
that was established in 1978 which defines itself as responsible for “provid[ing] smart 
solutions that simplify the licensing of content.”144 All these attempts are trying to settle 
the principle that as long as the tools of creation, publication and reuse are 
democratised it is a fair practice to democratise rights management and licensing.145 
That notion appeared in the Hargreaves Report in 2011,146 as he stated: “[w]e need the 
system, and in particular the mechanics of clearing rights, to adapt to serve the market 
opportunities which digital speeds and volumes make possible.”147 Hargreaves gave an 
example of the iPlayer that BBC spent five years to get licenses of the rights necessary 
to its launch,148 ultimately, Hargreaves proposed the establishment of a Digital 
Copyright Exchange for the aim of “provid[ing] a common platform for licensing 
                                                          
139 Voluntary registration is very different from one country to another. There are systems where the work 
is actually deposited (registration), and others where only declarations are submitted, without deposit of 
the work (recordation). See WIPO, 'Copyright Registration and Documentation', supra note  137. 
140 Ibid. 
141 It was stated in the Copyright Hub blueprint that: “[t]e internet has changed the context for copyright, 
because of the ease with which perfect copies of works can be made and distributed. It has been argued 
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transactions.”149 However, at the time of Hargreaves report and even before there were 
several attempts towards establishing such digital licensing bodies. For instance, the 
Global Repertoire Database [GRD] which was mentioned in Hargreaves report within a 
quotation of WIPO Director General, Francis Gurry, who thought that the world needed 
the GRD as an important step towards “establishing the infrastructure for global 
licensing”.150 It had already begun its foundation steps two years before the report. 
According to Isherwood “The Global Repertoire Database Working Group (‘WG’) was 
set up in 2009”151 and the GRD’s aim was solving the problem of inexistence of 
“database or data-resource that provides access to authoritative comprehensive multi-
territory information about the ownership or control of the global repertoire of musical 
works.”152 Though the GRD has been announced to be stopped or aborted by the PRS 
which is the main participant society, 153 and it was envisaged that this is due to funding 
problems, this research finds that its successor, the Copyright Hub, will probably face 
similar challenges due to the establishing or collection process being incomplete and 
requiring more radical solution than depending on collecting societies, 154 and it is this 
that the proposed DCNG will bring, as will be explained.  
A lot of hopes were attached to the GRD, for instance, ICMP Chair Andrew Jenkins told 
Music Week: “Everybody knows that the industry needs a Global Repertoire Database, 
and that the only efficient way to cost-effectively manage data is with a single, 
reconciled, authoritative database. Anyone who has seen the results of the Deloitte 
data assessment during the recent GRD process knows that the time for a GRD is 
now”.” 155 That is why when the GRD collapsed it was argued that its collapse means 
that “searching, finding, and paying for the use of a song worldwide will remain a 
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hopelessly complicated, nearly-impossible headache.”156 Having stated that GRD’s 
failure is attributed to guarantee sufficient funds that is mainly is directed to the 
collection of data, the proposed DCNG through the connection between originality, 
protection and licencing is proposed to solve this dilemma.  
Media companies before 2012 have already built several voluntary rights exchange 
databases that enable third parties to search for the ownership of works and get 
clearance of rights.157 That is why the Linked Content Coalition (LCC) was established 
in 2012158 to “establish seamless communication between these various right registries 
to support a rights trading infrastructure which is truly cross media in the long term.” 159  
Also, Hooper in his 2012 report (Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE) Feasibility Study: 
Call for Evidence) has called for the adoption of the Copyright Hub, which is a website 
(copyrighthub.co.uk) that has two functions: “the provision of copyright 
information/education to a wide audience; and access for users to simpler licensing, 
with much lower transaction costs, via websites connected to the Copyright Hub.”160It 
was confirmed in the blueprint of the UK Copyright Hub that it depends on the current 
“foundations laid by the Linked Content Coalition and uses existing data standards, 
identifiers and communication protocols - with no wish to reinvent them.”161  
Accordingly, to guarantee smooth application of the proposed system, it is proposed 
that it be associated with an identification system, wherein, it is proposed, every right 
holder and user is represented by a number on the Gate, and he should enter this 
number for every transaction process or any action. This number can be obtained by 
sending his details to the authority’s office (e.g., the copyright office in his/her country). 
This identification system helps to track any transactions made through persons related 
to the protected products. This policy may be similar to the followed measures on 
eBay, which is used to reduce scams on bank accounts.  
The WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property has approved ‘a 
Thematic Project on Intellectual Property and The Public Domain’, which provided for 
the elaboration of ‘a Survey on Voluntary Registration and Deposit Systems under 
Copyright.’ 162 WIPO has proposed the use of Rights Management Information (RMI) 
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for the application of the newly proposed system of registration, to find the content 
sought, and to reveal the changes that have occurred in it. Additionally, WIPO suggests 
that the mission of collecting information about the works can be conferred to private 
entities, like collective management organizations, which will collect the required data 
of its members with the objective of ‘managing the rights entrusted to them’, these 
functions are considered commercial and may include the provision of a record of 
transactions and declarations made by third parties. 163 
The proposed Gate is similar to WIPO’s proposal, except that this research offers a 
theoretical basis on which this Digital Gate can rely, and can be used for 
implementation of law principles and rules on emerging works or practices. The current 
copyright offices will also fill the gap in the current situation and will work jointly with the 
proposed Digital Gate (DCNG) in order to provide an open, clear, and transparent 
system of authorship and ownership that is suitable to current technological 
developments, and can easily and quickly interact with any changes and employ any 
legal amendments, as the copyright office is considered the factual arm of the system 
and the DCNG will be the virtual arm.  
8.6.3 Providing data and funds:  
The GRD and the Copyright Hub were established to do the same job, which is 
facilitating the identification of owners of works and facilitate the licensing of works 
directly between users and creators or through the publishers or collecting societies. 
For instance it was argued regarding the GRD that: “The scope of the GRD is to 
provide, for the first time, a single, comprehensive and authoritative representation of 
the global ownership and control of musical works.”164 In regard to Copyright Hub, “The 
Copyright Hub Ecosystem is essentially a data communication network. Its purpose is 
to allow buyers and sellers to communicate – in increasingly automated ways – to 
negotiate and conclude licensing agreements.”165 However, it is envisaged that the 
main reason for the failure of the GRD is the funding issue. The ICMP confirmed that 
“the establishment of the database faced huge challenges since its inception”, 166 and 
that the GRD has been greatly hampered of late by "various collecting societies failing 
to reach agreement on funding the initiative”.”167 Also it is confirmed that “Societies 
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including ASCAP, SOCAN, PRS for Music, SACEM, SIEA and SGAE pulled their future 
funding” 168 
It was also argued that societies themselves did not want to complete this venture “in 
the case of GRD, there is significant evidence that enough stakeholders didn’t want this 
to succeed.”169 Likewise it was argued that “having the societies involved in this venture 
at all, beyond becoming data providers, is counterproductive, because if and when the 
publishers start licensing digital services directly, an efficient repertoire database would 
render the societies redundant in that domain. And with the bigger societies all busy 
expanding their digital and multi-territory operations, they won’t want that.” 170 
This funding is directed mainly for the provision of a database. As it was contended that 
the main problem facing the current Copyright Hub is “the lack of availability of the 
consistent and accurate data necessary to extend the automated management of 
licensing in the ways that are envisaged. This is likely to prove to be the highest barrier 
to entry in many sectors, particularly those that are poorly served today.”171 
Accordingly, the collection of data about ownership of works is the main dilemma that 
faces any system of digital licensing: The proposed DCNG can solve this dilemma 
though the linkage between originality protection and licensing. For instance, the 
codification of a rule within the executive regulations of the DCNG that states that 
failing to register on the database may expose the right holders to the risk of 
compulsory licensing might help to encourage copyright holders to register their works 
on the Gate, this could be a legal means of overcoming the requirement in the Berne 
Convention, which states that copyright protection does not need registration to be 
conferred, as this did not relate to the granting of protection but to its scope. This 
proposal is similar to the voluntary registration of works that the United States offers 
through the US Copyright Office.  
Accordingly, although creators may not be encouraged to register their works for 
licensing purposes as they may be already are members of collecting societies; the risk 
of not protecting their works in case of litigation will encourage them to register with the 
DCNG. On the other hand, producers of compilation of facts will register to take the 
protection of the sui generis system to spare themselves litigation regarding originality 
of their works, and this accordingly helps in the licensing side. In addition, the 
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rewarding system for digitalization of works made by users can help enriching the 
repertoire or database of the DCNG, as will be explained below. 
Costs of the Application: 
The proposed Digital Gate may cost countries initially, but this expense will soon be 
recovered, as the costs spent to establish the Digital Gate, the buildings used, the 
instruments or employees, will be repaid through fees from every transaction, which 
should be very low, but the number of transactions will guarantee a continuous source 
for funding for such a system.  
Copyright holders will benefit from the registration of their works and nominal fees will 
be paid. Authors will benefit from the broad dissemination of their works on the global 
network, and financial gains can be expected from this system in return for a small 
percentage. Fees can be used later to digitalize works that are in the public domain, or 
to digitalize works for authors, deducting the costs from remunerations. In addition, 
countries can encourage their people to register works that are in their hands, which 
may be orphan works, in return for a specific percentage of the remuneration. The Gate 
will check whether the works have fallen into the public domain. If not, their right 
holders, or the right holder’s heirs, will be informed of the remuneration they may get 
through the Gate’s system.  
8.6.4 Benefits of the DCNG:  
First, this system provides the theories and legislation of copyright law with a tool to 
enhance their responses to the technological advances and challenges, and a method 
with which to reflect on judicial decisions quickly, and this allows the possibility to 
modify rules if they have proved to be unsuitable or ineffective. Avoiding such 
integration between theory and practice has encouraged right holders to make a 
parallel protective system to copyright law through the technological restrictions 
imposed on their works. A fear that is expressed by Adam Thierer, saying that: “[a]s the 
internet changes how goods and ideas are exchanged and transferred, copyright laws 
are becoming more difficult to enforce, and some people are wondering whether 
copyrights have any place in the future, or whether it is serving more as a road block 
than a protection to creators and inventors.”172 
Second, the combination of the DCNG proposal and ‘selection and arrangement’ will 
be a great help in revealing most of the current infringements of copyright works and 
illegal reproductions, and to reduce such violations in the future. Through this Digital 
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Gate many specialists can assist in deciding the grade of originality of many works, and 
to detect the non-original or infringing works and to report that through the Gate to all 
related parties.  
Third, the proposed system will offer a tool for identifying the owners of works, and 
facilitate licensing for works. Economically, any regulatory body or system of copyright 
should be concerned with licensing as without effective incensing system “copyright 
law would be ineffective in some markets for copyrighted works”.173 Economically 
speaking, collecting societies “enable markets to function for the use of copyright works 
in situations in which the copyright holder cannot contract directly with the user.”174 
However, on the digital environment piracy was proved to be a tough challenge that 
required more than traditional collecting societies, not just for benefitting publishers or 
authors but for the benefit of the users themselves.175 
The creation of a unified database of information about ownership has become an 
essential issue, as “the number of licensees of music booms, while the per-play 
royalties paid by some of those licensees are tiny, meaning extra efficient royalty 
distribution is required.”176 The DCNG can easily keep an up-to-date database of the 
locations of owners, publishers or producers, and this will help in reviving old, forgotten 
or orphan books, music, films. “Orphan works represent a substantial part of the 
collections of Europe's cultural institutions (e. g. , the British Library estimates that 40 
percent of its copyrighted collections, 150 million in total, are orphan works).”177 The 
Gate will help in preserving them for research and maintaining creativity, also the heirs 
will benefit of the dead authors of books, music and films, for the complete term the 
copyright law has stated. Likewise, the Gate will provide the right holders with a tool 
through which to disseminate their works for free, or for low fees, all over the world, if 
they are seeking fame for instance, away from the DRM policies that mostly ignore this 
desire. 
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Fourth, this system will help to activate the ‘compulsory licensing’ scheme for cultural 
works through providing a tool with which to inform the competent authorities of the 
need for specific works, due to the direct contact this Gate will provide between public 
demands and the governmental institution, who will then be conversant with the exact 
needs and the offered works.  
Fifth, it is proposed that the DCNG will reduce the number of intermediaries, as, 
through the website the right holder can get the remuneration -that the user has paid- 
transferred directly to him. This will help to provide the author with a clear view of the 
real quantity of works sold, and will eliminate the ambiguity around the real revenues 
which publishers or producers have made, increasing revenues to right holders due to 
the free or low fees of worldwide dissemination, and reducing the final price of works 
for the end users. Also, the DCNG will eliminate the publishing obstacle that faces 
aspiring writers and artists, as this publishing mechanism will cost approximately 
nothing. In the same time this has no impact on the free market, as this Gate firstly will 
not compel authors to register their works or to only distribute them through it, as, the 
Gate will principally guarantee right holders relative safety regarding copyright disputes 
through registering their works and ensuring the level of authorship of their works.  
The DCNG is the place where aspiring authors can secure their copyright before 
seeking publishing whether in analogue form or digital form, as the DCNG will provide 
them with a tool to register their works and get a certificate of the level of authorship 
they are qualified to and whether the work is original or not before engaging in any 
dealing with publishers or producers. The current practice requires such a tool through 
which an author can secure his attribution to his authorship, in face of other users, 
following authors or publishers. Hughes referred to one of the fears that plague 
authors: “Every individual who ever submits a treatment to a studio, a script to a 
production company, or a manuscript to a publisher has a fear that the company-giant 
or otherwise- will "steal" his or her ideas.”178. 
Accordingly, DCNG will economically benefit right holders through the broad 
dissemination of their works in developed and developing countries, without the trouble 
of seeking publishers in other countries, the costs of shipping and to avoid cross-border 
litigation, etc. Aspiring authors who have not published in hard copy can publish 
automatically through this Gate and get the full remuneration of the sales processed, 
and even the works which were neglected by their right holders, or their heirs can be 
revived, thus benefitting the right holders and the public. The proposed system will also 
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benefit developing countries and their people economically, culturally and scientifically 
by providing all the works they need, and there will perhaps be international 
conventions concerning the provision of works to developing countries for affordable 
prices and with wide dissemination the benefit will satisfy the right holders. 
Competent authorities in several countries can apply copyright rules through this gate 
and provide works to the public according to the legal regulations of public domain or 
copyright exceptions (fair use or fair dealing), and compulsory licensing in their legal 
system, which is difficult to enforce through private websites without resorting to the 
court in every case. This function will help to reduce the number of litigations 
concerning copyright law issues and increase the law’s efficacy, both theoretically and 
practically.  
Through registering films, for example, those which have been created more than 50 
years ago can be displayed for free, and newer films can be displayed in return for a 
little remuneration, in places where cinemas are unavailable or publishers are beyond 
reach. Works, in general, can be shown for free if an educational institution has asked 
for electronically and instantly. And, if somebody wanted specific parts of a work it is 
suggested that s/he can get a little percent of the work which relates to his research or 
study for free, through an application to the copyright exceptions guaranteed by the 
law.  
At last, it was argued recently by –the so called- father of the internet Dr Vinton Cerf 
that people may lose their personal data and reserved culture works in their computers 
because “operating systems and software become more sophisticated, documents and 
images stored using older technology will become increasingly inaccessible.”179 The 
proposed Gate will help in reserving all the musical, dramatic and literary works and 
maintaining them to make sure they are accessible even after the reinventing of newer 
devices abandoning old software.  
Cerf referred to Doris Goodwin’s book ‘Team of rivals: The political genius of Abraham 
Lincoln’180 as she confirmed that “there’s an awful lot of digital content that either has 
evaporated because nobody saved it, or its around but it’s not interpretable because it 
was created by software that’s 100 years old.” 181Actually, the speech about saving 
works and interpreting old ones which use software that was abandoned induces the 
search for a digital place to reserve the digital content and in the same time to be 
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responsible to develop this digital content to make sure that it is accessible always, 
even without the intervention of their authors, or after their death, or after the end of the 
copyright term. This cannot be imagined unless through a government operated ‘Digital 
Cultural National Gate’. 
8.6.5 Latest developments:  
During January 2015 PRS, STIM, and GEMA began to involve in a co-operation with 
the European Commission to launch new hub service that offer a multi-territory 
licensing service of works. 182 As previous attempts the new venture aims at “creat[ing] 
easier access for digital music services to clear music rights, and faster and more 
precise payments of royalties to rights holders.” 183 The preforming Rights Society 
(PRS) confirmed that the proposed EC hub will provide two services “[firstly] provide 
integrated ‘back office’ data processing services and [secondly] ‘front office’ digital 
multi-territory licensing services to authors, publishers, other collective rights 
management organisations and digital service providers (DSPs).” 184 It is suggested 
that this venture will achieve some benefits, first, “[e]ncouraging the aggregation of 
repertoires for pan-European licences resulting in simplified licensing for DSPs, 
assisting smaller and innovative services in particular to be able to start operating on a 
pan-European basis more quickly and efficiently.” 185 Second, “[s]olving the problem of 
split-copyright invoicing by integrating back office processing and matching services 
with front office licensing services ensuring that the systems will record copyrighted 
works accurately, reducing the possibility of licensees receiving incorrect invoices and 
eliminating hold ups and disputes.” 186 Third, “[p]roviding an unprecedented level of 
accuracy enabled by the consolidated copyright database that lies at the heart of the 
hub.” 187 Fourth, “[e]nabling partners and rightsholder customers to benefit from the 
economies of scale offered by the operation, offering them the best systems, 
processes and operations available.” 188 This proposal is similar in services it offers and 
its benefits to the proposed DCNG. 
Finally, the proposed digital system finds a prospect in a recent report, which advised 
the dependence on online courts system called ‘Online Dispute Resolution’ (ODR) for 
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small litigations.189 The advisory group appointed by The Civil Justice Council (CJC) 
“has set up a website that will grow over time”190 and through it the case will pass 
through three stages or tiers. The first one is the ‘online evaluation’ stage that will help 
users to “evaluate their problems, that is, to categorize their difficulties.” 191 [Underlining 
added] the report added that this is “a form of information and diagnostic service.” 192 
Then, tier two which is called ‘Online Facilitation’ if the problem could not be resolved in 
tier one ‘facilitators’ who are working online will review the papers and advise the 
parties and help in mediation. In tier three called ‘Online Judges’ members of judiciary 
will decide cases online.193 The advisory group justifies this proposal by arguing that 
“ODR is not science fiction. We present a series of case studies from around the world 
that clearly demonstrate its potential.” 194 This all supports the thesis proposal in making 
a Digital Gate that can categorise works prior to court litigations, through an interactive 
digital interface, and it seems that this orientation is going to be adopted in several 
branches in law. It is worth mentioning that the whole system resembles the online 
litigation already applied in eBay website and others.195   
8.7 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated a practical problem and found that its cause is a 
theoretical dilemma. The practical problem is the conflict in judicial decisions around 
the conferral of copyright protection to literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works, and 
although the common reason for this is attributed to originality interpretations and 
consequent uncertainty. We found that his conflict relates back to the disregard of the 
authorship concept in favour of granting ownership on works. Accordingly, what needs 
investigation is the copyright law’s underlying concepts and the normative rationales 
that call courts to adopt one specific interpretation and leave another.  
The thesis’s analysis shows that the priority of copyright law is the protection of 
authorship or the personal contribution offered by the author that reflects his thoughts 
and will, where the work functions as a vehicle for the authors’ thoughts, and that is 
why they are called intellectual works or works of intellect not just intangible works. 
This research has clarified the elements of authorship that are required in the work for 
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it to be considered an authorship work, and it has also demonstrated what is meant by 
their lack in a work which is then considered a non-authorship work. The concentration 
on the elements of authorship is important in the modern age where technological 
advancement has blurred the substance of authorship, like the technical developments 
in music, computer programs and dramatic works as personal authorship is not clear in 
several instances.196 
Dealing with both types or natures of works through the same principles and rules is a 
major reason for the conflict in juridical decisions. The thesis has thus proposed a 
categorisation of works into ‘high, low and non-authorship works’, and every category 
would have a separate originality criterion and this will help to identify those works 
which deserve a high level of protection by copyright, and give them the exclusive 
rights they deserve because of their high level of authorship. This will also help the 
copyright system to remain and to be maintained without fears that it will diminish or 
fade. On the other hand, this system will help the courts to easily grant to works that 
originality is not obvious in a lower level of protection, and to avoid the contradictions in 
rulings between those given protection and others not, although they are similar works.  
The proposed distinction between authorship and non-authorship works is expected to 
lessen the conflict among copyright decisions, and raise the current authorship and 
originality substances to their historical and legal meanings, which the thesis 
investigated and proved to be higher and more related to personal and mental values. 
At the same time, the protection can be conferred to non-authorship works without 
being distracted by the principles of authorship, which is unsuitable to their nature, 
through relying on manual labour, investment and time expenditure. This will help the 
copyright system to remain and to be maintained without fears of diminishing or fading. 
On the other hand, this system will help the courts to give simply the works in which 
originality isn’t obvious this lower protection, and to avoid the contradiction of rulings 
between those that gain protection and others that don’t, when the criteria for their 
protection is not clear, as then the existence of intermediate level at a lower grade of 
protection will reduce the negative effects of conflict of cases. This will help to identify 
works which deserve a high level of protection under copyright and to give them the 
exclusive rights they deserve because of their high level of authorship, and also protect 
the non-authorship works but through a different philosophy. 
                                                          
196 This meaning led Towse et.al. to confuse between the author’s creativity and technical intervention, as 
she explained that “[i]t is misleading, however, to focus too much on product innovation because there has 
been enormous process innovation in the cultural industries as well. Indeed, the cultural industries are the 
product of technical developments of sound recording, film, video, television and computers.” See, Ruth 
Towse, Hafiz Mirza, and Kee Hwee Wee, Creativity, Incentive, and Reward: An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright and Culture in the Information Age (Edward Elgar, 2001).p. 2 
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It is worth stating here how the argument developed from chapter one until this chapter. 
Chapter One was confined to discussing the argument of the thesis –namely the 
reduction of conflict in judicial decisions on copyrightability, the difference between 
works depending on the authorial contribution, what the proposed solution to lessen it 
is, and a synopsis of the approach or methodology that this research adopted to 
convince the reader of the proposed solution.  
In Chapter Two, there was an analysis of the conflict in courts’ decisions and whether 
this lay in the copyright justifications (protection of works, rewarding the right holder, or 
benefitting the society), or in judges’ interpretations of copyright concepts (originality, 
authorship, or creativity) and, finally, the conflict in the outcome, according to the 
adopted justifications and interpretation. We reached an outcome that this conflict is 
returning to theoretical reasons that have been discussed in following Chapters, 
however, these interpretations were divided on the categories of works proposed 
afterwards. 
In Chapter Three, the thesis focused on the originality interpretations and investigated 
how and why it may be considered the reason for such inconsistency. From this study it 
concluded that it is not originality per se that is the reason for the afore-mentioned 
conflict, but the reasons are briefed in the focus on finding a proper interpretation of the 
term ‘originality’ whilst ignoring the theoretical basis on which copyright law was 
established, and the theories that support the protection it gives, especially 
‘authorship’. And a discussion around the authorial contribution the author should do 
was intensified in the investigation of the cases of Feist v. Rural in the US and the 
Walter v. Lane in the UK.197 
Chapter Four focused on discussion the death of the author which is considered as a 
result of and a reason for the challenging of authorship. This research contended that 
the ‘death of the author’ is a literary concept initiated by literary scholars and adopted 
by legal ones to escape the discussions around the originality interpretations and 
authorship entirely. This thesis found that, firstly, initiators of this argument did not 
mean what legal scholars have understood by ‘the death of the author’ concept for it 
was a metaphorical expression, by which they meant ignoring the author when 
interpreting texts in literature. Secondly, if this claim of ‘death of the author’ were 
applied in law, it would not be based on proper theoretical and historical foundations. 
                                                          
197 In US law the expression ‘original work of authorship’ was mentioned about four times in defining a 
compilation work and derivative work in §. 101; in determining the subject matter of copyright law in §. 102, 
and in §. 104A. In the UK, originality was only required in some works and was ignored in others, 
indicating the special features in these works that necessitate the requirement for originality in them, as 
explained in Chapter Three.  
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Thirdly, that death cannot be contemplated in copyright law unless copyright law itself 
is dead, due to the authorship and the author concepts being inherent to that law.  
The discussion in the fourth Chapter induced the historical investigation in fifth chapter 
of authorship, originality and the literary property as a reply to the claims that 
authorship is a modern concept and is strange to English law, and literary property is 
new concept also. We found that authorship is an inherent concept in the English law 
and society even before the enactment of any law. 
 In Chapter Six, the personality theory’s role in authorship and the elements of 
authorship were investigated, and whether it is possible to apply the same rules to 
works with authorship elements and others without them. This research reached a 
conclusion that the personality theory is the dominant theory in copyright law, and that 
copyright law is principally made to protect the personal features in works: the personal 
thought, ideas and the ‘message’ that the author want to convey through the work. This 
was considered to be mental or ‘intellectual’ work, and that is the primary competence 
of copyright law. This is differentiated from ‘manual’ work, which does not include any 
work of the intellect, like collecting, or combining, performing or handcrafting, as 
manual skills applied through dictation or imitation. So, the thesis resorted to the 
inevitable solution, which is the division of works into two separate categories: 
‘authorship’ works and ‘non-authorship’ works, and it has articulated the theoretical 
foundation that supports this proposed categorisation.  
In Chapter Seven, we clarified how the overstatement of authorship in non-authorship 
works has contributed to the distortion of copyright principles. This Chapter showed 
how ownership has prevailed authorship in application, due to its existence in all works, 
while authorship is confined to some categories only. Selection and arrangement has 
been discussed and shown how it can only be a criterion for authorship works not non-
authorship works, and how its application to latter works has several disadvantages. 
And why non-authorship works should also be protected but under a separate system 
with separate criterion that measures the effort, capital and time expended not 
selection or arrangement of any intangible elements. 
Chapter Eight took the works’ categorization a step further, and proposed the 
categorization of authorship works into high and low authorship works, in the belief that 
elements of authorship can be measured by the selection, arrangement, physical form 
and expressive form. Using these criteria, we found that changes in the selection or 
arrangement can make the work one of ‘high authorship’, and changing the physical 
form or expressive form can only prove the existence of manual effort with some skills, 
as the work still bears the thoughts of the original author that are still exposed under 
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the same arrangement, and those are called the ‘non- authorship’ works if the change 
was just in the physical form. The works that include change in expressive form mainly 
include works of adaptations (in US or derivation in UK), translations, appropriation and 
parody allowed under fair use (in US or fair dealing in UK) and those are suggested to 
be the low authorship works. 
In addition the thesis proposed a digital system called ‘the Digital Cultural National 
Gate’ in order to implement the categorisation of works. The author should, according 
to this Gate, answer some digital questionnaires regarding the authorship process in 
his work and, according to his answers, the system will decide the grade of his work 
(high/low/non authorship work) and the corresponding level of protection. The author 
will then get a certificate at this level, although an appeals council is also proposed 
within the copyright office. In the meantime, the proposed system will contribute to 
lessening the number of orphan works and to reviving the cultural heritage of the 
nation, as although registering works will be voluntary it will encourage registration. 
This is because it will guarantee a level of protection initially and prior to any disputes, 
which can offer some stability and certainty to the culture industry, as it may be used 
even before the creation of the work to know the level of protection that his work will be 
qualified to.  
The ultimate proposals of this thesis: 
The thesis’s propositions can be briefed in the following points:  
1- There is a conflict in decisions regarding the copyright subsistence of works  
2- This conflict appears in the interpretations judges gave to originality, authorship 
and fair use (in US, or fair dealing in UK) concepts. 
3- The interpretations of originality differed regardless of the position of legislation 
and were mostly governed by the development of cultural works especially the 
factual and information works. Also, the interests of right holders had the most 
influence on judges’ orientation 
4- Barthes and Foucault argued the death of authorship in literature, however, 
Woodmansee and Jaszi applied this concept in copyright law to argue that 
authorship is not suitable to collective and adaption works. This is proven to be 
improper application. 
5- Romanticism and romantic or genius authors were used also as a criticism to 
authorship historically, and it is claimed that authorship is a foreign concept and 
more literary than legal. The thesis proved that authorship and literary property 
were inherent in England as legal concepts before copyright legislations. 
 
 
317 
6- After defending authorship, the thesis showed that copyright law is intermingled 
with authorship due to the personality attributes of copyright law and that 
reflects the position of the author in copyright law that defeat any claims of his 
death. Depending on Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Kant we extracted the 
‘elements of authorship’ that can be used to test the existence of authorship in 
any work. 
7- The thesis used these ‘elements of authorship’ to differentiate between 
authorship and non-authorship works. Besides, we focused on the importance 
of relying on selection and arrangement as an originality criterion for authorship 
works not non-authorship works. Yet, the thesis argues that non-authorship 
works can get protection under a sui generis system that excludes authorship 
and originality concepts. 
8- The thesis then finally argued the categorisation of works into authorship and 
non-authorship works, and also the categorisation of authorship works into high 
and low authorship. Additionally, the thesis proposed a Digital Gate that can 
apply this theoretical proposal online and provide a facility for licensing works. 
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